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Abstract  
 
 
In this thesis my aims are twofold. First, I provide an auto-history of the concept 
of reason in Anglophone IR from 1919 to 2009. I uncover the centrality of the 
language of reason. I show that the concept of reason has constituted, 
undergirded, and empowered many prominent IR scholars’ discourses. Second, 
I bring out a taxonomy of four construal of rationality. I argue that IR thinkers have 
spoken in four languages of reason. Kantian reason stands in a relation opposed 
to passion, emotion and instinct, and makes the stipulation that to base actions 
on the intellect is prerequisite for pursuing interest and moral conduct. I argue 
that the British Liberal Institutionalists, Has Morgenthau, Richard Ashley and 
Andrew Linklater are bearers of this construal. Utilitarian reason refers to the 
maximization of interests under constraints, where interest can be defined as 
strategic preference, emotional attachment, or cultural value and constraints as 
a two-person game, uncertainty or risk. I demonstrate how Thomas Schelling, 
Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, Helen Milner, 
Andrew Moravcsik and many other theorists use the concept. Axiological reason 
means following rules, cultures and norms, and always uses game as an 
analytical foundation and attends to the problem of how to enforce rules. I argue 
that Kenneth Waltz, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and K.M. Fierke have 
deployed the concept to construct their theories. Historical reason views all 
values as conditioned within a specific spatial-temporal background, and insists 
that moral problems, which are constituted in the margin of every political conduct, 
must be solved by overcoming universal morality and the unilateral pursuit of 
interest. I show that Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, David Boucher and Christian 
Reus-Smit have conceived of reason in this way.  
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By Way of Introduction 
 
 
  
(i) Research Question  
 
In his presidential address to the International Studies Association (1988), Robert 
Keohane announced the division of the American study of international 
institutions into two camps: “Rationalism” and “Reflectivism”.1 By Rationalism 
Keohane referred to the theories “regarding states as rational actors with specific 
utility functions”. Neorealist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz, Neoliberal ones 
such as Robert Axelrod and Keohane himself, were all alleged to have followed 
this tradition. Reflectivism, by contrast, was defined by its challenge to its 
Rationalistic counterpart. Scholars like John Ruggie and Richard Ashley, it was 
claimed, possessed value only when their works strike, confront, or complement 
the analysis of international regimes as the action of the “rational actors with 
specific utility functions”. What Rationalism acquires was precisely what 
Reflectivism lacks: a core concept such as rationality that could enable them to 
articulate “a clear reflective research program”.2  
  Keohane’s demarcation was simple, but its effects have been tremendous. 
First, by pioneering a novel category of “Rationalism”, Keohane proclaimed that 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism had transcended their disputant forebears, 
merged the two schools under the identically rationalistic banner and formed a 
single, magisterial, mainstream research program. Before Keohane’s speech, not 
only had the old Realists and Liberals been profoundly separated, but that 
separation was articulated precisely in terms of rationality.3 E.H. Carr, in his 
Twenty Years Crisis (1939), denounced the conviction held by Norman Angell 
                                                              
1  Keohane 1988. One of the most fertile sources of confusion within Anglophone IR is the (ab)use of “ism”. I shall 
either eschew to use them, or make my referents clear when have to do so.   
2  Keohane 1988: 392.  
3  The issue is in fact more nuanced than this simplistic formulation. See Chapter I, section (i).   
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that war would not occur because “war does not pay”. This “abstract rationalism”, 
Carr condemned, was one of the “foundation-stones” underlying the “liberal creed” 
of Alfred Zimmern and Arnold Toynbee, the animated supporters of the League 
of Nations.4 Hans Morgenthau, in his Scientific Man versus Power Politics (1946), 
declaimed no less forcefully the belief in “liberal rationality”, a “Rationalism” 
characterized by its profound misunderstanding of “the nature of man”, “the 
nature of the social world”, and “the nature of reason itself”.5 The old Liberals, 
nevertheless, thought the very opposite. Alfred Zimmern, for one instance, 
expressed in his Europe in Convalescence (1922) the view that “politics are but 
the outward and oversimplified expression of deep lying passions and traditions 
which have not yet been touched and transfigured by the harmonizing power of 
human reason”.6 Had men become more rational, and had ridded themselves of 
the “powerful forces of interest, conviction, prejudice, passion, [that] stood in the 
way”, as Norman Angell proclaimed in his revised edition of The Great Illusion – 
Now (1938),7 conflict could have been reconciled by rational argumentation, and 
war replaced by peaceful change.  
The second impact of Keohane’s address was its raising of the significance of 
and unprecedented contestations over the term of rationality. For the scholars 
subscribing to Keohane’s Rationalism, the concept of rationality hallmarked one 
of the “analytical foundations” or the “final strategy” for upholding mainstream 
theories.8 For those who propose to make further innovations such as Helen 
Milner and Peter Katzenstein, the concept formed the starting point that needed 
only elevation by incorporating domestic and cultural variables into the 
framework.9 Some Reflectivists, like Alker, wanted to “rescue ‘reason’ from the 
‘rationalists’,” by having conceptions in a different direction. 10  Still, other 
Reflectivists, who embraced the dichotomization and determined to be 
                                                              
4  Carr 1939: 27-8, 30.   
5  Morgenthau 1946a: 5, 122, 153, 168, 204.  
6  Zimmern 1922: 146-7.  
7  Angell 1938: 17.  
8  Keohane 1986: 163, Ruggie 1998: 9, Donnelly 2000: 64.  
9 See Chapter II, section (iii).  
10  Alker 1990.  
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“dissidents”, regarded the concept as the cardinal vice, undertaking what Waever 
called a “flanking operation” against the Rationalistic core to remove the term with 
Rationalism altogether. 11  “The methodological prescription of the utilitarian 
rationalists”, R.B.J. Walker announced, should never be “treated as the 
successful orthodoxy on whose terms the contributions of the reflective school 
should be judged”.12 “If one is to find a ‘genuine research program’”, Der Derian 
remarked, “it is better to take the enlightened road of rationalist reflection than 
the benighted wood of poststructuralist reflectivity”. 13  In the years following 
Keohane’s address, rationality indeed became a touchstone, or perhaps the 
intellectual compass to chart one’s direction and define one’s location. With the 
occurrence of the “Third Debate”,14 the concept of rationality was further turned 
into a battlefield over which many theoretical forces strive. (Nowadays, even after 
twenty years, Anglophone IR textbooks still tell the reader that “modern and post-
modern critical theorists stood united against the dominant rationalistic theories”, 
or that “empirical and analytical feminist approaches challenge given ways of 
thinking about and doing International Relations, especially dominant rationalist 
approaches”.15) 
It is the unanticipated end of the Cold War in 1991 that gives a fatal blow to the 
Rationalists. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, only three years after 
Keohane’s address, was for Reflectivists a demonstration of the Rationalist fiasco 
in tackling the problem of change in politics. As the Rationalists were undermined, 
the Reflectivists (or some of them) advanced rapidly to seize the fronts left by the 
fallen Rationalists. Although some wanted to retain the significance of the concept 
of rationality,16 many had regarded it as the ultimate cause of materialistic, static, 
and individualistic, pathologies. Ruggie criticized “Neoutilitarianism” for assuming 
“that the identities and interests of states are given, a priori and exogenously”, 
which were too narrowly “defined in such materials terms as power, security, and 
                                                              
11  See the Special Issue in International Studies Quarterly 1990, Waever 1996: 165. 
12  Walker 1992: 85.  
13  Der Derian 1992: 8.   
14  Lapid 1989.  
15  Reus-Smit 2009: 217, True 2009: 257.  
16  See Chapter III, section (iii), on K.M. Fierke’s idea of rationality.     
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welfare”.17 “Rational-choice” viewed “that interaction does not change identities 
and interests”, Alexander Wendt wrote.18 “It seems to me”, as Kratochwil once 
remarked, that far from “simply adding auxiliary assumptions [to utilitarian 
Rationalism]” the study of international relations “requires the change from a 
homo economicus model of action to one of a homo sociologicus”.19 Within this 
“Constructivist Turn” in Anglophone IR, the concepts of rationality, Rationalism, 
and homo economicus which Keohane had claimed as the undergirding a distinct 
research program, soon experienced its abandonment and downfall.20  
From 1991 to 1999, Anglophone IR witnessed such a rapid growth of 
Constructivism that it soon established itself as one of the three main paradigms. 
Yet, although some Constructivist scholars were zealous to announce the 
“strange death of liberal international theory”,21 the issue of rationality was once 
again revived by a sway of “Habermasian” theorizations when entering into the 
second millennium. For scholars like Thomas Risse and Harald Muller, the issues 
were twofold. First, Constructivism could not dispense with the notion of rationality, 
but instead presupposed the “logic of appropriateness” as an alternative 
conception. Second, what the Constructivists failed to explain – how cultures and 
norms originated as the consensus reached by unmute agents in the first place 
– could be expounded by Habermas’ theory of “communicative rationality”.22 
With the continuous flow of Habermas into IR, it seems that Constructivism is 
giving away to this revived theory of another rationality.  
Now looking back over the Anglophone disciplinary history, a quarter of century 
after Keohane’s presidential speech, “Rationalism” has experienced more 
vicissitudes than dominance: its momentary reign was soon followed by its 
downfall with the collapse of the Cold War, by its renunciation by the 
Constructivists within the first Post-Cold War period, and by the resurgence of 
                                                              
17  Ruggie 1998: 9.  
18  Wendt 1995: 426.  
19  Kratochwil 2007: 44.  
20  This is the standard account of how the constructivist turn occurred. I argue in Chapter II, section (iii), however, that 
the rationalistic theories live much longer, and have a stronger life, than commonly claimed.  
21  Reus-Smit 2001.  
22  Risse 2000.  
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significance of the concept in a communicative manner after 2000. These 
developments, indeed, had rendered Keohane’s claim blurry, remote, and 
somehow fanciful. But for those who study Anglophone IR from a perspective of 
intellectual history, Keohane’s announcement precisely commenced the 
formation of three historical puzzles since his proclamation of the 
Rationalism/Reflectivism bifurcation in 1988. 
The first puzzle, persisted under these swift changes, is how is Keohane’s 
Rationalism possible? From his influential essay “Theory of World Politics: 
Structural Realism and Beyond” (1983) to the presidential address,23 Keohane 
had asserted the supremacy of this monolithic Rationalism. Yet, is Morgenthau, 
a fervent critique of assuming states “playing games of military and diplomatic 
chess according to a rational calculus that exists nowhere but in the theoretician’s 
mind”, a Rationalist as Keohane depicts? Why does Waltz constantly clarify that 
“the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the 
part of all of the actors”?24 Is Keohane’s claim of a monolithic idea of rationality 
that not only includes Thucydides and Waltz, Morgenthau and Keohane 
historically, but unifies Neorealism and Neoliberalism theoretically, accurate? Is 
Keohane’s claim that Rationalism monopolizes the realm of reason, a claim 
widely accepted by the Reflectivists and dismissed by the Constructivist, still 
valuable for a reconsideration today?  
Second, what do IR scholars mean by “reason”, “rationality” and “Rationalism”? 
What is the relation between Keohane’s Rationalism and the “Rationalism” 
condemned by Carr and Morgenthau, when both are seen to be liberal? What is 
the “Rationalism” celebrated by one of the most prominent British thinkers Martin 
Wight? Is there any association between Keohane’s conception of rationality and 
that of the earlier Deterrence Theorists’, such as Thomas Schelling’s? The 
“reflectivist” Richard Ashley once advocated “practical reason”, which he 
considered as partially embodied in Morgenthau’s work – is this simultaneously 
related to “argumentative rationality” which is also inspired by Habermas’ theory? 
                                                              
23  Keohane 1983.  
24  Morgenthau 1967a: 244, Waltz 1979: 118.  
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Do they all presume the same account of reason? Is David Boucher’s articulation 
of a mode of action bearing the name of “historical reason”, similar to Christian 
Reus-Smit’s conception that “rationality is historically and culturally contingent”?  
Third, what is the role played by rationality within the whole IR discursive 
community in history? If so many Anglophone IR scholars have appealed to 
reason, rationality and rationalism in their various conceptions, then for what 
purpose does they deploy the term? Why do they want to have different 
conceptions? Does an alternative conception imply a contestation over a crucial 
theoretical and political issue? Is the “language of reason” descriptive, 
explanatory, evaluative, or prescriptive for a certain type of conduct? Does the 
term empower, constrain, dismay, or arrogate, the thinkers to perform an act?  
All the foregoing questions, indeed, are pointing to the ultimate problem. How 
has rationality been conceived and applied by Anglophone IR thinkers? While 
rationality was, is, and will perhaps remain one of the master concepts underlying 
IR discourse, there is as yet no comprehensive exposition of the various 
conceptions and applications of the term. 
 
(ii) Methodology 
 
In order to answer the above kind of question, four methodological approaches 
invite exploitation.25 The first approach, exemplified in Stephen Hobden’s study 
International Relations and Historical Sociology (1998), Colin Wight’s Agents, 
Structures and International Relations (2006), and Milja Kurki’s Causation in 
International Relations (2008), 26  is transcendentally analytical. To be 
transcendentally analytical requires an expedition into the fields other than IR to 
expropriate some canonically modeled conceptualization, either of “international 
system” from historical sociology, or of “structure” from sociology, or of “causation” 
from philosophy of the social sciences. Then by matching these exterior 
                                                              
25  These four approaches are idealized types for heuristic discussion here. Some can be a mixture and thus extrusion 
of my taxonomy, for instance, J.A. Vasquez’s The War Puzzle (1993).   
26  Hobden 1998, C. Wight 2006, Kurki 2008.  
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exemplars with IR scholars’ own conceptions, the analyst will compare, 
differentiate, categorize, and appraise, the IR conceptions in distance from the 
exemplars. A better idea of Mann’s conceptualization of international system will 
enhance clarity. The less distant from Aristotle’s four conceptions of causes, the 
more enlightening theory will become for analysis. The whole purpose of such an 
enterprise is to sharpen IR scholar’s conceptions in light of, and benchmark their 
bewildering conceptions against, an externally established standardized 
conceptualization.  
  The second approach, instantiated in John Hobson’s State in International 
Relations (1998) and Richard Little’s Balance of Power in International Relations 
(2007),27 is immanently analytical. Rather than intruding into other disciplines, it 
accumulates inductively how scholars have already conceived of “state” and 
“balance of power” within IR. Then by making an immanent comparison – a two-
multiplies-two taxonomy of the conceptions of states or models of balance of 
power in Morgenthau, Bull and Waltz’s theory – the immanent analyst wants not 
as much to correct the conceptions as to map each theorists’ position on a scale 
generated internally from within IR. Although the starting point is not transcendent, 
the immanent analysts still share the transcendent analysts’ assumption in 
regarding conceptions of “war”, “state” and “balance of power” as possessing 
some independent theoretical existence, as if all the theorists had been using 
these concepts in the same way to address the same problem.  
  The third approach, employed by Fred Halliday in his Revolution in World 
Politics (1999), Barry Buzan and Richard Little in their International System in 
World History (2001),28 is transcendently historical. It intends to bring the same 
effect as, but begin with a distinct starting point from, the first transcendent 
approach. Like the first approach that proposes to sharpen and enrich concepts 
against an external standard, a transcendent-historical method also wants IR 
scholars’ conceptions of “revolution” and “international system” to be improved, 
escaping from the ignorance of revolutionary force in shaping world politics and 
                                                              
27  Hobson 1998, Little 2007.   
28  Halliday 1999, Buzan and Little 2001.   
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breaking off the confinement of the Westphalian model. Yet, unlike the first (and 
also the second since both are analytical), the transcendent historicists’ 
measuring rod is not social theory but world history. The analytical concepts will 
be tested, refined, and reformulated, in light of the events which occurred in the 
past and which are concrete and complex.  
The fourth approach, exercised by Duncan Bell and Lucian Ashworth in their 
articles on disciplinary history, is immanently historical. 29  To be immanently 
historical is to understand the IR concepts within a particularly spatial-temporal 
context, either of thoughts or of events, rather than to view them as mere 
analytical lenses. To be immanently historical is to use history for comprehending 
some concepts within a field for their own sake, or to understand the whole filed 
in which they operate, rather than for transcendently testing their strength in the 
database of history. An immanent historicist, therefore, will endeavor to 
penetratingly understand how IR scholars have conceived of the “state” and 
“international” as embedded within a broad intellectual/international background. 
Such a method, as Ashworth puts it, demands an “Auto-history”.30 Notice that 
the “immanent historicist” I identified is not equivalent to the famous “internalist 
history” pursued by Brian Schmidt in The Political Discourse of Anarchy (1998).31 
In appearance, there is no distinction between being immanent within and being 
internal to a discourse. Yet in essence, my “immanent” approach means keeping 
close to what the IR scholars themselves see in their works – they may designate 
concepts which are as highly political as academic in origin and in purpose, 
depending on their conceptions – while Schmidt confines “internalist” to 
“academic”/“disciplinary” considerations and downplays the influences of the 
“exogenous events” on concepts.32 Both want to understand from within, but the 
                                                              
29 Bell 2002, 2009. 
30  Ashworth 2006: 291 
31  Schmidt 1998: 15ff.   
32 Schmidt (1998: 1, 11, 37-8) is satisfied to show IR as an “academic” discourse or as “a subfield of American political 
science”. I disagree, and my favorite counter example is the “idealists” during the Anglophone IR in infancy. Arnold 
Toynbee (historian), Norman Angell (public intellectual), Robert Cecil (aristocrat and politician), Leonard Woolf 
(Fabian socialist and writer), Gilbert Murray (poet and writer), H.G. Wells (novelist), J.M. Keynes (economist) and 
Bertrand Russell (aristocrat and professor of logics and philosophy) – did they write simply for Schmidt’s “internal” 
purpose? Schmidt overlooks the fact that a discipline like IR is constantly changing in its purpose, organization, 
intellectual orientation, etc., which renders any attempt to equate “internalist” with “academic” narrowly-focused.  
19 
 
immanent-historicist wants to be internal to the field not by insulating it from 
external events but by revolving a range of international, intellectual, and 
institutional (disciplinary) contexts around the same, central, concept as long as 
the latter can be illuminatingly understood through the former.  
Following Ashworth and Bell, I propose to undertake an immanent-historical 
study of the concept of rationality. Five methodological principles are devised for 
its operation. First is the principle of being immanently historical. Rather than 
standing outside, categorizing and correcting IR scholars’ conceptions of reason 
by such externalist measurement as philosophy or social theory or history, I want 
to immerse discussion in the IR discourse, grasping these conceptions as part of 
a language that has a logic of its own. As an immanent historicist, my principal 
task is not to seek for a “better” or the “true” conceptualization of reason, 
confirming or refuting them against a historical background. Rather, I want to 
dwell on the existing ones, depict a wide range of them, delve into their subtle 
connotations and sometimes denaturalize the customary ways of looking at them. 
To be immanent is more than being “internalist”: IR is neither a fixed entity, its 
boundaries enclosed, nor is the IR scholar resistant to drawing on resources 
outside the field or responding to political events. The background events and 
thoughts can be called on only in so far as they perform a service for 
reconstituting an IR thinker’s own thought, promoting a comprehensive 
understanding of these conceptions “from within”, in the same light as the IR 
thinkers themselves conceived of and deployed them.  
  Second, the principle of immanent historicism outlaws the tendency to view 
concepts as possessing separately ephemeral existences. In contrast to both 
kinds of analysts, the immanent historicist does not want to decipher conceptions 
as if they address the same theoretical problem which can be unquestionably 
compared on an analytical scale, as C. Wight did to structure and J.M. Hobson 
to state. Rather, I want to entangle with complexity, comparing their similarity and 
contrasting their differences. I want to understand how those conceptions, despite 
serving various purposes (either for tackling a new political problem, or pioneering 
20 
 
a new thinking space for research or rivaling another prevalent conception in 
political and theoretical debate), have all made the concept significant within the 
disciplinary discourse. I want to show their diachronic and synchronic relatedness, 
their variation, intersection and development across a certain time that form a 
story of enduring and collective importance. 
  Third, an immanent-historical study cannot be carried on across the whole of 
the changing ideas, boundaries and organization of IR, and requires some 
spatial-temporal qualifications. I shall begin my examination from 1919, a 
conventionally recognized starting point, and end with 2009, exactly nine 
decades later and conveniently bounding my investigation. By IR I refer 
specifically to Anglophone IR world. 
Fourth, principles for selection are necessary even for an immanent historicist 
to distinguish the writers worthy of discussion within IR. My criteria of exclusion 
and inclusion are threefold. First, I propose to narrow down focus to those who 
had spoken frequently of reason, gave the dramatically classic expositions of it, 
and delivered conceptions that were the most widely responded to. 33  The 
delicate, disciplined, and systematic use of the concept is always the first choice. 
Second, for the scholars who did not articulate the very term but assume much 
about the concept, I only indicate their significance as long as they can illuminate 
the thinkers of the first category. For an immanently historical project, the most 
crucial point is to reconstitute how the thinkers themselves use the concept, not 
to interpret how they could/should have used it, however much resemblance their 
language may bear with the term. Third, I shall rule out any consideration of those 
whose use of the term is of a casual, unintentional, and occasional character. The 
costs of studying them will far exceed the benefits.  
Notice one caveat here: the historical significance accorded to some texts may 
not be self-evident and sometimes demand revision. In some cases, the once 
classical expression of a certain conception of reason and the significance 
                                                              
33  It is within the thoughts of, for instance, Alfred Zimmern, E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Richard Ashley, 
Thomas Schelling, Anatol Rapoport, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Friedrich Kratochwil, 
Nicholas Onuf, Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, R.B.J. Walker, David Boucher, Andrew Linklater, and Christian 
Reus-Smit, than others that the concept occupies a more significant position. The list will augment in proceeding.  
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endowed it can be eclipsed by the course of history. For example, few nowadays 
discuss the Rational Deterrence Theorists who introduced the concept of 
utilitarian reason and rendered it predominant in IR discourse in the early 1960s. 
Fewer read Raymond Aron’s plea for a “reasonable” diplomatic-strategic action 
around the same time that endeavored to reorient rationality towards a more 
historical-sociological and moral direction. In this situation, the immanent 
historicist needs to recover the significance that had once been bestowed them. 
In other cases, he may even reappraise the significance of a conception which 
had been previously evaluated on an inaccurate basis. Did Hans Morgenthau and 
Kenneth Waltz endorse utilitarian rationality, as Keohane proclaimed? Where is 
Martin Wight’s Rationalism rational? These questions require an appraisal of the 
valuation accredited to them in the new, immanently-historical, light. It is 
necessary to notice, however, that this appraisal of the significance of the 
ascriptions made by IR scholars of others’ uses of the term in light of immanent 
history is not for benchmarking their understandings of the term against my 
interpretation.  
Fifth, what means can an immanent historicist deploy to pragmatically manage 
such a reconstruction? Indeed, the range of denotations, purposes, sources, and 
contexts revolving around the concept is so extensive that the method one 
chooses must be broadened enough to tackle all these complexities. For 
Zimmern and Morgenthau to be rational is to control man’s passions, while for 
Kratochwil and Fierke, it is rule-following. For Gilpin “rationality is not historically 
and culturally bound”, but for Reus-Smit, it is “culturally and historically contingent 
form of consciousness”.34 For Morgenthau it is employed for articulating a voice 
about the conduct of American foreign policy, for Ashley, academic theorization. 
Morgenthau and Aron are influenced by Weber’s as well as Clausewitz’s thoughts 
of rationality in sociology and strategy, Schelling and Snyder by Game Theory, 
Onuf, Kratochwil and Fierke by Wittgenstein’s “language games”, Linklater, Muller 
and Risse by Habermas’ communicative-rational theory. For Herz to speak of 
                                                              
34 Reus-Smit 1999: 161.  
22 
 
rationality might be an indication of the naïveté of thought, but for Schelling, Kahn 
and Morgenstern, it is an organized activity to elevate policy design into a science.   
My answer is to learn from J.G.A. Pocock, and to view all these IR scholars as 
speaking of the “language of reason” and forming a “discursive community of 
rationality”.35 Notice that I merely want to learn from Pocock. I do not claim to 
make a methodological innovation by showing how Pocock’s own method can 
necessarily bring out something new. Rather, I endeavor to use his method as an 
informatively heuristic device for making explicit what is already there.  
For Pocock, a language refers to a grammatically and syntactically coherent, 
stable, and relatively discrete mode of communication. These properties endow 
meaning on a term by embedding it within a special, grammatical, position in 
relation to a range of other terms, which is revealed either by IR thinkers 
themselves or by later reconstruction.36 Later on I argue there are four languages 
of IR within which reason can be seen to have distinct meanings – or four 
languages of reason – but suffice it here to notice three points. First, the various 
languages of reason, although sharing the same term reason, can structure the 
term in such a distinct way that even if they speak of the same term, what they 
mean by uttering the term can be drastically different. Second, by contrast, the 
terms serving as grammatical frame of reference can also be frequently shared 
by two or more languages: “game”, for instance, is shared by Game Theory and 
Wittgenstein’s language games but can point to different notions of rationality 
(and of game). It is on this account that a language, although discernible, may 
sometimes sounds alien from and sometimes similar to the rest. Finally, the 
intimate associations among the languages may cause difficulty in pigeonholing 
one thinkers’ conception. Linklater, for instance, is identified here as speaking in 
a Kantian language, but in his utterances one can find expressions of historical 
                                                              
35  Pocock 1981, 1987.  
36   Notice the distinction between a language with languages and a “tradition”: (1) a language of reason is one small 
portion of a thinker’s vocabulary that stands equally with many others (bottom-up), whereas a tradition is a 
hierarchically grand, broadly inclusive, categorization (up-bottom). (2) a language is something that has been really 
uttered, discernible by an empirical searching process of “look and see”, whereas a tradition can often be claimed to 
embody or finds representation in a thinker’s thought. (3) a language with different languages are interpenetrating, 
whereas a tradition seems to be exclusive, self-closed, and autonomous. 
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rationality. In this case, I shall concentrate on the most salient feature – the 
dominant, unique and defining trait – while at the same time indicating the other 
possibilities.  
  It is this conceptualization of language of reason that Pocock’s method gains 
two particular merits. First, Pocock’s lens of “language” can present an extremely 
vivid, precise and nuanced picture. Given the centrality of “reason” for IR thinkers, 
their different conceptions of reason can justify them being regarded as speaking 
different languages of reason. They can be viewed as deploying the same term 
in a particular way that sometimes disassociates and sometimes associates it 
with other languages; in a special tone that may be exhortative, presumptive, 
rhetorical or prosaic; with distinct styles that may be overtly accessible or 
idiosyncratic; for a variety of purposes that may be political, academic, or dialogic. 
Better than Skinner’s intentionalism and Foucault’s genealogy,37  the lens of 
language can accommodate such complexities because it can at the same time 
enlarge focus from the mere “intention” behind speech to the various ways of its 
performance, and does not widen it to such an extent that we lose sight of the 
constant and fall into shattered disparity. 
Second is Pocock’s insistence that the change of a language should be 
explained in a balanced manner. Pocock argues that the change of language 
must be examined as an outcome of the inner dynamic of a language game, a 
game played by the speakers who compete, supplement, and reinforce each 
other through pioneering distinct conceptions or developing existing ones within 
a community. Unlike Schmidt’s “internalist” account, Pocock also stresses that 
the inner play of a language game is also concurrent with its outer play, which 
engages one language game with others and with contemporary events 
overshadowing the play. To undertake an immanent-historical study of a concept 
is not to repress the significance of one side while privileging the other. Rather, it 
is to broaden one’s view to the twofold process, and scrupulously reconstruct how 
a language is changed within the interplay between the inner dimension where 
                                                              
37  Skinner 2002: 59-67, Foucault 1971.  
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scholars contend about the language of reason (why a certain conception of 
rationality rather than another one), and the outer dimension where they address 
to other language speakers (why rationality rather than other terms occupies a 
central position) or to the political events outside with which the language is 
grappling, and in some cases, the statesmen whose attention they seek to attract.  
These six principles may be simplified into three tenets for operational purpose. 
First, the thesis is indigenous in focus: it proposes to focus immanently on a field 
(first, third and fourth principle), and concentrates on the dynamic of an IR 
language (sixth principle). Second, it is comprehensive in scope: it wants 
systematic dissection of how IR scholars have variously conceived and applied 
the term (second and fourth principle). Third, it pays enormous attention to 
process: it show how these utterance of reason are interrelated within a certain 
spatial-temporal background (fifth principle).  
 
 (iii) Contributions & Chapter Outlines 
 
By embarking on such an immanent historicist investigation, I propose to make 
three contributions. My first aim is to provide an auto-history of the concept of 
reason in Anglophone IR, and uncover the centrality of such a hidden language 
of reason. I want to show that the concept of reason, far from being insignificant, 
has constituted, undergirded, and empowered many prominent IR scholars’ 
discourses. At the individual level, it contextually reconstitutes single thinkers’ 
construal of reason, showing how the term stands in a central position within their 
main writings. The thesis thus contributes to the specialized scholarships on Hans 
Morgenthau, Thomas Schelling, Kenneth Waltz, Martin Wight, and others, by 
rediscovering the thinker’s original vocabulary and restructuring the conceptual 
relations in their thoughts. At the communitarian level, it reconstitutes how these 
“speakers of reason” in IR conceive of and contend about reason, compares the 
resemblance (and divergence) and reconstructs the intricate purposes in 
deploying the term to perform such a wide range of acts as explaining, prescribing, 
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accusing, and extolling, political as well as intellectual conducts. Such an 
immanent study of the concept unravels the third puzzle that I identified: it 
captures only a small portion (dimension) of thought that exposes nevertheless 
the very discursive basis of modern international theory.  
  Second, I want to bring out a taxonomy of four construal of rationality. I argue 
that IR thinkers have spoken in four languages of reason. Kantian reason stands 
in a relation opposed to passion, emotion and instinct, and makes the stipulation 
that to base actions on the intellect is prerequisite for pursuing interest and moral 
conduct. Utilitarian reason refers to the maximization of interests under 
constraints, where interest can be defined as strategic preference, emotional 
attachment, or cultural value and constraints as a two-person game, uncertainty 
or risk. Axiological reason means following rules, cultures and norms, and always 
uses game as an analytical foundation and attends to the problem of how to 
enforce rules. Historical reason views all values as conditioned within a specific 
spatial-temporal background, and insists that moral problems, which are inherent 
in the sociological games played in the specifically chronological backgrounds, 
must be solved by overcoming universal morality and the unilateral pursuit of 
interest. Once again notice that the terms serving as grammatical frame of 
reference can be frequently shared by two or more language s: “interest”, 
“morality”, “emotion”, “culture”, and “game” (there are more such as “intellectual”, 
“system”, and “anarchy”).  
  Bringing out a taxonomy unravels the second and third puzzles. It exposes 
what the term exactly meant to the thinkers – not only as individuals but also as 
a group of thinkers. Metaphorically, with a compass having merely one utilitarian 
point, scholars can only know whether they are heading towards it or not. I want 
to replace the old conceptual compass that merely has one utilitarian point, by 
which scholars can only know whether they are heading towards it or not, with a 
new one with four directions (and degrees) that can locate conceptions on a 
complex scale, by which scholars can navigate their thinking in the intellectual 
ocean. Such a taxonomy, furthermore, provides answers to historical puzzles: it 
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shows that Keohane’s claim of a monolithic Rationalism was due to the similarity 
among language s that different language s of reason can be interpreted by 
Keohane into a singly dominating voice of “Rationalism”.  
Third, such an immanent history of the concept of reason by itself contributes 
to the historiographical writings (or “historiographical turn”38) of the discipline. It 
encapsulates at once an intellectual, a disciplinary, and an international, history. 
First, it reconstitutes the process of how IR scholars has applied the concept of 
reason, a concept that enables them to draw on a variety of intellectual sources 
such as Weber’s social theory of rationality, Clausewitz’s strategic thought on war 
as a rational instrumentality, Game Theory’s assumption of commonly rational 
players, Wittgenstein’s “language games” and rule-following rationality, and 
Habermas’ communicative-rational theory. Second, it continues the enterprise of 
disciplinary historiography, but concentrates on the period after the Second World 
War. Further to Wilson and Ashworth’s works focusing on the discipline in infancy 
(1919-1939), a historiography of reason reflects especially how the discipline has 
developed during and after the Cold War (1945-2009). It exposes the changing 
purpose of a discipline from a plea for rational discussion among nations in its 
infancy to a calculated management of deterrence in national security during 
disciplinary formation. It shows the varying boundary of the discipline from the 
study of nuclear strategy and conflict resolution to that of international institutions, 
legal rules, domestic cultures, and historical sociology. Third, it reverses the 
direction of the works by Halliday and others (the transcendent historicists),39 
demonstrating that international history is partly constituted in IR scholars’ works. 
What International Relations scholars write is international relations. In short, 
such a history of reason exemplifies the interplay between political events, 
intellectual currents, and the scholars’ own theorization as the very product of this 
interaction. 
  Finally, there is one contribution I may be additionally able to make: a history 
of the four language s of reason, grounded within the “historiographical turn”, can 
                                                              
38  Bell 2002; see also Vaughan-Williams 2005.  
39  Halliday 1994b, Hobson 2004.  
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by consequence elaborate the theory of political action for the “practical turn”.40 
Each language of reason, if variations pruned, denotations compressed and 
commonalities distilled, can display an essential core that amounts to a particular 
model of rational action. Although I shall not pursue that philosophical enterprise 
in this thesis, it would be better to recognize its potentially philosophical value: it 
must constantly resist, but is always on the verge of, becoming a philosophy of 
rational conduct.  
  In order to make explicit the individual language s but without losing sight of 
their interplay in the history of IR, I shall proceed in two steps. First, I provide four 
horizontally diachronic histories, each of which is devoted to exposing one single 
language along the chronological dimension. Then I conclude with a synchronic 
history recapitulating how the four languages interplay with each other in five 
different periods within the nine decades.  
  Chapter one addresses Kantian reason. Kantian reason is centered on the 
intellect. The Kantian conception stipulates that the intellect rather than passion 
(or desire, emotion, impulses) should be the spring of political conduct, foundation 
of morality, and guarantee of mutual understanding. I argue that a similar Kantian 
conception of reason runs through the thoughts of the English Idealists, Hans 
Morgenthau, Richard Ashley, Andrew Linklater, and the German Idealists from 
1919 to the mid of 2000s. Starting from the “English Idealists”, I show how these 
Liberal Institutionalists, despite holding a pessimistic view of human nature, turn 
it into a political program urging the cultivation of human reason to prevent war. 
Then I proceed to Hans Morgenthau’s writings mainly on Realism. I contend that 
Morgenthau’s “rational” Realism shares much similarity with the Idealists in its 
emphasis on the indispensability of using intellect to discipline political conduct. I 
show how Morgenthau deploys the term to exhort the American statesman to use 
reason to designate the end of foreign policy and military strategy. Next I 
reconstruct the process of how Richard Ashley, by using Habermas’ idea of 
practical reason to revive Morgenthau’s claim that reason should be concerned 
                                                              
40  See esp. Kratochwil 2011b. This contribution would reside’ at the intersection of the two “turns”.  
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with the end of political conduct, criticizes the Neorealists as having betrayed their 
tradition. Then I turn to Andrew Linklater, showing how his endeavor to use 
Habermas’ theory of discursive ethics to recover the old Liberal Institutionalists 
program has succeeded in reviving the idea of reasoned dialogue in a way that 
narrow in scope but dynamic in degree. Finally, I examine the recently rising 
movement of “German Idealism”, represented by Thomas Risse and Harald 
Muller. I contend that they have been less conscious of the similarity between 
their language of reason and the Liberal Institutionalists’.  
  By utilitarian reason is meant the maximization of interests under constraints. 
First of all, I examine the theories of rational deterrence and conflict resolution 
devised by Schelling, Rapport, Snyder, and Kahn, and Boulding in the early 
1960s. I show how they speak in the utilitarian-rational language for 
demonstrating by what means, in the games played by interest maximizers, the 
self can outmaneuver the opponent in a conflict without an actual trial of military 
strength, and resolve conflicts without conceding any interest to the adversary. 
Next I turn to the rise of Neoliberalism and Neorealism in the 1980s. First, I show 
how Gilpin and Bueno de Mesquita (hereafter Mesquita) uses the term to explain 
the occurrence of war as systematic, large-scale, conflict. Second, I show how 
Keohane and other Neoliberals use the concept to explain how extensively 
institutional cooperation can endure. Third, I expose the strategies through which 
Keohane absorbs the Kantian rationalists, including, notably, Morgenthau. The 
triumph of this second wave of the utilitarian movement faded away with the 
unexpected end of the Cold War. However, even after the unexpected end of the 
post-Cold War era, there are still many theorists, in the face of the challenges 
posed by the Constructivists, who endeavor to rescue utilitarian rationality by 
conceptualizing preference formation as conditioned by domestic culture or 
institution. By examining the works of Milner, Moravcsik, Jepperson, and 
Katzenstein, I show how they try to incorporate domestic identity and institution 
into the utilitarian-rational framework to strengthen the explanatory power of the 
utilitarian language.  
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  Chapter three addresses axiological reason. Axiological reason defines 
rationality in terms of the following of exterior rules, cultures, and norms. I argue 
that Kenneth Waltz, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and K.M. Fierke have 
deployed a language of reason in the axiological accent. I begin with Kenneth 
Waltz, posing two contentions against the currently prevalent depiction of him as 
a utilitarian theorist. In Waltz’s own vocabulary, the term “rationality” was a 
hallmark of reductionism that has to be resisted rather than embraced; Waltz’s 
Theory of International Politics, although in appearance speaking of a language 
of microeconomics, essentially utters a sociological language of game, rule, order, 
and imperative to show how the units are required to be axiological-rational by 
the international system. Then I turn to Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil’s 
account of rationality as rule bounded in a game. I show how they use the lens of 
game to define rationality as rule-following, and their account of a particular 
mechanism of enforcement as intersubjective contestation. Next I proceed to K.M. 
Fierke’s thesis that rationality should not only be designated by the game, but 
constantly changes in the transformation of games.  
Chapter four is devoted to historical reason. Historical reason refers to a 
conception of rationality as immanently within or dependent on a historical-
sociological-moral nexus. I argue that Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, David 
Boucher and Christian Reus-Smit independently develop their ideas of reason 
that converge nevertheless on a shared emphasis on the historical-sociological 
condition and moral dimension of political conduct. I begin with Raymond Aron’s 
“reasonable” strategic-diplomatic action. I show how he views it as a way out of 
the bipolar and nuclear dilemma that can at the same time limit violence driven 
by the ideological quest for absolute justice, while make no concessions in the 
pursuit of interest to the opponent. I then proceed to Wight’s tradition of 
“Rationalism”. I reconstitute his definition of Rationalism as a trinity, where the 
view of human nature as amenable to reason engenders the view of social 
coexistence as possible, of history as in a constant flux, and of morality as 
practical in context. Next I explicate Boucher’s tradition of “historical reason”, 
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highlighting how it features in the pursuit of a middle ground between universal 
moral order and empirical procurement of interest. In the end, I show how Reus-
Smit’s thesis of “rationality as a culturally and historically contingent form of 
consciousness” conceptualizes rationality in terms of a constitutive value residing 
in the specific historical contexts that provides the moral foundation for the pursuit 
of interest.  
  In the concluding part I synthesize these four diachronic stories into a 
synchronic whole, signposting their interrelation within a period. I divide the 
disciplinary history from 1919 to 2009 into five periods. I show how in the first 
(1919-1939) the Kantian conception is exclusively integral to the disciplinary 
discourse and purpose. Then I reconstitute the interaction among the three, 
representative conceptions of reason by Morgenthau, deterrence theorists, Aron 
and Wight, from the end of the Second World War to the early Cold War period 
(1940-1969). Next I concentrate on the third period (1970-1979), rediscovering 
Waltz’s idea of axiological rationality and the disciplinary responses to him, 
represented by Ashley’s revival of Kantian reason. I then proceed to the fourth 
period (1980-1990) and show the prevalence of utilitarian reason represented by 
the Neo-Neo theories. In the end, I concentrate on the development of various 
conceptions from the end of the Cold War (1991) to 2009.  
 
(iv) A Note on the Term 
 
Anglophone IR theorists have invoked “reason”, “rationality”, “rational”, 
“reasonable”, and “rationalization” so frequently – or so bewilderingly in fact – that 
their meanings cannot be grasped without a closer investigation of their 
application within certain concrete contexts. Suffice it here to notice two points. 
First, before the entrance of Game Theory and Rational Choice Theory into IR 
around the 1950s, most IR thinkers used “reason”, and since then, “rationality”. 
Second, the use and meaning of “reason” has more variations than “rationality”. 
It can be used as a singular noun denoting human beings’ intellectual faculty, or 
a plural noun (reasons) referring to the motive or aim for undertaking a certain 
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action,41 or an adjective (reasoned) indicating an attribute, or a verb (reasoning) 
meaning the process or of inference and deliberation. Rational (or reasonable) 
are limited in this aspect, serving only as adjective.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
41  Eslter 2009.  
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Chapter I. Kantian Reason 
 
 
 
The language of Kantian reason has three characteristics. First, reason is 
centered on the human intellect. The Kantian conception of reason regards 
human intellect as the source of calm, order, essence and intelligibility, which 
stands in opposition to the natural properties of emotion, passion, instinct, lust, 
appearance and experience that manifest phenomenally as the blind, violent, 
and meaningless contingency. For Kantian reason, the cognitive faculty is the 
most powerful capacity that should be used. The actors should surpass their 
emotions, instincts and impulses by the discipline of the intellect, and 
subordinate facts and experiences to intellectual understanding. The first 
definition of Kantian reason is also Kant’s conception of reason.1  
  Second, the Kantian conception of reason often draws a line between the 
objective and (inter)subjective use of reason. In the agents’ action towards 
object – or nature, environment, political reality, events – the intellect can 
enable the agent to penetrate into the surface of appearance, exercise 
intelligible control over reality, and designate the end of conduct and the most 
economic means for achieving the objective. In the agents’ action towards 
another subject (each other), the cognitive associates them together and forges 
dialogue and mutual understanding among peoples or between the political 
actor and observer. Notice that although scholars sometimes disagree about 
the relation between the two uses of reason – Morgenthau sees it as a 
conceptual division whereas Ashley argues in favor of an ontological division; 
Zimmern considers the two to be mutually constitutive whereas Ashley argue 
that they are incompatible2 – they acknowledge that there is an important 
                                                              
1  Kant 1784: 42 ff.  
2 The center of dispute is whether human beings can be the object of the instrumental use of reason. See more details 
below.  
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division between the two uses of reason. My second definition is larger than 
Kant’s own. Reason can make understanding possible (Kant’s reason), and 
pierce into the essence of objects (more powerful than Kant’s reason which 
cannot penetrate into thing-in-themselves); reason can be used as an efficient 
instrument (pace Kant) with a view of promoting the ultimate end (Kant’s).3   
Third, the Kantian conception of reason stipulates that political conduct, 
which should be grounded on an intellectual rather than passionate basis, is 
crucial for the pursuit of interest as well as of morality. The pursuit of interest 
requires a rational agent to harness passions, emotions, and impulses by the 
discipline of the intellect. This emphasis on the intellectual pursuit of interest 
has often incurred misunderstanding since the utilitarian language also deploys 
a notion of “interest” (I shall explicate the resemblance and difference in the 
next chapter). What makes Kantian reason distinct from the utilitarian 
counterpart is that the Kantian conception has a special concern with the end 
of political conduct, always carrying within itself a preoccupation with the 
ultimate destiny of action and an exhortation that the means should be adapted 
to ends. Furthermore, it regards the act performed on an intellectual basis as 
the morally good and ethically right. To ground action in the intellect is at once 
necessary for defending political interests and complying with moral precepts. 
The Kantian conception of reason in my definition is at once Kant’s and not his: 
it is highly concerned with the end of conduct but does not exclude the 
consequentialist value of reason, and it is further away from moral conduct 
(unlike Brown’s and Hutchings’ usage) and more oriented towards interest.4   
  Within IR many thinkers have spoken of a language .of Kantian reason, and 
they generally fall into three interrelated groups – the British Liberal 
Institutionalists, the Cold War Realists, and the scholars such as Ashley and 
Linklater who draw on Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality.  
                                                              
3  Kant 1781: 124 (A 90), 1785: 35ff.  
4  See Brown 1992: 27-41 and Hutchings 1996.  
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The first is the British liberal-institutionalists in the interwar period, commonly 
known as the “Idealists”. 5  In section (i), I shall reexamine the “Idealist” 
movement, showing how the Kantian conception of reason plays a crucial role 
in the Liberal Institutionalists’ discourse, but in a way that differentiates it both 
from the conventional reception and from the recent revisionist account. 
Conventionally, many IR scholars argue that one of the defining features of 
Idealism is the belief in the transforming power of human reason. Michael Cox, 
for instance, observed that “the utopian believed in reason, the realist in force”, 
and the former accordingly “assuming as they did that reason rather than 
material and military capabilities governed the actions of states”.6 Knutsen 
claimed that “the utopian approach to International Relations was preoccupied 
with finding reason-based substitutes for war”.7 On the other side are such 
revisionist scholars as Peter Wilson, Lucian Ashworth, and Casper Sylvest who 
deny such features of Idealism. For them, the conventionalist depiction of the 
naïve “Idealists” belief that violence and war can be substituted by rational 
discussion, legal adjudication and universal human reason, is but a “highly 
rhetorical devise” for defaming these thinkers. The alleged belief in reason is 
an insubstantial caricature, and a slurring of names defined by defects which 
renders the “First Great Debate” near to a myth.8 
In section (i) I show how the Kantian conception of reason plays a crucial and 
sophisticated role in the discourse of the Liberal Institutionalists, which can 
shed new light on the controversies if viewed through another angle of the 
                                                              
5 “Idealism” and “Idealist” have a history of their own. Carr used “utopianism” (and “the utopian”) to refer to the 
position of his opponent, a label borrowed from Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1936). It is not accurate 
to say that utopianism is just “Carr’s preferred term” and “the frequent substitution of the term [idealism]” 
(Ashworth 2006: 293). Carr (1939: 15) did use the term “Idealism” in his work, but referring to the 
epistemological theory that reality depends on the perception of the human mind. The award for popularizing the 
term “Idealism”, which replaced “Utopianism”, should be given to Herz’s Political Realism and Political 
Idealism (1951) which include a broad range thinkers such as Mazzini and the Socialists. In recent revisionist 
studies on the First Debate, Long and Wilson (1996) recognize that the label “Idealists” has been extended to 
cover more than the usual figures (from Woodrow Wilson, Lord Cecil, Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and 
Arnold Toynbee to Leonard Woolf, J.A. Hobson, J.M. Kenyes, Gilbert Murray and David Mitrany, who were 
only implicitly criticized by Carr. Ashworth further (2006) included H.N. Brailsford and Philip Noel-Baker.  
6  M. Cox 2001: xxi-xxii.  
7  Knutsen 1997: 216.  
8  Wilson 1998: esp. 11, Sylvest 2005, Ashworth 2006, “a slurring of names” came from Bull 1969.  
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concept of reason. I start from a brief survey of some leading Liberal 
Institutionalists’ postwar works such as Hobson’s Problems of a New World 
(1920) and Alfred Zimmern’s Europe in Convalesce (1922). I show that the 
Liberal Institutionalists are precisely those who do not believe that man has 
been rational enough to overcome his passions. In contrast to the conventional 
depiction, many Liberal Institutionalists displayed a profoundly pessimistic view 
of human nature, sharing a position much close to the one held by the Cold War 
Realists (Morgenthau, Herz and Kennan). Nevertheless, these Liberal 
Institutionalists, despite sharing with the Cold War Realists an assumption of 
the past failings of human nature, still expect that through cultivating his reason 
man can overcome passions and prevent another Great War. In a sharp 
contrast to the revisionist reading, the “Idealists” do have a common core: it is 
their deployment of Kantian language of reason as a politically activist weapon 
for exhorting man to become rational. First, war could be prevented if man used 
his intellectual faculty to understand the international problems, to verbalize 
(“hue and cry”) what they think as the voice of reason, and use persuasion to 
reach peaceful consensus. Second, education and the cultivation of human 
reason may repress man’s combative impulses. Third, I expound Zimmern’s 
thought as an example to show his exhortation that the intellectuals (scholars) 
should devote their expert knowledge to promoting the peoples’ “international 
intellectual understanding” and to strengthening statesman’s leadership in 
making peaceful cooperation. A reexamination of the discipline’s infancy shows 
how the term of reason was integral to IR: it not only occupied a central position 
in the disciplinary discourse but also provided one of the most inspiring 
purposes for creating the discipline. 
A reengagement with the work of the British Liberal Institutionalists 
simultaneously paves the way for a reappraisal of the role that reason played 
in the Cold War Realist discourse. According to the traditional IR historiography, 
the ultimate failure of the “Idealists” in their combat with the “Revolt against 
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Reason” (a term coined by Russell),9 gave rise to an intellectual movement 
under the name of “Realism” in the 1940s and 1950s to crusade the belief in 
human reason. Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, and George Kennan are claimed 
to have completely repudiated the confidence in reason, superseding the old 
program with fundamentally different theoretical basis such as animus 
dominandi and accomplishing the first “paradigm” shift.10 
  In section (ii), I use Hans Morgenthau, perhaps the most recognized hard-
headed Realist, to show that this foremost Realist thinker not only closely 
resembles the Liberal Institutionalists in his conception of reason, but also 
considers that despite their distrust of the performance of reason in practical 
human conduct, the role played by reason in politics should be enlarged. Notice 
the complexity of Morgenthau’s conception of reason. It has been well known 
that many Realist thinkers, shaped by the tragic events of the interwar period, 
do not believe that reason can control human action. What I want to disclose is 
another dimension of their conceptions of reason. These Realists (Morgenthau 
as one representative), in spite of the traumatic experience of the irrationalism 
of Fascism, still display considerable belief in reason and exhort reason to 
overcome passion in political conduct. Their tensional or antinomic position 
towards the Kantian idea of reason leads them to argue that reason should 
discipline, but can never determine, the use of political power.11  
In section (ii) I expose how Morgenthau, like the Liberal Institutionalists, 
exhorts that reason should designate the ends and means of the conduct of 
American foreign policy. I retrace Morgenthau’s successive intellectual steps 
from his Scientific Man versus Power Politics (1946) through In Defense of the 
National Interest (1951) and the several editions of Politics among Nations 
(1954 contained the first statement of “Six Principles of Realism”), to his critique 
                                                              
9 Russell 1935.  
10  See e.g. Vasquze 1983: Ch.2. 
11  Many Realists want a reconstruction rather than repudiation of Kantian reason. Politics constitutes a paradoxical 
sphere that should be subjected to, even though it can never be determined by, the sway and scrutiny of reason. 
Morgenthau 1962a: 309-10. 
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of the rational deterrence theorists in the 1960s. On these different occasions, 
I argue, Morgenthau has frequently spoken of the term reason in a manner that 
closely resembles the Liberal Institutionalists such as Zimmern. The theory and 
practice of politics, for Morgenthau, should be subjected to the designation of 
the intellect. Theoretically, the use of reason towards objects can penetrate into 
the mass of events and reveal the essence of politics; the intellect links 
scholarship and statesmanship together, making it possible for political 
observers to intersubjectively understand the political actors’ conducts. 
Practically, it is reason, not emotion or passion, that should designate the end 
and means of foreign policy and military strategy, where a decision based on 
intellectual contemplation is the one that complies with moral precepts.   
 Indeed, for quite a long time, IR scholars have been perplexed by 
Morgenthau’s idea of reason. Many of them have even been confused, for 
instance, by Morgenthau’s principles of Realism which advocate for a “rational” 
theory of Realism.12 For Robert Tucker, Morgenthau’s attempt at a “rational” 
theory of realism is a stark contradiction with Morgenthau’s previous 
acknowledgement of the impacts of the animus dominandi on politics. For Waltz 
Morgenthau’s rational Realism presents merely a picture of instrumental pursuit 
of power where “Morgenthau thought of the ‘rational’ statesman as striving ever 
to accumulate more and more power”. For Keohane, similarly, Morgenthau’s 
conception of rationality is “standard in neoclassical economics”. 13  By 
reconstituting Morgenthau’s language of reason, I show how he conceives of 
reason as an intellectual faculty to discipline the lust for power, and accordingly 
urges that the Americans should primarily use reason to designate not only 
means but also the end of foreign policy and military strategy.  
With the rise of rational deterrence theories in the 1960s and the 
establishment of the Neo-Neo supremacy in the 1980s, the Kantian conception 
                                                              
12  For Williams (2005: 107), the principles of Realism even is “perhaps the most oft-quoted phrase in the history of 
International Relations”!  
13  Tucker 1952, Waltz 2008: 56, Keohane 1986: 145-7.  
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experienced its decline, and the utilitarian notion became prevalent. Yet, from 
1981 onwards, the Kantian conception was given a new lease of life by 
Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality. In section (iii), I shall examine 
the last group that contains two individual scholars, and one intellectual 
movement called “German Idealism”,14 which runs through the decades from 
1981 to 2001.   
The first scholar in this group is the “early” Richard Ashley and his works such 
as “Political Realism and Human Interest” (1981), “Three Modes of 
Economicism” (1983), and “The Poverty of Neorealism” (1984). I show in all 
these articles that Ashley uses Habermas’ practical reason to revive 
Morgenthau’s Kantian conception of reason, particularly Morgenthau’s claim 
that reason should be concerned with the end of political action and that the 
intellect forges an intersubjective/dialogic link between the scholar and 
statesman. These articles composed by early Ashley have become generally 
well-known for heralding the Critical IR Theory movement. What I want to 
uncover in detail is how Ashley articulates his critical voice by reprimanding the 
later Neorealists for their betrayal of the practical idea of reason laid down by 
Morgenthau. They should have, Ashley argued, been concerned with the end 
of using reason rather than merely the means, and constructed theory as a 
hermeneutic dialogue between scholar and statesman rather than as a 
positivistic explanation.  
Whereas Ashley used Habermas’ theory of rationality to revive Morgenthau’s 
or classical Realist’s conception of reason (especially the intersubjective part), 
Andrew Linklater, finding Ashley’s use of Habermas inspiring, also used 
discursive ethics for “recovering the old idealist program”. 15  In The 
Transformation of Political Community (1998), a monograph sparking debate 
documented as a major event in the development of normative IR theory,16 
                                                              
14  Coined by Steffek 2010. 
15  Linklater 1992: 98.  
16 See the forum in Review of International Studies 1999; see also Brown 2000: 60, Rengger and Thirkell-White 
2007: 11.  
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Linklater argued for “a rational morality with universal significance”, a “higher 
rationality of efforts to bridge the gulf between actuality and potentiality”.17 
What is this rational morality with universal significance, and to what extent has 
it recovered the British Liberal Institutionalists’ program? I provide an appraisal: 
compared with the project envisaged by the Liberal Institutionalists, Linklater’s 
dialogic ethics narrows the scope of how the Kantian reason can function in 
some aspects – dialogic ethics relying heavily on intersubjective dialogue while 
overlooking the individual cultivation of reason – but enhances reason’s 
dynamic and intensive degree because of the dialogic encounter between 
people.  
Finally, turning to the recent works by the “German Idealists” represented by 
Thomas Risse and Harald Muller, I briefly show the unrecognized but 
remarkable resemblance in the language spoken by the German Idealists and 
their English forebears. I expose the similarity between the Kantian conception 
of reason held by the British Liberal Institutionalists and the communicative 
rationality deployed by the German successors. 
 
(i) The English Idealists and the “Revolt against Reason”: 1919-1939 
 
“The Great War” and the “Climate of Opinion” 
 
The First World War stunned many later called “Idealist” thinkers. Its outbreak 
as a “Great War”, like a suddenly natural calamity, demonstrated to them that 
the belief in the power of reason, a feature that pervaded the prewar period, 
had been misplaced. J.A. Hobson, for instance, began his Problems of a New 
World (1921) with a condemnation of the prewar people’s “faith in reason”. This 
belief in reason “with the fervor of religious zeal” assumed “first, that reason 
was by right, and in fact, the supreme arbiter in human conduct; and second, 
that a complete harmony of human relations was discoverable and attainable 
                                                              
17  Linklater 1992: 98.   
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by getting reason to prevail”.18 Like Hobson, Norman Angell opened his Fruits 
of Victory (1921) with the following statement: “Underlying the disruptive 
processes so evidently at work—especially in the international field—is the 
deep-rooted instinct to the assertion of domination, preponderant power”.19 
Man, far from acting on reason, is always “a fighting animal, emotional, 
passionate”. “It is so important to establish some international organization”, 
Angell continued to caution in Human Nature and the Peace Problem (1925), 
“for the proper discipline of unruly instincts”.20 Alfred Zimmern, in his Europe in 
Convalesce (1922), criticized the naïve belief in the rationality of human 
conduct: 
                                                                                     
“The deepest issues which arise between nation and nation, race and race, 
as between individual men and women, transcend the power of judge and 
court, of rule and precedent, to determine. This is not to decry the prestige 
or authority of the new creation…but only to remind the idealists, always 
apt to court disillusionment by pitching their concrete expectations too high, 
that politics are but the outward and oversimplified expression of deep lying 
passions and traditions which have not yet been touched and transfigured 
by the harmonizing power of human reason”.21 
 
For Zimmern, as for Hobson and Angell, the prewar “Idealists” had placed too 
much confidence in the reason of man; their optimism towards reason, progress, 
and the future was tantamount to a superstition. The Great War, indeed, is not 
only a demonstration of the inadequacy of human reason to harness the 
passions, but also itself an event which unleashed the fighting, animal, instincts. 
Arnold Toynbee was later to bemoane in 1926 that the peace settlement after 
the war had been gravely endangered by the fact that “all parties had been 
penetrated by the war spirit”. The popular movements for reinvestigating the 
                                                              
18  J.A. Hobson 1921: 6.  
19  Angell 1921: vii 
20  Angell 1925: 7.  
21  Zimmern 1922: 146-7.  
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cause of war were “essentially irrational”, dominated by “violent reaction” to the 
self-repression and suffering during the war.22 In 1936 Zimmern recounted “the 
shock of 1914 and the following years” that created in the postwar generation 
“an atmosphere of dull anxiety, of feverish suspicion, of relentless 
inquisitiveness.”23 
  The British Liberal Internationalists, far from being idealistic about human 
nature, regard themselves as realistic. And they are. Zimmern, in his works 
spanning the interwar period, has constantly reminded the “Idealists” of these 
obstacles standing in the way of reason.24 However, if they are aware that 
human action is always led by instincts, emotions and the lust for domination – 
in contrast to the naiveté commonly ascribed to them – then why is the term 
later turned against them (by thinkers such as E.H. Carr)?  
  The answer lies in their recipe given to the prewar overconfidence in human 
reason. For those who went through the Anglo-German navy race, the 
overconfidence in human reason should be corrected by building up Britain’s 
power.25 Human reason may or may not triumph over the deep lying passions, 
but to retain great power is warranted. The Liberal-Internationalists’ answers 
are diametrically opposed. For them, the prewar “Idealism” is prematurely 
erroneous not because the belief that man is rational is wrong, but because the 
belief that man has been rational enough already has been proven to be false. 
Had people not been overoptimistic with regards to their rationality, the tragedy 
of the war could have been prevented. The crux, therefore, is to cultivate reason, 
to create the conditions for reason to develop. Hobson proclaimed that “reason 
                                                              
22  Toynbee 1926: 1-2, 90-1.   
23  Zimmern 1936: 484-5.  
24  See e.g. Zimmern 1923: 211, where he criticized “the thoughtless idealistic phrase-making”, 1931. Zimmern 
refers to those who believes man as having possessed rationality to overcome his passions.   
25  Martin Wight (1957-60: 170) cited a lively exchange in his lectures: “‘There is one just way [stated Winston 
Churchill] in which you can make you country secure and have peace, and that is to be so much stronger than any 
prospective enemy that he dare not attack you, and this is, I submit to you gentlemen, a self-evident proposition.’ 
A small man [Norman Angell] got up at the back of the hall and said: ‘Is the advice you have just given us advice 
you would give to Germany?’ [a faint titter]…When the time came for questions and comment, the small man 
said: ‘Our Cabinet Minister tells us in the profundity of his wisdom, that both groups of quarrelling nations will 
be secure, both will keep the peace, when each is stronger than the other. And this, he thinks, is a self-evident 
proposition.’ [Loud applause]”.  
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points to economic order, democracy and internationalism, to a pacific 
settlement of the conflicts”. Conversely the Great War demonstrated “the 
cowardly betrayal of reason and right” that “right and reason are discredited, 
their moral and intellectual stock is low”. Force had invaded the terrain of 
education.26  
  It is on the basis of this diagnosis that the ideal of the Kantian-rational man 
became one of the bedrock foundations of the Idealist program. Underlying their 
concern was a threefold exhortation for political engagement (commitment). 
Indeed, when the League declined in 1930, when Fascists took over Germany 
in 1933 and the prospect of peace subsequently deteriorated after the mid-
1930s, they acted with increasing urgency to advocate the three rational ways 
to promote peace.   
The first way is to use persuasion and public opinion to prevent the 
employment of violence. Here, reason can generate peace through two 
mechanisms. One is that analogous to the parliamentary debate within states, 
where political disputes are solved by argumentation and dialogue. To the same 
extent, states in the international arena should resolve their conflicts by using 
verbal debate rather than force. To supersede violence is to open dialogue with 
different nationals and be prepared to be persuaded. Just as within the 
democratic community man “must have recourse to reason and discussion” and 
“is precluded from employing forcible means”, as explained by David Davies in 
Force (1933), in the international sphere “the resort to force will have been 
substituted for the appeal to reason”.27 Bertrand Russell, in “The Revolt against 
Reason” (1934), bemoaned that in his age politics had become deeply “anti-
rational”. Instead, he argued, reason should prevail in political conduct, and 
action relied on “persuasion rather than force” and sought to “persuade by 
means of argument”.28 “To abstain from fighting”, and “to use every efforts to 
                                                              
26  J.A. Hobson 1921: 271-2. See also Waltz 1959a: 152-3.   
27  Davies 1934: 23, 28.  
28  Russell 1934: 4.  
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persuade others to do likewise”, were the answers given by Russell in Why Way 
to Peace? (1936). 29  “The eternal struggle between reason and passion”, 
Davies remarked, “still holds the world in its relentless grip”: 
 
“Recent events in every country and the proceedings at Geneva portray a 
sinister picture in which the forces of reason are pitted against the blind fury 
of the passions […] The concept of justice […] strives to produce a system 
of human relationships, founded upon righteousness, in which reason and 
conscience are the sole arbiters of conduct. Policy, on the other hand, is 
based upon selfishness. It is the product of self-interest and intolerance, and 
ministers to arbitrary prejudices and mystic emotions which brook no 
restraint.”30   
 
Angell, in The Great Illusion – Now (1938), proclaimed that action should be 
“basing the appeal upon argument and reason”, since man’s actions depended 
on “the way we read the facts of that situation”, which “in its turn depends upon 
argument, argument with ourselves or others”. Man must construct a dialogic 
cosmopolis to sweep away “nationalist fallacies, passions and retaliations”, and 
the “powerful forces of interest, conviction, prejudice, passion, [that] stood in 
the way”.31 
  The other mechanism is more complex. Within states the rule of law 
(constitution) reduces the use of violence to a minimum police function, 
prohibiting its private use for illegitimate purpose. Similarly states should, by 
analogy, subject their individual force to the rule of international law (e.g. the 
Covenant) and to the governance of international constitution (the League). Yet 
in international politics there is no correspondent mechanism of enforcement, 
nor can the League have such power to become a coercive world government. 
It is under this background that persuasion as reaching reasoned consensus 
                                                              
29  Russell 1936: 223.  
30  Davies 1934: 1-2.   
31  Angell 1938: 17, 75-6, 81, 86-99.   
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and “hue and cry”32 acquires its profound significance. If in the municipal terrain 
the “hue and cry” can expose a criminal to seizure, then the hue and cry of the 
people can at least highlight states’ obligation towards international law, 
compelling them to have a clear recognition of their legal duties.33 Hence in 
order to urge states to realize their legal obligation to the maintenance of peace 
and subject violence to rationally legal control, the people must sound their 
“voices of reason”.34 The league, Zimmern argued in The League of Nations 
and the Rule of Law (1936, hereafter The League), “is the organization of the 
hue and cry – and nothing more”; “without the cooperation of voluntary 
agencies”, “intergovernmental organization can never proceed very far”. 35 
Robert Cecil, in his contribution to The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War 
(1933), noted that “the nearest approach to such an arbiter was the public 
opinion of the world” in which the common people “might have built up a potent 
public opinion against war”.36 Indeed, for Zimmern, the people of Britain and 
the people of France “are the representatives and for the time being, at any rate, 
the most powerful and prominent representatives of the collective opinion and 
conscience of mankind in its struggle for the restraint of violence.”37  
  The second solution is education. Public opinion, indeed, may not be the 
voice of reason since it can alternately appear as the “well-meaning appeals of 
the ignorant sentimentalist” or “the artful wiles of unscrupulous propaganda”. 
“The remedy here”, Zimmern stressed, “is not to mobilize sentiment against 
sentiment or propaganda against propaganda but to deepen and strength the 
foundations of general education”. It is education that facilitates the common 
man to articulate a true voice from reason, “bringing his healthy common sense 
                                                              
32  The “Hue and Cry” is originally contrived by Parker to declare political commitment and preventing “neutrality”: 
the states can at least use it to make it “becomes increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible, not in consulting 
the selfish interest of neutrals but in abolishing neutrality. Murders would increase if the murder could count on 
the neutrality of bystanders, and it is the same with war. The neutral, in fact, shirks his share of the burden of 
humanity”. Selected in Zimmern 1939a: 270.  
33  M. Wight 1960: 105. 
34  The term “voices of reason” comes from Carr 1939: 34, which may have an earlier origin.  
35  Zimmern 1936: 177, 8, emphasis in original.  
36 Cecil 1933: 263, 260.  
37  Zimmern 1936: 445.  
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to bear upon” foreign policy.38 The League, Zimmern explained, “will not only 
exhort its members to be sensible: it should show them in detail how to be so”.39 
The League “is only enlightening in so far as it points beyond itself to the forces 
in the mind of man”.40 “About nineteen-twentieths of the time”, Angell argued 
in response to his critics, “mankind seems to be guided by the negation of 
reason”. “What I am convinced of”, he went on, “is that its only hope lies in 
wisdom, and that that is the thing we must nurture and cultivate”.41 “If we are 
drifting back to barbarianism,” Zimmern diagonized in Learning and Leadership 
(1926), “the root of evil is not political but intellectual. It is because the peoples 
do not understand the problems of the post-war world that their statesmen are 
unable to control them”.42 In his massive The Problem of the Twentieth Century 
(1930), Davies declared that “the great task is the education of the public”. “Only 
by this means”, he continued, “will it be possible to create that new mentality 
which seeks to repress the combative instinct in international relationships.”43 
Leonard Woolf, in his Barbarians at the Gate (1939) recognized the problem of 
“primitive man in the modern world” as one of the ultimate causes of war. Let 
the civilization standard of the people be elevated, let the “barbarian inside our 
minds and our hearts” be purged, ensure the people are not subjected to 
“immediate satisfaction of the simple instincts, love, hatred, and anger”: in short, 
ensure the common man is committed to searching for the “intelligent man’s 
way to prevent war”.44 
The third solution is to promote international intellectual cooperation and 
mutual understanding between the “common man”. What is international 
intellectual cooperation? What role should be played by intellectuals who 
                                                              
38  Zimmern 1936: 27-8.  
39  Zimmern 1936: 496.  
40  Zimmern 1936: 9.  
41  Angell 1914: 37.   
42  Zimmern 1926: 11.  
43 Davies 1930: 692  
44  Woolf 1939: 83-4. Woolf (1933: 8), described by Wilson (1996: 122-3) as believing that “human emancipation, 
peace, and genuine civilization depended on the application of just a little more human reason”, cried out in the 
very beginning of his edited The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War that “We are all of us still half-savages, 
and these instincts of the animal or the save to kill, dominate, persecute, torture other people find themselves 
uncomfortable in such an ordered and humane society”. 
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devote their reason to peace? It is in Alfred Zimmern’s thoughts that one finds 
an encompassing answer to these questions.  
 
International Intellectual Cooperation in the Thought of Alfred 
Zimmern 1924-1936 
 
In Zimmern’s interwar writings, the intellectuals have been assigned three tasks. 
First, “the scholar in public affairs is a Realist: he has his feet on the rock of fact, 
of world facts”.45 Like Thucydides’ “observant, reflective and disinterested mind” 
that capacitates his thorough dissection of the causes of the Ancient Greek’s 
Great War (Peloponnesian War), a scholar is an impartial observer, an 
ascertainer of facts and an exposer of actual events.46 In a similar manner to a 
“wise physician”, he is able to use his rational faculty to provide “positive 
treatment for the problem itself” and to stimulate “public discussion on the 
general issues”. Or, as a skilled doctor knowing how to allay an inflammation, 
a scholar is a professional inquirer into “public disorders” who can “de-
emotionalize the material of their study”:  
 
“Every political problem, however passionately men may feel about it this 
way or that, has its non-contentious elements. […] in politics as in other 
department of life, fever is abnormal and unnatural: high passions wear 
themselves out by their very violence. Man is a reasonable being, when 
his reason has access to the knowledge which is its natural food. When 
reason and judgment of man have once more been brought into a 
harmonious relationship with his environment, they will resume their 
ascendency in the rhythm of the world. To facilitate this adjustment and to 
                                                              
45 Zimmern 1921: 8, see also Markwell 1986: 289. 
46 Zimmern 1921: 6.  
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make the post-war generation conscious of this rhythm is the primary task 
of international intellectual co-operation”.47  
                                                                                
The intellectuals use their rational faculties to disclose the non-contentious facts 
and reveal the substratum of truth. They provide knowledge to the common 
man, nourishing their reason and cooling down passions that can manifest as 
violence. Man, in acquiring reason, knowledge and judgment, can capacitate 
his control of the objective environment which will be “brought into a 
harmonious relationship” with man’s will. “The task of opening the mind to the 
appreciation of international problems”, Zimmern urged in “Education and the 
International Good Will” (1924), “is one of the most fatiguing that can be 
conceived”.48 Hence in their first task for promoting international intellectual 
cooperation, the intellectuals must supply knowledge of the real facts and the 
non-contentious truth of matters, and thereby nourish the common man’s 
rational faculty.  
Yet the intellectuals have to do more than this. Their task is not merely to let 
the people understand and take control over the objective events, but to enable 
them to intersubjectively understand each other. To understand each other must, 
in the first place, be rigorously intellectual. It is a problem “of promoting 
international understanding, not that of promoting international love”; it is 
“knitting intellectual relations” rather than “emotional relations”. 49  The 
intellectual relations should be knitted, in the second place, by going beyond 
the boundary of states and reaching down to the “plain man”.50 For Zimmern, 
the individual cultivation of reason must be coupled with a collective 
development of reason. The national cultivation of reason must be 
complemented by an international cultivation of reason. The intellectuals are 
obliged to promote “international understanding” and to “open the windows of 
                                                              
47 Zimmern 1924: 65-6.  
48  Zimmern 1924: 52, see also 59.  
49 Zimmern 1924: 54-5, emphasis in original.  
50 Zimmern 1928: 13. 
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their minds”.51 If the intellectuals want to help the common man to cultivate his 
reason, they must not only provide “knowledge of the relations between states 
but also of the relations between peoples” – or more precisely, “promoting 
understanding between peoples” and “a knowledge of the peoples 
themselves”.52  
Why will the intellectuals’ promotion of the mutually intellectual understanding 
between people become unfailing guarantee for peace? First, in promoting 
intellectual understanding they enable the people to recognize that the 
graveness of the international problem is overriding. Second, once people 
realize the significance of international relations, they will consciously exercise 
an intersubjective control over (or through which they can change) international 
relations. If intellectual relations had been knitted and mutual understanding 
promoted, then at least they could reach consensus on the significance of the 
problem and “recover control over ‘events’.” “Where like is in relation with like, 
even at a distance and under conditions inequality”, Zimmern claimed in his 
inaugural lecture The Study of International Relations (1931) as the first 
Montague Burton Professor in Oxford, “there is a natural basis for agreement”. 
Although finding ways to knit intellectual relations may take time and take still 
longer to manifest positive effects, “the very effort to realize it, where the parties 
are reasonably like-minded, changes and humanizes the relations involved”.53 
Third, the mutually intellectual understanding can also enhance moral 
interdependence between different nationals, thus enabling them to overcome 
the difficulties. A knitted intellectual relations teaches people how to live 
harmoniously with each other. Peace can grow out of “an inner order resulting 
[that resulted] from the harmonious functioning of international relationships”.54 
This understanding between and of the people will lead to their mutual 
                                                              
51 Zimmern 1924: 67, emphasis removed.  
52  Zimmern 1936: 5, 17.  
53  Zimmern 1931: 13-6.  
54  Zimmern 1931: 23. See also 27.  
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agreement, and render them to learn “art of living together” as the 
contemporaries of Zimmern frequently called it.55 Zimmern himself stated: 
  
“It is the common man who decides the issues of peace and war. It is the 
common man who carries on wars and decides wars, on a front as deep 
as the whole country. […] The problem before us… is the problem of 
making plain to ordinary men and women how, in the large-scale 
interdependent world of to-day, they can best do their duty to their neighbor 
[…] Let us not make the mistake of thinking that what is needed is simply 
the repression, or even the prevention of violence. It goes far deeper than 
that. It is a question of how the peoples can acquire the habit of living 
together”.56  
 
For Zimmern, the intellectuals have to make it plain to the common man that “it 
is the problem of primitive man in the modern world”, or “of small-scale man in 
a large-scale world”; “the ordinary man of to-day should accustom himself to 
enlarge his vision so as to bear in mind that the public affairs of the twentieth 
century are world-affairs”.57 The period from 1931 to 1939, which witnessed 
the testing of the League, the Turkish extermination of the Armenians, the 
Spanish Civil War, Japanese bombing of Chinese civilians, and the outbreak of 
the Second World War did not unsettle Zimmern’s belief. On the contrary. The 
more difficult it became for the League to maintain itself, the more responsibility 
was bestowed on the people to have a collective understanding of the 
graveness of the problems and to undertake actions.58  
                                                              
55 Angell 1925: 162.  
56  Zimmern 1938: 20-2.   
57  Zimmern 1938: 22, 23, 26.  
58  Zimmern 1939b: 31, and Zimmern expected that soon after the war, “in due course it will pass away under the 
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  An intellectual’s third task is to use his expert knowledge to strengthen the 
leadership of statesmen. In international politics, the statesman may proceed 
very well by relying on their senses and intuition. But without the supplement of 
a particular knowledge, their frustration may equally render them directionless, 
leading to “national incubus”. The intellectuals, by using their intellectual 
faculties, provide an essential service for the statesman. The intellectuals, 
through the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (1925) and the 
League, should construct “a point of convergence between Knowledge and 
Power”.59 It was a juxtaposition of “scholarship and statesmanship”, a Geneva 
that has brought Plato’s Republic to life.60 To enhance the leadership of the 
statesman, the intellectuals are required to “adjust the available resources of 
goodwill, expert knowledge, and intellectual and moral leadership to the needs 
of the post-war world, and to set them to work together according to the rhythm 
of the age.” “This, no more, but no less”, Zimmern stressed, “is the problem of 
international intellectual co-operation”.61 In quoting J.H. Newman’s The Idea of 
a University (1852), Zimmern describes Robert Cecil, Edvard Benes, and Leon 
Bourgeois as statesmen in possession of a perfectly disciplined intellect. This 
makes their acts prudent and responsible:  
 
                                                              
impact of twentieth-century facts and that then the process of rational and neighborly discussion between the 
peoples of Europe, great and small, can be resumed.”  
59  Zimmern 1936: 319, emphasis in original.   
60 Zimmern 1923: 224.  
61 Zimmern 1929: 26. 
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“The intellect which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, 
which knows and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leaven the 
dense mass of facts and events with the elastic force of reason, such an 
intellect cannot be partial, cannot be exclusive, cannot be at a loss, cannot 
but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it discerns the 
end in every beginning, the origin in every end, and law in every 
interruption, the limit in each delay; because it ever knows where it stands 
and how its path lies from one point to another”.62  
 
For individuals, including statesman, the discipline of the intellect can render 
them patient, collected, impartial and capable of penetrating into the origin and 
end of things. 
 
Idealism and Its Upshots 
 
“Where are the Idealists in interwar International Relations?” is Ashworth’s 
intriguing question.63 One of the answers is the Idealists’ language of Kantian 
reason uttered for empowering their political program that has three defining, 
complex, traits. Both the conventionalists and revisionists overlook the 
sophisticated role played by reason through these three features.  
First, the Liberal Institutionalists emphasize the idea of Kantian reason.64 
They urge the common man to cultivate his individual intellectual faculty, to 
control his violent impulses, to verbalize what they think as the voice of reason, 
                                                              
62  Zimmern 1923: 232.  
63  Ashworth 2006.  
64  Apart from reason they also waged a war of “internationalism”, “democracy”, “international constitution (rule 
of law)”, and “civilization” against “nationalism”, “autocracy”, “anarchy”, and “barbarianism”.  
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to use persuasion to reach peaceful consensus, and to establish an 
intersubjectively understand of the international problems and to work towards 
collective change within international politics. Rather than using the concept to 
explain how decision-makers should make a deterrent move or to initiate a 
hegemonic war (as I shall show in the next chapter), these thinkers consider 
the cultivation, articulation and mobilization of the common man’s reason to be 
indispensable for international politics. 
A second feature is the exhortative tone they adopt when speaking of the 
language of Kantian reason. For the Liberal Institutionalists, Kantian reason is 
not an assumption of what men actually are, but an ideal for which the common 
man should strive to be. Instead of confirming the later Realist accusation that 
the Liberal Institutionalists have naively believed in the reason of man, the latter 
rather share the former’s interpretation of human nature. Nevertheless, the 
Liberal Institutionalists are characterized by their emphasis on the need to 
transform the common man into a more rational being. The normativity they 
endowed on the conception was integral to the purpose of creating IR as an 
academic discipline. Later on, I shall show how Kantian reason is used by Risse 
and Muller – the German Idealists – in an explanatory rather than exhortative 
way.  
Third, the Liberal Institutionalists ascribe a distinct subject to reason. Reason 
is an attribute of the common man, not one of state. The Idealists did not attach 
hope to the claim that states’ actions can be governed by reason (as Cox 
claimed). Rather, they argued that it was the common man who should cultivate 
their reason. For Zimmern, “‘Reason’, once transmogrified into ‘Reason of 
State’, was a convenient pretext for setting aside the moral law”.65  
The Idealists’ attempt to foster reason finally failed. As Boucher amply put it: 
“The Wall Street Crash of 1929, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, 
Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, the withdrawal of Japan and Germany 
                                                              
65  Zimmern 1936: 62.  
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from the League in 1935, and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 
confirmed the view of sceptics that faith in human reason for the divergence of 
world peace was misplaced”.66  
It is against this background that Carr introduced the term “utopianism” into 
the field in The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (1939). Far from slurring 
intangible names of as an accusation, Carr’s target was clearly in view. He 
depicted the “foundations of utopianism”, which he dated back to Bentham and 
Buckle, as a “doctrine of reason”, the “rationalist faith”, “rationalism”, 
“intellectualism of international politics”, “abstract rationalism” in which only “the 
metaphysicians of Geneva” believed. For Norman Angell, for instance, “war 
was simply a ‘failure of understanding’.” “Never was there an age”, bemoaned 
Carr, “which so unreservedly proclaimed the supremacy of the intellect”.67 Carr 
was very aware – like J.A. Hobson before and Morgenthau after – that this 
doctrine of reason is underpinned by a “triple conviction” in the positive relation 
between intellect and action. First, the Liberal Institutionalists believe that to 
reason rightly from a priori starting points is not only a necessary but sufficient 
condition for interest and moral conduct. Second, education, spread of 
knowledge and public opinion as the “voice of reason” can be deployed by the 
common man who will make right judgment. Third, action results necessarily 
from their enhanced knowledge. “Reason could demonstrate the absurdity of 
the international anarchy; and with increasing knowledge, enough people would 
be rationally convinced of its absurdity to put an end to it”.68 As Carr himself 
recapped in a rhetorical passage:  
 
“If mankind in its international relations has signally failed to achieve the 
rational good, it must either have been too stupid to understand that good, 
or too wicked to pursue it. Professor Zimmern leans to the hypothesis of 
                                                              
66  Boucher 1998: 7.  
67  Carr 1939: 27-39, passim. Sometimes Carr speak of the “essential foundation of the liberal creed” or “foundation-
stones” of Liberalism. 
68  Carr 1939: 27-8.   
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stupidity, repeating almost word for word the argument of Buckle and Sir 
Norman Angell: ‘The obstacle in our path […] is not in the moral sphere, 
but in the intellectual […] It is not because men are ill-disposed that they 
cannot be educated into a world social consciousness. It is because they 
– let us be honest and say ‘we’ – are beings of conservative temper and 
limited intelligence’. […] Professor Toynbee, on the other hand, sees the 
causes of the breakdown in human wickedness.”69 
 
  For Carr, the utopians have privileged the intellect (a priori) over experience, 
morality over power, purpose over facts and theory over practice. Whereas they 
believe in reason, a Realist will correct the rationalist dogma by historical 
induction and experience. Given the “complete bankruptcy” of the “synthesis of 
morality and reason”, and the “breakdown of the system of ethics” on the basis 
of “the reconciliation of reason and morality through the doctrine of the harmony 
of interests”, Realists will necessarily view that “morality is the product of 
power”.70 Whereas the utopians want to see that the League, which is “closely 
bound up with the twin belief that public opinion was bound to prevail and that 
public opinion was the voice of reason”, could prevail over violence, the Realists 
conversely accept the fall of the League as a fact.71  
Although Carr’s critique is not well received in Britain because of his 
“disparagement of reason”,72 it does arouse a number of echoes from the other 
side of the Atlantic. First, in the long run, Carr’s accusation of the Idealist naïve 
belief in reason that can lead to the convergence of interest and morality (the 
“harmony of interest”) had an intimidating effect on the latter theorists, 
especially the Neoliberals. As I shall show in the next chapter (section ii), many 
of these Neoliberals, such as Arthur Stein and Robert Axelrod, used a distinct, 
“egoistic”, conception of reason to show that international institutions are 
                                                              
69  Carr 1939: 38.  
70  Carr 1939: 58, 62-3, 1945: 102.  
71  Carr 1939: 34, 29.  
72  Wilson 1998: 2.  
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beneficial even if the states are acting in accordance with their own self-interest. 
Second, within the next few years, reason would be received with profound 
suspicion and even disdain by IR thinkers in the US. Nevertheless, rather than 
offering a complete repudiation of the term, many scholars, including Hans 
Morgenthau, instead displays quite a nuanced, transitive, and mixed position.   
 
(ii) The Realist Reconstruction: The Case of Hans Morgenthau  
 
Ideology vs. True Reason: Scientific Man vs. Power Politics 1937-1946  
 
Having witnessed the series of fiascoes of the Anglophone statesman (and 
intellectuals) to come to terms with the challenge of Totalitarianism, Hans 
Morgenthau, after his immigration to the US in 1937, resolutely embarked on a 
project. This project, culminating in Scientific Man versus Power Politics (1946, 
hereafter Scientific Man), was a dissection of the paralyzed “political philosophy” 
that failed to triumph over the “intellectual, moral, and political challenge of 
fascism”.73 The critique of Scientific Man by Morgenthau, far from being an 
academic attack on the “behaviorist social science” represented by Charles 
Merriam and Harold Laswell in Chicago,74 addressed political failure such as 
Robert Cecil’s “rational discussion”, Chamberlain’s “peace in our time”, the 
unexpected defeat of the French army in 1940, and the Japanese attack of 
Pearl Harbor in 1941. It was against this political background that Morgenthau 
spent five years turning from law to an investigation of the “philosophy” of 
Rationalism.75 
Being Morgenthau’s first English but “premature” monograph,76 Scientific 
Man manifests as well as distorts Morgenthau’s conception of reason. Both of 
                                                              
73  Morgenthau 1946a: 6-7. 
74  Juntersonke 2010: 131ff.  
75  Morgenthau 1946a: 105, 115, 101, see also Frei 2001: 182-3. Morgenthau’s undertaking of this project, in addition 
to his liberal commitment, was also under the pressure of seeking and securing a profession to live in America, 
see Lebow 2011: 547-50. 
76  Morgenthau 1970a: 5.  
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the manifestation and distortion will become evident by comparing with the 
critique undertaken by Carr.77 
First, Scientific Man exposes Morgenthau’s criticism of a particular 
conception of reason that overemphasizes the potency of the human intellect. 
Like Carr, Morgenthau criticized the fact that Rationalism was predicated on the 
belief that “man gained confidence in the general transforming powers of 
reason” (recall Zimmern’s transfiguring, harmonizing, power of reason). In 
contrast to Carr who views the Liberal Institutionalists’ intellectualism as mainly 
manifested within the political terrain, Morgenthau argues that Rationalism has 
pervaded into the every corner of the social world: Rationalism is an assumption 
that “the rationality of nature” could also be attained in the “social world” as if 
the issues of ethics, politics, and even arts are susceptible to intellectual 
control.78 (Morgenthau’s Rationalism thus seems to be more than what the 
Liberal Institutionalists advocate.)  
Parallel to Carr’s definition of Idealism as the “triple conviction”, Morgenthau 
also depicted Rationalism as the threefold zealous faith in human reason. First, 
“rationally right action is of necessity the successful one”; second, “the rationally 
right and the ethically good are identical”; third, education can cultivate reason 
and human reason has universal application in the social sphere.79 Yet unlike 
Carr whose criticism makes few distinctions between the instrumental and 
purposive use of reason, Morgenthau is more aware that the Liberal 
Institutionalists want to use reason to designate both the means and ends of 
political conduct. The Liberal Institutionalists believe that “the reign of reason 
[as the end] in international affairs will make impossible those fundamental 
conflicts, and reason will provide instrumentality by which the remaining 
conflicts can be settled peacefully”. They hope that the triumph of reason over 
                                                              
77 I compare it with Carr’s critique to show that in contrast to the conventional understanding (e.g. Reus-Smit 2002), 
Morgenthau does not go as far as Carr does in crusading the “Idealists”. I will make more comparisons (with 
other Realists) below. 
78 Morgenthau 1946a: 26, 9, 104, 144, 12-8, 27-8, 35-7, 1947: 312-3.  
79  Morgenthau 1946a: 11-3.  
58 
 
the outburst of “political passions” and of “ignorance and emotions” can 
designate the end of human action. The construction of “rational system of legal 
rules” and to the “rational solution either through compromise or through 
adjudication”, will provide instrumentality for safeguarding peace.80  
Like Carr, finally, Morgenthau also condemned the overlook of the human lust 
for power, “the ubiquity of evil in human action” or “ubiquity of the desire for 
power”. The “animus dominandi”, the “very life-blood of the action, the 
constitutive principle of politics as a distinct sphere of human activity”, is ignored. 
The social dimension of conduct, namely that rational action may be frustrated 
by another agent, was completely overlooked. 81  “The League of Nations, 
harmony of interests, collective security, identification of the national interest 
with the universal good”, as Morgenthau summarized later in the founding issue 
of World Politics (1948), “are indeed classic examples of a utopian 
rationalism”.82 
Second, which proves to be well beyond his expectation, is that the rhetorical 
forcefulness of Morgenthau’s critique rather obfuscates his intention to “rescue 
reason from the Idealist Rationalism” (to borrow Alker’s term). Whereas many 
later IR theorists regard Morgenthau’s Scientific Man as a complete refutation 
of the significance of human reason in politics,83 Morgenthau intends on the 
contrary to restore the importance of the intellect in a complex way. As a letter 
of two years later exposed,84 Morgenthau regretted his failure to make it clear 
in Scientific Man that there was a distinction between “rationalism” and “rational” 
(and “scientism” and “science”), and for him he irrational or anti-rational view of 
politics was no less malignant than the rationalistic one. (Unlike Carr whose 
Marxist orientation engenders hostility to the “liberal rationality” and the 
proclamation of its “bankruptcy”, Morgenthau considers, anticipating his 
                                                              
80  Morgenthau 1946a: 71, 53ff., 75-6, 85, 90, 52; also 1945c: 196-7, 1946b: 232.  
81  Morgenthau 1946a: 194-6.  
82  Morgenthau 1948b: 129.   
83  See e.g. Jervis 1994: 867-9 
84 Behr and Rösch 2012: 48, Jervis 1994: 864-5.   
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defense of Liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s, that Rationalism has both 
considerable validity and value under certain socio-historical conditions.85) At 
least in Morgenthau’s own intention, the critique of Rationalism is not designed 
to be a complete destruction of reason. Rather, it has to be a restoration of the 
real significance of reason in politics.  
How does Morgenthau undertake his reconstruction to save reason from a 
conception that exaggerates the potency of the human intellect? First, 
Morgenthau brings the lust for power back into the social world to balance the 
alleged potency of human intellect. Notice, however, that Morgenthau brings 
power back in a way that is fundamentally different from the one viewed by Carr 
(at least in Morgenthau’s own view). Whereas Carr polarizes the relation 
between reason/morality as utopian, and experience/power as reality, and 
wants to inhabit the space between Realism and Utopianism, Morgenthau 
instead subdivides the same human existence into various dimensions that has 
at once an intellectual, a passionate, and a moral, facet.  
For Morgenthau, Carr’s problem is the “philosophically untenable equation of 
utopia, theory, and morality” on the one side, and experience, practice, 
induction, power and reality, on the other. This dichotomization leads Carr to 
the emphasis on the one (latter) pair at the expense of the other. The Liberal 
Institutionalists had established a utopia of intellect and morality to govern 
power. Carr created a “utopia of power”, and a utopia of eventual experiences 
that makes it impossible to have a “transcendent point of view from which to 
                                                              
85  For Morgenthau (1955a: 66), Rationalism “was not destroyed by its own rational deficiencies or by the hostility 
of the intellectuals”, but “by the modern conditions and problems of its life” which rendered it “unable to reflect 
and solve”, see also Shilliam 2009: 313-5. Not only did Rationalism enhance man’s mastery over nature in the 
premodern era, disenchant international politics from religious fevers in the beginning of the modern period and 
facilitate the balance of power, it had also performed a well service for the middle class in their struggle against 
feudal rulers. In its socio-historical origin, the Liberalists, realizing that their inner commonality prevailed over 
disputes, build a range of mechanism to resolve their internal conflicts through such “instrumentality of liberal 
rationality” as “rational argument” (public opinion), “legal rationality” (legal adjudication), and “rational means 
of compromise and adjudication” (democracy). In their external struggle with the feudal and autocratic class, they 
represented themselves as true reason, constructing on the one hand the rulers as representatives of power, 
violence, arbitrariness, and on the other, “the people” (middle class) as by nature “being inclined to reason and 
peace”. Rationalism, serving as “an ideological weapon”, had helped the Liberalists demolish the autocratic class 
while simultaneously concealed the power struggle underlying it. See Morgenthau 1946a: 20, 62-3, 106-7, 113-
4, 1948a: 165, Nobel 1995: 65. The Liberal dimension of Morgenthau’s thought, see Morgenthau 1960a, 1970-
1973, Scheuerman 2009: Ch.6.  
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survey the political scene and to appraise the phenomenon of power”.86 Rather 
than retaining the tensions between the reason and power and thus constantly 
enabling reason to scrutinize the use of power (intellectually as well as 
morally),87 Carr dichotomizes the relation between the two and attempts at a 
permanent resolution. If previously the potency of the intellect has been 
exaggerated as if intellectual life is the way of human existence, then now it is 
opportune to understand that it is only one among many dimensions of human 
existence. And to recognize power as one dimension of human existence is not, 
as Williams construes,88 to construct political action as within an exclusively 
distinct sphere or an ideal type, where only power is preponderant and reason 
is crushed. Rather, it is to recognize that the existentialist condition retains the 
antinomies. Politics is a distinct sphere that despite admitting of rational 
interference (since it is only one dimension), is characteristically driven by the 
lust for power to control other human subject as instrument. Or, as Morgenthau 
clarifies six years later, the autonomy of politics “does not imply disregard for 
the existence and importance” of other modes of being: “political realism is 
based on a pluralistic conception of human nature”, which makes the mere 
political man a beast, the mere moral man a fool.89  
Second, for Morgenthau, reason and power, which has an intimate relation, 
interplays in a nuanced way. As Morgenthau stated in the beginning of Scientific 
Man: 
 
                                                              
86  Thus remarked Morgenthau (1948b: 134) two years later. Rather than bringing reason and power back into a 
harmonious relationship with human existence (to use Zimmern’s phrase) as a multidimensional being, Carr leads 
critique to a construction of a newly idealized sphere of action to compete with Rationalism. Hence Carr, like 
Carl Schmitt, led critique to the demolishment of an old ideology and replacement by a new one. Carr 1939: Ch.3. 
On the Mannheim-Morgenthau relation, see further Jütersonke 2010:151-6; Behr and Rösch 2012: 44-5.  
87  For Morgenthau, reason is crucial for revealing the truth of politics that poses a moral challenge to the function 
of power. In 1948, for instance, Morgenthau criticized Carr: “whoever holds seeming superiority of power 
becomes of necessity the repository of superior morality as well. Power thus corrupts not only the actor on the 
political scene, but even the observer, unfortified by a transcendent standard of ethics”. See more in Morgenthau 
1970a.  
88  Williams 2005: Ch.3.  
89  Morgenthau 1952a: 12.  
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“In order to eliminate from the political sphere not power politics […] but 
the destructiveness of power politics, rational faculties are needed which 
are different from, and superior to, the reason of the scientific age. Politics 
must be understood though reason, yet it is not in reason that it finds its 
model.”90  
 
And he rearticulated in its end:  
 
“To be successful and truly ‘rational’ in social action […], it is in the insight 
and the wisdom by which more-than-scientific man elevates his 
experiences into the universal laws of human nature. It is he who, by doing 
so, established himself as the representative of true reason, while nothing-
but-scientific man appears as the true dogmatist who universalizes 
cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them to realms not 
accessible to them. It is also the former who proves himself to be the true 
realist; for it is he who does justice to the true nature of things”.91   
 
For Morgenthau, the rational faculties are requisite. To be “truly” rational in 
action and to behave as the representative of “true” reason can be achieved 
not by abandoning reason but by realizing its existentialist boundary. Notice 
Morgenthau’s rhetoric: he radicalizes the limitedness of reason in politics into 
an assertion that politics is a realm “not accessible to them [cognitive 
principles]”. 
  Third, unlike Carr’s series of dichotomizations leading ultimately to the 
resolution of tensions, Morgenthau’s critique of Rationalism is concluded by its 
acknowledgment of the multidimensional being of man and its associated 
embrace of antinomies. First, is the rationally right automatically the successful 
in conduct? No, since reason is only one way to give life meaning, and man 
                                                              
90  Morgenthau 1946a: 9-10, emphasis added.   
91  Morgenthau 1946a: 219-20.  
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acts no less as a passionate and religious, than  rational, being. As a 
multidimensional existence, “the mystical desire for union with the universe, the 
love of Don Juan, Faust’s thirst for knowledge”, as well as the animus 
dominandi, all are motivating forces.92 Second, in addition to its failure to 
monopoly the spring of human conduct, reason also fails to monopoly the 
ultimate source of morality. “In brief, man is also a moral being”. “It is this side 
of man”, Morgenthau continued, that Rationalism “has obscured and distorted, 
if not obliterated, by trying to reduce moral problems to scientific propositions”.93 
Finally, Morgenthau highlighted that power must be recognized as a constitutive 
element of politics. “There can be no actual denial of the lust for power”, as 
Morgenthau neatly summed up, “without denying the very conditions of human 
existence in this world”.94 
As the consummation of his project to reveal what reason cannot accomplish, 
Scientific Man has two historic significances. First, for Morgenthau himself, 
Scientific Man exposed his existentialist position towards reason and marked a 
turning point in his intellectual trajectory. Starting from a critique of the 
Rationalistic conception of reason – a delineation of the existential trait of 
politics in which reason can have an influence on, but never determine, power 
– Morgenthau would later on turn to the other side, arguing that reason should 
discipline the use of power. After years of being an immigrant and experiencing 
the “red scare”, Morgenthau would, as “the representative of true reason”, 
vigorously plea for a “truly rational”, “true realist”, American foreign policy. 
Reason, Morgenthau would subsequently insist, could both give intelligible and 
prescriptive meaning to the novel international conditions that defined the new, 
“Cold War”, era.  
  Second, Morgenthau’s dualistic stance towards reason was also exemplary 
of the transitive conception of reason held by many scholars at that time 
                                                              
92  Morgenthau 1946a:194.  
93  Morgenthau 1946a:168.  
94  Morgenthau 1946a: 187-201 (at 201); on the moral being, see Scheuerman 2009: 54-64. 
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(especially the later named Realist after 1950). John Herz, who was working 
during this period on his upcoming Political Realism and Political Idealism 
(1951), outlined his “Realist Liberalism” through an adoption of a dual position 
towards reason. On the one hand, Hertz argued “political Idealism is 
characteristic of that type of political thinking [that] concentrates its interest 
upon ‘rational’ conditions or ‘rational’ solutions”.95 “But”, turning to the other 
side, he simultanously insisted that “at the same time it seems to us that it would 
be a rash conclusion to say that, because rationality does not exist in the world 
as we find it, the ideas and ideals which constitute it cannot have any effect, 
except the negative one”.96 G.F. Kennan, in his American Diplomacy (1951), 
criticized the “emotional fervor” of the American belief in public opinion, and 
pleaded that “employing force for rational and restricted purposes rather than 
for purposes which are emotional and to which it is hard to find a rational limit”.97 
Herz and Kennan’s transitional position towards reason, which exhibits 
considerable tension, embodies Morgenthau’s statement in Scientific Man that 
politics must be understood through reason, yet not in the Rationalistic one that 
politics finds its model.  
 
Rationality in Theory and Practice: The Construction of “Rational 
Realism” 1947-1959 (Part I: Political Argumentation) 
 
Although Scientific Man was torn apart piece by piece within the American circle 
of political studies, Morgenthau was still capable of moving on and unfolding 
his construction of “true reason”. In Politics among Nations (1948), a textbook 
published one year later for undergraduates, Morgenthau for the first time 
announced that he was embarking on a “scientific enquiry” to “detect and 
understand the forces which determine political relations among nations”. In 
                                                              
95  Herz 1951: 18. “Rationality”, Herz continued, “is not inherent in things political themselves; that it only forms 
the sum total of certain theories and ideas concerning what would be imposed on an irrational world”. 
96  Herz 1951: 133.   
97  Kennan 1951: 88-9.  
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contrast to the dogmatic scientists, Morgenthau’s own “scientific enquiry” 
necessarily ran the risk of obfuscation, precisely because facts in the social 
world are bound to be ambiguous, equivocal, and less susceptible to intellectual 
comprehension.98  
How this “scientific enquiry” commences Morgenthau’s theoretical 
construction of a rational realism will be seen in the next section. Here, it is only 
necessary to note that the successfulness of that textbook, which brought him 
both fame and intimacy within policy circles, was nevertheless subverted by the 
dramatic events that ensued afterwards. In 1949, the Soviet acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and the establishment of communist rule in China (and the 
Korean War that would break out shortly) shocked the Americans as if a 
worldwide communist aggression was being commenced. In the face of this 
“Red Scare”, Morgenthau cautioned that “the choice before the United States 
is to prepare for war or for peace (or, perhaps, for both)”, yet “we are doing 
neither”.99 The Truman administration was simultaneously considered to be 
badly equipped for waging a war because its policy was not going far enough 
in Europe but had gone too far in Asia.100 Whereas the government should 
have enhanced its military existence in Europe and redressed the nuclear 
balance of power – in addition to the Marshall Plan as economic assistance – 
it was rather assumed that the apocalyptic consequences of a nuclear war was 
known to Stalin, and hence warranted no military vigilance. In Asia the situation 
was the very opposite: the government misjudged the communist movements 
in the region as instances of military aggression. They were in fact national 
independence movements, with communism providing organizational 
leadership rather than the ultimate aspiration: they demanded political and 
economic (as opposed to military) solution. Nor was the government any better 
prepared for peace. Deliberately fabricating the public conception of the Soviets 
                                                              
98  Morgenthau 1948a: 3-7.  
99  Morgenthau 1950a: 166. Morgenthau’s perception of the early Cold War, see 1951b, 1954b, 1956c, 1956d, 1956e, 
1952a: 326-33.  
100 Morgenthau (1953: 13) later summarized thus.    
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as irrational, immoral, foul, and belligerent,101 the Truman administration not 
only refused to reach a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union, but instead 
appeared to be filled with the militant spirit of a democratic crusade.  
Thus in the immediate years after 1949, Morgenthau the stuff of policy 
planning essentially turned himself into a vigorous policy critic. Changed, 
however, is not merely his role. First, it is during this period, as Scheuerman 
has cogently shown,102 that Morgenthau starts to fervently embrace the term 
“Realism” in his vocabulary. Fearing to witness that the democratic crusading 
spirit, overacting in Asia and inaction in Europe would lead to an unanticipated 
outbreak of war, Morgenthau forewarned that a superpower conflict might far 
exceed “rational limitations”.103  
Second, and what has been seriously neglected, is the Kantian–rational 
nature of Realism depicted by Morgenthau. At the heart of Realism, there must 
be a Kantian–rational conduct of American foreign policy that is normatively 
prerequisite for tackling the present dilemma.  
This advocate for a “rational Realism” commences with his In Defense of the 
National Interest (1951, hereafter Defense). In Defense, which stands as a 
milestone in his intellectual development, Morgenthau succeeds in what he 
proposed but failed to spell out fully in Scientific Man – namely to demarcate 
Rationalism from “true reason”. In the beginning of Defense, Morgenthau 
criticizes the American leaders for committing the very same Rationalistic error 
as the Idealists once did. The postwar American policies in Europe and Asia, 
Morgenthau remarked, “repeat in a new terminology the same error which has 
frustrated our policies with regard to Germany twice in this century”.104 The old 
error, which is roughly called by Carr as “rationalistic” and used by Morgenthau 
in Scientific Man, is now enunciated explicitly under the new terminology as 
“Utopianism” and “Legalism”. The mistakes of “Utopianism” and “Legalism” 
                                                              
101  The best work on this period of history remains Campbell 1992: Ch.1.  
102  Scheuerman 2009: 71ff, cf. Rice 2013: 159-63. 
103  Morgenthau 1951a: 92ff.  
104  Morgenthau 1951b: 200.  
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manifest in Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull’s hopes that the antagonism 
between the superpowers could be reconciled and resolved by an international 
organization (the UN), legalistic commitment (the Yalta Agreement), and public 
opinion “reforming and bringing him [Stalin] to reason”.105 “Sentimentalism” 
and “Neo-isolationism” were subsequently added to the sins of “Utopianism” 
and “Legalism”: both contaminated the Truman government to the extent that 
that it had not only demonized the Soviet Union but, reminiscent of Wilson’s 
“crusading spirit”, “erected a message of salvation to all the world, unlimited in 
purpose, unlimited in commitments”.106 For Morgenthau, these were “the four 
intellectual errors” committed by the successive American leaders from 1945 to 
1951.107  
These four “intellectual errors”, Morgenthau argued, must be corrected by the 
true reason. A conduct of foreign policy guided by reason is requisite for 
defending the national interest. In this critical moment, Morgenthau urgently 
called for a “rational guidance for political action”, “sound political thinking”, “a 
clear and concrete understanding of what is it we are fighting”, a “rational 
approach to the problem of American assistance”, or simply, “a rational foreign 
policy”.108 Morgenthau declared that 
 
“A foreign policy, to be successful, must be commensurate with the power 
available to carry it out. The number of good deeds a nation, like an 
individual, desires to do is infinite; yet the power at the disposal of a nation, 
as of an individual, to carry them through is finite. It is this contrast between 
what a nation wants to do and what it is capable of doing […] which 
compels all nations to limit their objectives in view of the relative scarcity 
of available power […] To establish a hierarchical order, an order of 
                                                              
105  Morgenthau 1951a: 91-112.  
106  Morgenthau 1951a: 78, 116, 35, 129. 
107  Morgenthau 1951a: Ch.IV passim. It was issued in Britain under a less polemical and more substantial title: 
American Foreign Policy: A Critical Examination.  
108 Morgenthau 1951a: 35, 160, 89, 123, 118. 
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priorities, among all possible objectives of a nation’s foreign policy, must 
be the first step in framing a rational foreign policy.”109 
 
A “rational” foreign policy, as Morgenthau remarks, provides precisely the 
instrument for defending the national interest. Unlike the “Idealists”, 
Morgenthau directs reason to power, arguing that the realization of true reason 
in designating political conduct must be built on the recognition of the 
significance of power. Yet like the Idealists who have been criticized for using 
reason as an instrument to solve conflict, now it is Morgenthau himself who 
resurrects the old belief that the reign of reason in the making of foreign policy 
can prune down overweening ambitions to the level of available resources.110  
Yet from 1952 onwards, the newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration 
not only failed to complete the unfinished business left by his predecessor, but, 
in the view of Morgenthau, went further in the wrong direction. In Europe, with 
the overt compliance and covert manipulation of Konrad Adenauer, the 
American overreliance on remilitarizing Germany (1952-1954) and integrating 
her into the European Defense Community (1954) both limited and undermined 
the US’ own military influence. Instead of reducing extravagant commitments in 
Asia, the government rather drastically extended “military aid” from Syngman 
Rhee in South Korea (1950) to Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam (early 1950s), 
to Chang Chai Shek in Taiwan (1955), and to the states such as Pakistan, in 
addition to its attempt to organize an Asian NATO (i.e. SEATO, 1954-7). All 
these policy moves, Morgenthau warned, would maximize the risk in Europe 
and involve the Americans excessively in Asia so draining the US financially 
and dragging her into a direct conflict in a military front.  
For such a misconceived foreign policy, the problem did not lie in a paralyzed 
action. Rather, Morgenthau warned, in a Zimmernian tone, that the fundamental 
                                                              
109  Morgenthau 1951a: 111, 117-8. 
110  Smith 1981, Nobel 1995: 68-9, M. Cox 2007: 179-83, Scheuerman 2009: Ch.3. Translated into policy language, 
Morgenthau was recommending that the US should liquidate indiscriminate commitments in Asia, concentrate 
on Europe, and give priority to a bargained-with-strength settlement with the Soviets.   
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problem laid in “an all-pervading deficiency of understanding”, the “clumsiness 
and confusions” of intellectual guidance, the “unsophisticated and mechanical 
way of thought”. The crux is not political but intellectual, not “the quality of 
specific policies” but “the quality of the thought which goes into them”. 
Accordingly, Morgenthau argued for thinking of a “rational foreign policy”, a 
“political doctrine” that “would give political meaning to those technical activities 
and co-ordinate them with the over-all objectives of our political policy.”111 To 
give overarching meaning to every move undertook on the grand chessboard, 
statesmen are required to discipline their intellects to the perfection of their 
powers. In the case of the American (military) aid to the Asian states where 
“military aid has no rational political objective”, for example,  
 
“That policy is lacking in the practical discipline which is the reflection, in the 
field of action, of the discipline of the intellect. When I am sure in the 
knowledge of what I seek to achieve and how to go about achieving it, that 
certain knowledge will give all my actions a common direction and all my 
plans a common standard for evaluation, and the smallest detail of my 
planning and the action will be informed by it”.112  
 
In crafting policy, therefore, reason rather gives all political conducts an 
overarching meaning, a center of ultimate end around which all the detailed 
proceedings should be arrayed. Reason goes beyond the mere designation of 
means.  
  During the second term of the Eisenhower administration, Morgenthau was 
once more shocked by two incidents which distanced Morgenthau from the 
rational ideal. In 1956, when the simultaneous crises in Suez and Hungary 
(1956) occurred, Morgenthau vehemently criticized that the president, rather 
than driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and its satellite states, did his 
                                                              
111  Morgenthau, 1954c, 1957d, 1958b, 1959b, all in 1962b: 222, 46, 169, 71; 1954b: 21, 1956c: 252.  
112 Morgenthau 1956c: 267-8. 
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formidable opponent a favor against the US’ own allies by eliciting an UN 
resolution. This incident demonstrated that Eisenhower neither based policy 
design on “a reasoned calculation of the interest involved and power engaged”, 
nor detached himself from his predecessor’s sentimental attachment to the UN. 
“A discriminating and unemotioinal intelligence”, as Morgenthau cried out, “is 
more necessary than ever in our approach to the UN”.113 Again, in 1957, 
stunned by the “missile gap” (the Soviet emanation of Sputnik) and Dulles’ 
appointment of Maxwell Gluck as ambassador to Sri Lanka, Morgenthau 
charged bitterly that the American leaders are subjecting national interest to 
“popular prejudices”, trading “a sound foreign policy” for “the demands of 
domestic politics” which constitutes “a formidable handicap to the rational 
conduct of American foreign policy”.114  
  Indeed, within the decade from Truman to Eisenhower, Morgenthau had 
constantly invoked Tocqueville’s aphorism (wrote in Democracy in America) 
from Defense to The Purpose of American Politics (1960): “The propensity that 
induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, and to abandon 
mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion, was clearly seen in 
America on the breaking out of the French Revolution.”115 Instead of using 
reason to provide a basis for both the end and means of defending national 
interest, the two administrations rather give way to sentimental and emotional 
considerations. It is precisely at this point, Morgenthau cautioned in a manner 
reminiscent of Zimmern, that an intellectual theory was needed to both de-
emotionalize and facilitate statesmen’s actions.  
 
Rationality in Theory and Practice: The Construction of Rational 
Realism 1947-1959 (Part II: Theoretical Debate) 
 
                                                              
113 Morgenthau 1956e: 33, 1957c: 278. 
114 Morgenthau 1957b: 210, 1961a: 301, 1961c:100.  
115  Morgenthau 1951: 222-3, 1960: 26. 
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In parallel to his normative plea for using reason to structure both ends and 
means of conducting American foreign policy is a war waged in the theoretical 
front. Ironically, although Morgenthau devoted considerably less time to this 
theoretical enterprise – throughout the 1950s, his writings on a theory of 
international politics are characterized not only by paucity but also by 
monotonous repetition116 – these writings have nevertheless attracted vast 
attention because they establish the basis for Morgenthau’s “Six Principles of 
Realism”.  
  With the exception of Molloy,117 IR scholars seem to have overlooked that 
the defining purpose behind the six principles is its offering of a “rational” theory 
of international politics. Indeed, Morgenthau’s writings in the 1950s reach their 
zenith with his construction of an account of rational Realism. Having published 
In Defense of National Interest (1951) intermediately between J.H. Herz’s 
Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951) and G.F. Kennan’s American 
Diplomacy (1951), Morgenthau received ardent, though misconstrued, 
responses from many academics. The reviewers, including the celebrated 
Quincy Wright, not only downplayed his substantial policy recommendations, 
but criticized his dichotomization between “realism” and other various “ism”s for 
befuddling policy analysis.118 Morgenthau, in response, soon opened a second 
front within academia. From 1952 to 1959, Morgenthau can be seen, as a 
rejoinder, to undertake three rhetorical, and two metaphorical, moves to deepen 
the construction of rational Realism.   
The first polemical move is Morgenthau’s portrait of the dispute as “Another 
Great Debate” (1952). In it, Morgenthau defends himself chiefly on theoretical 
ground. The principle merit of Realism, Morgenthau declared, was its offering 
of a “scientific” theory that brought “rational outline” and “order and meaning to 
a mass of phenomena” without which “it would remain disconnected and 
                                                              
116  Compare Morgenthau 1954a, 1955b: esp.456-7, 1959c, 1959a: 17ff., 1959c: 121-38.  
117  Molloy 2006: 77. 
118  Wolfers 1952, Tucker 1952: 212-4, Wright 1952: 119, 126.  
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unintelligible”. Realism at least enables scholars to intellectually understand the 
statesmen’s political actions:    
 
“In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must 
meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances and 
ask ourselves, what are the rational alternatives from which a statesman 
may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances, 
presuming always that he acts in a rational manner, and which of these 
rational alternatives was this particular statesman, acting under these 
circumstances, likely to choose? It is the testing of this rational hypothesis 
against the actual facts and their consequences which […] makes the 
scientific writing of political history possible.”119 
 
Like Zimmern, Morgenthau defines a Realist as putting his feet on “actual facts”. 
The first function of rational Realism is to serve as a “rational hypothesis” to 
make political acts and actual events intellectually understandable.  
In his second rhetorical move Morgenthau polemicized his original statement. 
In 1954, when he postulated a novel “Principles of Realism” (based on some 
materials from “Another Great Debate”) in the second edition of Politics among 
Nations (1954), Morgenthau announced that the rational Realism had two 
incomparable virtues. First, Realism, more than simply “ascertaining facts and 
giving them meaning through reason”, is claimed to be capable of exposing the 
“force” that determined political relations, of penetrating into those forces as 
“objective laws” rooted in human nature. Second, for Realism, its superiority 
does not merely build on its competency to grasp the objective laws, but to 
verbalize them as “a rational theory” which always lies behind the actions of the 
statesmen. “As disinterested observer”, Morgenthau announced in a 
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Zimmernian tone, “we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than 
he, the actor on the political scene, does himself”.120 
Third, by giving meaning to political action through human reason, Realism 
can provide a truly convergent point between scholarship and statesmanship 
that links the scholar and statesman altogether. As Morgenthau stated in his 
contribution to the Rockefeller-foundation-funded meeting on “IR theory” in 
1959:  
 
“What makes a theory of politics possible in spite of the ambiguities of its 
subject matter is the rationality in which both the mind of the observer and 
the object of observation, that is, politics, partake. Politics is engaged in by 
rational men who pursue certain rational interests with rational means. The 
observer, however, handicapped by the ambiguities…is able, by virtue of 
his own rationality, to retrace the steps which politics has taken in the past 
and to anticipate those it will take in the future. Knowing that behind these 
steps there is a rational mind lie his own, the observer can put himself into 
the place of the statesman – past, present, or future – and think as he has 
thought or is likely to think”.121 
 
The common intellect, transcending the constriction of time, unites the political 
observer and actor intersubjectively together. For Morgenthau, as for Zimmern, 
the common rationality of man also guarantees that one’s rational theory can 
be used by another individual (a statesman) to discipline conduct. Like 
Zimmern’s intellectuals, Morgenthau announces that the rational Realism 
devised by theorists can be further used “for rational discipline in action” that 
guards national interest against emotional, ideological, and other motivational, 
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deviations.122 Or, as Morgenthau’s first metaphorical move in 1955 illustrated, 
a theory is like a map that 
 
“allows the observer […] to orient himself in the maze of empirical 
phenomena which make up the field of politics, and to establish a measure 
of rational order within it. A central concept, such as power, then provides 
a kind of rational outline of politics, a map of the political scene. Such a 
map […] provides the timeless features of its geography distinct from their 
ever-changing historic setting […and] will tell us what are the rational 
possibilities for travel from one spot on the map to another […] Thus it 
imparts a measure of rational order to the observing mind and, by doing 
so, establishes one of the conditions for successful action.”123 
 
Without giving meaning to action through reason, the statesmen can easily lost 
in the empirical maze, becoming directionless in the face of the overwhelming 
facts. They may rely on their intuitions (as Zimmern would say), but it is reason 
that capacitates the observing mind to penetrate into the essence of politics. 
Rational Realism, therefore, captures the “timeless feature” distinct from the 
“ever-changing historical setting”, and provides the most economic route 
(“rational measure”) to the proposed end, and thereby establishes “conditions 
for successful action”. For Morgenthau, as for Zimmern, it is essential to ensure 
that reason is the basis of political conduct – the intellectual’s reason should 
guide the statesman’s action. As Morgenthau himself used the metaphor of 
“photograph and portrait” to illustrate this point further in 1958:  
 
“The difference between the empirical reality of politics and a theory of 
politics is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. 
The photograph shows every-thing that can be seen by the naked eye. The 
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painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked 
eye, but it shows one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human 
essence of the person portrayed. A theory of politics must want the 
photographic picture of the political scene to resemble as much as possible 
in painted portrait”.124 
 
For Morgenthau, the rationally right now becomes the ethically good. Because 
reason can disclose the essence of empirical reality, and expose what “the 
naked eye cannot see”, political conduct ought to conform to the portrait rather 
than the other way around. A theory making sense of action through reason is 
also the moral one that should be the arbiter of policy design.125 Hence “a 
theory of politics”, Morgenthau declared, “must value that rational nature of its 
subject matter also for practical reasons. It must assume that a rational policy 
is of necessity a good policy; for only such a policy minimizes risks and 
maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of 
prudence and the political requirement of success.”126 “Political realism”, as 
Morgenthau himself wrote in his updated edition of Politics among Nations 
(1960), “maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements 
of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational in view of its 
own moral and practical purposes”.127 
In Morgenthau’s view, reason (intellect) should not only designate both 
means and ends to actual conduct of foreign policy in practice, but also be 
deployed in theory to reveal the essence of the political sphere and to discipline 
and facilitate such a propitious action. “Far from venting his lust for power on 
the world,” as Nobel once recapped, “Morgenthau’s statesman represents the 
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essence of rationality”.128 Indeed, it is reason that assures theoretical insight, 
practical acuity and moral soundness.  
 
Nuclear Weapons and the “Providence of Reason” 1952-1964 
 
In parallel with his plea for an ideally “rational” theory and conduct of American 
foreign policy, Morgenthau’s continued to insist on the need for a Kantian–
rational military strategy. Conventionally, Morgenthau has been portrayed as a 
utilitarian theorist of military strategy (or power) and is accordingly aligned with 
the utilitarian conception of rationality which defines the Deterrence theories – 
Aron and Keohane make precisely this argument, as I shall show in the next 
and final chapter. Nevertheless, Morgenthau himself, in drawing on a 
Kantian/Clausewitzian perspective, is a fervent critic of rational deterrence 
theories and argues that any “rational” military strategy must be first of all 
concerned with the end of war.  
From 1952 to 1958, Morgenthau had been constantly warning the US 
government to guard against two deadly errors and to rationally deploy her 
military force. On the one side, it would be erroneous to assume that nuclear 
weapons can be actually used for maximizing American interest. Because 
nuclear weapons would bring incalculably disastrous repercussions, they 
became unserviceable to such an extent that the whole purpose of war could 
be eliminated. “War in the atomic age”, as Morgenthau alerted as early as in 
1951, “has become the reduction ad adsurdum of policy itself”.129 In 1954 when 
John Dulles proposed “massive retaliation” as nuclear strategy, Morgenthau 
was desperate to point out its impossibility because “atomic war is no longer, 
as traditional war, an instrument of rational policy”. 130  In addition, the 
performance of the Eisenhower government in the Geneva Conference (1955) 
and Suez-Hungary Crisis (1956) also disturbed Morgenthau. In his policy of 
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“new pacifism” – acting as if the eschewal of a nuclear confrontation with the 
Soviets prevailed over all other American considerations – Eisenhower might 
have gestured the wrong signs, conceded initiative to the opponent and 
incurred the very risk he wanted to avoid.  
For Morgenthau both nuclear war and the policy of “appeasement” were 
detrimental to American interests. Yet, what was the way out? “Weakness born 
of fear, then, is liable to call forth the very thing feared; force rationally employed 
is the supreme guarantee of peace”. 131  By “force rationally employed”, 
Morgenthau did not suggest, as Craig asserted,132 that nuclear weapons could 
be used as a means to serve the American interest. Rather, for Morgenthau, “a 
rational instrument of national policies” has to start by questioning the ultimate 
end of using nuclear war as an instrument. Traditionally, statesmen can be seen 
as weighing the advantages and risks of employing war to enhance their 
position. But in the nuclear age, 
 
“The feasibility of all-out atomic war has completely destroyed this rational 
relation between force and foreign policy. All-out atomic war, being an 
instrument of universal destruction, obliterates not only the traditional 
distinction between victor and vanquished, but also the material objective of the 
war itself.”133 
 
In this instance, speaking of the language of Clausewitz – Clausewitz, drawing 
on Kant, construes that war should be governed by reason in both purposive 
and instrumental use 134 – Morgenthau draws a sharp distinction between 
military strategy in a prenuclear age and in the nuclear one. In the prenuclear 
age, war serves as an instrument to break the opponent’s will, whose 
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purposeful use can be controlled, and efficiency calculated and compared (with 
alternative means), by the intellect. In the nuclear age, not only have nuclear 
weapons obliterated the means of advancing national interest, they have also 
destroyed the rational end of war itself. The advent of the nuclear weapons 
demolishes reason’s control over their use as a beneficial means It is because 
of the obliteration of the ultimate end of nuclear war that the US has to afford “a 
non-atomic military establishment” and behave in a manner of “a blend of self-
restraint and daring” – only then, Morgenthau stressed, could the Americans be 
militarily strong enough to deter the aggression while not “so strong as to 
provoke all-out atomic retaliation”.135  
Nevertheless, around the same time as he declared his strategy of “force 
rationally employed” as conventional deterrence, Morgenthau discerned that 
there was also a voice propagating “force rationally employed” but having the 
very distinct denotation from his own. Oskar Morgenstern’s Questions for 
National Defense (1959), Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict (1960), 
and Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War (1960), astonished Morgenthau for 
the widespread belief in the employability of nuclear weapons: they were even 
formulated in a “rational” form just like his own! (I shall say more in the next 
chapter.) Indeed, even his former student Henry Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Policy (1957), which also admitted of the instrumental utility of a 
“tactical” nuclear strike, shocked Morgenthau.136  
It is against this intellectual background, and no less hazardously the Cuba 
Missile Crisis (1962) which nearly brings Chicken Game into reality, that 
Morgenthau undertakes a Kantian critique of the instrumental conception of 
reason. For Morgenthau, the fundamental errors which Kahn and the like 
committed are twofold.  
                                                              
135  Morgenthau 1957a: 161, 1956a: 140. “Effective diplomacy and strong conventional forces”, as Morgenthau 
(1969, 242) would restate in his last suggestion on A New Foreign Policy for the United States, “are an insurance 
against the suicidal absurdity of nuclear war”.  
136 See Morgenthau’s review (1958d). Morgenthau seemed to engage extensively with Rational Deterrence, his 
survey in Morgenthau 1965a.   
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First, to think about nuclear weapons, Morgenthau stressed, was to consider 
what ends they would serve. As long as they make war itself meaningless in 
end, obliterating any intelligibility, they can never serve as “a rational instrument 
of national policy, but as a suicidal absurdity”.137 Military-strategic actions have 
to be designated with a view of the ultimate end. True, a state that first commits 
to unbearable cost when playing a Chicken game can deter the opponent if 
both are “rational” – “rational” denotes, as Kahn himself conceived and 
Morgenthau perfectly understood, a constricted vision of cost-benefit 
calculation. 138  But as long as nuclear weapons nullify the constitutive 
precondition as an intelligible and meaningful instrument, their regulative, 
calculable, efficiency could (or rather, should not) neither be attested to, nor 
tested against other alternatives. The “rational” deterrence theorists have 
privileged the instrumentality of reason to such an extent that like the “Idealists”, 
they have established a superstition as if political action is solely governed by 
the intellect and its instrumental use:  
 
“What characterizes contemporary theories of international relations is the 
attempt to use the tools of modern economic analysis in a modified form in 
order to understand international relations […] In such a theoretical 
scheme, nations confront each other not as living historic entities with all 
their complexities but as rational abstractions, after the model of ‘economic 
man’, playing games of military and diplomatic chess according to a 
rational calculus that exists nowhere but in the theoretician’s mind.”139 
  
Nations, like men, are also multidimensional beings. The economic man is only 
one mode of being.  
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Second, Morgenthau criticizes the fact that behind Kahn and the like’s 
apparently “rational” demonstration there is an underlying emotional 
commitment to show the employability of nuclear weapons. Motivated by the 
urge to show that states can use nuclear weapons in accordance with 
calculation, the deterrence theorists had been “fascinated by the rational model 
of the natural sciences”. As a consequence they disregarded the multicity of 
being of nations, and overlooked “the very nature of foreign policy and military 
policy with all its ambiguities, its contingencies, and the bunches derived from 
them militates against it”. For Morgenthau, the emotional, once disguised as 
the intellectual, can simply conceal the “stark facts” that the latter would 
otherwise have revealed. Once again, Morgenthau considered that he is 
witnessing “the scientist [sic] theories of our day pretend to be capable of 
manipulating with scientific precision a society of sovereign nations”.140 Their 
subsequent propagation and exploitation can only turn those theorists into the 
“proponent and ideologue of political and military policies”.141 
  Morgenthau, to sum up, is a thinker of Kantian reason. First, although he 
acknowledges that passion is a constituent of human existence and the passion 
for power makes political conduct characteristic, Morgenthau still insists that 
political action should be understood as well as guided by reason. Second, 
reason, as Morgenthau presents it, can objectively penetrate into facts and 
events, making them intelligible, and forge an intersubjective link between the 
scholar and statesman, connecting the two intellectually together. Third, for 
Morgenthau, foreign policy and military strategy should be designated on the 
basis of reason. Far from being a theorist of utilitarian rationality depicting 
political conduct simplistically as the instrumental maximization of power, 
Morgenthau urges that a rational action must not only economize action 
efficiently but also take the end into account. Only actions based on reason can 
satisfy the moral precept.  
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(iii) The Revival of Kantian Reason since the 1980s 
 
With the flow of game theory into IR, a process which began in the 1960s, the 
old conception of reason as a rational faculty of man (which harnessed his 
passions, facilitated peaceful discussion and argumentation), gradually broke 
down. The same fate transpired for the alternative notion of ranking the most 
beneficial course of action and making a choice to maximize interest. Reason, 
of which such IR thinkers as Zimmern, Carr, Morgenthau, Herz, and Kenan, had 
spoken in some depth, was subsequently scienticized into “rationality”. 
  Yet, from 1981 onwards, the Kantian conception of reason experienced a 
revival. This resurgence of Kantian idea was accomplished through the 
influence of Habermas’ idea of communicative rationality. In what follows I shall 
mainly focus on two thinkers, showing how they have both employed Habermas’ 
communicative rationality to resurge the conception of reason shared by the 
“Idealists” and Morgenthau. The first thinker is Richard Ashley. The second is 
Andrew Linklater. In addition to Ashley and Linklater, an additional group of 
scholars are also reexamined, on the basis that they briefly illustrate the 
extraordinary similarity between their conceptions of rationality and the one 
beheld by the “Idealists”. These German Idealists, to be sure, have not realized 
their remarkable resemblance with British Liberal-Institutionalists in the 
conception of rationality.  
 
Early Ashley, Practical Reason, and the Habermasian Reading of 
Morgenthau 
 
It has now become standard practice to reference Ashley’s articles of the early 
1980s as the commencement of the “critical international theory” movement. 
“Political Realism and Human Interest” (1981), “Three Modes of Economicism” 
(1983), “The Poverty of Neorealism” (1984) – all these works are rightly 
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celebrated. In introducing Habermas’ theory of practical and technical reason, 
Ashley criticized the fact that the North American IR theories had become too 
saturated with the instrumental idea of rationality.  
  But in what way does Ashley in his early works revive the Kantian conception 
of reason? And on what basis? In Ashley’s view, the introduction of Habermas’s 
theory of rationality demonstrates that many “North American proponents of 
neorealism”, although claiming “to carry forward a rich intellectual tradition of 
long standing [classical Realism]”, have in fact betrayed the Realist tradition “by 
reducing political practice to an economic logic” and “neuter[ed] the critical 
faculties”. 142  The Neorealist pathological belief in technical rationality, for 
Ashley, can be diagnosed by Habermas’ theory of rationality. The ultimate issue 
is to realize that to construe politics as irrelevant with the end of conduct or 
intellectual critique is a betrayal of the traditional conception of reason that 
prevails within the work of canonical old Realist scholars such as Morgenthau.  
  For Ashley, the Kantian conception demands revival; more precisely, it is the 
intersubjective/dialogical dimension of Kantian reason that requires rediscovery. 
And Ashley can be seen as proceeding in two steps to resurrect the Kantian 
conception (especially its intersubjective part). 
 In the first step – in a “symposium in honor of Hans Morgenthau” – Ashley 
recovers Morgenthau’s whole Kantian conception without particular emphasis 
on each side, arguing that Morgenthau’s rational Realism exemplifies both 
technical and practical reason. Morgenthau’s theory of Realism, which aspires 
to reveal the objective laws of politics rooted in human nature and imposes 
intellectual discipline on the observer (second rhetorical move), is viewed by 
Ashley as attempting at intelligible control over politics. In this aspect, 
Morgenthau’s rational Realism is technically rational. The technical-rational 
dimension of Morgenthau’s Realism is to “constitute knowledge in order to 
                                                              
142  Ashley 1984: 227-8. Notice Ashley’s reference to “Neorealism”. In his “Poverty of Neorealism” Ashley (1984: 
298) used the term pointing to Waltz, Gilpin, Krasner, Keohane, Modelski, and Kindleberger, and earlier he 
(1983: 481) used the term “new utilitarianism” to include Waltz, Gilpin, Krasner, Keohane, and Mesquita (cf. 
Gilpin 1986: 301-2). 
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expand powers of technical control over an objectified reality”, to enhance 
“efficiency of means” and to achieve “objectified necessity”.143 Furthermore, 
Morgenthau’s claim that a theory can enable scholars to stand on the shoulder 
of statesmen, intersubjectively retrace, anticipate or even have a better 
understanding of their own action, to merge the “interpreter” with the 
“interpreted” (third rhetorical move), is an instantiation of practical reason.144 
The practically rational Realism “stresses the ‘uniquely human’ character of its 
subject matter”, and coincides with the view that “human beings can converse, 
remember, know, expect”. Practical reason, as a defining feature of classical 
Realism, demands one “behave as a worthy member of one’s traditional 
community [Realism], with its intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms, 
rights, meanings”.145 Practical reason warrants a cognitive interest of mutual 
understanding, of reaching consensus between the agents acting and 
observing within “the intersubjectivity of the traditional community of 
statesmen”.146  
Ashley’s interpretation of Morgenthau as a dual rationalist incurred 
skepticism, apprehension and even silence, since most IR theorists then 
believed that Morgenthau denied the significance of reason or thought of it 
merely in a technical sense.147 Yet Ashley captured Morgenthau’s Kantian 
conception of reason and highlighted its interpretive/dialogic dimension. In front 
of reality and facts, reason can be objectively used to exercise control over 
objects. In the relation to other subjects, reason can be used to converse, to 
act on an “intersubjective and consensually endorsed norms”. But the Kantian 
conception revived by Ashley is also different from Morgenthau’s own in two 
aspects. First, whereas in Morgenthau’s Kantian language, intelligibility, 
(objective) controllability, and (intersubjective) reflectiveness form a coherent 
                                                              
143  Ashley 1981: 210.  
144  Ashley 1981: 212-3.  
145  Ashley 1981: 211.  
146  Ashley 1981: 214, 217,  
147  Ashley 1981: esp. 208-9. Herz (1981) turned Ashley down by criticizing Ashley’s interpretation of his thought 
as “an incorrect reading of my theoretical approach”. C. Weber (2010: 984) recalled that “there was nothing 
obvious about Ashley’s insights when he introduced them into North American IR in the early 1980s”.  
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whole, it is in this revived Kantian conception that the unity is eroded, replaced 
by a tension. Technical reason, which presupposes the objectification of an 
outer world over which man wants to control, is claimed to be fundamentally 
different from the practical one that endeavors to reach consensus with another 
subject without trying to control anything. This bifurcation between the two 
becomes more evident in comparison with Zimmern’s expectation that the 
cultivation of individual and collective reason (mutual understanding and 
dialogue) is for controlling political events. Second, whereas for Morgenthau 
reason is intimately connected with the problem of conduct, Ashley applied 
practical reason with a predominating concern with knowledge.148  
  Ashley’s second move is to condemn the fact that the Neorealists have 
deviated from such a balanced conception, pursuing the power of technical-
rational control while completely ignoring the practical-rational dimension. 
Hence in the “Poverty of Neorealism” (1984), an article which stimulated an 
enormous response within the field of IR, Ashley reiterated the significance of 
the intersubjective dimension of the Kantian conception, rebuking the 
Neorealists for committing four crimes, all caused by their ignorance of the 
intersubjective dimension of Kantian reason.  
  First, in contrast to the Neorealist “statism” that rules out the legitimacy of 
human interest, the old Realists are “very much animated by a practical interest 
in knowledge” for improving human condition. By citing Gilpin’s statement as 
foil,149 Ashley declaimed against any technical use of reason:  
 
“With Gilpin, one can remember classical realism not as an embodiment 
of a continuing dialectical struggle between absolutist darkness and 
                                                              
148 In addition, it seems that Ashley’s conceptions of reason displays a tendency to extend in its denotation. Whereas 
in Morgenthau the reference to reason is defined as an intellectual faculty and its use, Ashley seems to use it 
referring to a general certain trait of Morgenthau’s thought rather than the latter’s specific application of reason. 
149  Gilpin’s (1981: 226) original statement is very Zimmernian: “Embedded in most social sciences and in the study 
of international relations is the belief that through science and reason the human race can gain control over its 
destiny. Through the advcanement of knowledge, humanity can learn to master the blind forces of change and to 
construct a science of peace. […] Political Realism is, of course, the very embodiment of this faith in reason and 
science.” 
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bourgeois Enlightenment but only as a product of the latter […] Its 
[classical Realist] discourse is now frozen in acquiescence to the Cold War 
conditions of the revolutions it recalled: competition among states mutually 
preparing for war. As Gilpin writes, ‘The advance of technology may open 
up opportunities for mutual benefit, but it also increases the power 
available for political struggle. The advance of human reason and 
understanding will not end this power struggle, but it does make possible 
a more enlightened understanding and pursuit of national self-interest’. 
How painful this is: the revolutionary science of peace has become a 
technology of the state!”150  
 
Beneath Ashley’s polemic is his insight: whereas Gilpin’s conception only aims 
at efficient control over objects, the old Kantian conception has a particular 
concern with the end of conduct. The instrumental use of human reason should 
be constrained by the end that human reason serves. The bourgeois 
Enlightenment, if having no humanistic purpose to center on and giving 
overarching meaning to every use of reason, will bring about absolutist 
darkness. Human reason, rather than serving as an instrument for the state to 
exploit, should be used for promoting “the revolutionary science of peace”, 
linking scholars and statesman into the same intellectual process and develop 
prudent statesmanship. For Ashley, the classical Realists’ practical reason 
demands “judgment on ends” of political conduct where “normative structures 
[must be] transcending and irreducible to individual wants and needs”.151 
Second, unlike the “structuralism” of Neorealism that embodies in “formal 
logic”, “set of rules external to practice”, and unhistorical “frozen category”, the 
classical Realists have offered a “practical structure” or “practical scheme”.152 
Whereas the Neorealists assume that interest maximization is sufficient to show 
                                                              
150  Ashley 1984: 263-4.  
151 Ashley 1984: 243 (in Keohane 1986: 274).  
152  Ashley 1984: 266-7.  
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how states behave within the anarchical structure, the old Realists’ rational 
theory is aware of the dynamic relation between the intellect and reality. The 
interplay between the intellectual theory and daily-changed reality eludes any 
attempt to explain all actions in terms of structure. The rational Realism is a 
“more-or-less consensual recognition of the truth of a dialectical scheme”, 
which “disallows any final closure on a singular, contradiction-free truth”.153  
Third and fourth are the errors of “utilitarianism” and “positivism”, each of 
which, when perpetrated by the Neorealists, has resulted in an economicized 
theory of political conduct and objectified human reason. For Ashley, 
Morgenthau’s criticism of the deterrence theorists (states playing game in the 
theorists’ mind in the model of economic man) is a prophetic demonstration of 
“the classical Realist repudiation of Neorealism”.154 In order to remedy the 
utilitarian flaw and grasp the political nature of action, Ashley once again 
invokes Morgenthau’s rational Realism where the scholar and statesman are 
linked together. Political conducts cannot be understood from an outsider’s 
point of view. Rather, the intersubjective dimension of Kantian reason unites the 
statesmen and scholar into the same process through their intellect: 
 
“Evolving its theory while peering ‘over the shoulder of the statesman when 
he writes his dispatches,’ classical realism can advance its theory no farther 
than competent statesmen, in the course of their practice, are able to theorize 
about themselves and their circumstances. […]. Thus, while classical realism 
is rich with insights into political practice, it fares no better than neorealism 
as a scientific theory of international politics. Though it closes on an 
understanding that is far truer to the traditional practice of world politics, it is 
no less closed”155 
 
                                                              
153  Ashley 1984: 271-2, emphasis added.  
154  Ashley 1984: 279. 
155  Ashley 1984: 274-5. 
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This unification of scholar and statesman is so intersubjectively perfect that 
where “competent statesmen are prepared to recognize problems, classical 
realism will give voice to problems”; but if “competent statesmen have an 
interest in silence, classical realism will be silent too”.156 
“The Poverty of Neorealism” has reached the climax of “critical theory” as 
revived the Kantian conception of reason, especially the latter’s concern with 
the end of action and the intersubjective dimension. In his later works, however, 
it seems that Ashley’s conception of reason ended up with the negation of 
both.157  Thus marked by his 1988 essay “Untying the Sovereign State: A 
Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique”, Ashley became a critic of the 
Kantian conception, both in its technical and practical dimension. Before 
moving to Linklater, Let me reveal this change by exercising an Ashleyian 
double reading of Ashley’s own double reading of the concept of the rational: 
 
“The sign of sovereignty betokens a rational identity: a homogenous and 
continuous presence that is hierarchically ordered”, presupposing “a 
principle of interpretation that makes it possible to discipline the 
understanding of ambiguous events and impose a distinction: a distinction 
between what can be represented as rational and meaningful and what 
must count as external, dangerous, and anarchic”. It amounts to “a unique 
and coherent rational narrative of order”, and a foundational principle “to 
discriminate the normal, the rational, and the necessary from the arbitrary 
and the dangerous events that must be brought under rational control”. 
The sovereign voice “is rational and meaningful in the representation 
offered by a text or discourse”, a “unique, autonomous, and rational source 
– some fixed authorial personality, some already given referent reality [...]” 
This “rational sovereign voice” voices only “as a pure presence, a 
                                                              
156  Ashley 1984: 274.  
157 C. Weber 2010: 979.  
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sovereign identity that might be a coherent source of meaning and an 
agency of the power of reason in international history”.158 
 
Reason still retains its meaning. Yet for Ashley this intelligibility is achieved by 
the discipline of the equivocal, contingent, and anarchical. Ashley finally 
becomes a critic of Kantian reason.159  
 
Andrew Linklater, “Higher Rationality”, and the Transformation of 
Political Community (1998) 
 
For Andrew Linklater the practical-rational rebellion of Ashley against the 
dominance of technical rationality demonstrates the “intellectual exclusion” 
within the IR “community”.160 Like Ashley, Linklater also wants to use practical 
reason – or dialogic ethics – to construct dialogue and correct the error 
committed by such scholars as Waltz to “reduce rational political action in 
international relations to technical considerations of national power and self-
interest”. 161  But unlike Ashley who wants to recover/promote dialogically 
                                                              
158  Ashley 1988: 230-4. Ashley always use his own words as quotations.  
159 Within the upcoming decade after Ashley’s “Untying the Sovereign Problematique” (1989-1999), Anglophone 
IR witnessed the rapid spread of “postmodernist” spirit. International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern 
Readings of World Politics (1989), the special issue in International Studies Quarterly (1990) oversaw by Ashley 
and Walker, Walker’s Inside/Outside (1992), David Campbell’s Writing Security (1992, esp. 56-9, 65-7, 73-4, 
152-3) – by all these work the authors had devoted too seriously, and too frequently, to the problem of rationality 
that it deserves lengthy dissection in the future. Let me highlight two points about why I shall not continue on 
this vein but, why it deserves reconsideration at some point. First, many poststructuralists, although being critical 
towards the Kantian conception of reason, still shares the very conception with the one by Morgenthau. Reason 
is defined as a secure, coherent, and continuous source to make events theoretically intelligible, practically 
controllable; it can provide efficient means to control the outer world as well as point to the preexisted and 
prefixed end (the ordered, hierarchical, rather than contingent, anarchical – recall Morgenthau’s dictum that 
establishing a hierarchical order is the first step towards framing a rational foreign policy). Second, Far from 
being purely “irrational” (see e.g. Halliday 1993: 38-45), the “postmodernists” were quite divided in their 
outlooks. On the one hand there was the demarcation made by Der Derian (1992: 8) that “if one is to find a 
‘genuine research program’ it is better to take the enlightened road of rationalist reflection than the benighted 
wood of poststructuralist reflectivity”. On other there was Campbell’s (1998: 210-5, at 214-5) argument – by 
drawing on Foucault’s reflection on Kant’s replies to “Was ist Aufklarung?” – that postmodernism is rather a 
rediscovery of “a particular mode of philosophical inquiry” that interrogates what has been unhistorically and 
unreflectively taken for granted. To be postmodernist is to philosophize, to debunk the reified nature of reality 
and “things”. “This means”, reemphasized Campbell, “that the central (but all-too-often forgotten) feature of the 
Enlightenment is being practiced better by the ‘postmodern’ critics than by the self-proclaimed rationalist 
defenders of the faith”. 
160  Linklater 1992: 83.  
161   Linklater 1998: 16. Discursive ethics is a variant of communicative rationality or practical reason, which 
Linklater, like the early Ashley, draws from the work of Habermas. Notice that Ashley’s own use of Habermas’ 
theory of rationality is equally inspiring for Linklater (1995: 256-8).  
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mutual understanding within a (Realist) community between the scholar and 
statesman, Linklater proposes to open dialogue between different nationals and 
between the “communities” which they inhabit.162 In a similar application of 
Ashley’s attempt to expel technical-rational control in politics, Linklater 
endeavors to at least alleviate the degree of technical-rational control which 
communities exercise over citizens, and at best to emancipate the citizens from 
the instrumental control of their political associations. 
  For Linklater, his endeavor to use practical reason to promote dialogue 
between nationals and communities is fundamentally a recovery of the “old 
idealist program”.163 And in The Transformation of Political Community (1998), 
Linklater eventually resurrected the old Kantian conception of reason, in a 
similar but also different manner to that of the British Liberal Institutionalists’ 
usage. The resurgent idea of Kantian reason is used narrowly in extent but 
more dynamically and intensively in degree.  
  First, like the Idealists who regarded the rational as ethically right that should 
prevail, Linklater argued that he was normatively pursuing “a rational morality 
with universal significance”. 164  For Linklater, the attempt to enlarge 
communitarian bonds into a universally cosmopolitan tie must be based on 
reason: it is a pursuit of “rational” morality that requires the use of dialogic ethics 
to promote dialogue, mutual understanding and the eradication of exclusions. 
Parallel to the Idealists, the dialogic ethic is firstly defined as a dialogue that 
should recourse to reason and discussion, rather than “a trial of strength” or 
demonstration of prejudged superiority. It is secondly a dialogue that should 
turn the peoples themselves into “co-legislators within wider communities of 
discourse” and create “a dialogic cosmopolitanism”, granting equal access to 
all. By quoting Lyotard as endorsement, Linklater poses the argument that “all 
                                                              
162  Linklater 1998: esp. 113-9, 123-33. Communities, be they collection of civilizations or specific grouping, all are 
social bonds that associate and dissociate, or “systems of inclusion and exclusion” that segment and integrate at 
a certain tier.  
163  This was originally proclaimed in Linklater 1992: 98.  
164  Linklater 1998: 76.  
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human beings have an equal right to take part in dialogue and to ‘establish their 
community by contract’ using ‘reason and debate’.”165 It is thirdly a dialogue 
that “assesses the rationality of the practices of exclusion”. 166  By 
“universalizing the communication community”,167 the peoples discriminated, 
repressed, excluded (both within and outside the community) would be able to 
use dialogue to scrutinize and eradicate those fetters. Linklater, employing 
Habermas’ theory, speaks in a very “Idealistic” way.  
Second, Linklater’s rational morality, despite closely resembling the work of 
the Liberal Institutionalists in many senses, also differ in four key respects. First 
is Linklater’s assertion that the use of reason – rational debate and dialogue – 
is directed not only to inter-national but also to inner-national relations. Dialogue 
should be conducted both among different nationals as well as within them, 
between men as between all people (women, immigrants, unprivileged class, 
gays and lesbians).168  
Second, whereas the Idealists evidence a clear understanding that the 
cultivation of human reason is the ultimate end of their program, Linklater 
sometimes views it as “the preferred means” and frequently demonstrates his 
commitment to the “universalistic conceptions of ethics and dialogue” as an 
ultimate end.169 Unlike Ashley, who denies any possibility of the instrumentality 
of practical reason, Linklater envisages that dialogic ethics can be itself an 
instrument, by which subjects decide the rationale of exclusionary system.170 
In contrast to Ashley who later leans completely on the antithetical side of the 
Enlightenment, Linklater seem to have resolvedly committed to the 
Enlightenment project as an unyielding end.  
Third, whereas the Idealists envisage a complex program – broad in extent 
– to cultivate individual reason to combat impulses (education), to develop 
                                                              
165  Linklater 1998: 98.  
166  Linklater 1998: 92, 85, 87-8, 216.  
167  Linklater 1998: 79.  
168 Linklater 1998: passim.  
169  Linklater 1997: 338, 1998: 10.  
170  Linklater 1998: 109.  
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collective reason through public opinion, mutual understanding that many 
enhance moral interdependence and the collective control over events, 
Linklater’s recovered program downplays the significance of individual 
cultivations of reason.  
Finally, in outlining a more dynamic and reciprocal understanding, Linklater 
goes much further than the “Idealists” (and, to take another example, Angell) in 
his articulation of dialogue and mutual understanding. Linklater argued against 
the idea that “all human beings have the rational faculties” enabling them to 
grasp universal moral truths”, as if “individual reason can discover an 
Archimedean moral standpoint” which aligns itself with everyone.171 In contrast 
to Kant’s theory of reason which is not dynamic enough, Linklater’s rational 
morality is pursued by the “dialogic encounter” that knits dialogue between the 
similar likes and enhances the intersubjective exchange of discourse:  
 
“Dialogic encounters which promote greater diversity in this way may never 
come to an end, and no lasting resolution of the ethical differences 
between human subjects can ever be anticipated, as Habermas has 
argued. The idea of moral progress retains its meaning but it is neither 
associated with the conviction that ultimate moral truths reside in any one 
culture nor linked with the Archimedean supposition that immutable 
universal moral principles are built into some conception of human 
rationality which transcend history. What moral progress refers to is the 
widening of the circle of those who have rights to participate in dialogue 
[…].”172 
 
This emphasis on the intersubjectively dynamic dimension of rationality 
provides Linklater’s account with a tremendous historical color (In chapter four, 
                                                              
171 Linklater 1998: 48 (emphasis added), 88-91, also 34-45, 64-71, 79-85, but notice in 81 Linklater employed the 
term “reasonable” instead of “rational”. 
172  Linklater 1998: 96 
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I shall say more on this historical conception of reason). Rather than assuming 
that reason unfolds as a teleological purpose of history where “reason itself has 
a history and conceptions of freedom are revised and enlarged over time”, 
Linklater points to the human endeavor as a constant process to approach the 
ideal, which bears resemblance to Kant’s own design.173  
  It is in the view of dialogue as an encounter within the historical process that 
Linklater appears to depart most radically from the Idealists. Whereas for the 
Idealists dialogic rationality was achievable by discipline and contrivance, 
Linklater wanted instead to exploit the “possibilities of higher forms of freedom 
and rationality which were immanent within modern societies”, using a “higher 
rationality of efforts to bridge the gulf between actuality and potentiality”.174 For 
Linklater, the cultivation of reason needs to exploit the existing systems of 
inclusion and exclusion, not by pioneering new forms of organizations to do 
so.175 Hence, in contrast to the Liberal Institutionalists who expect that the 
League can teach the common man to become sensible, and who argue that 
the intellectuals (epistemic communities) can play a crucial part to arouse their 
recognition of the problem of “small-scale man in a large-scale world”, Linklater 
bestows hope solely on the existing communities themselves. Linklater 
undertakes a sociological analysis to show how the “paradoxical nature” of the 
communities, standing “at the intersection of several rationalization processes”, 
can be exploited.176 Drawing on Habermas, Benjamin Nelson and Martin Wight, 
Linklater argues that the “intrinsic rationality” as dialogic potential is contained 
in the society or civilization and can accordingly be universalized into the 
communication community. By reversing the process studied by Michael Mann 
                                                              
173  Linklater 1998: 89.  
174  Linklater 1998: 22, 159. The last quotation is what Linklater let the young Hegelians and Frankfurt Theorists 
speak for him, see originally Linklater 1996: 202-3.   
175 Linklater 1998: 3-4. Linklater’s sociological is in fact the combination of historical and sociological in Aron’s 
scheme, as the former professed: “sociological investigations reveals that present structures are mot natural and 
permanent but have a history”; and “identifying the seeds of future change in existing social order”, he went on, 
“is a key feature of sociological enquiry”.  
176  Linklater 1998: 147.  
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and Charles Tilly, Linklater demonstrates how communities can lessen their 
social, religious and ideological control over the citizens.177  
  Viewed from the perspective of reason, Linklater has partially recovered the 
old Idealist program. In extent, the application of reason in Linklater’s program, 
although entailing more subjects (inter- and inner communities, from man to all 
citizens) in appearance, still concentrates too much on the communitarian level. 
Indeed, for the Idealists, the most crucial point is to point to the force in the mind 
of the citizens: it is not the rationalization process of communities but citizens 
that give community both their substance and their particular tone. 
 
“Let’s Argue?” Communicative Rationality and German Idealism 
 
Like their English precursors, the German Idealists also conceive of rationality 
as a search for reaching consensus by means of persuasion, dialogue and 
intellectual argumentation. Although their inspiration is Habermas and his 
“communicative” idea of rationality, what is presupposed is almost the same as 
the English Idealists’ understanding. Communicative theory, implying 
communicative rationality, is a theory of and for communication. Indeed, even 
a glance at the titles of these representative works will be indicative enough 
(with regard to their position): Thomas Risse’ “Let’s Argue” (2000), Harald 
Muller’s “International Relations as Communicative Action” (2001) and “Arguing, 
Bargaining and All That” (2004), Marc Lynch’s “Why Engage?” (2002), Corneliu 
Bjola’s “Legitimating the Use of Force in International Politics” (2005), Nicole 
Deitelhoff’s “The Discursive Process of Legalization” (2009).178  
  The German Idealists’ conception of rationality bears remarkable 
resemblance with the English in two places. First is the similar view of the end 
and means of rationality. In its ultimate end, communicative rationality facilitates 
actors to reach consensus. It aims to solve problems through a contestation of 
                                                              
177  Linklater 1998: 144-53, 124-8. 
178  In addition to these, see also Grobe 2010.  
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persuasion rather than of strength as means. Although for the German Idealists 
it is the states rather than the “plain man” that can be the subject of reason, the 
ultimate objective of using reason remains alike. “International politics consists 
predominantly of actions that take the form of language”, Muller argued, and 
these actions were “oriented to reaching understanding, or communicative 
action”. “Politics”, he went on, “must for the most part be produced through 
understanding via the medium of language”.179 “The goal of the discursive 
interaction is to achieve argumentative consensus with the other”, Risse 
pinpointed, “not to push through one’s own view of the world or moral values”.180 
In a remarkable similarity to Russell (recall his remark on persuasion), Risse 
claimed that communicative rationality was to “seek a reasoned consensus” 
where the agents “are themselves prepared to be persuaded”. 181  Or, as 
Deitelhoff articulated in Angell’s tone, “in argumentative rationality the goal is to 
arrive at a shared understanding of the nature of a situation”.182 The goal of 
international political action is to reach mutual understanding with each other.  
Second, communicative rationality, like “hue and cry” (Zimmern), is also 
capable of clarifying states’ legal duty towards the occurrence of war and 
enforcing the international rule of law. Although unlike the British Liberal-
Institutionalists (who anticipate the ultimate triumph of the rule of law) the 
German Idealists acknowledge the imperfectness of communication, they still 
also bestow a similarly enforcing function on reason. Bjola, in his assessment 
of the legitimacy of war, contended that the question of whether the actors 
“using argumentative reasoning for reaching consensus on the use of force” 
was an indispensable criterion.183 The Iraq War (2003), compared with the one 
in Kosovo (1999), was deficient in legitimacy for its abandonment of equal 
access to argumentation that could at least expose war to a trial of opinion. In 
                                                              
179  Muller 2001: 161, 174 emphasis added.  
180  Risse 2000: 9.  
181  Risse 2000: 9.  
182  Deitelhoff 2009: 35 
183  Bjola 2003: 280. Bjola clarifies that he is concerned with moral rather than legal legitimacy.   
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her study of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Deitelhoff argued that the 
voices of the sub- and trans- national organizations played a crucial role in 
directing attention to the rule of international law. “In the absence of a common 
identity or sense of “we-ness” as well as a democratic polity at the global level,” 
as Deitelhoff argued in a Zimmernian tone, “a major source of legitimacy of 
international governance seems to rest on ‘the sober power of reason and good 
argument’.”184 
  What particularly differentiates the German Idealists from the Liberal 
Institutionalists is that whereas reason and its cultivation are crucial for the 
British Liberal-Institutionalists as a political project, the introduction of 
communicative rationality is used for waging a war in the academic front. In the 
former case, to change political agenda is overriding: the common man, through 
the cultivation of reason, can reach an intelligible (mutual) understanding of the 
graveness of the international problem, and then gradually take control over the 
events. For the German Idealists, the ultimate objective is to supersede the 
Rational-Choice and Constructivists explanations. Their principal intention is to 
criticize the manner in which Game Theory and Rational Choice Theory 
assume reticent actors, thus maximizing their individual interests without 
emphasizing the exchange of communication.185 In the next chapter, I shall 
expound the origin of the “mute” assumption of actors – an assumption 
deliberately set by the early Game Theorists to tackle the Cold War dilemma – 
and explicate how Rational Choice and Game Theory becomes principal 
targets for disciplinary attack.  
 
(iv) Conclusion  
 
                                                              
184  Deitelhoff 2009: 62.  
185  “All rational choice models”, Muller (2001: 160) argued, “have one remarkable feature in common: the players 
are mute”. This criticism is somehow unjustified in dualistic sense. Second, the “hot line” opened after the Cuba 
Missile Crisis in 1962 attested, as Raymond Aron (1963: 59) once remarked, to the fact that neither side expected 
“the end of the dialogue and the onset of unlimited violence” in front of a potential escalation into nuclear disaster.  
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A “Grammatical” Dissection of the Kantian Dialect 
 
In the preceding sections I have demonstrated the existence of a Kantian 
language of reason. The first feature of the Kantian conception of reason is that 
the human intellect stands in a position vis-à-vis passion, impulses, instincts 
which manifest as the violent. A rational man will not be “a fighting animal, 
emotional, passionate”, led by “unruly instincts”, “herd instinct”, “lust for power”, 
“animus dominandi”, “sentimentalism”, “emotionalism”. Conversely, Kantian 
reason requires actions to be based on “knowledge”, “judgment”, 
“understanding”, where the intellect stands for the “patient, collected” and is 
capable of discerning “end in every beginning”. Rather than letting passion drive 
the use of political power, political action should be based on “the discipline of 
the intellect”. Rather than resorting to the trail of physical strength, political 
conduct can be undertaken “through reason”, intellectual “dialogue”, “debate”, 
and “communication”.  
Second, there are two ways of using reason. The direction of reason towards 
objects will give rise to “control over events” and provide “disinterested and 
reflective” observation. In addition, it will provide an “instrumentality” for the 
promotion of peace, orient an observer to find a way in the empirical “maze” 
and reveal the essence of politics through the portrayal of the nature of politics. 
In its use towards human subjects, reason gives rise to “persuasion” (or the 
“appeal to reason”, “voice of reason”) and knits intellectual relations together 
and links the subjects – scholars and statesman – together. Human reason 
should be “practically” used for forging a hermeneutic consensus between the 
theorists and statesmen, between the outsiders and insiders of a community, 
and between states that endeavor to reach an agreement on the end/s of their 
conduct. Notice, however, that the thinkers who draw on Habermas tend to 
consider the strategic (technical) and communicative (practical) uses of the 
cognitive to be incompatible.  
96 
 
Third, conduct based on intellectual designation is truly moral. For the 
Idealists, reason (and “conscience”) is the “arbiter in human conduct”. Even 
Morgenthau the hard-headed Realist is not immune from this presupposition. 
There is an underlying presumption that “a theory of politics must value that 
rational nature of its subject matter also for practical reasons”, an assumption 
which in turn leads to the assertion that  “a rational policy is of necessity a 
good policy”; this is precisely because “such a policy minimizes risks and 
maximizes benefits” and “complies both with the moral precept of prudence and 
the political requirement of success.” In Linklater’s case, the transformation of 
community into dialogic cosmopolis is defined as a pursuit of “rational morality 
with universal significance”.  
 
The Fall and Resurgence of Kantian Reason  
 
Both the fall of the Kantian conception of reason in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
its subsequent revival through Habermasian theory after the 1980s, have 
profoundly impacted on subsequent articulations of Kantian reason within the 
field of International Relations.  
First, notice that a different conception of reason reflects a distinct purpose 
of the academic study (discipline). This point has been insightfully developed 
by Ashley. On comparing the two conceptions – cultivating dialogue/mutual 
understanding among the people, and maximizing states’ interest under 
constraints (I discuss further in the next chapter) – against each other, it 
becomes evident that the application of the former has a quite different purpose 
from that of the latter. The former is more activist, inclusive, and oriented to the 
“common man”. The latter is “statist” (to Ashley’s term), exclusive, and directed 
to the interest of the state. The conventional IR historiography and textbooks 
normally introduce the discipline as the academic study devoting to curing the 
disease of war, and stops with that, thus failing to highlight the changing 
purpose of the discipline with the changing conception of reason. 
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 Second, through the influence of Habermas, the Kantian conception of reason 
experiences a resurgence; the old conception of reason as dialogue and 
mutually intellectual understanding restores the significance of the concept. 
While one can assert that the communicative idea of rationality is entirely novel, 
it does have remarkable similarity to the one conceived both by the “Idealists” 
and Cold War Realists. It should be noted that Ashley, Linklater and the German 
Idealists always draw a sharp, ontological, line between the dual uses of reason 
– this is the problem of sectored structure. In the old Kantian-rational conception, 
the division between the technical/instrumental use of reason (towards object) 
and practical use (towards subject) is neither ontological nor viewed as 
incompatible. For Zimmern, the intersubjective understanding and dialogue can 
rather enhance the human control over events. For Morgenthau, the (scholar’s) 
use of reason towards object – to understand political events and reality – is 
inextricably linked with the use of reason towards another subject, forging an 
intersubjective dialogue with statesman. In Ashley and Linklater’s accounts, 
however, the division between technical and practical use is ontological and 
unbridgeable.  
Third, Kantian reason in its old form has a human and masculine foundation. 
Without the action of the common man, neither international organization can 
work, nor can international peace be genuinely achieved. It is man’s (or 
statesman’s) intellectual capacity. It entails a profound problem of masculinity. 
In Linklater’s work, however, this bias has been modified.  
 
History  
 
The thinkers who conceive of reason in a Kantian manner have different views 
of history. For Zimmern and Linklater, for instance, reason can develop in 
correspondence with the cultivation of individual and collective reason in a 
given period. The relations between as well as within communities can be 
transformed with the flow of time. Yet for Morgenthau, the intellect can be 
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historically transcendent. The observer can “put himself into the place of the 
statesman – past, present, or future”, retracing or anticipating what the 
statesman has done or will be doing. As I shall show in chapter four, it is 
Morgenthau’s distinct emphasis on the transcendent nature of reason that 
distinguishes his accounts from many of his contemporaries (notably Raymond 
Aron and Martin Wight’s “historicized” ideas of reason). 
Is the concept of Kantian reason still useful, if the two actors are trapped in a 
situation where they can neither have a rational discussion (communicate) with 
each other because of enmity forbidding such behavior, nor resort to violence 
to resolve their antagonism, and neither their intellect is dispensable for the 
pursuit of interest, nor their intellectual has been disciplined enough to harness 
emotions and passions which are sometimes dominated by entrenched 
ideologies? Can the Kantian conception of reason tackle this dilemma? To look 
for an answer, I shall turn to chapter two, utilitarian reason.  
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Chapter II. Utilitarian Reason 
 
 
 
Having examined Kantian reason, I shall proceed in this chapter to the second 
language: utilitarian reason. Utilitarian reason, which has also been called 
“instrumental rationality”, “economic reason”, “technical rationality”, or the “logic 
of consequence”, refers to the maximization of interest under constraints.1  
  The language of utilitarian rationality has three defining characteristics. First, 
it enunciates the maximization of interest, utility, values, or preferences. 
Whether deterring an aggressive action, waging a war, creating an international 
institution, or designing foreign policy, all conducts can be conceptualized as 
the choices of the course of action that are expected to bring about the optimal 
consequence (subsequent to a ranking of the possible outcomes). Notice the 
differences which distinguish the Kantian conception and its utilitarian 
counterpart. Whereas the Kantian language does not deny the significance of 
the pursuit of interest and requires the pursuit to be undertaken with a view to 
promoting the ultimate end, the utilitarian rationalists construe all actions as 
instrumental for maximizing interest, and to this extent the pursuit of interest 
seemingly appears as an ultimate end. Whereas the Kantian-rational pursuit of 
interest is achieved by suppressing emotional or passionate satisfaction, and 
thereby subjects the use of force to intellectual control, theorists of utilitarian 
rationality instead argue that emotional acts and use of force are more effective 
means of maximizing interest, to which cognitive calculation is necessarily 
subordinated. (I subsequently provide a more concrete discussion on rational 
deterrence theories and Neorealism.) 
                                                              
1  “Instrumental rationality” is a standard reference but its pioneer is unknown. “Economic reason” and especially 
“technical rationality” is made famous by Habermas (and Ashley). The “logic of consequence” is used by March 
& Olson (1998), which is built essentially on “consequentialism”, a term initially coined by G.E.M. Anscombe 
(1958). The term “utilitarian reason” is turned into a standard reference by Ruggie’s (1998). Many Rational 
Choice/Game theorists had protested that utilitarian rationality is not solely concerned with “instrument” or 
“technique” at all, see e.g. Harsanyi 1969. 
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  Second, utilitarian rationality always entails quantification. For utilitarian 
reason, the quantification of cost, benefit, and risk is a major condition for the 
maximization of interest: quantification enhances precision and economic 
management. Although utilitarian reason and Kantian reason share the view 
that the intellectual faculty is needed in human conduct, utilitarian rationality 
requires the use of intellect to make very complex calculations to maximize 
interest (rather than to suppress passions). Two points deserve special 
emphasis. One is that not all utilitarian rationalists make such a demand on 
quantification (since a minority of them are satisfied with ordinal ranking). The 
other is that quantification is not the only way to achieve precision in 
understanding and action: in chapter four, I explain how historical-rational 
thinkers, such as Raymond Aron, equate precision with looking more closely at 
the historically specific.  
  Third, utilitarian reason is concerned with maximizing interest under a variety 
of constraints. In the Rational-Choice form, the actors’ choice is always 
constrained by uncertainty and the law of marginal utility. In its Game-
Theoretical form, constraint can assume a number of forms. Whether the 
aggregation of payoffs is zero or not (zero-sum game/ and non-zero-sum game), 
which game is played (focal point, chicken, prisoners’ dilemma), whether these 
games are played with certainty or uncertainty, in a sequential or simultaneous 
way, in a one-shot or iterated way, all have been specified in order to maximize 
interest under variously detailed conditions. Here, it is necessary to note that 
maximizing interest in a game always means that the constraint is another 
rational player. Thus, whereas Kantian reason presupposes the universality of 
human interest (intersubjective understanding enhances moral 
interdependence and advances the recognition of collective interest), utilitarian 
rationality, especially in Game-Theoretical form, emphasizes the individual’s 
maximization of interest vis-à-vis others. Indeed, all these “constraints” operate 
to ensure that under a range of specific conditions the actor never misses an 
option with greater utility.  
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  In addition to the three substantial characteristics, it is noticeable that the 
theorists of utilitarian rationality always articulate their voices in a presumptive 
tone: unlike the theorists of Kantian reason, who speak of their language in an 
exhortative way: reason should be used, the intellect ought to discipline passion 
and forge dialogue – the utilitarian theorists always assume the actors to be 
interest maximizers who act under constraints.  
My central intention in this chapter is to reconsider how IR thinkers have 
articulated the language of utilitarian reason on three specific occasions. The 
first occasion was once referred to by Hannah Arendt as an “‘apocalyptic’ chess 
game” between the superpowers in the early Cold War, which is “played in 
accordance with the rule that ‘if either “wins” it is the end of both.”2 During the 
early Cold War period, the relationship between the US and USSR was 
characterized by bipolar confrontation and nuclear dilemma, a historically 
unique condition which made peace impossible and war improbable. On the 
one hand, the superpowers kept an extremely hostile stance towards the other, 
generating crises and small-scale conflicts. But on the other, they could not 
resort to sheer physical violence to resolve their antagonism. Within such a 
game, the US needed a handmaiden for deterring the Soviet Union from 
aggression: it needed to outwin the opponent without an actual trial of strength, 
and halt conflict at the brink of escalating into a total war but without sacrificing 
its own interest to make concessions.   
It was against this background that the utilitarian conception of rationality was 
initially brought into the discipline in the 1960s. Many prominent economists 
and mathematicians were subsequently recruited as “the soldiers of reason” to 
contrive a way out.3 For many of them, the bipolar/nuclear dilemma can be 
solved by conceptualizing the superpowers as interest-maximizers, who play a 
“mixed game” that is neither purely conflictual nor cooperative. They used 
utilitarian rationality to demonstrate how a rational actor can contrive a 
                                                              
2  Arendt 1969: 3-4.  
3  Abella 2008. A filmed popularization is The Beautiful Mind of John Nash.   
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deterrence of the opponent without incurring a pure conflict that puts physical 
strength in actual test as a defensive war, and make conflict resolution without 
pure cooperation that may concede interest to the opponent. Focusing on 
Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict (1960), Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War 
(1960), Snyder’s Deterrence and Defense (1961), I show how utilitarian 
rationality is used as an underlying assumption for envisaging different 
strategies to deter the opponent under four conditions. First is deterrence as 
maximizing interest in front of certain payoffs (Schelling’s). Second is 
deterrence as maximizing interest in front of uncertain payoffs (Snyder’s). Third 
and fourth are deterrence under irrational certainty (Kahn’s Chicken Game) and 
irrational uncertainty (Schelling’s Brinkmanship): the self can maximize interest 
to such an extent that it pretends to be passionately or emotionally committed 
to a payoff (i.e. keeping close to irrationality) to deter the opponent when both 
the payoff is certain and uncertain. Next I turn to Anatol Rapoport’s Fight, Game 
and Debate (1960), Schelling’s “tacit bargaining”, and Kenneth Boulding’s 
Conflict and Defense (1962). I show how the concept is used for envisioning 
conflict situation as “bargaining” situation, in which conflict can be drew to a 
close as utility maximizing behavior that make no sacrifices of interest at all. In 
particular, I concentrate on the work of Thomas Schelling, a writer who has 
been accredited as having “introduce[d] rational choice analysis to international 
affairs”.4 
The second occasion is the decline of American power vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union and Western allies in the 1970s. With superpower détente in the late 
1960s and the rise of economic issues (e.g. the collapse of the Bretton Wood 
System) in the 1970s, theories of deterrence and conflict increasingly came to 
appear outdated. At the same time, as Keohane retrospectively recalled, “many 
voices were claiming that the continuing decline of American hegemony 
signaled a return to much greater conflict, and the collapse of international 
                                                              
4  Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998: 12. Herman Kahn were regarded by his contemporaries as exerting the 
most influential impacts.  
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institutions”.5 Hence whereas in the 1960s, IR theorists used the concept to 
explain the peculiar condition of the apocalyptic chess game – which made 
peace impossible and war improbable, a game neither purely conflictual nor 
purely cooperative – the political events of the 1970s caused IR scholars to 
redeploy the concept to show how interest could be maximized under opposite 
conditions. A new generation of utilitarian-rational theorists showed under what 
conditions pure conflict, even the use of violence at a systematic level (US vis-
à-vis USSR), would occur, and engaged the associated question of whether 
extensive cooperation (US and her Western allies) at the international level 
would collapse or be maintained.  
  In section (ii) I turn to the second wave utilitarian intellectual movement which 
takes the form of Neorealism and Neoliberalism. Notice that while my label 
“Neorealism” excludes Waltz – who has been left to the next chapter6 – it does 
contain Gilpin and Bueno de Mesquita’s (hereafter Mesquita) explanation of war 
in terms of expected utility theory. I start from Gilpin’s War and Change in World 
Politics (1981), one of the defining works of Neorealism, and show how Gilpin 
uses the concept to explain hegemonic war as the maximization of expected 
utility within the international system. I then proceed to reexamine Mesquita’s 
The War Trap (1981). I reconsider Mesquita’s use of expected utility theory to 
dissect the occurrence of war has been previously described by Keohane as 
“an excellent discussion of the rationality assumption as used in the study of 
world politics”.7 
Turning to the Neoliberals next, which represented by Keohane, Stein, and 
Axelrod’s theories of cooperation, I dissect the three pillars of the Neoliberal 
movement. One of my initial intentions is to demonstrate how Keohane has 
                                                              
5  Keohane 2005: ix.  
6  The Neorealist scholars I have identified are chiefly those who use utilitarian rationality to explain war. Other 
scholar, such as Adler (1997: 321), may define in a different way that “Realists (Kaplan, Morgenthau) and 
Neorealists (Gilpin, Waltz) […who are] empowered by positivist and exclusively materialist philosophies of 
science (with the exception of Mearsheimer) have been reluctant to engage in ontological and epistemological 
polemics. They prefer to explain International Relations as simple behavioral responses to the forces of physics 
that act on materials objects from the outside”.  
7  See respectively Keohane 1986: 25 [fn.4], 1983: 201 [fn.11]. Mesquita’s work stimulated huge controversies, and 
Nicholson (1987: 346) described it as one that had heavily “disturbed the academic dovecotes” in the 1980s.   
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adapted rationality as an overarching principle to explain the origin and 
endurance of international institutions. I subsequently show how Keohane uses 
a more complex way of calculation – the inversion of Coase theorem – to argue 
for the endurance of international institutions in After Hegemony (1984). The 
second pillar is Stein’s and Axelrod’s essay “Collaboration and Coordination” 
(1982) and The Evolution of Cooperation (1984). In these works, Stein and 
Axelrod demonstrate that in a variety of games played either in a simultaneous 
and one-shot, or a sequentially and iterated way, institutional cooperation can 
be fostered among the “rational egoists” and varied in types to tackle different 
games. Notice, as I shall highlight below, how Carr’s critique of “harmony of 
interest”, Schelling’s “bargaining” and Rapoport’s studies of prisoners’ dilemma 
exert huge impacts on both Stein and Axelrod’s thinking. The final pillar 
discloses how the utilitarian reinterpretation of other IR thinker’s thoughts has 
become an important source for creating the illusion of “rationalistic dominance”. 
I argue – or rather reconstitute the very process – that the supremacy of 
“Rationalism” alleged by Keohane is based on his utilitarian-rational 
construction and reinterpretation of Morgenthau and Waltz, and that this 
development has in turn engendered a series of conceptual, historical, and 
theoretical misunderstandings. The proposition that Morgenthau is a utilitarian 
rationalist has been erroneously taken for granted; similarly the assertion that 
Waltz is a utilitarian rationalist has also been widely accepted.   
  The third point of engagement is the unexpected end of the Cold War, in the 
aftermath of which many utilitarian rationalists expressed their hope to revamp 
utilitarian reason by integrating domestic culture and regime type into a more 
encompassing utilitarian analysis. On the one hand, IR theorists are dissatisfied 
with the Neoliberals and Neorealists, arguing that the utilitarian conception of 
rationality is undermined not because it has gone too far, but because it has not 
gone far enough in unpacking the enclosed state box and showing how 
interests in conflict and cooperation are conditioned by endogenous factors) On 
the other hand, in face of the challenges posed by Constructivists that utilitarian 
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explanations have been confined to “material” and “unitary” interest, they 
endeavor to revamp utilitarian rationality by bringing culture and domestic 
institution into analytical view. The upshot is what I call “endogenous 
rationalists”. Hence in section (iii) I show how these “endogenous rationalists”, 
such as Moravcsik, Milner, Goldstein and Keohane, Jepperson, Wendt and 
Katzenstein, juxtapose domestic institutions and cultures within their utilitarian 
framework. They endeavor to show that by unveiling the process of how the 
states’ preferences are generated in culture and aggregated in configuration, 
the states’ actions of war and peace can be aptly explained. 
Before proceeding two interrelated cautions are required. First, whereas the 
thinkers of Kantian reason always speak of a language of humanity, the voices 
articulated by the theorists of utilitarian rationality sound dehumanized, neutral 
and objective. Second, utilitarian reason is saturated with the pursuit of 
precision, and by complex calculations that many figures, formulas and 
equations will be lurking behind.  
 
(i) “To Deter or Not to Deter”: Theorizations of Deterrence 
and Conflict Resolution in the 1950s and 60s 
 
During the late 1940s and early 1960s, the two superpowers were trapped into 
a deadly predicament. On the one hand, the Americans and Soviets, together 
with their respective allies, displayed extreme hostility towards each other. The 
Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons (1949) and the successful launch of 
Sputnik (1957) were seen as fatal threats to the Americans. The creation of 
NATO (1949) and the remilitarization of Germany (1956) were perceived by the 
Soviets as inherently aggressive acts. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1951, 
the Berlin Crisis in 1954 and 1958, and the Cuba Missile Crisis (1962), exposed 
the level of tension that divided the two blocks. On the other hand, it was 
impossible for both powers to resolve their antagonistic confrontation by sheer 
violence. Although equipped with nuclear weapons that could “bury” the other 
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side at any time, neither party could gain a victory in the traditional sense where 
the victor survived the war. What differentiates the diplomatic and military 
practices from prior periods resides precisely in the predicament that both 
actors maintain an extremely hostile stance but cannot resort to sheer physical 
violence. It was a predicament in which, as a leading French thinker Raymond 
Aron observed, “paix impossible, guerre improbable”.8 
It is living in this dilemma that grave anxiety is engendered over the period. 
In such “an era of anxiety” (as Holsti termed it),9 an apprehensive epoch 
characterized by intensive crisis and pessimistic prospect of peace, strong 
pressures were exerted on successive American governments to contrive a 
dual way out. On the one side, assuming the burden and imminent risk of 
nuclear war, the Americans needed a strategic “handmaiden” for containing the 
Soviets. On the other side, the Americans wanted to ensure that they could 
escape from the nuclear dilemma, which required a knowledge of how to avert 
crisis on the brink of a nuclear shooting match. “Many of the social scientists 
who are moving into the study of conflict want to get something accomplished”, 
Charles McClelland recounted, since they “are beginning to see that firm 
knowledge of the dynamic of conflict is the crucial factor in future social 
survival…but many think that there is not much time”. 10 Cold War bipolarity 
and the nuclear predicament, indeed, posed the thorny question of “how to 
survive in the margin between mutual deterrence on the one side and mutual 
destruction on the other”.11 
Indeed, with the immediate conclusion of the Second World War, there had 
already been such individual efforts, including Bernard Brodie’s The Absolute 
Weapon (1946) and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations (1948) which 
touched on the problem. But with the entrance of the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations (1952-1963), the task of addressing the dilemma was soon 
                                                              
8  Cited from Mahoney 1992: 150. 
9  Holsti 1998.  
10  McClelland 1962: 94. 
11  McClelland 1962: 88.  
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upgraded from spontaneous thinking into organized and institutionalized 
research. The funding of research centers on national security, military strategy 
and conflict resolution drastically increased; new journals were founded; think 
tanks such as RAND were created, and prominent economists, mathematicians 
and physicians were recruited.12 
  Within this mobilization of intellectual capital, the clash between two groups 
of scholars became increasingly evident. On the one side, scholars such as 
Hans Morgenthau and John Herz, although acknowledging the novelty of the 
dilemma, considered that the political vocabulary which had prevailed prior to 
the Cold War was still employable enough to guide the design of foreign 
policy. 13  Force rationally deployed, in Morgenthau’s view, is to act in 
accordance with Clausewitz’s ideal, scrupulously thinking about whether 
nuclear weapons can serve as means for promoting an intelligible end. The 
Cold War, for him, demanded only a “New Balance of Power”.14  
  Yet, for the other group, the Cold War between the superpowers represented 
such a decisive break with the past that both the old vocabulary and the slippery 
meanings of the terms were far from sufficient. “One of the most important 
things that could be done to facilitate discussion of defense problems”, Khan 
argued in his On Thermonuclear War (1960), “would be to create a vocabulary 
that is both small enough and simple enough to be learned, precise enough to 
communicative, and large enough so that all of the important ideas…can be 
comfortably and easily described”.15 Schelling observed, in the Strategy of 
Conflict (1960, hereafter Strategy), that in the context of superpower struggle, 
which was “inherently frantic, noisy, and disruptive, defined by an environment 
                                                              
12  These centers include for instance the Conflict Resolution in Michigan University, which hosted the publications 
by Rapoport, Boulding, and The Journal of Conflict Resolution. The Princeton Center of International Studies in 
Princeton University was renowned for its publication on the studies of strategy/security. RAND, whose relation 
with the US Air Force is compared by Boulding (1962: 332) as “a study of the Reformation by Jesuits based on 
unpublished and secret documents in the Vatican”, is described by Abella (2008: 54) as “difficult to think of any 
of the major figures in game theory who did not work for RAND at some point during that period [mid 1950s]”.  
13  Worse still, the dominance of such terms as “realism”, “idealism”, “moralism”, “legalism”, “internationalism” – 
all had been used by Morgenthau and Herz – disturbed the newly came utilitarian theorists.  
14 Morgenthau 1948a. For Herz (1950: 180), the superpower struggle remains a “security dilemma”, although it “is 
perhaps more clear-cut than it ever was before”. 
15  Kahn 1960: 5.   
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of acute uncertainty, and conducted by human beings who have never 
experienced such a crisis before and on an extraordinarily demanding time 
schedule”, “the retarded science of international strategy” needed to be 
enriched by new thought. 16  The Americans, G.H. Snyder criticized in his 
Deterrence and Defense (1961), “have no scarcity of prescriptive arguments 
for or against some policy alternative”; however “a systematic method, or theory” 
that could be used to “compare and weigh the arguments for particular policies”, 
was in radical absence. 17  World politics, as A.L. Burns observed in an 
enormously influential article entitled “From Balance to Deterrence” (1957), was 
in a transition in an era when the balance of power, even of a new kind, was 
insufficient to meet the scale and significance of the change.18 And no one 
contributed more than a co-founder of Game Theory to explain why such a new 
vocabulary – a scientific, mathematical, demonstrable, operational, vocabulary 
– must be employed: 
 
“The problem raised are harder than the most difficult problems ever 
solved in science. They are much less understood, not clearly described, 
not sharply defined. No specific science exists that is designed to cope 
with them, and the great, accumulated experience of the military has for 
the most part become obsolete…In the absence of firm guidance from 
established science and valid experience it is little wonder that authority 
while behind them there is exactly nothing. ‘Sound military decision’ and 
‘calculated risk’ are some of these phrases […] We do need guidance. It 
can come only from combining experience with a highly developed, proven 
system of thought. Loose thinking is seldom permissible.”19 
 
                                                              
16  Schelling 1960: Ch.1, Schelling 1965: 220. 
17  Snyder 1961: v. 
18  A.L. Burns 1957. 
19  Morgenstern 1959: 5, see also 76.  
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Loose thinking is seldom permissible indeed! But how can they break a path 
in contriving a vocabulary? These mathematicians, economists, physicians, 
rather than “manqués” who are “unable to make careers for themselves in their 
own fields”, as Bull’s acid pen presented, 20  have instead carried with 
themselves the newly-developed, powerful, intellectual weapon with which they 
have been familiar by profession. Schelling, for example, proclaimed that “the 
premise of ‘rational behavior’” was as “potent” as “productive” for developing 
the retarded science of military strategy.21 For Rapoport, following the lead of 
utilitarian rationality, “one gets an entirely new slant on conflict and on the 
requirement of any discipline which proposes to deal with conflict”. 22 
Furthermore, the game-theoretical construction of two agents who are using 
strategies to maximize his own utility under the constraint of the other’s choice 
epitomizes so perfectly the reality of the early period of the Cold War.23 It is on 
the basis of their steadfast belief in the concept of utilitarian rationality that they 
make their strident promises.  
Here it is noticeable that there are two subtle differences between the new 
utilitarian rationality and the old Kantian conception. First, although utilitarian 
rationality partly shares the Kantian idea of intelligibility, it also has a distinct 
focus that clearly distinguishes it from the former. Schelling spelt this point out 
in more detail:  
 
“If we confine our study to the theory of strategy, we seriously restrict 
ourselves by the assumption of rational behavior – not just of intelligent 
behavior, but of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of 
advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internal 
consistent value system.”24 
                                                              
20  Hedley Bull 1966: 25. 
21  Schelling 1960: 4, see also 14-6.   
22  Rapoport 1960: xiii.  
23  See e.g. von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944.  
24  Schelling 1960: 4, emphasis added.  
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The “conscious calculation of advantages” makes the new rationality 
transparent to the objective observer. Or, as Rapoport clarified, the utilitarian 
agent was particularly aware of “the possible consequences of each of the 
courses of action” and of “a certain preference order” that could most likely bring 
about the desired consequence, taking into account other “courses of action 
which other individuals will choose”.25 For Kahn, preference ordering in a scale 
had to be presented.26 For the idea of utilitarian rationality, as I shall soon show, 
calculation is always conducted in a quantitative manner, a feature which 
sharply contrasts with the blunt way of calculation proffered by the thinkers of 
Kantian reason.  
  Second (and on this point I shall say more below), utilitarian rationality, unlike 
its Kantian counterpart, admits, or rather advocates, the “rationality of 
irrationality”. 27  For Schelling as well as for Kahn, passionate/emotional 
commitment should not be disciplined by the intellect. Rather, to maximize 
interest, “it would be rational for a rational player to destroy his own rationality”, 
or “it may be perfectly rational to wish oneself not altogether rational”.28  In 
order to “maximize one’s value position”, as Snyder elaborated, it would be 
legitimate to pursue “‘emotional’ values [such] as honor, prestige, and 
revenge”.29  
It was due to this belief in the power of utilitarian reason that the concept, 
together with the theories of deterrence and conflict solution which built on it, 
suddenly arose around the turn of the 1960s. Whereas the old Kantian 
conception of reason is under critical reconstruction, the new utilitarian 
conception has been privileged and elevated over its contemporaries. This shift 
in the meaning of reason has been captured by Miles Kahler: 
                                                              
25  Rapoport 1960: 108.  
26  Kahn 1960: 120ff.  
27  The term came from Kahn 1960: 291, emphasis in original. Most utilitarian theorists referred to Khrushchev’s 
unconventionally diplomatic performance as example. See e.g. Kahn 1960: 293, Schelling 1960: 17-8, 1965: 39-
43. Cf. George and Smoke 1974: 490  
28  Schelling 1960: 143, 18 
29  Snyder 1961: 25.  
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“Realist skepticism toward the power of reason, grounded in European 
intellectual life, was soon purged in its new American home […] Running 
counter to this forceful but temporary European insertion in American 
international relations were more powerful countervailing tendencies that 
reinforced rationalist approaches to international relations: economic 
analysis exploited the assumption of utility maximization to construct a 
research program that was the envy of the other social sciences; strategic 
interaction began to yield to the power of game theory and its international 
relations offshoot, deterrence theory”.30 
  
Kahler is right to highlight the succession between the two languages. Yet he 
errs in claiming that rationalist approaches are being “reinforced”. On the very 
contrary: when O. Morgenstern issued The Question of National Defense 
(1959), Schelling collated his pre-circulated essays into The Strategy of Conflict 
(1960), Kahn delivered his lectures On Thermonuclear War (1960), G.H. 
Snyder published Deterrence and Defense (1961), A. Rapoport released his 
defining Fight, Game, and Debate (1960), K.E. Boulding offered his Conflict and 
Defense (1962), and various scholars, including J. Harsanyi, devoted a special 
issue to the game-theoretical study of international relations (in The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (1962),31 they were unprecedentedly installing “rationalist 
approaches” into the discipline and initiating the first utilitarian, intellectual, 
movement.  
 
Deterrence 
 
Deterrence was to provide the initial context in which the utilitarian concept of 
rationality was deployed. For the deterrence theorists, the concept of rationality 
                                                              
30  Kahler 1998: 281.  
31  There are other works that deserve mention 
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was useful to the extent that it demonstrated how violence can be utilized as a 
potential rather than actual resource for triumphing over the adversary. The crux 
is to outwit the opponent without an actual trial of strength. Hence most theorists 
draw a clear distinction between deterrence and defense.32 Whereas defense 
entails the actual, ex post, warfare, deterrence points to the potential, ex ante, 
threat of warfare. Deterrence, as Rapoport maintained, was to “outwin” the 
opponent without the actual use of force.33 “Strategy [of deterrence]”, Schelling 
highlighted, “is not concerned with the efficient application of force but with the 
exploitation of potential force”. This in turn explains why “violence is most 
purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used”.34 
  On the basis of these assumptions, four ways of utilizing the potential force 
have been proposed: deterrence under rational certainty, deterrence under 
rationally irrational certainty, deterrence under rationally irrational uncertainty 
and finally deterrence under rational uncertainty.  
The first influential contrivance originates within Schelling’s Strategy. 
Schelling stresses, with particularly strong emphasis, that rationality is not used 
for demonstrating an unsophisticated form of deterrence as mere cost-benefit 
analysis. (Deterrence then takes a simplistic threat that “I can inflict more hurt 
(cost) upon you than you upon me”.) Rather, rationality can be deployed to 
show how an actor can make complex calculations to artfully triumph over the 
opponent by simultaneously posing a “threat”, preventing the opponent from 
doing what is not expected, and by the origination and extension of a “promise”; 
namely seducing the opponent to do what is expected by the self.  
Consider Schelling’s illustration of deterrence under rational and certain 
condition.35 Suppose that both actors are interest maximizers who anticipate, 
and who stand in front of given, certain, payoffs. Suppose the game is played 
                                                              
32  Sometimes disputes arise over where the line should be drawn. Schelling (1966: 78-86), for instance, insists the 
distinction but think the two maybe emerged once war breaks out. Snyder (1961: 11-2) contends that even in war 
the two remains separable: “when deterrence fails and war begins, the attacked party is no longer ‘deterring’ but 
‘defending’.”  
33  Rapoport 1960: 9-11.  
34 Schelling 1960: 5, 1966: 10, emphasis in original. 
35  Schelling 1960: Chs. 3-5.   
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in a sequential and one-shot way by Row and Column.36 Row is a defender 
and Column is an aggressor who is expected to initiate attack.  
 
                                  
                           
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Threat               Fig. 2.2 Promise            Fig. 2.3 Deterrence 
 
In the first game of threat (Fig. 2.1), Column will win if moved first [2, 1]. Row, 
knowing that Column is rational, can issue a threat before Column making his 
move: if Column chooses I Row will take ii, which leads finally to the payoff [0, 
0] for both of them. Column, if rational and convinced,37 will decide on II rather 
than I. By using threat, Row eschews the occurrence of disadvantage. In the 
second game of promise (Fig. 2.2), Column will strive for [1,1] but necessarily 
runs the risk of the outcome [2, -1]. Now if Row promises, once again before 
Column making his own choice, that Row will decide on ii [1, 1] provided 
Column will have chosen II, then Column will, if rational and persuaded, decide 
on Row’s promise. Row secures the most beneficial outcome.  
  Deterrence, for Schelling, is a sophisticated and strategic maneuver (see Fig. 
2.3). It is completed, not by a crude warning of the unbearable cost of 
aggression that may far exceed the benefit, but by a crafty move to maximize 
one interest by coupling “a threat and a promise”.38 Suppose that Column is 
still permitted to make the first move. Column is prone to choose I, and Row 
has to threat ii [1, 1] against I [2, 5]. As a rational agent, Column will become 
likely to take II, but there is II-ii [5, 0] that makes him refrain from acting in 
accordance with a firmly convinced resolution. In order to tempt Column to 
choose II-i, Row must accompany his threat with a promise that he will not 
choose ii in the event of II taken by Column.  
                                                              
36 Notice here that it is on this occasion that Schelling injected the concept of “moves” into game theory.  
37  How to convince the opponent is an extremely controversial topic known as the one of “credibility”.  
38  Schelling 1960: 133, 1965: 74.   
 I II 
i 2, 5 4, 4 
ii 1, 1 5, 0 
 I II 
i 0, 0 2, -1
ii 0, 0 1, 1 
 I II 
i 1, 2 2, 1 
ii 0, 0 0, 0 
114 
 
Like Schelling, Herman Kahn also constructs his On Thermonuclear War 
(1960) on the assumption of rationality. But unlike the former, Kahn considers 
deterrence less as a sort of strategic maneuver than as a game in itself. 
Envisage that two superpowers are playing a game, called “Chicken”, under the 
condition of rationally irrational certainty. The game “Chicken”, whose rules 
have been well-known, is used by Bertrand Russell in his Common Sense and 
Nuclear Warfare (1959) to show how the leaders of the superpowers should 
de-emotionalize their struggle and use dialogue to achieve nuclear 
disarmament. Russell condemned the dangerous practice of the superpowers 
in following the practice of the “youthful plutocrats” in America, risking “not only 
their own lives but also those of many hundreds of millions of human beings”.39 
Kahn, however, turns this argument on its head to show how statesmen can be 
passionately committed to the maximization of their states’ interests. Consider 
Fig. 2.4, where Row and Column are still playing a sequential and one shot 
game.40 
 
 
 
 
                                     
                                Fig. 2.4 Chicken 
   
Suppose that both I and i signifies an offensive gesture, and II and ii a defensive 
one. Suppose further that if both choose to be offensive, a war will occur and 
both suffer [-100, -100]. If both tend to be defensive, they will both forfeit the 
utility [-100, -100] which could have been realized had they pretended to be 
offensive. Third, if Row takes the offensive initiative and Column retreats, or 
conversely Column acts as if aggressive and Row withdraws, then the side who 
initiates the aggressive move in the first place obtains the most utility.  
                                                              
39  Kahn 1960: 291-2, cf. Russell 1959: 30.  
40  Kahn’s original illustration is too complex to be reproduced here. Modern utilitarian rationalists (e.g. Elster 2007) 
will tend to conceive of Chicken as a simultaneous game. 
 I (Offensive) II (Defensive) 
i (Offensive) -100, -100 5, 1 
ii (Defensive) 1, 5 -100, -100 
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  To break through this predicament, Row has to make a resolved commitment 
to losing 100 in order to win 5. For Kahn, an agent should be so passionately 
committed to the payoff that he is on the brink of becoming totally irrational. To 
deter the opponent, the agent must even be willing to run the risk of losing 100 
to obtain 5.  
Schelling’s design of playing a game under rationally irrational uncertain 
conditions pushes Kahn’s argument one substantial step further. 41  In 
Schelling’s view, to deter the aggressor one must envisage not only that it may 
be possible to couple a threat with a promise, nor merely to feign to be rationally 
irrational, but instead to be predisposed to “chance, accident, third-party 
influence, imperfection in the machinery of decision, or just processes that we 
do not entirely understand” and which “neither we nor the party we threaten can 
entirely control”.42  
 
 Attack Non-Attack 
Retaliation (p) -100, -x 0, 0 
Non-Retaliation (1-p) -10, 200 0, 0  
                                 Fig. 2.5 
 
The figure above shows how Schelling’s “brinkmanship” and the “manipulation 
of risk” function.43 Suppose that Row and Column are involved in a game in 
which Column could attack Row and, the payoff is (–x) if Row retaliates at the 
probability of p, and 200 if Row fails to counterattack at the probability of (1 – 
p). Suppose further that Column has no idea of how large (or small) p and x is. 
In this case, Column will be incapable of making any decisions at all, precisely 
because, if he is rational, there is no way to calculate the consequences of each 
course of action. Column is deterred by a calculation whose outcome is so 
indeterminate that it effectively invokes paralysis of calculation. 
                                                              
41  Schelling 1960: Ch.8.  
42  Schelling 1960: 188.  
43  “Brinkmanship is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely 
control…It means harassing and intimidating an adversary by exposing him to a shared risk, or deterring him by 
showing that if he makes a contrary move he may disturb us so that we slip over the brink whether we want or 
not, carrying him with us”, Schelling 1960: 200.  
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The last kind of deterrence, contrived by G.H. Snyder in his Deterrence and 
Defense (1961), which was conceived as acritical response to Schelling, takes 
back to the basic form of cost-benefit calculation. Suppose that both the agent 
and the opponent are interest maximizers, but they are uncertain about the 
probability that their counterpart will attack or retaliate. In order to deter the 
rational opponent, the decision maker has to think about how to demonstrate 
his own credibility (as to how he will repel an attack). The crux of the issue is 
illustrated in the subsequent figure.   
 
 Column (Aggressor’s) Calculus 
Row (Defender’s) Retaliation Probability Attack Not Attack 
Retaliation: p -90 0 
Not Retaliation: 1-p 10 0 
                                 Fig. 2.6 
 
As Fig. 2.6 illustrates, Row and Column are choosing under the uncertainty 
where, when under attack, Row’s possibility of retaliation is p, and the non-
retaliation possibility (1 – p). Given this calculus, Column will expect that the 
utility in attacking Row is U = p (– 90) + (1 – p) 10. If the expected utility of 
aggression (U > 0) exceeds zero, then the attack will be conducted; if not, then 
no attack happens. Given this calculus, the deterrence of a potential aggression 
works in a way both similar to and different from Schelling’s. The similarity lies 
in the uncertainty of retaliation (p). Yet, whereas Schelling wants to retain and 
exploit uncertainty to paralyze the opponent’s calculative action, Snyder instead 
proposes that Row should demonstrate to Column that there is a probability of 
retaliation which will at least make the expected utility of aggressions less than 
zero (contra Schelling), and at best highly (or uncertainly) enough to make 
aggression very costly. It is by demonstrating to Column that Row’s probability 
of retaliation is over 0.1 (x (-90) + (1 – x) 10 < 0, then x > 0.1) that Column can 
be deterred.   
Under those four conditions – rational certainty (Schelling), rationally 
irrational certainty (Kahn), rationally irrational uncertainty (Schelling) and finally 
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rational uncertainty (Snyder) – the rational agent Row is expected to have 
deterred Column. But what if Row fails? Can conflict and crisis, before 
escalating into a total war, still be bounded and at the same time the resolution 
of conflict makes no gesture of concession? 
 
Conflict Resolution 
 
For the first wave utilitarian rationalists, the deterrence of an opponent is 
unconditionally prioritized over defense. But once war has occurred, it will have 
to be “bounded”, otherwise there is a clear risk that both will be dragged into a 
nuclear war. It is noticeable how the theorists of utilitarian rationality use the 
concept to contrive conflict resolution. Rapoport, in his influential Fights, Games 
and Debates (1960), offered two particularly insightful observations.44 First, 
whereas debate expect persuasion, conviction and mutual understanding to 
solve conflict – typically Kantian-rational methods – the utilitarian-rational 
(game) theorists envisage instead that conflict can be solved without any verbal 
exchanges or through the “voices of reason”. The intense confrontation 
between the superpowers forbids dialogue, making actions speak louder than 
words. Second, more crucially, conflict can be solved in a way that allows each 
actor to maximize their individual interest in a manner that is inclusive of their 
opponents’ interest. In other words, no “harmony of interest” is required to solve 
conflict.  
Consider two instructive examples. The first is Schelling’s theory of “tacit 
bargaining”. Suppose, as Schelling does, that conflict resolution, far from being 
a process of reaching consensus through mutual understanding and moral 
interdependence, is one that entails bargaining. In this sense, it is appropriate 
to reflect that “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations”. 
Even war, Schelling continued, “is always a bargaining process”, requiring 
“accommodation”, “cooperation”, or even “collaboration” between 
                                                              
44  Rapoport 1960.  
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adversaries.45 Suppose further that within most conflict situations (conceived 
as instances of bargaining), the agents are too antagonistic to speak to each 
other. Given this situation of tacit bargaining, how can conflict be resolved?  
  Schelling’s answer is to show that the agents can sometimes discover the 
focal point where their expectations (of a solution of conflict) may converge.46 
His two experiments are well-known: first, Row and Column, possess divergent 
and rival interests but are required to 
make choices in confrontation;47 they are 
given 100 (say utilities as dollar) to divide. 
They will receive what they claimed if the 
total amount of claim does not exceed 100, 
and nothing if the aggregation of their two 
claims is over 100. Let them make the 
claim. Second, suppose that Row and 
Column are commanding two armies 
(respectively X and Y). Both actors are 
required to occupy as much space as he can in the map (fig. 2.7), and both are 
ordered to fortify his front as a line that could facilitate defense. If the occupying 
areas overlap, or intersect, or if there are empty space which has not be 
occupied (which leads to the instability of situation), then violent combat will 
occur. Let them draw the line that demarcates the two areas. 
  How will Row and Column behave? Schelling’s answer is that even without 
communication between the two, they will both converge their expectations on 
some “focal point” (of “prominence, uniqueness, simplicity” or precedency) that 
could facilitate a situation in which the agent reaches a settlement.48 In the first 
example, both Row and Column converge their expectations on 50 as the focal 
                                                              
45  Schelling 1960: 5, 1961: 50, 1965: 142, emphasis in original, also 1960: Chs. 2-3, 1965: esp. 136 [fn.7], 216-20.  
46  The Chinese’s unanticipated intervention in the Korean War impressed Schelling (1965: 134) to such an extent 
that “The Yalu [River] was like the Rubicon. To cross it would have signaled some something. It was a natural 
place to stop; crossing it would have been a new start”. See further Schelling 1965: Chs.2, 4, passim.  
47  Schelling 1960: 55ff.  
48  Schelling 1960: 70-1.  
Fig.2.7 
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point. In the second, Row and Colum draw the line along the river, and thereby 
divide the whole space. Although Schelling has not explicitly specified this point, 
the function of rationality, by which to converge the two agents’ expectations on 
a focal point, is crucial. In the first case, unless both are rational maximizers, 
50 cannot be a focal point (why not 30/70?). In the latter case. Schelling 
deliberately designs the condition on the understanding that empty space will 
leave the door open to a potential conflict.  
  In an account which recalls Schelling’s theory of focal point on the 
presupposed basis of rationality (which is expounded in more depth in Conflict 
and Defense (1962)) Boulding similarly demonstrates how conflict can be 
resolved through interest-maximized behavior.49 Suppose first that there are 
two organizations named Row and Column, whose action is constrained by the 
law, with the further serving as the weaker” or “loss-of-power gradient”.50 With 
the extension of distance, the actors’ marginal benefits of projection of power 
will decrease as costs increase (see Fig. 2.8).  
 
 
Fig. 2.8                                Fig. 2.9 
 
Suppose further that Row and Column are two interest maximizers. Whereas 
Row’s and Column’s original spheres of influences center upon OC and OR, 
Column can only reach point A (the left of Fig. 2.9).Column, by acquiring a 
technical improvement, could expand from A to A’ (the right of Fig. 2.9); as a 
                                                             
49 Boulding 1962: Chs.4, 12, 13.  
50  Boulding 1962: 79.  
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consequence, Column’s curve of cost is moves towards the right (see Fig. 2.8, 
with specific reference to the curve of ‘costs’).  
  Like Schelling, Boulding also urges to find the point where Row’s interest can 
be maximized without, however, inducing an overlapping of arena, a proposition 
that is based on the clear understanding that this development may cause 
instability and war. For Boulding, it is crucial for Row to perform two acts. First, 
it is important to understand that as long as Column’s curve of costs moves 
towards the right and there are net benefits to gain, Column will continue to 
expand – the assumption of maximization of interest clearly manifests itself in 
this understanding. Second, if Row, in preparing his defense at A’, even if this 
triggers conflict with Column, can both restrain Column’s expansion and 
eschew a general escalation into war.   
  For both Schelling and Boulding, this approach (in which both actors are 
conceived as interest maximizers) can shed enormous light on the problem of 
conflict resolution. Although Boulding draws more on the law of marginal utility 
whereas Schelling relies more heavily on two-person bargaining, both of them 
sketch an extremely similar picture. In doing so, they illustrate that both actors 
can expand to a point – a river or a new equilibrium point – and that neither 
overlapping nor empty space can exist. In doing so, both writers perfectly 
illustrate how the Americans and Soviets can at the same time maximize their 
interest (with conflictual interest) while preventing this same conflict of interests 
leading to a total war.  
 
The Impacts of the First Utilitarian Movement  
 
The nuclear dilemma and the general political condition of bipolarity (both of 
which defined the early stages of the Cold War) gave a strong impetus to the 
first wave of utilitarian theorization. Political influences aside,51 contributions 
                                                              
51  Kahn’s work is seen as laying the foundations for American Nuclear Strategy. Schelling is construed as theorizing 
Dulles’ Brinkmanship. Kennedy’s play of the Chicken Game in Cuba, McNamara’s bombing on the Vietcong 
(“Compellence”) has been considered by many as the influences of them. 
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from Schelling, Kahn, Snyder, Boulding, and Rapoport placed the concept of 
utilitarian rationality at the center of controversy. In their view, utilitarian 
rationality, by demonstrating in an ordinal way how calculations of 
costs/benefits and risks could deter the opponent and halt the conflict, 
represented an unparalleled accomplishment which both enhanced precision 
and orientated strategy.  
It is this claimed advantage of rationality that has sparked many subsequent 
debates and discussions. Critics such as George and Rapoport (who outlined 
his apprehensions in Strategy and Conscience (1964) subsequently pointed out 
that the concept essentially presupposes what the decision-maker and the 
opponent are assumed to behave.52 Deterrence and conflict resolution can 
work only if the players undertake actions in accordance with what the utilitarian 
assumes their calculations of utility and risk to be. To this extent, the stipulation 
of rationality is more like an ideal than a description.53 As I subsequently 
illustrate, utilitarian theorists generally evidenced this failing: namely the 
inability to recognize the presumptive tone and character of their assertions.    
A further criticism derived from the insight that the utilitarian conception of 
reason is too individualistic. Decision making is a complex, collective, process 
that cannot be merely explained as a single interest-maximizing choice. 
Allison’s The Essence of Decision (1971) soon stimulated wide echoes.54  
Third, the utilitarian conception of reason was heavily criticized, especially by 
the “Traditionalists”, for its instrumentality and quantification. Morgenthau 
subsequently questioned the instrumentality of nuclear weapons from a 
Kantian-rational (Clausewitzian) perspective (as I have expounded in a 
previous chapter). Hedley Bull attacked the deterrence theorists’ attempt at 
“eliminating antiquated methods”, a position which appeared to rest upon the 
fallacy that a rational theory “will enable us to rationalize our choices and 
                                                              
52  See Green 1964: Ch5, George & Smoke 1974, esp. Jervis 1979.  
53  The earliest critique I can find is Verba 1961. See also George & Smoke 1974.    
54  Allison 1971.  
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increase our control to the same extent as the latter [economics] has done”.55 
Raymond Aron, as I shall demonstrate in the fourth chapter, criticized the 
quantification of interest, and argued against the abstractness of calculation, 
arguing instead in favor of a closer engagement with specific (or structural), 
spatial-temporal conditions, an emphasis which in turn preceded a more 
precise mode of political conduct.  
The final criticism addressed itself to the intellectual foundations which these 
scholars established. From the mid/late 1960s onwards, the deterrence 
theorists, these self-professed soldiers of reason, began retreat.56 Yet from a 
more long-term perspective, these first wave utilitarian theorizations were to 
provide a pattern (or style) of analysis for later generation scholars, a 
contribution which was most obviously evidenced in the emergence of their 
Neo-Neo successors in the 1980s. Gilpin was to later draw upon Boulding’s 
proposition. Rapport’s interest in the two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma,57 which 
evidenced the clear imprint of the Cold War superpower struggle,  was later to 
re-emerge within Axelrod’s work (most notably in the latter’s consideration of 
the optimal conditions for the consolidation of cooperation). Schelling’s theory 
of focal points in tacit bargaining is, in turn, widely recognized to have impacted 
on the work of say Arthur Stein. 
Having experienced its initial blooming in the early 1960s, the first utilitarian 
flower finally withered. The drastic change of the political context in the late 
1960s and the 1970s in turn raised the question of whether theories of 
deterrence and conflict resolution were now outdated. The focus of attention 
increasingly turned towards interdependence (with Keohane and Nye’s 1972 
publication, Power and Interdependence), the operations of the world capitalist 
                                                              
55  Bull 1968: 595, also 601ff. I spend more space on Morgenthau and Aron because their critiques are now less 
familiar and systematically studied than Bull’s.  
56  Schelling’s efforts in Arms and Influences (1965), and Kahn’s On Escalation (1965), Boulding (1963) abstained 
from saying systematically on conflict resolution after his tour de force except several short essays on calling for 
promoting “peace research” in universities after 1963. Morgenstern ceased to research on strategy since 1966. 
And it was not until 1971 that Snyder (1971) released his another major work on game theory and endeavored to 
reoriented them to power analysis Harsanyi 1969, Snyder 1971, Snyder & Diesing 1978. 
57 Rapoport & Chammah 1965.  
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system (see Wallerstein’s The Modern World System, which was published 
in1974), and the political significance of the international system (see Waltz’s 
Theory of International Politics, which was published in 1979). By direct 
implication, the value and importance of utilitarian rationality appeared to be 
increasingly questionable.58 Yet it is precisely the political context, which was 
so influential in engendering these challenges to Rational Deterrence Theories, 
that was to subsequently to pave the way for the Neo-Neo movement of the 
1980s.  
 
 (ii)The Neorealist and Neoliberal Movement of the 1980s 
        
Hegemony and Legitimacy of Pax Americania  
 
In retrospect, the 1960s and 1970s can be said to have contributed two 
dramatic changes to international politics. The first was detente between the 
superpowers. Within the Soviet bloc, Brezhnev succeeded Khrushchev in 1964. 
The Prague Uprising in 1968, to which Brezhnev responded with the doctrine 
of “international obligation” of socialist countries, and the fermenting impacts of 
the Sino-Soviet split (an ongoing consideration since 1962), directed the 
Soviets’ attention increasingly to the consolidation of the socialist camp. On the 
American side, the Vietnam War had been escalated by Lyndon Johnson after 
he came to power in 1963. This war, denounced by Morgenthau as so 
“emotionally committed” that it becomes “a counter-theory of international 
politics, a kind of pathology of international politics”, would drag the Americans 
into a political and military quagmire for a decade.59 Around the same time, the 
French demand for an independent nuclear policy and the expulsion of NATO 
from its territory, sent shockwaves through the Western alliance. In 
                                                              
58  Keohane & Nye 1972, Wallerstein 1974, Waltz 1979.   
59  Morgenthau 1972: 7.  
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consequence, the attention of both superpowers increasingly turned to the 
consolidation of their respective blocs and spheres of influence.  
Second, it is particularly important to recognize that the US’ own position 
within the international system substantially changed during this period. With 
the escalation of Vietnam War and the resurgence of the European states and 
Japan, both of which undermined US power in both an absolute and relative 
sense, the question of whether the US could sustain its leadership and 
management became increasingly pressing. In 1971, the Breton Wood System 
collapsed, engendering the first “Nixon Shock” and the generalized fear of a 
return to the Great Depression. “In the world agencies for maintaining freer 
trade and a liberal flow of capital and aid”, Kindleberger warned two year later, 
the leadership of the United States is disconcertingly “slipping”.60 The Oil crisis 
of 1973 (which was triggered by American support for Israel during the Yom 
Kippur war) was also to occur in the same year as Kindleberger’s study of the 
Great Depression. This event, as Joseph Nye subsequently recalled, 
demonstrated “that power can also grow out of a barrel of oil”.61 This point was 
underlined by the extent to which the embargo paralyzed American power and 
posed an unprecedentedly novel problem to the use of force. 62  Those 
monetary and energy “shocks” were not, however, the end of the story. During 
the 1970s, the rise of MNCs (that apparently substituted the function of the state 
in governing international trade), the deterioration of environments, the rapid 
growth of population, and finally the proliferation of nuclear weapons (which 
changed the bipolar nuclear monopoly to a multipolar nuclear competition) all 
contributed to a growing global unease: a development which was further 
compounded by the decline of American influence. Each event appeared 
almost as confirmation of the fact that things seemed to be falling apart.63 
                                                              
60  Kindleberger 1973: 304. 
61  Nye 2003: 195.  
62  Keohane 1984: 224, 204.  
63  Susan Strange (1982: 339-40) was the first scholar I know who realized that these shocks were “exaggerated”. 
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  The impacts of these shocks were tremendous. First, the dramatic 
transformation of international politics, which changed the US’ superior position 
into a much inferior one, was matched by a parallel anxiety which hung over 
the early utilitarian rationalists. “By the 1980s this Pax Americana was in a state 
of disarray”, a fact which was reproduced in the bleak diagnosis of leading 
American scholars:  
 
“Here, perhaps, is the greatest cause for anxiety in the years immediately 
ahead. What would be the reaction of the United States if the balance of 
power is seen to be shifting irrevocably to the Soviet advantage? What would 
be the Soviet response to a perceived threat of encirclement by a resurgent 
United States, an industrialized China, a dynamic Japan, a hostile Islam, an 
unstable eastern [sic] Europe, and a modernized NATO? How might one or 
another of these powers respond to the continuing redistribution of world 
power?”64 
 
“Many voices were claiming that”, as Keohane was to subsequently recall of 
the 1970s, “the continuing decline of American hegemony signaled a return to 
much greater conflict, and the collapse of international institutions”.65 Krasner, 
when reflecting upon the 70s, posed the question “why did things not fall apart 
during the 1970s?”66  
  Second, and more crucially, previously dominant ways of studying 
international relations (e.g. merely in terms of strategy and conflict resolution) 
became increasingly unsustainable. The anxiety generated by the elusive 
prospect of a declining American power begged once again the question of 
management. In the face of these transformations, one scholar observed that 
“the study of internationals is fast replacing economics as the dismal science”.67 
                                                              
64  Gilpin 1981: 231, 239-40, see also 49 
65  Keohane 2005: ix.  
66  Krasner 1982b: 358.  
67  McClelland 1966: 43, 56.  
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Scholars started to incorporate actors such as MNCs and processes such as 
“interdependence” into their agenda; additionally, a sub-field which would later 
become known as International Political Economy (IPE) rapidly developed. 
With the studies IR scholars were themselves more integrated into the 
economic discourse. “As research progressed”, Mastanduno explained, these 
scholars “became more systematic and self-conscious in borrowing concepts 
and insights from economics”.68 Thus in addition to the intellectual capital 
accumulated by Schelling and Boulding – and under the intellectual current at 
that time when Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) made the 
revolutionary though mistakenly-construed impacts that a system theory is to 
conceptualize the states as utility maximizers (to this I shall return in the next 
chapter) – the utilitarianists of the second generation appealed once again to 
the notion of rationality. 69  As Krasner recalled, whether to explicate the 
prospect of war or peace, conflict or cooperation, the conceptualization of “a 
world of rational self-seeking actors” had become the “prevailing intellectual 
orientations for analyzing social phenomena” in the 1980s.70 Mesquita argued, 
for instance, that utilitarian reason could help the decision-makers to find the 
“necessary conditions for war”, and to identify the calculations which inform 
antagonistic leader’s “assessment of the expected costs and benefits 
associated with particular war-or-peace situations”.71 Gilpin argued not only 
that “we shall assume that rationality is not historically or culturally bound”, but 
that “the explanation of international political change is in large measure a 
matter of account for shifts in the slopes and positions of indifference curves of 
the states”.72 Keohane based his account of cooperation without an hegemon 
on the assumption that “states, the principle actors in world politics, are rational 
egoists”, which “have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate 
                                                              
68  Mastanduno 1998: 199-200. This article remains the best, succinct, account of the development.  
69  The connection between the second and first generation will be detailed in due course.  
70 Krasner 1982a: 6.  
71  Mesquita 1981: 29, 6, 131-9.  
72  Gilpin 1981: xii, 23.  
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costs and benefits…in order to maximize their utility in view of those 
preferences”.73  
  Indeed, whereas the first generation concentrated exclusively on the very 
predicament of the Cold War, the second generation had considerably 
expanded the boundary of utilitarian reason: Robert Gilpin’s War and Change 
in World Politics (1981), Bruce Beuno de Mesquita’s The War Trap (1981) and 
a range of pertinent essays (which spread across the 1980s), explained how 
even large-scale warfare (which Gilpin termed “hegemonic war”) could be 
initiated by interest-maximizing states. Under the editorships of Stephen 
Krasner and Kenneth Oye, defining collections such as International Regimes 
(1982) and Cooperation under Anarchy (1985) explored the conditions under 
which cooperation could be established. These enquiries were further 
consolidation by Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), Robert 
Keohane (After Hegemony, 1984), and Duncan Snidal’s essays on the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma74, each of which demonstrated that rationality remained a 
productive concept which could be productively applied to the specific political 
exigencies of the 1980s.  
 
Neorealism 
 
In War and Change in World Politics (1981), Gilpin explores how the change of 
international system is conducted by the trail of military strength. For Gilpin, 
what concerns him most is neither the change of system entailing the 
transformation from one system to another, nor the one involves “interaction 
change” in the modifications of interactional process. Rather – overshadowed 
by the Soviet supremacy of the 1970s – Gilpin wanted to examine the change 
in system as “the rise and decline of the dominant states or empires that govern 
                                                              
73  Keohane 1984: 66, 27.   
74  Snidal’s three essays are: “The Game Theory of International Politics” 1985a, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability 
Theory” 1985b, and “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma” 1985c. Other influential Neorealists and 
neoliberals who had participated in this rationalizing movement included: Stein 1982, Lipson 1984, Grieco 1988,  
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the particular international system” or, more precisely, “the replacement of a 
declining dominant power by a rising dominant power”.75 Notice Gilpin’s special 
conceptualization of international systematic change. Frist, for Gilpin, the 
change in system can no longer be tackled by any strategic manipulation but 
by sheer violence. And violence occurs on a large-scale level. The rise and fall 
of dominant power is described as a “hegemonic” war where the change of 
such a system “involves all of the states in the system; it is a world war”, and 
its maintenance entails the institutionalization of the status quo by creating 
hegemonic organizations “to advance particular sets of interests”.76 Second, 
like the precursory utilitarian theorists (such as Schelling, who conceptualized 
conflict resolution as a variation upon the economics of bargaining), the 
“international system” is defined by Gilpin as “in effect an arena of calculation 
and interdependent decision making”, in which the maximizers of expected 
utility make their choices.77 
  How is international political change within a system accomplished? Gilpin 
outlines five hypotheses in order to explain how systematic change is initiated, 
maintained and collapsed (see fig. 2.8). First, “an international system is stable 
(i.e. in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to 
change the system”. Second, “a state will attempt to change the international 
system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e. if there is an 
expected net gain)”. Third, “a state will seek to change the international system 
through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of 
further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits”. Fourth, “once 
an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion 
is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo 
to rise faster than the economic capacity to supports the status quo”. Fifth, “if 
                                                              
75  Gilpin 1981: 3, 40-3.   
76  Gilpin 1988: 600.  
77  Gilpin 1981: 38.  
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the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system 
will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power”.78 
  These hypotheses are very complex. The 
role played by utilitarian rationality in 
explaining change and de facto conflict can 
be simplistically explained by reconsidering 
Boulding’s theory, on which Gilpin himself 
draws.79  
Rationality plays a crucially dualistic role 
here. First, the rationality of the potential 
challenger necessitates its response to the incentive of change. If the state is 
at point A, where neither marginal costs nor marginal benefits occur, then the 
state will not initiate war (hypothesis one). Yet, if the state expects that there 
are net benefits in conducting a war (when the curve of cost changes into costs’), 
then the state will strive for hegemony through the means of war (hypothesis 
two). Second, rationality directs to the point at which change is halted. As long 
as the state is rational, and expects that change can bring net benefits or 
innovations within the state that altered its cost (or benefit) curve (from costs to 
costs’), it will constantly expand (territorially, militarily, politically, and 
economically) until a new equilibrium at point A’ is reached (hypotheses three, 
four and five).80 
Gilpin’s explanation of hegemonic war in terms of an interest maximizer’s 
response to the change of slopes systematic change is but a change in 
calculation on the part of a potential hegemon who does not take others’ 
“calculation and interdependent decision making” into its own account. 
Mesquita’s The War Trap (1981), by contrast, demonstrate that the condition of 
war needs more relational calculation to determine. In a similar manner to Gilpin, 
                                                             
78  These five hypotheses are:  
79  Gilpin 1981: 56.  
80  Gilpin 1981: 9-11.  
Fig. 2.8 reproduced 
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Mesquita sought to “present a general theory of war and foreign conflict 
initiation and escalation”.81 But in contrast to Gilpin, who envisaged that the 
ultimate cause of war consists in a single state’s calculation in front of the 
“international system”, Mesquita instead asserted that it resided rather in the 
calculation into which the account of the opponents’ reaction must be taken. 
Pace Gilpin, whose rational state is challenging the “international system” which 
is waited to be changed, Mesquita’s rational agents are dueling against other 
agents, active, and able to undertake their own calculations.  
  Now suppose that there are two rational states – say a potential hegemon 
Row and actual one Column – who are in an adversarial relationship. Suppose 
further that UR (or UC) signifies the expected utility of the state Row (or Column) 
in initiating a bilateral war against his adversary Column (or Row), and PR (or 
1–PR) the possibility of successfulness of Row’s (or Column’s) war. Thence 
comes the formula82 
 
 EU (R) = PR (UR – UC) + (1 – PR) (UC – UR)  
 
  In this formula the general cause of war resides in the calculation by Row 
when taking into account of Column’s expected utility. (UR – UC) signifies the 
utility obtained if Row’s preference over Column’s (i.e. his triumph over Colum). 
And PR (UR – UC) represents the probability of such a net benefit when Row 
prevailed over Column. Conversely, (1 – PR) (UC – UR) denotes Row’s expected 
net gain in waging a war against Row. Since both of them cannot 
simultaneously have positive gains in conducting such a war – one of their utility 
must be negative – then the sum total of Row’s calculation will be either positive, 
if a war brings more net utility to Row than to Column, or negative, if Column’s 
net benefit in waging a war against Row exceeds the one of Row’s. 
                                                              
81  Mesquita 1981: ix.  
82  The original formula is much complex, see Mesquita 1981: 47.  
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For Mesquita, the key point is not, as Fearon asserts,83 that when both or all 
of the agents are expecting net benefits from conducting war or conflict, a fight 
can be initiated. Rather, when one of them (say, Column) expects net gain in 
waging war, then regardless of whatever outcomes may be procured by other 
agents (via the same calculation), there will inevitably be a war initiated by this 
very agent (i.e. state Column will start the war). The merit of Mesquita’s formula 
is its inclusion of the opponent’s calculation as influence, but not as 
determinants. Mesquita’s key point, which can be seen as arguing against 
Gilpin, is that the condition of war needs to be defined by one agents’ calculation 
that takes the opponent’s calculation into account.  
In this section, I have shown how rationality had been employed by 
Neorealists to delineate the conditions of war as a pessimistic response to the 
decadence of American hegemonic power. In the next, I shall show how 
Neoliberals have tried to answer to this question.  
 
Neoliberalism (Part I) 
 
Now we turn to the Neoliberal wing. Will the decline of the American power vis-
à-vis the Soviets and the Western allies signify a return to conflict and the 
collapse of international institutions? Will institutions in world politics fall apart? 
The Neoliberal’s replies are more optimistic. Many argue that international 
institutional cooperation will endure and even develop. “Rational-choice theory”, 
Robert Keohane the leading Neoliberal thinker declared, “enables us to 
demonstrate that the pessimistic conclusions about cooperation often 
associated with realism are not necessarily valid”.84 Even if “by adopting the 
Realist model of rational egoism” as Gilpin and Mesquita did, Keohane 
continued, “the characteristic pessimism of Realism does not necessarily 
                                                              
83 Fearon 1995: 386.   
84  Keohane 1984: 13.  
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follow”.85 How can utilitarian rationality instead demonstrate that the prospect 
of institutional cooperation remains bright? 
To give warning beforehand, the Neoliberal movement is such a complex one 
that it develops along three distinct lines which sometimes intersect, and which 
sometimes run parallel. And the supremacy of the Neoliberals is dependent no 
less on their concept of utilitarian rationality than upon their 
reinterpretations(such as Morgenthau’s rational Realism and Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics) and subsequent recapitulation (in the language of 
utilitarian reason) of key Realist theories.  
To begin with the first line: in 1980, Keohane published a rebellious article 
against hegemonic theory, contending that during the decade between 1967 
and 1977, the undermined American power did not result in the breakdown of 
trade and monetary “regimes”.86 Although the endurance of these regimes as 
a phenomena is highlighted, Keohane does not sufficiently explain why they 
persisted. Two years later, Keohane once again contended that in contrast to 
Gilpin’s pessimistic anticipation, those regimes could by themselves “help to 
compensate for eroding hegemony”. In this time, Keohane explicitly argued that 
the reason why such institutions could endure (and offset negative effects 
associated with eroding hegemony) was because of “The Demand for 
International Regimes” (1982, hereafter Demand).87  
Demand is an important contribution for a number of reasons. Yet in addition 
to the fact that it was published in an edited volume together with a number of 
other parallel efforts under the title of International Regimes (1982) – many 
contributions to this volume use utilitarian rationality as a foundation to show 
the origin and persistence of international regimes – it is in Demand that 
Keohane lays down the analytical foundation of Neoliberalism, which later 
develops into a book called After Hegemony (1984). For Keohane, the reasons 
                                                              
85 Keohane 1984: 6.  
86  Keohane 1980.  
87  Keohane 1982: 166.  
133 
 
why international institutions endure and compensate the impacts of the decline 
of the American hegemony can be explained in three steps. Step one is to use 
“systemic constraint-choice analysis” and to construe states as inherent 
interest-maximizers that respond to the incentives (such as a market) provided 
by the system. 
 
“In a systemic theory, the actors’ characteristics are given by assumption, 
rather than treated as variables; changes in outcomes are explained not 
on the basis of variations in these actor characteristics, but on the basis of 
changes in the attributes of the system itself […] We assume that, in 
general, actors in world politics tend to respond rationally to constraints 
and incentives. Changes in the characteristics of the international system 
will alter the opportunity costs to actors of various courses of action, and 
will therefore lead to changes in behavior”.88 
 
Like Gilpin’s states that are responsible to change of slopes, Keohane also 
assumes the interest-maximizing actors are responsible “rationally to 
constraints and incentives”. Consequently, step two is to conceive of “a market 
for international regimes [in the same way as] one thinks of an economic 
market”. It is “on the basis of an analysis of relative prices and cost-benefit 
calculations, [that] actors decide which regimes to ‘buy’,”89 accordingly actors 
“buy” (join) a regime in the market (system) because the benefit of membership 
is expected to outweigh the costs of joining it.  
  So far, as Keohane himself recognized, one has only explained why states 
maintain institutions (on the basis that the institutions are assumed to be 
preexistent and capable of offering net benefits to states). Nonetheless, a series 
of questions remain unclarified – these include: Why states have the demand 
to create a regime in the very first place. Will they still contribute to its 
                                                              
88  Keohane 1982: 143-8, quotations at 143-5.    
89  Keohane 1982: 147. 
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maintenance even if the net benefit is in decline? If states can use resort to 
bilateral war to maximize interest, why will they not make bilateral agreement 
to avoid the cost of constructing regimes (as in a Schellingian form, by 
coordinating to maximize their interests?)  
  In reply to these questions Keohane asks theorists to proceed to the third 
step. In this step, states are assumed as capable of making more complex 
calculations than, say, Schelling’s. Consider the question posed by Ronald 
Coase in “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960). Suppose that there are firms 
proposing to solve the problem of market failure, and each party wants to reach 
agreement with each other and create an institution which will subsequently 
alleviate the problem of externality. 90  For Coase, an agreement can be 
attainable if: (a) there is a legal framework establishing liability for actions; (b) 
both have perfect information; and (c) transaction costs in this bargaining are 
zero. Keohane inverted the Coase theorem and changed the direction of the 
causal chain. If what give rise to institutions, institutions can give back to them, 
then institutions must be capable of facilitating the establishment of the liability 
of legal framework (if there is none), the flowing of information (if there are few), 
and the maximization of the transaction costs (if they are high).91 And the realm 
that matches all these conditions of market failure is international relations. 
Since international politics is characterized by its anarchical condition – there is 
not a compulsory legal framework existing among the states; the distribution of 
information among them will be rather asymmetrical; and the transaction costs 
are very high between the states – to establish an institution can precisely 
alleviate these problems.  
  For Keohane, the crux is that states, as interest maximizers, can make such 
a calculation to create and maintain institutions. Hence, this “functional” 
                                                              
90  Keohane (1989b: 28) recalled how his student introduced George Akerlof, Oliver Williamson and Ronald Coase’s 
works to him which gave him “the ‘aha’ feeling” and “the realization that international regimes could be account 
for in ways that are parallel to the modern of the firm – that political market failures result from transactions costs 
and uncertainty, and that these failures could be corrected…through international institutions”. Keohane refers 
particularly to Coase’s (1960) article and Williamson’s “A Dynamic Theory of Interfirm Behavior” (1965).   
91 Keohane 1984: Ch.6.  
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usefulness of an institution generates the states’ demands for creating and 
sustaining the regimes.92 As long as the rational states have the demand for 
reaching agreement and act in order to attenuate the problem of market failure 
in an anarchical, international system, the corollary of “Realist pessimism” 
necessarily loses its convincingness. But when he succeeded in demonstrating 
that in the absence of authority states would still have the demand to create 
institutions, Keohane also started to employ an interpretive strategy.  
In 1983, a year after Demand, Keohane turned to the second interpretative 
line. In his extremely influential essay which launched the second line (under 
the title of “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond”, 1983) – 
Keohane depicted realism as a “tradition” and “research program” which was 
indispensable for analyzing world politics because of its “focus on power, 
interests, and rationality”. 93  Indeed, the realist preoccupation with power, 
interest and rationality had already been evidenced in Morgenthau’s formula 
that politics could not be rationally understood unless via the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power, as I have just shown. But Keohane has an entirely 
different understanding of the assumption of “rationality” – in quoting the same 
passage as I have invoked (Morgenthau’s first rhetorical move), Keohane 
argued that  
 
“In reconstructing state calculations, Thucydides and Morgenthau both 
assume that states will act to protect their power positions, perhaps even 
to the point of seeking to maximize their power [...] World politics can be 
analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating costs 
of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected 
utility, although doing so under conditions of uncertainty and without 
necessarily having sufficient information about alternatives or resources 
                                                              
92  Keohane (1982: 149, 1984: Ch.6, 1994: 36-7) named his own approach as first functional then contractual.  
93  Keohane 1983: 159. The other articles fall into this group see Keohane 1986, 1988.  
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(time or otherwise) to conduct a full review of all possible courses of 
action”.94 
 
In a sharp contrast to Morgenthau’s own denotation of rationality, Keohane was 
imposing a utilitarian interpretation on Morgenthau’s original formulation and on 
the whole allegedly realist “tradition”. First, it imputes a neoclassical-economics 
to Morgenthau who has learnt the theory of rationality from Clausewitz. Second, 
it misrepresents Morgenthau’s remark on reason (thus perpetuating the 
misconception that Morgenthau’s reason has no concern with the end of action). 
Having rationalized Morgenthau, Keohane also subsequently discovered that 
the concept of utilitarian rationality is also a critical element within Waltz’s 
Theory: 
 
“The link between system structure and actor behavior is forged by the 
rationality assumption, which enables the theorists to predict that leaders 
will respond to the incentives and constraints imposed by their 
environments. Taking rationality as a constant permits one to attribute 
variations in state behavior to variations in characteristics of the 
international system […] Thus the rationality assumption – as we will see 
in examining Waltz’s balance of power theory – is essential to the 
theoretical claims of Structural Realism (Note 15)”.95  
 
Keohane clarified in Note 15 that “Waltz denies that he relies on the rationality 
assumption; but I argue in section II that he requires it for his theory of the 
balance of power to hold”.96 Waltz, indeed, has already stressed, in his Theory 
of International Politics (1979), that “the first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system”, and “states 
                                                              
94  Keohane 1983: 164-5.  
95  Keohane 1983: 167.  
96  Keohane 1983: 201 [fn. 15].  
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balance power rather than maximize it”.97 (I shall further explicate on this in the 
next chapter.) Yet ironically enough, after proclaiming that Waltz’s theory of 
balance of power will be rely upon the rationality assumption, Keohane (in 
“section II”) drew the striking conclusion, which he himself, italicized, that 
“Balance of power theory is inconsistent with the assumption frequently made 
by Realists that states ‘maximize power’.”98  
Inconsistency indeed – between the states that maximize their own 
power/interests and the ones that balance each other there has to be one 
choice – but it is a contradiction or binary choice constructed by Keohane 
himself to reveal how the realist tradition was inconsistent within itself.  
But why did Keohane trap Realism into rationality? The answer is that if 
rationality is indispensable for the whole Realist tradition but simultaneously 
incompatible with the other tradition of balance of power, then the contradiction 
has to be resolved. Realism, namely, must be remedied into “a modified 
structural research program”. In Keohane’s view, such a modification must 
reject Realist’s emphasis on (the balance of) power but retain the rationality 
assumption. “This research program”, he maintained, “would pay much more 
attention to the roles of institutions and rules than does Structural Realism”.99 
It is here that the line of interpretation intersects with the one of Keohanean 
theorization.  
 
Neoliberalism (Part II) 
 
Having planted the seed for developing the second interpretive line – Keohane 
would return to this line later on – Keohane moved back to the first line, thus 
continuing his theoretical exposition of how states demand institutions to 
enhance their interests. The first line soon culminated in After Hegemony (1984, 
hereafter Hegemony), which is widely recognized as the defining work of 
                                                              
97  Waltz 1979: 126-7. 
98  Keohane 1983: 174, emphasis in original.  
99  Keohane 1983: 192, 194.  
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Neoliberalism. In comparison with Demand, which lays down the analytical 
foundation for Hegemony, there occurs a significant change in Keohane’s 
account. Whereas previously Keohane speaks of Coase’s language of market 
failure, in Hegemony Keohane begins with an echo of Carr’s critique of “the 
harmony of interest”. Accordingly he stresses that institutional cooperation is 
not built on such a utopian doctrine but on the “adjustment of policy”.100  
  Keohane’s change of language has two underlying implications. The first 
corresponds to his concern to demonstrate that even if by adopting the Realist 
assumptions of rational egoism, the pessimistic consequence may not 
necessarily follow. The second is more crucial: it is here that the first line 
initiated by Keohane intersects with the third (which originates in the work of 
Arthur Stein and Robert Axelrod).  
  The third line is profoundly shaped by two thinkers’ thoughts. One is Carr’s 
critique of the Liberal Institutionalists’ “harmony of interest”, a harmony which 
presupposes that human reason can intellectually link together, enhance moral 
interdependence and exercise collective control over peace and war. The other 
is the game of Prisoners’ Dilemma (which had been deeply studied by 
Rapoport). Under the influences of Carr and Rapoport, 101  both Stein and 
Axelrod seek to demonstrate how the interest maximizers can develop 
extensive institutional cooperation, even under difficult conditions in which 
disharmony and defections are prevalent. In 1981, Axelrod’s study of how 
cooperation under the Prisoners’ Dilemma could be fostered was released in 
embryonic form.102 Although his study did not initially enjoy a substantial impact 
(this only occurred subsequently, when Axelrod developed it into The Evolution 
of Cooperation (1984), it had already been made clear that the strategy, devised 
by Rapoport as Tit for Tat, could help cooperation emerge out of the “rational 
egoists” when they play a game of Prisoners’ Dilemma in a sequential and 
                                                              
100  Keohane 1984: Ch.4 (esp. 52-3).  
101  See more in Stein 1990: 18, Axelrod 1984: Ch.2.  
102  Axelrod 1981.    
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iterated way.103 While Axelrod was laboring on writing up The Evolution of 
Cooperation, Arthur Stein published his “Coordination and Collaboration: 
Regimes in an Anarchical World” (1982), an article which appeared in the 
collective volume of International Regimes, and which was soon to evidence an 
enormous impact and influence.104  
  Stein’s demonstration of how an interest-maximizing actor will create and 
maintain institutions is complex. First, Stein uses Schelling’s focal point to 
reproduce Carr’s critique of the Kantian-rational theory of harmony of interest. 
If the “rationality” can coordinate the actors’ expectation to maximize interests 
(see fig. 2.7),105 Stein argues, then there is no need to create institutional 
cooperation at all. Suppose that there are two agents, Row and Column, who 
are playing games in a one shot and simultaneous way (Fig. 2.10, 2.11). In 
these games there will be no need of institutional cooperation, since both 
agents can, by their pursuit of interest maximization, be led automatically to the 
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Both Row and Column will choose [5, 5] instead of 
any others. 
 
                                
 
 
                                       
          Fig. 2.10 Focal Point               Fig. 2.11 Coordination  
 
Second, Stein contends that institutional cooperation, instead of deriving from 
the harmony of interest, is in fact built on the actors’ maximization of self-interest 
which abandons their own individualistic pursuit of interest. Accordingly, he 
argues that “[t]here are times when rational self-interested calculation leads 
actors to abandon independent decision making in favor of joint decision 
                                                              
103  Axelrod 1984.  
104  See e.g. Grieco 1988: 117ff. 
105  Stein seems to conflate Carr’s Kantian conception of rationality with his utilitarian one.  
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making”.106 Suppose once again that both agents are playing the games of 
Prisoners’ Dilemma and Battles of Sexes, as the following two figures illustrate.  
 
   
 
 
                                      
           Fig. 2.12 Prisoners’ Dilemma         Fig. 2.13 Battle of Sexes 
 
Suppose in these two games Row and Column make simultaneous and one-
shot choices. Unlike Schelling, Stein stresses that these two games have to be 
played simultaneously in order to prevent the actors using strategic maneuver 
to maximize their individual interest. In both games the play leads to the 
creation of institutions. The Prisoners’ Dilemma (see Fig. 2.11) originates an 
incentive for the establishment of collaborative institution to ward off the 
temptation for each to defect. Without a regime to regulate their decisions the 
ultimate outcome is worse for both actors, [1, 1]. Like Schelling, Stein points out 
that collaborative institutions need the actors’ promise to abandon their 
individualistic pursuit of interest. But unlike Schelling’s promise that may turn 
out to be a scam of assurance (that is why the problem of credibility is involved), 
Stein’s promise relies on the creation of institution to enforce promise. When 
Row and Colum play the game on the right (see Fig. 2.13), they need 
institutions to coordinate: the optimal choices for both lie in [3, 4] and [4, 3], and 
an institution will be in need if both intend to eschew the smaller payoffs and 
consequently converge upon the same choice. Thus, even if within an 
environment of disharmony of interest, as Stein sums up, “individualistic self-
interested calculations leads them to prefer joint decision making because 
independent self-interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal 
outcomes”.107  
                                                              
106  Stein 1982: 132.  
107  Stein 1982: 120.  
 I II 
I 3, 3 0, 5 
ii 5, 0 1, 1 
 I II 
I 3, 4 1, 2 
Ii 2, 1 4, 3 
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Whereas for Stein the rational states need to create different types of 
institution to cope with various situations, Axelrod subsequently demonstrates, 
in The Evolution of Cooperation, that cooperation can be fostered out of the 
most difficult game that states play in a way different from all previous 
account.108  
Consider that there are two egoistic actors Row and Column playing a game 
of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Suppose, first, that in contrast to Stein’s Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, Row and Column are moving sequentially, in the same way as in 
Schelling’s game. Suppose, second, unlike Schelling and Kahn’s design, that 
the game is played repeatedly rather than one shot where n round of moves 
will be undertaken. Suppose further, like Stein also stipulates, that the strategic 
manipulation envisaged by Schelling cannot be used here, namely that 
“strategic maneuvers, such as promise and threat, are prohibited”.109 Suppose 
finally that the payoff obtained from subsequent round of play is always worth 
less than the previous one – a “shadow of the future” is cast on the present 
move – at the discount rate of w (0<w<1).110 Given the fact that within each 
round both Row and Column can choose i or ii, I or II, Axelrod calculates all the 
possible outcomes. In adopting various strategies and the conclusion that when 
both agents adopt the strategy of “Tit for Tat” – a “policy of cooperating on the 
first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous 
move”111 – they could obtain in total the highest utility among various strategies.  
 
 
 
 
                               Fig. 2.14 
   
When both agents decide on Tit for Tat, or the one Tit for Tat and the other 
Defect, or both choose to Defect, their individual gain is: 
                                                              
108  Axelrod 1984: 29.  
109  Axelrod 1984: 11 
110  If n→∞, and 0<w<1, then wn=0.  
111  Axelrod 1981: 308, see also 1984, Ch.3.  
 I II 
i 3, 3 0, 5 
ii 5, 0 1, 1 
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STT vs. TT= 3+w3+w23+...+w(n-1)3= 3/1– w 
SD vs. TT= 5+w+w2+…+w(n-1)= 5+(w/1 – w) 
SD vs. D = 1+w+w2+…+w(n-1)= 1 + (w/1 – w) 
 
Within the three possible strategies, the second is evidently superior to the third. 
But the relation between [3/1– w] and [5+(w/1 – w)] remains indeterminate. For 
Axelrod, as long as w is sufficiently large – if [3/1-w > 5 + w/1-w] then [w> 0.5] 
– then Tit-for-Tat can bring relatively more utility to the agent.  
  It is on the basis of these general efforts by Axelrod and Stein that Keohane 
could highlight the distinction between harmony and cooperation,112 a fact 
which was formally recognized when the two lines were incorporated into a 
single format with the with the publication of Cooperation under Anarchy (1985). 
In this volume, which represented the culmination of Neoliberal movement, 
Axelrod and Keohane co-authored an essay and systematically restated the 
guiding principles of Neoliberalism (which merges the first line with the third.113 
Indeed, although Keohane drew on a Rational-Choice form and Axelrod (and 
Stein) on Game Theory, the similarities which conjoin the Neoliberals appear to 
be pervasive. One of the most striking resemblances originates within the 
manner in which they sharply distinguish cooperation and harmony; in addition, 
both also seek to demonstrate that even in the context of Realist “rational 
egoistic” assumptions, extensive cooperation is still feasible. This aspect 
becomes even more pronounced in Stein’s use of Schelling to endorse Carr’s 
critique and Axelrod’s use of Rapoport’s Tit-for-Tat to study the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma. Keohane, as he himself stated more clearly in 1990, “deliberately 
adopted the Realist assumption of egoism, as well as rationality, in order to 
demonstrate that there are possibilities for cooperation even on Realist 
premises”.114 
                                                              
112  Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 85. 
113  See Also Snidal 1985c.  
114  Quoted in Katzenstein 1996: 15.  
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One year later, the collection entitled Realism and Its Critics (1986) under 
Keohane’s editorship came to the forefront. Together with the participants’ 
critique of Waltz’s “utilitarianism”, Keohane’s second line was taken up again – 
in his introductory essay which resumes his old undertaking (namely 
rationalizing realism), Keohane reiterated how rationality had played a critical 
role within realism: 
 
“Morgenthau’s conception of rationality is clearer than his view of power. 
Although he does not offer a formal definition in Politics Among Nations, 
he seems to accept the conception that is standard in neoclassical 
economics. To say that governments act rationally in this sense means that 
they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the 
costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility 
[…] Morgenthau explicitly acknowledged that the assumption of rationality 
was not descriptively accurate […] even though such an assumption is not 
always descriptively accurate […] the analyst can infer actions from 
interests, and thereby construct an explanatory theory of behavior […] 
Morgenthau’ sophisticated use of the rationality assumption was consistent 
both with that of Thucydides and those of later realists and neorealists, 
including Waltz”115 
 
Keohane grasps Morgenthau’s sophisticated way of deploying reason. But 
whereas Morgenthau’s conception of rationality is neither simplistically clear nor 
economistic, Keohane construes that Morgenthau’s notion of rationality is even 
“clearer” than his idea of power because he accepts one definition that is 
“standard in neoclassical economics”. Having depicted Morgenthau, 
Thucydides and Waltz as utilitarian rationalists, Keohane was finally able to nail 
                                                              
115  Keohane 1986: 11.  
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realists and Neoliberals down together in his 1988 presidential address that 
posed the demarcation and sparked debate within the discipline ever since: 
 
“Realist and Neorealist theories are avowedly rationalistic, accepting what 
Hebert Simon has referred to as a ‘substantive’ conception of rationality 
[…] Even though the assumption of substantive rationality does not compel 
a particular set of conclusions about the nature or evolution of international 
institutions, it has been used in fruitful ways to explain behavior, including 
institutionalized behavior, in international relations […] Indeed, the 
rationalistic program is heuristically so powerful precisely because […] with 
such a record of accomplishment, and a considerable number of 
interesting but still untested hypotheses about reasons for persistence, 
change, and compliance, cannot be readily dismissed. Indeed, the 
greatest weakness of the reflective school lies not in deficiencies in their 
critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective research program that 
could be employed by students of world politics”.116  
 
In Retrospect of the Neo-Neo Theories: A Brief Overview  
 
The “Neo-Neo synthesis”,117 which appears to be so formidable as if relying 
upon the single notion of rationality, theorists can explain almost all the 
significant phenomenon within the international arena – has three pillars. The 
first is the accounts of war by Gilpin and Mesquita, through which the concept 
of interest maximization appears as historically and culturally independent. The 
second, which contains bifurcations and confluences of two directions, is the 
accounts of cooperation by Keohane, Axelrod, and Stein (which conceive of 
rational actor endeavoring to reduce transaction costs and advance interest in 
different games). The third is the constructed “tradition” of “Rationalism” being 
                                                              
116  Keohane 1988: 381, 392.  
117  Waever 1996: 163.  
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“avowedly rationalistic” and which is indispensable to the previous two: a 
tradition which allegedly originated in Thucydides which, passes down to 
Morgenthau and Waltz, and which manifests itself in both the Neo-Neo 
theoretical works.  
  Notice that four problems revolve around the concept. First, compared with 
the rational deterrence theorists, the concept of utilitarian rationality is applied 
to the explanation of a broad range of phenomenon. It shifted from the narrow 
focus on deterrence and conflict resolution during the embryonic period of 
utilitarian when the tension between of superpowers had reached its zenith, to 
the much broader phenomenon of war, discord, and cooperation (largely in 
response to the various challenges that arose during the period of superpower 
détente). The Neo-Neo scholars can explain almost all the significant 
phenomenon within the international arena. As a consequence, the boundary 
of the explanandum of utilitarian reason appears to have been vastly expanded.  
  Second, the expansion of utilitarian reason is also achieved by a particularly 
utilitarian, homogenized, reading of other theorists. After the Neo-Neo 
movement, the image of Morgenthau as a utilitarian rationalist had been 
erroneously taken for granted, and Waltz was accordingly widely read, and 
interpreted, as a utilitarian rationalist. Indeed, Keohane’s rationalizing 
endeavors were so successful that in 2001 when Mearsheimer issued his The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, the idea of utilitarian rationality became a 
“bedrock” assumption, allegedly underlying the whole realist tradition.118 After 
Keohane’s utilitarian readings, the Realists are trapped into the utilitarian 
language: it is now the Realists’ turn to show that even if based on a Neoliberal 
idea of rationality the optimistic prospect of institutional cooperation would not 
necessarily follow! Both Grieco’s “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” (1988) and 
                                                              
118 Measheimer 2001: 30-1.  
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Mearsheimer’s “The False of Promise of International Institutions” (1994/1995) 
are typical cases in point.119  
  Third, Keohane’s utilitarian reading also incurred doubt, objection, and 
clarification, although the voices are unexpectedly feeble. Waltz, for one 
instance, issued a clarification in his “Reply to My Critics” (1986): 
 
“Contrary to his [Keohane] statement, I do not differ with him over 
rationality, except semantically. I prefer to state the rationality assumption 
differently. My preference is based partly on fear that ‘rationality’ carries 
the wrong connotations. Since making foreign policy is such a complicated 
business, one cannot expect of political leaders the nicely calculated 
decisions that the word ‘rationality’ suggests. More significantly, my 
preference is based on the importance I accord, and Keohane denies, to 
the process of selection that takes place in competitive system. In 
structural-functional logic, behaviors are selected for their 
consequences.”120 
 
For Waltz, rationality might be seen as central to his theory. But it has to connote 
a differently “semantic” meaning than the one construed by Keohane, pointing 
to the “structural-functional logic” and the “process of selection” that takes place 
in “competitive system”. Rather than serving as an idea of cool-head calculation 
by the decision makers in foreign policy – notice Waltz’s somehow peculiar 
understanding of Keohane’s idea of rationality – it entails the selection of 
behavior according to “their consequences”. This “structural” rationality 
                                                              
119  Due to space limits only brief discussion is allowed here. For Greico, Keohane and the Neoliberals overlooked 
the “impact of anarchy on the preferences of actions of states”. Instead of believing that “states’ utility function” 
(U) would be “in direct proposition to its payoff” (V) – thus the more institutions the better for reducing the 
transaction costs for these “rational egoist” actors as Neoliberal expected (since U=V) – a state depicted by 
Realists would contrastingly calculate relative gains, deducing the relative advance that may be accumulatively 
procured by others and turned against itself.119 (Hence the new equation, U=V – k (W – V), where W is the total 
payoff obtained by all the participants, k the coefficient of sensitivity to such a gap). Keohane’s claim for a single 
avowedly rationalistic tradition synthesizing Neo-Neo theories is untied into what Powell named “The 
Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate” (1994). See esp. Mearsheimer 1994/5.  
120  Waltz 1986: 43-4.  
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conceived of by Waltz, as I shall expound in the next chapter, means following 
the anarchical ordering principle designated by the system as a kind of rules of 
the game, which is the very opposite to the one Keohane  imputes to him 
(which instead conceives of an interest maximizer).  
Fourth, the privilege claimed to utilitarian rationality by the Neo-Neo theorists 
also greatly stimulates the exploration for alternative conceptions of reason. 
One of the efforts, as I shall explicate in the next chapter, is to conceptualize 
rationality as dependent on the rules of a game, a conception which is both 
constitutive and regulative. Theorists such as Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich 
Kratochwil are representative in their works around the turn of the 1990s. 
Another consists in the idea of “historical reason” that will be canvassed in the 
last chapter. Christian Reus-Smit’s thesis – rationality as a culturally and 
historically contingent form of consciousness, a very opposite to Gilpin’s 
unhistorical conception of rationality – will also be engaged at that point. Indeed, 
from a historical point of view, utilitarian rationality had as homogenized some 
languages of reason as stimulated the development of others in a negative 
sense.  
 
(iii) “Bring the State Back in?” Endogenous Rationalists in the 1990s 
 
In the standard disciplinary history, the collapse of the USSR and end of the 
Cold War is claimed to have dealt a fatal blow to the Neo-Neo theories. The 
unexpected termination of the Cold War seems to have ravaged all the efforts 
of the Neorealists and Neoliberals. 121  The Constructivists seized this 
opportunity, soon establishing a new paradigm to replace the Neo-Neos. Hopf, 
for one instance, declared that Constructivist could “suggest a research agenda” 
that provided “alternative understanding of mainstream international relations 
puzzles”.122 
                                                              
121 See e.g. Wendt 1999: 4.  
122 Hopf 1998: 171-2.  
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  But the foregoing story is inaccurate. The idea of utilitarian reason withstood 
the watershed of the end of the Cold War, and the discipline experienced a new 
wave of utilitarian movement that was very powerful in renovating the utilitarian 
framework. Notice, however, the peculiarity of this movement: the theorists 
participating in it endeavor to wage a war on two fronts, trying to seize a “middle 
ground” between the Neo-Neos and Constructivists. (This “middle ground” is 
fundamentally different from Adler’s “middle ground” which is between 
Neorealists/liberals and Postmodernists. 123 ) On the one hand, they are 
dissatisfied with the Neoliberals and Neorealists, arguing that the utilitarian 
conception of rationality is undermined not because it has gone too far, but 
because it has not gone far enough in unpacking the enclosed state box. To 
simply assume that states are interest-maximizing actors and that they respond 
merely to the exogenous incentives offered by the international system (recall 
Gilpin) or international institution (recall Keohane) is not enough. Why does the 
initiation of hegemonic war become an agent’s interest? Why do the agents 
demand institutional cooperation in the first place? The Neo-Neos need to 
answer those questions. On the other hand, in the face of the challenges posed 
by Constructivists, which center around the fact that utilitarian explanations 
have been confined to material and unitary interest, the participants in this 
movement, who want to retain the power of (utilitarian) reason as a productive 
line of enquiry, at the same time endeavor to revamp utilitarian rationality by 
bringing culture and domestic institution back into account. 
  It is within this background that these “endogenous rationalists” (my term) 
turn the concept of utilitarian rationality to the agent itself. Their aim is clear. 
Whereas in the previous two waves the interest maximized has been taken for 
granted, the third wave utilitarian theorizations focus precisely upon the process 
of the preference formation per se. Notice the particularity of their demand. First, 
unlike the Neo-Neo theorists, they want to show that interest cannot be 
                                                              
123  Adler 1997: 321.  
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assumed. If the state wants to initiate a war, or maintain an institution, then the 
origin of the preferences must be clarified. The preference formation is by no 
means an exogenous process determined by the external incentives; rather, 
problems such as who is authorized, under what rules, in which cultural 
background, to maximize one preference other than another, have to be 
elucidated.  
Second, like the Neo-Neo theorists, it is by using the concept of rationality in 
a special way that these endogenous rationalists show how interests are 
generated. In a similar to their forbearers, they conceptualize state as an 
interest-maximizer comprising interest-maximizers (plural) rather than as a 
unitary entity. They want to show that through a “two step” theory124 – in the 
first the state is assume to derive the preferences out of the domestic and 
cultural context, and then lets them be ranked and the optimal preference 
maximized by the actor in its international conduct – that the endogenous 
process of how interest is made to be maximized can be revealed.  
Their voices had been frequently heard in form of individual articles. In 1991, 
H. Milner published her essay on “The Assumption of Anarchy” which paved 
the way for her latter incorporation of domestic politics into utilitarian rationality. 
The essay was later collected into D. Baldwin’s Neorealism and Neoliberalism 
(1993), with which V. Rittberger’s Regime Theory and International Relations 
(1993), and Ideas and Foreign Policy (1993) under the editorship of J. Goldstein 
and Keohane were released simultaneously. In all those edited volumes 
(especially the latter two), participants were demanding that both the state and 
culture be brought back into the account of a rational agent’s action. Again, in 
1996, P.J. Katzenstein’s The Culture of National Security (1996) as an edited 
volume was issued in which many theorists tried to aggregate identity and 
rationality in various ways. Later on, A. Moravcsik’s “Taking Preference 
Seriously” (1997), Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner’s Exploration and 
                                                              
124 Typically see Lergo 1997.  
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Contestation in the Study of World Politics (1998), and finally Lake and Powell’s 
Strategic Choice and International Relations (1999) brought the development 
of utilitarian rationality into another climax at the turn of the millennium.125  
How to illuminate the preference formation process? I shall direct my 
discussion towards two branches: the first is domestic cultures, norms, and 
identity; the second is domestic institutions. Let me first explain how the cultural 
variant of the endogenous rationalists renovates the utilitarian framework. 
 
The Cultural Rationalists 
 
For the Cultural Rationalists, utilitarian rationality is not only compatible with the 
explanations of a cultural (or Constructivist) kind, but also capable of disclosing 
how states maximize a certain cultural interest. This requires the incorporation 
of identity, norms, culture, and domestic institutions into the utilitarian 
framework, endeavoring to “consider interests and preferences to be socially 
constructed”. 126  “Cultural explanations”, Kahler argued, “are a means of 
enriching models of state choice, not an instrument for overturning them”.127 
Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner proclaimed that “Constructivists seek to 
understand how preferences are formed…prior to the exercise of instrumental 
rationality”.128 “Norms”, Kowert and Lergo maintained, “affect not only actor 
interests but also the ways actors connect their preferences to policy 
choices”. 129  Finnemore and Sikkink declared the inseparability of the two, 
arguing that “Rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant 
episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative 
context conditions any episode of rational choice”.130  
                                                              
125  Other enterprises include Fearon 1994.  
126  Johnston 1996: 264.  
127  Kahler 1998: 294.  
128 Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner 1998: 41.  
129  Kowert & Lergo 1996: 463.  
130  Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 248.  
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  Consider two influential examples. The first is laid down by Jepperson, Wendt 
and Katzenstein (hereafter JWK) under the name of “Norms, Identity and 
Culture in National Security” (1996).131 See the Fig. 2.15 below.  
 
 
       Domestic Culture, Tradition,                 Identity                  
       Military Doctrine, Norms                                       Fig. 2.15 
                                               Interest 
 
                                               Foreign Policy 
 
For JWK, the impacts of culture (etc.) on foreign policy can be clearly seen in 
the cultural influences on preference formation. Domestic cultures, traditions 
and even military doctrines, are incorporated into such a framework. In one 
route, they inform identity, and identity informs interest, which decides the 
interest to be maximized in foreign policy. In another route, culture shapes 
interest, which will in the end be pursued as a preference in foreign policy. Kier, 
who shows in her article how military doctrine can shape foreign policy (JWK’s 
framework is a summarization on the basis of Kier’s argument), makes a nice 
demonstration. For Kier, a state’s initiation of a hegemonic war, such as 
Germany’s struggle for supremacy in the Second World War, is considerably 
pre-determined through “the ways in which culture and the meanings that actors 
attach to certain policies shape actors’ interests”.132 Instead of waiting for the 
“incentive” provided by the international system, the initiation of a hegemonic 
war may be predetermined as an interest by the military doctrine. (Notice, 
however, that the last link by beginning from culture and ending with policy may 
skip and subvert the utilitarian framework.)  
  Consider the second example by Goldstein and Keohane, entitled “Ideas and 
Foreign Policy” (1993). Goldstein and Keohane formulate the following table. 
See Fig. 2.16 below. 
 
                                                              
131  Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996.  
132  Kier 1996: 187.   
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Fig. 2.16 
 
 
 
In this table, the ideas are divided into three categories: worldviews, principled 
beliefs, and causal beliefs (horizontal level).133 Worldviews are those ideas of 
the broadest extent, including religious or scientific outlook. Principled beliefs 
have a more limited boundary, serving as normative structures that guide 
actions. In the end there is causal belief, which is defined as providing “guides 
for individuals on how to achieve their objectives” and implying “strategies for 
the attainment of goals”.134 
  Having posed the taxonomy of ideas, Goldstein and Keohane explain how 
these three kinds of ideas can leverage influence over foreign policy (the 
vertical table on the left). To begin with the road map: worldviews, principled 
and causal beliefs, all can shape strategic interest by serving as road maps:  
 
“People’s preferences for particular policy outcomes are not given but 
acquired. World views and principled beliefs structure people’s views about 
the fundamental nature of human life and the morality of practices and 
choices […] To understand the formation of preferences, we need to 
understand what ideas are available and how people choose among them.” 
 
The causal beliefs, Goldstein and Keohane continued, could also “help 
determine which of many means will be used to reach desired goals and 
therefore help to provide actors with strategies with which to further their 
objectives”.135  
                                                              
133  Ideas are defined fundamentally as “beliefs” by Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3.  
134 Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 10.  
135  Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13-4.  
 Worldviews Principled Belief Causal Belief 
Road Map    
Equilibria    
Institutionalization    
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  The three endogenous ideas can also have an impact on the equilibria that 
reverses the process described by Stein and Keohane himself. Recall 
Schelling’s focal points and Stein’s game of the battle of sexes (Fig. 2.12). For 
Goldstein and Keohane, ideas can shape interest because they can serve as 
focal point, “alleviating coordination problems arising from the absence of 
unique equilibrium”.136 Whereas in Stein’s account institutions are devised for 
converging the individual choices on the same equilibrium, Goldstein and 
Keohane argue that the reverse process may have occurred. The endogenous 
ideas, which can first of all contribute to the convergence of expectations, is 
capable of being institutionalized as organization, and are subsequently 
manifested as the “incentives of those in the organization and those whose 
interests are served by it”.137 
  For the Cultural Rationalists, utilitarian rationality is more than compatible 
with the Constructivists’ emphasis on the impacts of ideas and identities: the 
utilitarian-rational framework can rather demonstrate how ideas makes 
influences on the agents’ actions.  
 
Domestic Institutionalists 
 
Near the end of the 1990s there appeared two outstanding articles that 
broadened the conceptual space of utilitarian rationality by taking domestic 
institutions into account: Andrew Moravcsik’s “Taking Preference Seriously: A 
Liberal Theory of International Politics” (1997) and Helen Milner’s “Rationalizing 
Politics” (1998).138 Each cogently demonstrates that the subject of utilitarian 
rationality needs to be broadened. Although the two scholars take somehow 
different stances towards “rational institutionalism”, they all concur that the 
utilitarian conception of rationality remains indispensable for political study and 
                                                              
136  Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 17.   
137  Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 20.  
138  See Moravcsik 1997, Milner 1998. With great unfortunateness and due to the limitedness of the space, there are 
some fascinating essays that scattered in the already mentioned edited works will be incapable to be reconsidered 
here, such as Zurn 1993, and Kahler 1998, Rogowski 1999 
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requires development. To use Milner’s statement as an illustration: where 
rational institutionalism is wrong is not because it has gone too far, but because 
it has not advanced far enough to consider domestic institutions, like their 
international counterparts, are interest-maximization aggregators. 139  Milner 
enunciated that “one means for making this work more systematic and 
cumulative is through the use of rational institutionalist approaches” to 
“systematically explore the consequences of strategic interaction among actors 
with diverse preferences when facing differing political institutions [in both 
domestic and international realms]”.140  
  Two interweaved assumptions form the commonly theoretical basis for both 
thinkers: all associations – societal groups, states, and international institutions 
– are interest maximizers under constraints and are non-unitary entities. For 
Moravcsik, the “fundamental actors” in international politics are “individuals and 
private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who 
organize exchange and collective action to promote differential interests under 
constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in 
societal influence”.141 States, likewise, represent “some subset of domestic 
society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences 
and act purposively in world politics”. This view of the state as interest-
maximizer comprising sub-state interest maximizers is also shared by Milner. 
“Institutions”, Milner suggested, “are the means by which the diverse 
preferences of individuals are aggregated into choices or outcomes for the 
collective.”142 States’ preferences, rather than arbitrarily assumed, must be 
viewed as an outcome of “the strategic interaction among agents within these 
institutions”. 143  As Rogowski once pointed out, these “strategic-choice 
approach[es]” were crucial for understanding how “domestic institutions” could 
                                                              
139 Milner 1998: 140.  
140  Milner 1998: 138.  
141  Moravcsik 1997: 516.  
142  Milner 1998: 120-1. 
143  Milner 1998: 120.  
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exert influences on the “process of aggregating the preferences of variously 
individuals and groups”.144 
  On the basis of these two inextricable assumptions, the two scholars have 
constructed slightly different theories. To start from Moravcsik, his “Liberal 
Theory” assumes that the states’ preferences will be aggregated in a sequential 
and repeated way. “Collective state behavior [in international politics]”, 
Moravcsik explicated, “should be analyzed as a two-stage process of 
constrained social choice”. 145  In the first stage, the sub-state groups 
strategically interact with each other, imputing their preferences into the state. 
In the second stage the same process is repeated. The preferences of the 
individuals and groups (or the configuration of their preferences) will be 
transmitted into the state. The state, having defined its preferences by 
aggregating the sub-state groups’ preferences, will projects them in turn to the 
international terrain, using “debate, bargain, or fight [to particular agreements]” 
to prevail over the others. In the end, “the configuration of interdependent state 
preferences determines state behavior.”146  
  Milner’s account is more dynamic. For Milner, the aggregation of state’s 
preferences is undertaken through the play of a “two-level”, simultaneous, 
game. Like Moravcsik, Milner conceives of the state as aggregating and 
maximizing the (configuration of) sub-state groups’ preferences. Yet quite unlike 
Moravcsik, Milner, drawing on Dahl and Putnam, argues that the state should 
be regarded as a “polyarchy”, where the sub-state “actors internally bargain 
with one another, while they also bargain externally”.147 In addition to the 
inclusion of the international dimension into the game is Milner’s original 
emphasis that the state’s preferences are co-determined by the simultaneity of 
the two games played. In other words:  
 
                                                              
144 Rogowski 1999: 136, 113.  
145  Moravcsik 1997: 544, emphasis in original.  
146  Moravcsik 1997: 516-20.  
147  Milner 1998: 136.  
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“Bargaining among executives, legislatures, bureaucracies, and interest 
groups or the public is structured by national political institutions to yield 
particular collective outcomes […] they usually embed this domestic game 
within an international one, so that only outcomes that lie within the 
acceptable range of both domestic and foreign actors will emerge”.148 
 
Consider the following figure used by Milner.149  
 
       Environment 
 
Actor 
      Fig. 2.17 
 
Whereas Moravcsik falls into the low-left quadrant, making a progress than the 
Neo-Neo theorists who regard the state as a rational unity entity (upper-left 
quadrant), Milner intends to open up the state to both domestic and 
international actors (low-right quadrant). In contrast to game theorist such as 
Stein and Axelrod, who assume games are played one-dimensionally against 
other states (upper-right quadrant), the state’s preferences is generated in 
Milner’s account by the joint play of a domestic game and an international one. 
When the domestic actors bargain with each other, the prevailed preference will 
become the state foreign policy towards other states (the low-left quadrant); 
when the domestic actors bargain with another international domestic actor, 
their respective preferences will be transmitted into the two states’ preference 
scales (the lower-right quadrant). It is by this approach that the internal strategic 
bargaining process of “how these preferences were aggregated into policy” can 
be can be revealed. 150  “In this situation”, Milner elucidated furthermore, 
                                                              
148  Milner 1998: 136-7. 
149  Milner 1998: 129.  
150 Milner 1998: 137.  
 Rational Choice (one state) Strategic Interaction (two states)
State as unit Perfect Market Game Theory 
State as polyarchy Domestic Sources Two-Level Games 
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“international politics and foreign policy are part of the domestic struggle for 
power over collective outcomes and the search for internal compromise”.151 
  For the Domestic Institutionalists, the formation of interest can be revealed 
by unpacking the state as an interest-maximizing association that contain sub-
state interest-maximizing associations.  
 
(iv) Conclusion 
 
The Trajectory of Historical Development  
 
Within the four languages of reason, utilitarian reason is the one that has 
generated the most influential and enduring movements within the discipline 
over the last six decades. Let me first provide a retrospect of its trajectory of 
development. The whole utilitarian movement in IR can be portrayed as a 
crystallizing process in which the conceptual space is expanded by applying to 
more objects.   
 
                                                    Conflict 
 
        
                                                                      Deterrence 
      the domestic institutional           Maximizing Interests                    
                                                                      Conflict Resolution  
 
          State (Statesman)  
                                                                    Cooperation 
  
                                      Fig. 2.18 
 
Consider the figure (2.19) above. The concept of maximizing interest stands at 
the center. First, in the theories of deterrence and conflict resolution, the 
explanandum can be neither pure conflict nor pure cooperation (recall Aron’s 
“peace impossible, war improbable”). In the theories of deterrence devised by 
                                                              
151  Milner 1998: 134.  
Institution 
Culture  
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Schelling, Kahn and Snyder, the concept is used to show how an agent who 
maximizes interest can deter the opponent (who is also assumed as an interest 
maximizer) without an actual trial of strength (in other words, defense). In 
Schelling and Boulding’s account of conflict resolution, the agent is expected to 
find a focal point or equilibrium, a point where both agents’ interests are 
maximized (the maximum space is occupied) and where their expectations 
converge because they are interest-maximizers. Notice the particular condition 
of deterrence and conflict resolution: both agents are required to outwin the 
opponent without an actual use of violence, and to halt conflict before its 
escalation (if force is involved). This emphasis on the “mixed game” is imprinted 
by the dilemma during the early Cold War period.  
  Next the explanandum extends to pure conflict and cooperation by the Neo-
Neo theorists. Gilpin and Mesquita’s accounts of war in terms of “expected 
utility” go much further than deterrence theorists. War, even hegemonic war, is 
taken into account. In Keohane, Stein and Axelrod’s theories of cooperation, 
the agents cease to be merely searching for the focal points. In Keohane’s 
explanation of the maintenance of institutional cooperation, the agents demand 
institution to lower transaction cost and maximize absolute gains. Stein and 
Axelrod expound why institution origins and varies in types by envisaging that 
the agents want to maximize their interests in different games (also in various 
ways of play). It is noticeable, finally, that the decline of the American power 
vis-à-vis the Soviets as well as the Western allies in the 1970s generates strong 
apprehensions with the prospect of a return to greater conflict and the collapse 
of international institutions.  
  The last movement directs utilitarian rationality back to the agent itself. 
Whether morality conflict or institutional cooperation, their interests are shaped 
first of all by an endogenous condition. The explanandum is now the agent’s 
own formation of interest. Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein explain how the 
interests maximized by the agent are shaped by identity, domestic culture, and 
norms. Milner and Moravcsik show that the agent, far from being a single 
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interest maximizer, is itself an interest-maximizer which comprises interest 
maximizers and which aggregates their interest into its own. Unlike the previous 
two movements, the utilitarian rationalists of a new generation face the growing 
challenges of constructivists, and, by implication, the requirement to engage 
more with disciplinary debate.  
  This is the trajectory of the changing explanandum: from non-pure conflict, 
non-pure cooperation, through pure conflict and extensive cooperation, to the 
agents’ interest formation that can determine their conduct of pure conflicting 
or cooperative action.   
 
The Voice of Utilitarian Reason: Its Defining Features  
 
Within the development of the theories building on utilitarian rationality, the 
language of utilitarian reason – calculation of interest under constraints – has 
been pronounced in a slightly different way.  
First, it is concerned with “advantage”, “utility”, “value”, “cost and benefit”, 
“self-seeking”, “egoists”, “self-interest”, or “preference”. However it may be 
uttered, the central content of utilitarian reason must be revolved around the 
maximization of interest, the procurement of benefits and avoidance of costs. 
Such a utilitarian language is in itself a special way to endow meaning on action 
that it verbalizes in a special form: whether making a strategic move, halting a 
conflict, creating an international institution, waging a war, or following the 
ideational road map, all these actions undertaken by the agent must be made 
sense of specifically through the presumption of the agent as maximizing 
interest.  
Notice that some constructivists claim that utilitarian reason can be 
fundamentally distinguished from constructivists by the latter’s distinct 
emphasis on culture and identity.152 The claim is partly unconvincing, since 
                                                              
152 See Wendt 1995, 1999, Checkel 1998, Hopf 1998, Ruggie 1998: Intro.  
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utilitarian reason can also embrace these “ideational” features, easily cashing 
them in as interest. What does differentiate the referent object from a 
Constructivist framework is not whether ideas and identities are taken into 
account but whether in the last resort, the agent’s action is explained in terms 
of interest maximization or culture.153 Utilitarian reason, indeed, invites actors 
to an “enchanted world of interest” in which the pursuit of interest provides 
motivation, and the net balance between cost and benefit offers regulation. 
Second, utilitarian reason is to undertake calculation under constraints. For 
the utilitarian theorists, constraints can be uncertainty, another actor, a different 
game, a different way of playing, or an institution or culture that may shape the 
form of preferences. Indeed, one may define constraints as anything that can 
disturb the ego’s own calculation.  
The influences of “constraints” can be discussed for convenience under two 
conditions. The first is Game Theory, and the second Rational Choice. In the 
Game-Theoretical application of utilitarian reason, constraints take mainly two 
forms. One is the different games that the actors play. I have shown how 
Schelling, Kahn, Stein, Axelrod have applied such various games as Chicken 
(fig. 2.4), Focal Point (fig. 2.10), Prisoners’ Dilemma (fig. 2.12), and the Battle 
of Sexes (fig. 2.13). The actor’s maximization of interest becomes very different 
under these conditions. The other constraint, which has been rarely discussed, 
is the diverse ways of playing a given game. Consider the following table:  
 
 
Choice One-off Iterated 
Sequential Schelling Axelrod 
Simultaneous Stein Milner 
Fig. 2.19 
 
Given a game, a different manner of playing can exert enormous influences on 
the actors’ calculations of interest. When agents are making sequential choices 
                                                              
153  This is the reason why Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein’s figure implies a radical constructive explanation: the 
cultural factors can impact on foreign policy without using interest as its intervening variable. 
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in a one-by-one way (upper-left quadrant), the first can leave the burden to the 
second, manipulating and maneuvering the other’s choice (recall Schelling and 
Kahn’s illustration of deterrence). When both agents choose simultaneously 
(low-left), there will be few space for coercing and convincing the other unless 
some preparatory actions had already been taken beforehand. Furthermore, 
the agents’ choices can also be impacted by the rounds of interaction: their 
choices would be dramatically different when they have only one interaction 
(namely making one choice of a once-for-all character), where few thoughts will 
be allotted for considering long-term gains, and when they are acting under the 
“shadow of the future”, where the consequence of one interaction must be taken 
into account during the next. 
  In the Rational-Choice form, constraints can also take two forms. One form 
is the issue of uncertainty, or expected utility. This constraint is evident in 
Snyder’s analysis of aggression, in Schelling’s discussion of brinkmanship, in 
Boulding and Gilpin’s account of conflict resolution and hegemonic war, and 
finally in Mesquita’s explanation of war. By quantifying the certainty and 
uncertainty of the prospect of war – sometimes the law of marginal utility is also 
invoked – the thinkers of utilitarian rationality have endeavored to delineate the 
precise condition under which not a single utility can escape from being 
maximized. The other form is the constraint exerted on the formation of 
preferences. Moravcsik’s two-step process and Milner’s two-level games show 
how preference is conditioned by the internal aggregation of domestic 
preferences. The cultural influences on the preference formation have also 
been highlighted by Goldstein and Keohane, Jepperson, Wendt and 
Katzenstein, and by the many “cultural rationalists” I mentioned in Katzenstein’s 
The Culture of National Security.  
The diverse games, the different ways of playing the games, the uncertainty 
and culture and domestic institutions, all have delineated a specific condition 
under which the benefits of conduct are maximized. To envisage how to 
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maximize interest under these various conditions of calculation, the theorists of 
utilitarian reason can justly claim to have made a considerable contribution.  
 
The Myth of the Rationalist Dominance  
 
Is utilitarian reason giving rise to a monolithic tradition of “Rationalism” that knits 
together Thucydides, Morgenthau, Waltz and Keohane historically and unifies 
(Neo)Realism and (Neo)Liberalism theoretically? Keohane claimed so, but the 
assertion proves to be unwarranted. As I have shown, Keohane exploited the 
analytical similarity between the two languages of reason, and employed an 
interpretive strategy to read Morgenthau as a utilitarian rationalist. It is with 
reference to this tactic, namely the translation of other theories into a utilitarian 
tongue, that the dominance of Rationalism can be seen to have been fabricated.  
  The similarity between the two languages are remarkable. How, one may ask, 
to meticulously distinguish the two languages? Their differences are truly 
profound in the following aspects. First, whereas the Kantian language stands 
in opposition to emotion, the utilitarian one admits of the “rationality of 
irrationality”. For the thinkers of Kantian reason (think about Morgenthau’s 
“sentimentalism”), emotion is a manifestation of the failure of reason. But for 
the utilitarian theorists (consider Schelling and Kahn), emotional commitment 
can strengthen the maximization of interest, by behaving in a manner that is as 
if uncontrolled by reason. 
  Second, the notion of interest occupied such a preponderant position in the 
utilitarian accent that the moral dimension of conduct has been seriously 
overlooked. Even if Morgenthau, the most ardent advocate for defending 
“interest” by the discipline of reason, and who has long been mistaken as a 
utilitarian thinker, is conscious that the ethics of responsibility is intimately 
connected with the rational pursuit of interest.  
Third, the two languages, despite sharing common concern with interest, 
point to different ways to maximize interest. Whereas the Kantians can at best 
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exercise control through ordinal calculation (Morgenthau’s call for 
establishment of hierarchical objectives), the utilitarianists can accomplish this 
by ordinal calculation, by quantitative calculation that take payoffs, risks, 
strategies, and different kinds of constraints into account. At the level of the 
instrumental pursuit of interest, utilitarian reason is equipped with far advanced 
techniques than its Kantian counterpart. Conversely, for the thinkers of Kantian 
reason, there are also two ways to advance an agent’s interest that the 
utilitarian rationalists fail to follow suit. One is to defend the agents’ interest by 
starting from a contemplation of the end of political conduct. The other, which 
is more important, is that the utilitarianists have not developed an 
intersubjective way for maximizing interest. Rather than reaching mutual 
understanding and dialogic consensus, they have to be mute and try to outwin 
each other. The Kantians wanted the agents to cooperate by articulating voices 
and reach reasoned consensus (forging an intersubjective play of the game), 
yet the Utilitarianists wanted them to cooperate through independent decision 
making and forbid interpersonal (relative) comparison of utility. The de-
emphasis of the transcendent reason that may link the agents intellectually and 
morally together may be seen as a typical feature of Utilitarian reason. 
Notice a feature that may also distinguish the two. Whereas the thinkers of 
Kantian reason speak in an exhortative manner, the utilitarian rationalists are 
normally less aware of their presumptive tone. The Liberal Institutionalists know 
that men are irrational but they exhort to transform the human nature. 
Morgenthau acknowledges that reason cannot determine power but urges for 
its rational use. Linklater understands that unjust exclusion are within and 
without the communities and plea for dialogic interrogation. The utilitarianists 
are the very opposite. An opponent would be deterred if he was indeed as 
rational as Schelling, Kahn and Snyder anticipated. A state and its opponent 
would have found the common boundary of conflict if both were interest-
maximizers, as Schelling and Boulding described. A state would initiate a war 
and stop somewhere if it was acting in accordance with the law of marginal 
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utility. States will create international institutions if they were rational to the 
extent that making complex calculations (such as reversing the Coase theorem) 
to lower the transaction costs.    
 
The Games that States Play  
 
Utilitarian reason pronounces an enchanted world of calculating interest, 
indicating that all actors are interest maximizers under constraints. But what if 
the actors fail to comply with this requirement? Have the actors internalized 
utilitarian rationality to such an extent that without any external pressures they 
can still behave in this way? What if they are unwilling to cash culture and value 
into interest, seeing instead that the calculation of interest per se is determined 
by culture? In his response to Keohane’s misconstrued claim that utilitarian 
rationality plays a crucial role in Theory for discovering the systematic effects, 
Waltz argues that “I do not differ with him over rationality, except semantically” 
– what is this rationality assumption that is central to Theory but whose “sematic” 
meaning is different from Keohane’s?  
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Chapter III. Axiological Reason 
 
 
In this chapter I shall turn to the third language of axiological rationality. 
Axiological rationality, which has also been renowned as “the logic of 
appropriateness” or “contextual-institutional rationality”, defines rational action 
as following exterior rules, norms, and cultures.1 It is concerned with “trying to 
do the right thing” within various contexts, of which cultures, values, and 
identities are an indispensable part.2 Here, three points deserve clarification. 
 First, axiological rationality is characteristically relational. Unlike its utilitarian 
counterpart that ascribes rationality to the individual agent’s action, axiological 
rationality conceptualizes rationality as an interrelation between the agent and 
the external frame of reference. Rationality is always measured by the extent 
to which the agent can keep up with the external rule.  
Second, although many axiological-rational thinkers refuse to consider the 
“external” rules, norms, and cultures as ontologically independent of the 
agents,3 they still draw a sharp conceptual distinction between the agents who 
act on the rules exogenous to them, and the rules which are “systematic”, 
“social”, “intersubjective”, and irreducible to any internally individual property. 
As I shall show, all the thinkers of axiological rationality have argued strongly 
against a view that reduces rationality to the level of the individual agent. 
Third, axiological rationality does not suppose that all actions are essentially 
“determined” by these exterior frames of reference. On the contrary, many 
                                                              
1  Although its essential principle has been employed by IR scholars for a long time, the very term “logic of 
appropriateness” has only a recent history: it was first introduced by March & Olson (1998: 311-2), celebrated 
by Risse’s (2000: 3-7) tripartite comparison between it and the logics of consequence and arguing, and 
systematically criticized under the name of “the contextual-institutional or normative rationality” by Sending 
(2002: 450). For IR scholars, Brian Barry’s Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy (1970) has been well 
referred as a landmark comparison between the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness before the 1990s, 
while Martin Hollis’ Philosophy of Social Sciences (1996) seems to have replaced Barry’s and become a new 
classic. Outside the IR circle, the “logic of appropriateness” is first outlined in March & Olson’s Rediscovering 
Institutions (1989), whereas the “logic of consequence” appears to be untraceable but can be dated back to the 
coinage of “Consequentialism” by G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1959).  
2  Fierke 2007: 170.  
3 Onuf’s (1989: 114) “Constructivism” is a theory of rules that proposes to “overcome the dualism of self and world 
by denying priority to either”. 
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axiological-rational thinkers acknowledge the elasticity of social action (as the 
verb “trying to do the right thing” indicates). External rules shape and shove, 
push and pull. They rarely determine the agents’ action in a decisive way 
without going through a process of coercing, inducing, exhorting and aiding the 
agent to act on themselves. Indeed, as we shall see throughout the chapter, 
one of the most distinct feature of axiological-rational thinking is precisely the 
issue of why and how to ensure the agents can be axiological rational.  
Notice that when the thinkers of axiological rationality speak, they always 
articulate their voices in an explanatory tone. Unlike the Kantian and utilitarian 
rational theorists, the axiological-rational theorists are keen to demonstrate how 
the concept can be used to provide cogently theoretical explanation of political 
conduct. Even if they engage with history, they still tackle historical problems in 
a manner that is less interested in looking at history for its own sake, than in 
using history to show how the concept can provide more explanatory power.  
  In what follows I show that four IR thinkers conceive of reason in a manner 
of axiological rationality. The first thinker I want to examine is Kenneth Waltz 
and his Theory of International Politics (1979, hereafter Theory). Indeed, 
Waltz’s opus is of such a singular importance that it has given rise to numerous 
debates, both over whether he is “rationalist” but also over the kind of rationality 
that he is aligned with. 
First, there has been a heated debate between Waltz and his critics over 
whether the assumption of rationality is prerequisite for the former’s Theory. 
Waltz, for his part, denied the indispensability of such a concept; even if it is 
crucial, declared Waltz, the rationality will be very different from the one 
employed by Keohane in a “semantic” sense. The critics – who included 
Rationalists such as Keohane, Realists such as Mearsheimer, Postmodernists 
such as Ashley and Constructivists such as Wendt – conversely maintained 
that not only is Theory (particularly of the balance of power) built on the concept 
of utilitarian rationality but that it simultaneously established a classic 
demonstration of how utilitarian rationality can be exploited. At least “in effect, 
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and crucially in terms of the influence of his work”, in the words of a leading 
British IR theorist, Waltz has offered a “‘rational choice’ version” of Realist 
account of international politics. 4  This controversy leads to a number of 
questions: are the critics’ insistent assertions of the significance of utilitarian 
rationality (in relation to Theory) copious or justified? Is Theory a masterpiece 
that falls into a tradition linking Thucydides with Morgenthau, Waltz and 
Keohane himself? What is the rationality in Waltz’s distinctive “semantic” 
meaning?   
Second, in contrast to the first utilitarian-rational reading, there is a rival 
interpretation which contends that the concept of rationality is crucial for Waltz, 
although it is important to note that the meaning of the term substantially 
diverges from the utilitarian conception. Knutsen, for instance, argues that 
Theory displays a “concept of systems rationality” in which the system “has its 
own rationality” and “the rationality of the system is not a function of the 
rationality of its members”.5 Within recent years this systematic/sociological 
rational reading has gained increasing attention and acknowledgement. “Waltz 
highlights a positivistic epistemology of picture”, Fierke argued, “against the 
background of an implicit social ontology”.6 Goddard and Nexon point out that 
“structural realism is a far richer sociological theory of international politics than 
its critics and defenders usually recognize”.7 “If Waltz had declared himself a 
thoroughgoing constructivist”, Onuf remarked after reexamining Waltz’s 
account of structure, “other scholars might have followed suit”. 8  All these 
rediscoveries of Waltz as a systematic or sociological rational theorist point to 
an implicitly axiological conception of rationality which can be clearly 
distinguished from a conventional stance which construes Waltz as a Rational 
Choice theorist.  
                                                              
4  Brown 2000: 47-8, emphasis added.  
5 Knutsen 1997: 248-9.  
6  Fierke 2002: 340.  
7  Goddard & Nexon 2005: 10.  
8  Onuf 2009: 196.  
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Why and where should I position myself within these controversies? First, I 
want to unravel the riddle of why Waltz has consistently denied the significance 
of the term imputed to him by such critics as Keohane. Second, I also want to 
show what the differently semantic meaning would be given to the term if Waltz 
was compelled to accept its indispensability. The two riddles have generated 
considerable controversy and contestation. Yet Waltz’s position nonetheless 
remains opaque and uncertain.  
My engagement with the two preceding riddles will proceed in three steps. In 
the initial instance, I provide a brief examination of Waltz’s Man, the State and 
War (1959) and of his writings on the nuclear problems (during the 1980s). I 
show that in Waltz’s own vocabulary, the concept of rationality, considerably 
shaped by the Realist discourse of the 1950s and the Rational Deterrence 
Theories of the 1960s,9 is defined as man’s capacity for controlling passions 
and conducing interest calculation. Far from embracing this conception of 
reason as his inspiration, Waltz rather takes it as foil, seeing it as an essential 
trait of the “reductionist” theories, a very taboo term from which he wants to 
distance himself (and which he consequently engages with extreme scruple in 
Theory). This explains why his critics’ ascription of rationality to him caused 
Waltz considerable consternation. In a further step, I briefly contextualize 
Waltz’s Theory by reconstituting the system theories that preceded Waltz – with 
specific attention to contributions from Morton Kaplan, Raymond Aron, Stanley 
Hoffmann and Charles McClelland – and then I reinterpret his Theory within this 
intellectual context. This contextual reading subsequently reveals that although 
Waltz apparently spoke in the language of microeconomics, he in fact uttered 
a sociological language of game, rule, order, and imperative in order to 
demonstrate how the units are required to be axiological-rational by the 
international system. This presents an image of “systematic rationality” or 
“social ontology” which closely resembles the work of later axiological-rational 
                                                              
9  Notice “considerably”: Waltz did sometimes speak of the rationality of firms rather than of decision maker in 
Theory. Nevertheless, the dominant conception in his thought remains at the man level. See more details below.  
169 
 
scholars such as Onuf, Kratochwil, and Fierke. Finally, I reconstitute the 
process through which Waltz’s axiological-rational theory had been 
incrementally “utilitarianized”. By retracing the process through which Waltz’s 
conceptions of “system” and “anarchy” were misappropriated by both the 
Keohanean Rationalists and Ashlyian Reflectivists (in a manner which clearly 
diverged from Waltz’s own interpretation and usage), I demonstrate how Waltz 
was gradually reconceived as a utilitarian theorist. 
Waltz’s Theory is an exemplar of axiological rationality. Yet too few scholars 
have recognized his axiological-rational insight and all too many have arrived 
at the belief that Waltz is a utilitarian theorist per excellence. Onuf and 
especially Kratochwil’s accounts of rationality, to which I shall turn in the second 
section, fall into this trap. As two leading “Constructivist” thinkers, Onuf and 
Kratochwil have long been renowned for their pursuit of an alternative 
conception other than the predominantly utilitarian one – the latter is even 
renowned for his critique of Waltz who is construed by Kratochwil as a typical 
utilitarian-rational theorist. What has not been recognized, however, is the 
remarkable resemblances as well as differences between Onuf and 
Kratochwil’s ideas of rationality and Waltz’s.  
By concentrating on Onuf and Kratochwil’s defining works from the early 
1980s to early 1990s – the former’s World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in 
Social Theory and International Relations (1989) and the latter’s Rules, Norms 
and Decisions (1989) and several manifesto articles – I shall proceed in three 
steps and in the latter two display my arguments. In the first, I briefly reconstitute 
their dualistic critique of the a-contextual pathology of utilitarian rationality and 
the restrictedness of consequentialist logic rooted in Rational Choice and Game 
Theory. Then I shall show how Onuf and Kratochwil had taken these critiques 
as a foil for exposing an alternative definition of rationality which is 
preconditioned, anteceded and bounded by rules. It is in this conceptualization 
of rationality as embedded within a much broad rule-constituted and regulated 
game (or rules-bounded world politics) that the resemblance between Waltz’s 
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and Onuf and Kratochwil’s idea of rationality reaches the climax: Kratochwil’s 
game and Onuf’s rules are essentially parallels of Waltz’s system to the extent 
that all consider the actors’ strategies to be conditioned constitutively and 
regulatively by external rules/principles. In the third step, having disclosed the 
similarity between their conceptions, I shall go on to delineate an extra, 
intersubjective, dimension of Onuf and especially Kratochwil’s notions of 
axiological rationality: they argue that rule-following can be intersubjectively 
contested and enforced. In concluding the section I suggest however that if 
viewed from a broader perspective, Onuf and Kratochwil’s intersubjective 
mechanism of rule-following ultimately complements, rather than competes 
with, Waltz’s own understanding.  
In the third section I turn to K.M. Fierke’s outstanding analysis of axiological 
rationality, which is evidenced in Changing Games and Changing Strategies 
(1999), Diplomatic Interventions (2005), and several significant articles. 10 
Although she is widely recognized as a leading Constructivist thinker, Fierke’s 
axiological conceptualization of rationality, which possess a greater degree of 
dynamism than other axiological-rational thinkers such as Onuf and Kratochwil, 
remains underappreciated. I want to demonstrate, first, that like other theorists 
of axiological rationality, Fierke also develops an exemplary conception of 
rationality that is defined by following external rules. Second, and more crucially, 
I show how Fierke’s conception of axiological rationality is dynamic. To 
follow/enforce a rule is, for Fierke, not merely to axiologically rationally 
reproduce a game. Rather, because a rule can be shared by multiple games, 
the actors, in following a certain rule (being axiological rational in relation to a 
rule), may transform the present game into a new one – hence the state of 
being axiological rational can transition from one game to another. For Fierke, 
this requires consideration of the axiological “rationality of moving towards a 
new game”.11 I shall proceed in three steps. First, I locate Fierke’s idea of 
                                                              
10  Fierke 1998, 2005.  
11  Fierke 1998: 130.  
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rationality vis-à-vis other Constructivists who argue that rationality can be an 
externalization of internal values. Secondly, I demonstrate how Fierke has 
constructed her theory of axiological rationality on Wittgenstein’s language 
game. I show the similarity and difference between Fierke’s and Kratochwil’s 
location of rationality within language game. Finally, I expound Fierke’s account 
of how rationality, while being axiological, can be dynamic and generate 
transition to different games.  
One clarification is required before proceeding. In the ensuing discussion 
Alexander Wendt’s name will sometimes occur, but his such influential works 
as Social Theory of International Politics (1999) will not receive an extensive 
engagement. Indeed, Wendt has presented an implicit theory of axiological 
rationality without explicitly invoking the term – state action is construed to be 
both constituted and generated by the three international “cultures” (Hobbesian, 
Lockean and Kantian).12 However, it is precisely because Wendt himself has 
never enunciated the concept in axiological-rational terms, that enormous 
violence may be done to his thought if it is interpreted in such a light.  
 
(i) Kenneth Waltz, Rationality and the Theory of International 
Politics 
 
In order to understand the axiological-rational basis of Theory, it is necessary 
to grasp the two interconnected components of Waltz’s enterprise: the pursuit 
of a system theory and a system theory. For Waltz, the two are inseparable.13 
Theory begins by conceptualizing a distinct domain, and the concept of 
international system is deployed to characterize its (international politics) 
essence. Theory explains regularity within a particular realm, and system points 
to such similarity and repetition in conduct. Theory omits disturbances from 
                                                              
12  Wendt 1999.  
13  Waltz 1979: 79.   
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other domains, and system counterbalances personal and cultural deviations.14 
Hence for Waltz, both theory and system have to be closed in order to render 
a pattern of regular conduct recognizable. Their unification as a system theory 
is thus applicable to, but remains distinct from, a bounded terrain in reality. To 
either consider Waltz’s Theory as a theory independent of its system content, 
or to regard it as merely a theory of system (as if Waltz was not concerned with 
how a proper theory should be), are both utterly erroneous.15 In what follows, I 
shall concentrate on the systematic aspect of Theory without focusing too much 
on the theoretical dimension.  
 
Waltz and Reductionist Theories 
 
Throughout his life, Waltz did not speak very much of the term except on two 
occasions – both before and after Theory. Both examples show that the concept 
of rationality, far from inspiring Waltz, conversely played an extraordinarily 
negative role in shaping his thinking (and construction of Theory).  
  The first occasion when this is demonstrated is in Man, the State and War 
(1959). Influenced by his contemporaries, especially Hans Morgenthau and 
John Herz, Waltz discerned the tendency for both Realists and Liberalists to 
identify the cause of war as lying within human (ir)rationality. Kennan’s 
comment on the irrationality of human nature, Morgenthau’s denunciation of 
“Rationalism”, Herz’s idealism as concentrating on rational solution, were 
pervasive elements within Waltz’s discussion. Liberals, on the other hand, 
expect that the triumph of human reason will eradicate the cause of war. 
Spinoza regards “reason [… as] accurately interpreting the true interest of each 
would lead all people to live harmoniously in society”.16 Kant considers that the 
                                                              
14  Many of Waltz’s intellectual mentors – such as Morgenthau (1959) and Aron (1967), and behind both, Kant – 
define theory as using a concept to order the infinitely empirical manifolds of reality. See Waltz (1979: 5-7, 1990: 
7-8).  
15  Many IR scholars have examined Waltz’s “Theory of Theory” from a formal point of view, without realizing the 
crucial, constitute, role played by the concept of “system” as substance in his construction of such a theory, see 
e.g. Kratochwil 1984b: 313-5, Waever 2009.  
16  Waltz 1959a: 22-6, at 23.   
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triumph of man’s noumenal being (reason) over his phenomenal existence 
(passions and impulses) and the public use of human reason will make war 
obsolete, substituted by the international moral law, hinted Waltz in Man.17 
“Nineteenth-century liberals [Cobden] had thought it comparatively easy to 
substitute reason for force”; even Hobson the socialist, continued Waltz, adopts 
their program but with a modification that “reason will instead be the means by 
which the relations of states are adjusted to the mutual advantage of all of 
them”.18 Even within policy circles, cautioned Waltz, this idea of reason had 
never died out in the minds of statesmen. In his review of Philip Noel-Baker, the 
outstanding campaigner for nuclear disarmament and ministers of several 
departments for the Labor cabinet, Waltz declared that the former’s proposal, 
“by the application of man’s power of reason” to guarantee peace, 
demonstrates “his confidence of reason and will” but commits the error of 
overlooking fear and distrust among states while assuming that “reason dictates 
disarmament”.19 
The second occasion is demonstrated within Waltz’s writings on nuclear 
weapons. Having completed Theory, Waltz soon turned to the problems of 
nuclear deterrence and proliferation, a topic that was forcefully contested 
around the same time as that Theory was written. Although Waltz’s 
engagement with deterrence theories lagged far behind many of his 
contemporaries – Morgenthau and Aron had kept abreast of the development 
of deterrence theories and responded to Kahn and Morgenstern over the 
course of the 1960s – Waltz soon caught up by reproducing his critique of the 
explanations with specific reference to the internal properties of the rational 
decision maker. Having undertaken a close reading of the works of Brodie, 
Kahn, Schelling, and Snyder, Waltz argued that Deterrence theories, which 
                                                              
17  Waltz 2008: vii. This theme was subsequently elaborated in “Kant, Liberalism, and War” (1962), an essay based 
on the cut-down materials on Kant for Waltz’s doctoral dissertation.  
18  Waltz 1959a: 152-4, also, 120,  
19  Waltz 1959b: 254-55.  
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were necessarily constructed on the “slippery notion of rationality”, 20 
misconstrued the logic of nuclear weapons. As his 1986 reply to Keohane 
underlining the impossibility that decision-makers would always act in 
accordance with precise and exact calculations, Waltz instead declared that it 
was rather nuclear weapons that enabled leaders to scrupulously make their 
own moves:  
 
“Nuclear weapons are different; they dominate strategies. […] Indeed, in an 
important sense, nuclear weapons eliminate strategy. If one thinks of strategies 
as being designed for defending national objectives or for gaining them by 
military force and as implying a choice about how major wars will be fought, 
nuclear weapons make strategy obsolete.”21 
 
In both cases Waltz uses the term with worrying caution. Three factors explain 
this emphasis. First, the subject of rationality is always considered by Waltz as 
a human, whether as a man or decision maker. This feature is clearly evidenced 
in his writings from both the1950s and 1980s. Second, for Waltz, to choose an 
internal quality as independent variable will lead to endless questions rather 
than a definite answer. If the overthrow of human reason brought war and its 
restoration peace, then how much rationality will ensure the eradication of 
conflict and discord? And how “rational” must the decision maker be in order to 
refrain from the use of nuclear weapons? In fact, not only such an internal 
quality of man (as rational and good) but also those of states (as socialist, 
democratic or revolutionary) will require the same interrogation.22 Theoretical 
accounts which conceive of a deficiency in an internal quality ultimately result 
in “regression” or immunity from falsification, which renders the very 
meaningfulness of enquiry at such a level suspect. Third, in addition to the 
                                                              
20  Waltz 1983: 269. 
21  Waltz 1990: 285.  
22 In addition to Waltz 1979: 62ff, see his critique of the “thesis” of democratic peace, Waltz 2000: 198-203.  
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properties of man, there is always something external and circumstantial that 
can constrain, intermediate and subdue human action. Human reason can take 
effect only under broadly anarchical ground.23 If these reductionist theories24– 
explanations of transgressive character that intrude on a different level – are 
insufficient in invoking the internal attributes, then the remedy has to be 
obtained by looking at “external” explanations that were outside but which 
simultaneously encompassed the agents themselves. This was what he later 
identified as the “international system”.  
 
Waltz and System Theorizations 
 
Waltz’s pursuit of a system theory of international politics, implying an 
axiological conception of rationality, was built on a comprehensive critique of 
many preceding endeavors from 1957 to 1967. 25  Although those system 
theories are too complex to be reviewed here – another immanent 
historiography is in demand elsewhere – it would be sufficient to notice the 
following aspects.  
First, Waltz defined “system” not as an intellectual construct but as a real 
existence. In Waltz’s view, the term had been used to such a pervasive, and 
indeed perplexing, extent that few had ascertained what it really was. Was it 
synonymous with a comprehensive analysis of a field, or a real thing that had 
attributes, compositions, functions and different historical-morphological 
existences; or perhaps a combination of both? In his System and Process in 
International Politics (1957), the first monograph bearing the title in the field, 
Morton Kaplan analyzed six international systems where four of them did not 
                                                              
23  Waltz 1959a: 236-7.  
24  Waltz’s category of “reductionist” demands extreme scruple, as later IR thinkers erroneously equated Waltz’s 
“reductionist” with “individualistic” or “atomistic” (Buzan 1995: 199-200). Waltz’s “reductionist” is not only 
vertically but also horizontally and spherically defined. Thus an economic explanation of international political 
action, or the unit-level account of international occurrence, are all transgressive explanations. See Waltz 1979: 
esp. 36-8. 
25 Two excellent surveys, see Goodman 1965, and Hobden 1998: esp. 39-47.  
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exist in history. 26  In 1960, Kenneth Thompson claimed that Morgenthau’s 
Politics among Nations provides a first “system” analysis of international politics 
while within the same year Ada Bozeman equated international system with 
Politics and Culture in International History (1960).27 In 1966, when Stanley 
Hoffmann defined system, he even considered it as “at the same a ‘given’, a 
challenge, and a mystery” where the units’ decisions “resemble a shot in the 
dark, more than a keeping of accounts”.28  
For Waltz, the abuse of the term evidenced the system theories in disarray: 
system should neither be simply equated with a comprehensive analysis, nor 
viewed as a mere parameter of conduct. Rather, it had to be ontologically real, 
“productive rather than be a product”.29 In order to emphasize that the system 
could really act as a compelling logic of action, molding and selecting the agents’ 
conduct, Waltz even endeavored to speak of a language of Physics to enable 
him to distinguish himself from others. “A political structure”, Waltz stated boldly, 
“is akin to a field of forces in physics”.30 “System theories, whether political or 
economic,” he explained, “are theories that explain how the organization of a 
realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within 
it. Such theories tell us about the forces the units are subject to”.31 Although 
speaking in a language of physics, of “force” and “mechanism”, Waltz actually 
verbalized his thoughts in another language of “rule” and “games”, as I shall 
subsequently show.  
Second, Waltz argues that the productiveness of system can become 
recognizable only in isolation from unit level and from its historical-sociological 
contingency. It is only by insulating the systematic causes from the “internal 
characteristics”, “internal dispositions”, “internally generated aims”, “internal 
compositions”, “internal conditions”, “internal processes”, that the very reverse 
                                                              
26  Kaplan 1957: 21, 7, Ch.9.  
27  Thompson (1960: 34) dated even back further: “If Scientific Man provided a blueprint for the building of a 
systematic theory of world politics, then Politics among Nations gave us the completed edifice.” Bozeman 1960.   
28  Hoffmann 1965b: 266.  
29  Waltz 1979: 50.  
30  Waltz 1979: 73.   
31  Waltz 1979: 72, also 69.  
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of these “inside-out explanations” becomes possible. 32  Unlike most of his 
contemporaries who regarded both the international system and the national 
system (sometimes called “subsystem”) as operating simultaneously at two 
vertical levels and thereby jointly determining outcomes, Waltz insisted that it 
was necessary to focus on systematic effects and pack the national subsystem 
into mere units (or “like units”).33 Arguing against Morton Kaplan and Raymond 
Aron,34 Waltz announced that what needed to be investigated was how the 
units responded to external influences. With the collapse of the national 
subsystem into units, the differences between puissance and pouvior were 
eliminated.35 Again, unlike most of his contemporaries (with the exception of 
Charles A. McClelland), Waltz proposed that the transformation of capability 
into power was not constrained by internal structure at all – since the subsystem 
was condensed into a unit – but was instead heavily constricted by external 
structures such as the conditions of bipolarity or multipolarity.36 To use the 
language of Milner, the states in Waltz’s Theory only play an external game 
towards each other, thus indirectly emphasizing that the internal domestic game 
has no influence on the transformation of capability into power. Or, as J.M. 
Hobson pointed out, Waltz’s states, although possessing high “domestic 
                                                              
32  Waltz 1979: 60-5, passim.   
33  Waltz was unclear about whether his division is conceptual or ontological. Sometimes he stressed the significance 
to recognize that “different national and international systems coexist and interact” or “unit-level and structural 
causes interact”, which rendered his radical statement in Theory seemingly inconsistent. See further Waltz 1979: 
38, 1986: 54, 1990: 78.  
34  Kaplan, despite distinguishing the problem of “macrosystem structure” from “microstructural problems of foreign 
policy”, failed to keep up with this distinction and sometimes allowed the subsystem (national) to dominate the 
international ones. Aron, attributing the use of force to the characteristic of internal regimes, committed the 
similar error as Kaplan and “drift to the ‘subsystem dominate pole’.” See Waltz 1979: 54, 62, 72; cf. Kaplan 1966: 
51, Aron 1967: 191. 
35  Aron 1966: 48ff, puissance (power of the state), pouvior (power within the state). Most scholars then, like Aron, 
drew a sharp distinction between capability and power – capability is the possession of tangible resources whereas 
power is relational, a product of conversion of capability through mobilization and transformation. For them, the 
mobilization of capability into power is intermediated by the internal (as well as the external) political relation. 
Waltz, by packing states into units, equates power with the internal capability.  
36  Consider Rosenau’s words: “For years, I have solved this conceptual problem by dropping the word ‘power’ from 
my analytic vocabulary (thus the use here of quotation marks) replacing it with the concept of capabilities 
whenever reference is made to attributes or resources possessed and with verbs such as control or influence 
whenever the relational dimension of ‘power’ is subjected to analysis” (quoted from Onuf 1989: 238, fn.15). 
Waltz, however, made the distinction but did not stick so rigorously to it, see e.g. Waltz 1979: 98, 185. McClelland 
(1966:73), in his Theory and International System (1966), made the classic expression that power is “a 
performance trait of international relations”, or “power is to be interpreted as a property of the international 
system”. For McClelland, power was comparable to the eventually generated horsepower by an engine when 
running under the condition of fuel, air, and combustion, which formed a system.  
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agential power”, had only limited “international agential power” towards each 
other.37  
Third, Waltz’s enthusiastic pursuit of an external explanation over an internal 
one resulted in his radical rejection of historically open systems. To this extent, 
the presentation of states as mere units exhibits a system-dominant picture in 
which the system orientated states’ actions. The agents were concerned less 
with themselves than with the maintenance of their position within a system 
which had to be in the first place. Waltz’s system was “homeostatic” rather than 
“homeorhesis”. 38  It is on this account that the historical canvass, with its 
associated preoccupation with the question of “how changes in these 
components make for changes in the international system”, exemplified in 
Richard Rosecrance’s Action and Reaction in World Politics (1962) was 
dismissed by Waltz as answers to “how good is the historical writing?”39 In this 
context, consider the following statement from Hoffmann’s Contemporary 
Theory in International Relations (1960):  
 
“We must include in our research the international relations of non-
Western civilizations, and world politics of periods other than those of the 
city-states or nation-state. The relations between Empires, the complex 
hierarchies within Empires, the relations between Empires and peoples at 
their borders, are worth a study. […] the study of international relations is 
a study of change; forces of change cannot be treated as external or 
deviants: they are fundamental, and internal; furthermore, the lack of a 
supreme straitjacket comparable to the state in domestic politics turns 
world affairs into the pure dynamics of ‘open’ systems.”40 
 
                                                              
37  J.M. Hobson 2000: 19-30.  
38  Hass 1981: 30. 
39  Waltz 1979: 43.   
40  Hoffmann 1960: 76.  
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This open historical system has to be superseded, rebutted Waltz, by the 
proposition that “there is one, and only one, international system [which] 
govern[s] the political units, be they city states, empires, or nations”.41 The 
system is conceived as a texture of political action that has not changed over 
the last two millennia. A system theory is possible only if the system is closed 
and homeostatic; it is only as a consequence of this feature that patterns of 
conduct become discernible.  
 
System and Structure in Theory (Part I): Axiological Rationality    
 
In Theory Waltz presented an image of axiological rationality in three ways, 
each of which corresponded to his tripartite definition of structure. The first 
corresponded to his general definition, and the other two to more operationally 
orientated definitions. 
  In its general definition, a structure designated “a set of constraining 
conditions [that act] as a selector”. Rather than being a purely analytical 
construct, this form evidences strongly ontological implications. Its operation, 
even if under the condition that “the efforts and aims of agents and agencies 
vary”, could “limit and mold agents and agencies and point them in ways that 
tend toward a common quality of outcomes”. Indeed, Waltz sometimes 
attempted a language of physics to account for this molding effects, an action 
which seemed to suggest that the agents were acting in response to an external 
“force”. Yet this language soon gave way to one more closely attuned to 
sociological themes. Structure molded and limited, “through socialization of the 
actors and through competition among them”.42 In its socialization dimension, 
structures, functioning in a manner like that of societies, brought “member of a 
group into conformity with its norms” and “establish norms and encourage 
                                                              
41  Waltz 1979: 91. 
42  Waltz 1979: 73-4, see also Sorensen 2008: 7-9. 
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conformity”. 43  Selection was the other side of the socialization coin. It 
functioned by “rewarding some behaviors and punishing others”, ruling out 
unsuccessful competitors and rewarding the successful ones in accordance 
with their conformity to such norms. For Waltz, it was important to recognize 
that “so far as selection rules”, the actors’ action will be selected “according to 
consequences rules [sic]”.44 
When the structure rules by socialization and selection, no special 
requirement is imposed on the assumption of individual actor’s rationality. Thus 
the selective function of structure is analogous to a market that makes no 
demand on agents’ profit maximizing rationality: 
 
“Firms are assumed to be maximizing units. In practice, some of them may 
not even be trying to maximize anything. Others may be trying, but their 
ineptitude may take this hard to discern. Competitive systems are 
regulated, so to speak, by the ‘rationality’ of the more successful 
competitors. What does rationality mean? It means only that some do 
better than others – whether through intelligence, skill, hard work, or dumb 
luck. […] Those who survive share certain characteristics. Those who go 
bankrupt lack them. Competition spurs the actors to accommodate their 
ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices.”45 
  
For Waltz, the most successful actors in the market were not necessarily those 
which maximized interests. Rather, it was those that shared the attributes of 
“the socially most acceptable” practices that were subsequently “spurred” by 
the market. Competition thus worked like a directive or even inductive rule that 
molded agents’ action, directed them towards conformity and “spurred” them to 
follow the most successful practice. The source of success was not derived 
                                                              
43  Waltz 1979: 75-6.  
44  Waltz 1979: 74-7, emphasis added.  
45  Waltz 1979: 76-7.  
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from an internal attribute of the actors themselves, but from an external rule 
that preemptively designated what the attribute would be. The directive rule 
posed no demand on the utilitarian-rational assumption of the actors (i.e. 
rationality as an attribute of firms to maximize their interest) and could thus be 
viewed as independent of their very intents. Whether the actors were trying to 
maximize interest or not – indeed “some of them may not even be trying to 
maximize anything at all” – their action would be sanctioned and conducted in 
accordance with the “socially most acceptable and successful practices”.  
In presenting a general definition of structure Waltz implicitly anticipated a 
picture of rule-governed and externally derived rationality. This point was further 
clarified by the manner in which he explicitly defined structure as an “anarchical” 
organizing principle”.46 The rule of nobody, Waltz argued, was not tantamount 
to no rule: anarchy, in its formal form, was an “order without an orderer”; 
accordingly it was conceived as the “ordering principle” or “organization of 
realms” in the singular, and “modes of organization” in the collective.47 How did, 
however, this anarchical principle organize international politics?   
Waltz’s answer was that, functioning like a positivist legal rule, 48  the 
anarchical ordering principle would “reward or punish behavior that conforms 
more or less nearly to what is required of one who wishes to succeed in the 
system”: 
 
“Actors may perceive the structure that constrains them and understand 
how it serves to reward some kinds of behavior and to penalize others. But 
then again they either may not see it or, seeing it, may…fail to conform 
their actions to the pattern that are most often rewarded and least often 
punished. To say that ‘the structure selects’ means simply that those who 
                                                              
46 History proves, however, that his choice of the term, causing endless confusions and misunderstandings, has 
eventually complicated the issue. See more in the next section.  
47  Waltz 1979: 88-9, 98, 103. Waltz (1979: 115 footnote, 1998: 384) acknowledged that Durkheim provided “the 
best explication of the two ordering principles”, and it is a “real insight”.  
48  Martin Wight (1961: 92-3) is the earliest to draw such a connection (or analogy) between “Realism” and Legal 
Positivism. Bull (1962) explores further. As an admiring reader of both Wight and Bull, Waltz himself would 
understand this analogy very well.  
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conform to accepted and successful practices more often rise to the top 
and are likely to stay there. The game one has to win is defined by the 
structure that determines the kind of player who is likely to prosper”.49  
 
Instead of adhering to his previous use of a language of physics (and 
accordingly speaking of the force of the universe), Waltz conversely adopted a 
form of language which adhered to the rules of a game. The structure of a game 
could designate “accepted and successful practices” and the distinctive 
features of a prosperous player. Ordering principles rewarded the action 
conforming to their requirement and punished the ones defying their direction. 
Furthermore, Waltz added, the rules had counterfactual validity even if they had 
been defied by the actors: whether the agents followed the rule or not – or even 
they defied the rules they had already recognized – these rules were still 
binding in effect.  
  What the anarchical ordering principle required in content was both tangible 
and transhistorical. This anarchical order without an order was neither an 
incidental status “identified with chaos, destruction, and death”,50 nor, as Aron, 
Hoffmann and Rosecrance conversely argued, a historically specific status that 
was superseded by empire and moderated by the Concert of Europe. Rather, 
it was itself an “imperative” that had prevailed since the formation of the realm. 
“The domestic imperative is ‘specialize’!”, and the “international imperative is 
‘take care of yourself’!”. Under the direct influence of anarchical organizing 
principles, each unit was required “to put itself in a position to be able to take 
care of itself” and “to maintain or improve their positions by maneuvering, by 
bargaining, or by fighting”. The reward would be “the maintenance of their 
autonomy”. The punishment brought by non-conformity was that they “will fail 
to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer”.51 For Waltz, this 
                                                              
49  Waltz 1979: 92, emphasis added.     
50  Waltz 1979: 103. 
51  Waltz 1979: 106-7, 113, 118.  
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imperative was trans-historically applicable to all “the primary units of an era, 
be they city states, empires, or nations”. “Over the centuries states have 
changed in many ways”, Waltz argued, “but the quality of international life has 
remained much the same”.52 Ruled by such a principle, the units’ autonomy 
and prosperity would correspond to the degree to which they follow the lead. 
“Notice”, Waltz nevertheless cautioned:  
 
“that the theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of 
will on the part of all of the actors. The theory says simply that if some do 
relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside. […] Nor need 
it be assumed that all of the competing states are striving relentlessly to 
increase their power. The possibility that force may be used by some states 
to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to 
break out of the competitive system”.53  
 
The theory required no assumption of rationality on the part of the actors, since 
socialization would make them emulate others. But did it not demand an 
alternative conception of rationality as following the rule? Waltz’s reply was 
twofold. First, if rule meant following the assumption of “a necessary 
correspondence of motive and result”, inferring “rules for the actors from the 
observed result of their action”, then no such rule-following rationality is needed. 
In that case, it would be fallacious to conclude that in an intensively competitive 
market the profit of firms would be driven to zero because they followed the rule 
of minimizing benefits. Similarly, it would be similarly erroneous to announce 
that states engage in power struggle because it is a rule for them to do so.54 
On too many occasions, “rules” inferred from the result of interaction had been 
mistakenly “prescribed to the actors”.55 For Waltz, there was a fundamental 
                                                              
52  Waltz 1979: 91, 110.  
53  Waltz 1979: 118.  
54  Waltz 1979: 120. 
55  Waltz 1979: 120. 
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distinction between the “power-political game played because of international-
political imperative”, and the game which arose simply because “states are 
power-minded”.56 
  Second, if rationality means following the rule designated by the system 
outside the actors, then such a definition is indeed required. To this extent, it is 
the external rule that intermediates the internal motive and decides the final 
outcome: 
 
“In anarchy, security is the highest end. […] Because power is a means 
and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They 
cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. 
The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power 
may or may not serve that end. […] The first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system. States can 
seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. International politics 
is too serious a business for that.”57 
 
The states, when pursuing power and playing the power-political game, are not 
acting in accordance with their own calculations of power. Rather, this is an 
imperative legislated by the anarchical ordering principle – the requirement to 
use power to take care of yourself. It is a goal encouraged by the system, and 
the maximization of power might endanger this objective. This, for Waltz, 
presented a picture “of how the placement of states affects their behavior and 
even colors their characters”: it “supports the proposition that states balance 
power rather than maximize it”.58  
  Indeed, to comply with the anarchical ordering principle, the states are 
required to maintain the balance of power. To maintain the balance of power is 
                                                              
56  Waltz 1979: 61. 
57  Waltz 1979: 126, emphasis added.  
58 Waltz 1979: 127.  
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to maintain a certain (power) relation in their external standing vis-à-vis each 
other.59 And to maintain this power relation in their relation to each other – or a 
certain “distribution of capability” – is to consider how states are positioned in a 
“balance-of-power game” that, despite their willingness or perhaps 
consciousness, has nevertheless been played recurrently to restore the 
balance.60 Thus emerged Waltz’s second specific definition of structure: the 
distribution of capability. In Waltz’s Theory, the states’ generation and 
application of power vis-à-vis each other are not constrained by their internal 
distribution of capability at all; rather, it is profoundly restricted by the distribution 
across the units.  
  Was a different type of distribution crucial for the states’ actions? Waltz’s reply 
was clear. It served as a distinct structure of “power-political game” and 
corresponded to a particular pattern of conducting the balance. It designated 
antecedent conditions for strategies and a distinct framework that simplified 
choices. It pointed to distinct rules for defining what kind of “political strategy” 
is likely to prosper, molding calculation (or choices), and mobilizing economic 
resources. Indeed, once embedded within these two games – a two-person 
bipolar game and five-person multipolar game – the performance of the units 
would be their positions within the system, and it might be positional to such an 
extent that the players themselves could (to a tremendous extent) even ignore 
that their choices were shaped by the game.61 
Under multipolarity the choices (to forge alliance) are flexible, but the players’ 
strategies are uncertain, costly and rigid. The players are unable to ascertain 
“who threatens whom, about who will oppose whom, and about who will gain 
                                                              
59  Waltz 1979: 97-8.  
60   Waltz 1979: 163. Two qualifications here demand caution. First, distribution of capability rules out the 
consideration of non-power elements, such as “traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government” 
and “revolutionary or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic” (Waltz 1979: 98). Second, 
the distribution of capability is to count states, not MNCs, and not all the states, but only the great powers. To 
measure a distribution of capability between the US on the one hand, and Cuba and North Korea on the other, is 
not only fallacious but meaningless not to consider the non-power relations, nor to compare power relation 
between the drastically unequal, as Wendt once famously illustrated the case between the US and Cuba. 
61   For Waltz 1979: 98-9, “What emerges is a positional picture, a general description of the ordered overall 
arrangement of a society written in terms of the placement of units rather than in terms of their qualities.” 
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or lose from the actions of other states”. 62   Under these circumstances, 
calculation was not easily to make, and action was necessarily orientated by 
the insight that the “flexibility of alignment narrows one’s choice of policies”. 
Thus, “uncertainty and miscalculation”, rather than enhancing the chances of 
peace, would gradually lead to war: both elements would engender the 
“unfolding of a series of events”, tilt the balance and incur a counter-balanced 
war.63 Since “a state’s strategy must please a potential or satisfy a present 
partner”, only when “the game of power politics, if really played hard”, can 
decisively press the players into two rival camps. Hence, so “complicated is the 
business of making and maintaining alliances that the game” can be played 
only at the expanse of imminent rigidity as “may be played hard enough to 
produce the result only under the pressure of war”.64 
In a bipolar game, by contrast, the choices are inflexible, but the strategies 
are clear, economical and flexible. The antagonism between the two camps 
would show “clarity of dangers” and anticipate “certainty about who has to face 
them”. In contrast to the uncertainty and miscalculation prevalent in the 
multipolar game, in its bipolar counterpart “the incentives to a calculated 
response stand out most clearly”.65 Since the lesser power were relatively 
insignificant to their more powerful counterparts, the latter could dispense with 
complicated considerations and instead “make their strategies” in accordance 
with their “own calculations of interests”. 66  The states’ choices were thus 
“flexible” to the extent that they acquired the enjoyment of “wider margins of 
safety in dealing with the less powerful”, thus entitling them to the extent that 
they “ have more to say about which [diplomatic/economic] games will be 
played and how”.67 In a sharp contrast to the multipolar game, where the 
“flexibility of alignment made for rigidity of strategy”, in this bipolar game “rigidity 
                                                              
62  Waltz 1979: 165.   
63  Waltz 1979: 168 
64  Waltz 1979: 165-167.  
65  Waltz 1979: 173, 176.  
66  Waltz 1979: 170.  
67  Waltz 1979: 194.  
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of alignment…makes for flexibility of strategy and the enlargement of freedom 
of decision”.68 Instead of behaving sluggishly in response to the unfolding of a 
series of events, states had “to be wary, alert, cautious, flexible, and 
forbearing”.69 “Between parties in a self-help system”, Waltz explained, “rules 
of reciprocity and caution prevail”.70 
The different games also have separate rules that are pertinent to the 
conduct of balance of power and mobilization of economic resources. In 
multipolarity, the units maintain their positions by external balance. In bipolarity, 
they consolidate their positions by concentrating on internal capability. The 
“solidity of the bipolar balance” will invariably elude the third party’s attempt to 
impact the dominant balance.71 A certain distribution of capability provides 
rules for a certain pattern of conduct, which is in turn manifested or will affect 
the mobilization of economic resources. Economically, the degree of 
interdependence is high in multipolarity but low in bipolarity. In a bipolar 
distribution of capability, a state relies less on interdependence than a 
multipolar one.  
Indeed, for Waltz, the merit of a system theory lay in precisely this fact: “The 
intricacies of diplomacy are sometimes compared to those of chess. Neither 
game can be successfully played unless the chessboard is accurately 
described”.72  
 
System and Structure in Theory (Part II): Theory and Its 
Utilitarianization 
 
Waltz’s Theory, as I have endeavored to demonstrate, is at once a contrivance 
to distance from the conception of rationality as the internal composition of units, 
                                                              
68  Waltz 1979: 169-70.  
69  Waltz 1979: 172-3.  
70  Waltz 1979: 175.  
71 Waltz 1964: 105: “The French and Chinese, in acting contrary to the wishes of their principles partners… have 
demonstrated not their power but their impotence: their inability to affect the dominant relation in the world”.  
72  Waltz 1979: 159-60.  
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and an effort gravitating towards axiological rationality (that in turn stresses the 
external influence of “structure”). In the first sense it is a repudiation of the 
reductionist theoretical account that associates states action with their intention 
to maximize interest, motivation for power, and mind for playing the political 
game. In the second, it serves as a vigilant rejection of variants of system theory 
that are purely analytical or historically-sociologically contingent. If “Waltz’s 
work on the international system seeks to overturn all that went before it”,73 
then it must necessarily be due to Waltz’s unconventional conceptualization of 
system as a real, external, trans-historical game that exerts leverage over the 
unit’s action. A structure, for Waltz, is a sort of directive rule, an ordering 
principle, an order without order, an imperative, and a rule of the game 
designating preconditions for strategic calculation. It is an “interposition” that 
directs, attenuates, impedes, the agents’ pursuit and use of power. Indeed, 
Waltz’s Theory is pioneering and epoch-making mainly because of its rigorous 
endeavor to construct an axiological rational theory of international politics, a 
theory of “systematic rationality”.  
  Yet, Waltz’s Theory, being published just in the beginning of the rise of the 
second wave of utilitarian theorizations (as I show in chapter two, section two), 
is soon debased into a Rational-Choice version, misconstrued as a classic 
theory of utilitarian rationality. In order to understand how Waltz’s systematic 
rationality has been debased into a utilitarian one, it is crucial to delineate the 
subtle distinctions between the two terms (which share several terms such as 
“system” and “anarchy”) so as to fully comprehend their distinctive grammatical 
positions.   
The initial point of engagement is with the term “system”. Indeed, with the 
publication of Theory, the whole of Anglophone IR was refashioned by the 
“system” theories of the early 1980s. But, largely as a consequence of the 
prevalence of Rational Choice and Game Theory, “system” was endowed with 
                                                              
73  Hobden 1998: 47.  
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a meaning that not only had a very distinct denotation from Waltz’s but which 
appeared as a bewildering analogy to the rather confused usages of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Two examples are strikingly illustrative in this respect.74 One is the 
very name of “Structural Realism”. When Stephen Krasner christened Waltz’s 
Theory as “Structural Realism” in 1982 (a label ever since celebrated), the term 
“structural” was used to refer to the intellectual “orientations” that “conceptualize 
a world of rational self-seeking actors”. Rather than showing how structure 
substantially preconditions the actors’ strategic choices, the “structural realist 
perspective” becomes a presentation of “a world of sovereign states seeking to 
maximize their interest and power”.75 The other is Robert Keohane’s “system 
analysis” attributed to Waltz. In Keohane’s construal, for Waltz the concept of 
utilitarian rationality is indispensable for Waltz’s “system analysis” precisely 
because it forges the link between structure and the states’ actions. Without 
assuming the utilitarian rationality of the states to be given and constant, 
Keohane argues, the incentive and constraints generated by the structure, to 
which the states respond, will by no means be discernible. Yet if this rationality 
is taken for granted, Waltz’s theory of balance of power will be self-contradictory, 
since every state seeks to maximize rather than balance power.  
  Is Keohane’s “system analysis” the same as Waltz’s system theory? Not 
really: three crucial differences require emphasis. First, whereas for Waltz a 
system must be functioning ontologically like a real game, Keohane is less 
aware of his use of system merely as an analytical tool. Second, whereas 
Waltz’s system does not require the actors to have a constant property of 
maximizing profits, Keohane’s system is dependent on such an assumption. A 
system for Waltz is a rule that pushes the actors’ action into conformity to its 
designation through competition and socialization, reward and punishment, 
regardless of whether the actors are individualistically (internally) motivated by 
                                                              
74  See more instances in Stein 1982: 140.  
75  Krasner 1982: 6-7. Similar to Ashley, Krasner considers Keohane and Stein as building their theories on “a 
conventional structural realist perspective”.  
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interest maximization. Third, for Keohane systematic effects manifest 
conspicuously when the actors constantly hold a utilitarian rationality. Unless 
they do so, the change of incentive in the market cannot be transmitted to the 
responsive actors. But for Waltz a system will demonstrate its axiological-
rational effects most conspicuously when the actors possess inconstant 
properties: whether internally socialist or capitalist, democratic or authoritarian, 
revolutionary or conservative, interest maximizing or not, the states will all be 
“shaped and shoved” by the structure and follow the rule of taking care of 
yourself, even if the imperative may sometimes be consciously neglected or 
defied. Waltz clarified this distinction in his “Reply to My Critics” (1986):  
  
“Contrary to his [Keohane] statement, I do not differ with him over rationality, 
except semantically. I prefer to state the rationality assumption differently. My 
preference is based partly on fear that ‘rationality’ carries the wrong 
connotations. Since making foreign policy is such a complicated business, one 
cannot expect of political leaders the nicely calculated decisions that the word 
‘rationality’ suggests. More significantly, my preference is based on the 
importance I accord, and Keohane denies, to the process of selection that takes 
place in competitive system. In structural-functional logic, behaviors are 
selected for their consequences.”76 
 
Rationality, for Waltz, connotes a “semantic” meaning different from the one 
asserted by Keohane. Instead of conveying interest maximization, Waltz 
employs the term to mean the “process of selection” in terms of “consequences”. 
To say that structure selects is for Waltz to say that those conforming to the 
most acceptable, social, practice are likely to prosper in a game (as I quoted 
above). Notice, in addition, that whereas for Keohane the actors have to react 
to the change of incentive unconditionally, Waltz even allows them to defy the 
                                                              
76  Waltz 1986: 43-4.  
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rule whether it has been recognized or not. The third crucial difference is 
evidenced within Waltz’s statement – which is obviously conditioned by the age 
of deterrence – that rationality remains a demand for “political leaders” to make 
“nicely calculated decisions” in “foreign policy”. It is quite different from the one 
ascribed to him by Keohane and others in two key respects: it not only refers to 
human beings as the subject of reason rather than the states, but it also has an 
Kantian dimension in its emphasis on the demand of the intellectual harness of 
emotion to carry out calculation. In this respect, Keohane and Waltz seem to be 
speaking drastically different languages of rationality. 
  Second, with the submergence of Waltz’s original voice under the sweep of 
the second wave of the utilitarian movement (in which Rational-Choice and 
Game theorists masqueraded as “system” theories), the term “anarchy” also 
emerged as a point of divergence. Immediately after Waltz’s theorization of 
“anarchy”, the term suddenly became chic within IR discourse. Like “system”, a 
term which subsequently became an “intellectual orientations”, “anarchy” was 
also posited throughout the 1980s as “the single most important characteristic 
underlying international relations”. 77  Although Waltz himself conceived of 
anarchy as sociologically axiological, his deployment of “market” and “firms” as 
analogies to anarchy and states appeared to render Waltz’s Theory as 
inherently economistic. Hence within only five years of Waltz publishing his 
Theory, the concept of anarchy was soon transformed from a conception of 
itself as a very order, ruled by the system to command units taking care of 
themselves, into one implying the absence of order and a license of the 
utilitarian-rational egoistic states to strive ruthlessly for their own good. Thus it 
was asserted that “Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority 
imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests” – a dictum voiced by 
Kenneth Oye to launch the whole edited volume Cooperation under Anarchy 
                                                              
77  Milner 1991: 143. It is in response to this order-less conception of anarchy popularized in IR that two leading 
scholars – Hayward Alker and Richard Ashley (who would later be labeled “Reflectivist” by Keohane) – prepared 
an edited volume entitled After Neorealism: Anarchy, Power, and Community in International Collaboration. 
This volume, although never coming out, had been well-referred even as manuscript around the turn of the 1990s 
and demonstrated the (in)famous conception of anarchy as the lack of order and rule. 
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(1985) – was widely invoked and echoed in the 1980s.78 Grieco’s influential 
essay “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation” (1988), a piece invoked in the 
previous chapter, similarly defined anarchy as “no overarching authority to 
prevent others from using violence…to destroy or enslave them”.79 
  Third, in a particularly ironic development, Reflectivists such as Richard 
Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil and Alexander Wendt, although committed to 
exploring the analytical ground beyond utilitarianism, also failed to recognize 
the sociological potential of Theory. In upshot they were to fall victim to the 
same misconceptions and misunderstandings as the utilitarianists such as 
Keohane and Krasner. In his understanding of Waltz’s idea of anarchy, Ashley 
did not capture Waltz’s proposition that anarchy is an ordering principle of self-
help legislated by the system and maintained by the balance of power. Ashley 
instead considered that 
 
“[Theory] therefore appeared to be a ‘sociological’ perspective on the 
states system rather than an individualistic or utilitarian perspective. 
However, despite occasional dignifying references to Durkheim’s sociology 
Waltz’s structural theory is modeled on the individualist rationalism of 
Adam Smith’s Political Economy. The ‘international system’ is an emergent 
property, a consequence of the coaction of a multiplicity of unitary, 
complete, and egoistic states oriented according to the logic of raison 
d’état…Waltz’s raison d’état thus collapses to technical reason, the logic 
of economy”.80 
 
For Ashley, Waltz’s “sociological perspective” is pseudo-systematic, since the 
international system becomes a product that is not at all productive. Anarchy 
seems to be a product/consequence of the coaction of the rational-egoistic units. 
                                                              
78  Oye 1985: 1.  
79  Grieco 1988: 126.   
80  Ashley 1983: 481.  
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Waltz’s constant clarification that the international system has to be externally 
productive (and functions independently of the rationality of the respective units) 
is accordingly overlooked by Ashley. Similarly, Kratochwil also neglects the 
insight that Waltz’s Theory defines structure as a kind of directive rule. The 
balance of power, which Waltz considers as generated by the system in the first 
instance, is heavily criticized because  
 
“the balance of power will only emerge under conditions of rationality 
among actors. […] In the case of balance of power this means we must 
assume that the principle of rationality has been specified, and the 
maximization of power is assumed to be the underlying maxim of state 
action.”81 
 
For Kratochwil, Waltz has to presume the utilitarian rationality of the actors. 
Without this presumption, the balance of power cannot function. Once again, 
Waltz’s statement that the balance of power resembles a softened positivist-
legal rule – (“soften” since states may disregard or disobey its direction) in 
which defiance does not invalidate the principle itself, is altogether overlooked. 
Wendt, in “The Agent and Structure Problem in International Relations Theory” 
(1987), concentrated on the third definition, with specific reference to the 
distribution of capability:  
 
“neorealists’ individualist definition of the structure of the international 
system as reducible to the properties of states – to the distribution of 
capabilities – is perfectly consistent with the important role that system 
structures play in neorealist explanations of state behavior. Indeed, in both 
its decision- and game-theoretic version [Wendt means Mesquita] 
neorealism, like microeconomics, is characterized by ‘situational 
                                                              
81  Kratochwil 1982: 27-9.  
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determinism,’ by a model of action in which rational behavior is conditioned 
or even determined by the structure of choice situations. […] This definition 
leads to an understanding of system structures as only constraining the 
agency of preexisting states, rather than, as in world-system and 
structuration theory, as generating state agents themselves.”82  
 
Wendt does capture here Waltz’s central point that a distribution of capability is 
an antecedent condition for strategic calculation. Yet, do Waltz’s actors 
undertake utilitarian-rational calculations in a manner similar to that designed 
by Mesquita? No; the crucial difference is that for Mesquita, an actor’s conduct 
is decided by its own individual calculation, although the calculation taking a 
form of relational calculation. For Waltz, it is the interrelation between the actors 
that shape strategic calculation.  
Before proceeding any further, three points deserve emphasis. Firstly, I argue 
that an immanent reading of Theory, uncontaminated by the later utilitarian 
interpretations of various kinds, reveals that Waltz’s interpretation of rationality 
is deeply axiological. A contextual exposition of the “hidden dialogue” (some 
may prefer to call the “system debate”) between Waltz on the one side, and 
Aron, Hoffmann, Rosecrance and Kaplan on the other, redisplays his pursuit of 
an ontologically real, transhistorical, external system which is constituted by an 
“anarchical” rule of self-help, and which is enforced by “reward and punishment”, 
the balance of power, and the distribution of capability (each of which in turn 
conditions strategic calculation). Unfortunately, most of the thinkers of whom 
Waltz accused passed away or were incapable to make a counterblast,83 which 
could have made explicit the axiological-rational basis of Theory.  
The only noticeable exception is Morton Kaplan. In his book-length reply to 
Waltz – Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem 
                                                              
82  Wendt 1987: 340-1, emphasis in original.  
83  Aron died in 1983. Hoffmann did not respond openly. Rosecrance (1981: 698-9), who compared Theory with 
Bull’s Anarchical Society (1977) and criticized both for scarifying historicity for analytical simplicity, debated 
with Waltz (from 1980 to 1982) but directed the attention to the theme of “interdependence”. Waltz and 
Rosecrance had further exchanges in Waltz (1982) and Rosecrance (1982).  
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Analysis (1979) – Kaplan explicitly criticizes Waltz for repudiating the 
significance of the assumption of rationality. First, Kaplan argues that Waltz’s 
theory cannot “dispense with the concept of rationality”.84 For Kaplan, Waltz 
fails to make explicit the distinction between “individual rationality and collective 
rationality, and individual rationality and collective irrationality”.85 The latter, 
exemplified in the decrease of profits of firms in competitive market (Kaplan 
cites Waltz’s own illustration as I did above), shows that when there are 
numerous actors, the relationship between individual rationality and systematic 
outcomes becomes uncertain/divergent. In this case systematic effect is 
independent of the individual rationality. But in the Theory constructed by Waltz, 
the number of actors are small, and thus in the maintenance of the systematic 
rule the actors have to assume some “rationality” to subscribe to them. This, for 
Kaplan, warrants that “individual and collective rationality coincide”; or at least, 
that “the actors have an incentive to observe rules that are consistent with 
equilibrium”.86 As Kaplan later enunciated,  
 
“Although system-dominant systems usually can remain stable despite the 
system-irrational behavior of individual actors, their persistence assumes 
the intrasystem rationality of most actors. […] Rational analysis, thus, is 
central to systems theories, including international systems, in which 
agents function. The criteria for rationality differ with the focus of analysis. 
If an actor wants to succeed in a particular system, it must know what the 
system rewards and punishes, that is, what rational interests are in these 
terms.”87 
 
Rationality is a link between the system and actors. Rationality may not be an 
attribute of the system alone; this is because the actors need to understand the 
                                                              
84  Kaplan 1979: 29.  
85 Kaplan 1979: 31. 
86  Kaplan 1979: 31.  
87  Kaplan 2000: 696.  
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systematic order – “what the system rewards and punishes” – if they want to 
succeed.  
  Second, although Waltz’s attempt to construct a closed, homeostatic, system 
temporarily demolished the line of enquiry pioneered by Aron, Hoffmann and 
Rosecrance, there would soon occur a revival of interest in that line of 
theorization under many rubrics, a topic that has to be reserved for the next 
chapter. Waltz, although intending to repress the historicity of system, 
conversely gave a most powerful impetus to the historicization of international 
relations. 
  Third, alas, Waltz’s attempt to construct a rigorous “system” theory is almost 
completely frustrated with the rise of the Neo-Neo theories. “System” becomes 
an analysis of the choices of the rational egoists; “anarchy” is understood as 
the ruthless pursuit of self-interest. It is against this background, however, that 
two scholars emerged to the forefront: anarchy, they argue like Waltz did, far 
from being a rules-less status, is in fact constituted and regulated by rules that 
designate the rationality of conduct. It is to these propositions that we shall now 
turn.  
 
 (ii)  Rules and Norms All the Way Down: Rationality in Nicholas 
Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwil’s Thoughts around the Turn of 1990s 
  
 
Neo-Neo Theories and the Anarchy Problematique 
 
When Onuf and Kratochwil confronted the IR in the early 1980s, they were 
astonished by the mainstream theorists’ “egregious lack of familiarity with legal 
theory”.88 On the one hand, both Onuf and Kratochwil cultivated their thoughts 
in a background that was distinct from the economic orthodox: with the flow of 
                                                              
88  Notice “in IR”, since both were regarded as international-law scholars intruding into IR.    
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various post-isms into the social sciences in the 1970s – Wittgenstein and 
Winch, Levi-Strauss and Habermas, Foucault and Bourdieu – Onuf and 
Kratochwil’s thoughts were heavily conditioned by the anti-positivist orientation 
that not only positivism in jurisprudential sense but the one in a generally social-
theoretical sense is repudiated as overly objectified and static. As Onuf recalled: 
  
“The first generation of constructivists came out of a troubled times – a decade 
or so – in the world of scholarship. Great challenges from intellectual 
movements, including feminism, had swept through all the social sciences. 
Those of us who were not much satisfied to start with went back to basics. 
Some of us ended up repudiating even the basics, and others tried to think 
through the implications of new basis…We shared a sense that all is basically 
provisional, and beyond that a certain improvisational sensibility”.89 
 
This predilection on the provisional and “improvisational sensibility”, when 
encountered with the utilitarian theorists on the other hand, soon became 
incompatibly evident. “As one representative of ‘rational choice’ once 
humorously quipped”, Kratochwil used the anecdote repeatedly, “when the 
dangers of nailing down too many things were pointed out to him: ‘Listen, when 
you are equipped with my hammer, the whole world looks like a nail’.”90  
For Onuf and Kratochwil, what the utilitarian hammer had undistinguishably 
nailed down in Keohane’s After Hegemony, Axelrod’s The Evolution of 
Cooperation, and Waltz’s Theory,91 leaves, or rather conceals, two unclarified 
problems. First, the external conditions of and complexity surrounding choice 
are evacuated. States do make decisions, but they rarely do so within a vacuum; 
                                                              
89  Onuf 2001: 241.   
90  Kratochwil 1987: 303, 2001: 13.   
91  First, Kratochwil remains the most careful reader of Waltz ever seen so far. His critique of Waltz is extremely 
comprehensive, ranging from criticizing Waltz’s conception and application of international system as somehow 
ambiguous (Kratochwil 1982: 27, 1984b: 313, fn.18) to decrying the latter’s positivism which can be seen 
everywhere. Yet, in a second place, for Kratochwil, Waltz has committed too many mistakes: reducing the 
complexity of international politics to “capability analysis” and employing a positivistic approach rather than 
hermeneutic one, are the two chief accusations among many others. 
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in a constantly changing environment, the states usually cannot have a clear 
and quick understanding of the circumstance in which they are involved. Rather 
than jumping to make choice merely in accordance with the imperative “you 
calculate”, the starting point will have to be “defining situations and thus in 
indicating to the other that one understands the nature of the ‘game’ in which 
one is involved”.92 “Individuals”, Onuf contended, “must choose courses of 
action that cannot be readily changed, often under circumstances that present 
no clear grounds for rational choice”.93  
  Second, the consequence of optimal choice has been over-studied. As long 
as the focus is the optimal choice, the original, sophisticated, scenario in 
(process through) which the agent is required to make a choice within a number 
of choices must be dismissed as insignificant, since what is important here is 
only about whether the consequence is furthering or diminishing interest. 
International relations becomes indeed anarchical, a ruthless competition and 
struggle for making the most advantageous choice.  
  In order to remedy these two flaws, both Onuf and Kratochwil realized – as 
had Waltz – that to conceive of an order without an orderer in international 
politics is vital. Rules, norms, principles or even “imperatives” do exist and play 
a significant role in shaping states’ action. The “international arena”, rather than 
“a norm-less anarchy [a status rather than Waltzian principle]”, is itself a mode 
of organization. “The international legal order exists”, Kratochwil stressed once 
again, “simply by virtue of its role in defining the game of international 
relations”.94 When writing his collaborative article “International Organization: 
A State of the Art on an Art of the State” (1986) with John Ruggie, Kratochwil 
later recalled vividly how he could no more agree with the former’s “pitch that 
no organization but the way of organizing, i.e. organization in the collective 
singular, should be the proper focus for analysis”. 95  Onuf, like Waltz and 
                                                              
92  Kratochwil 1989a: 48.  
93  Onuf 1989: 262.  
94  Kratochwil 1989a: 67, 251 
95  Kratochwil 2011a: 8.  
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Kratochwil, argued that “international relations was never a matter of anarchy 
[a status], any more than domestic societies could have been”. 96  In one 
occasion, Onuf even articulated more clearly than Waltz himself that there is a 
danger of “emptying anarchy of content”: anarchy, argued Onuf, not only needs 
to be carefully distinguished as an “incidence” rather than a “condition” 
characterized by the “absence of rule”, it also demands a recognition that 
“political society, however much or little centralized, and not possessive 
individualism, however enriched, explains the complexities of international 
relations”.97 If anarchy is not synonymous with chaos and has a substantial 
content, then what will it turn out to be?  
 
Games, Rules, and Rationality  
 
In an oft-quoted manifesto criticizing “The Embarrassment of Change: 
Neorealism as the Science of Realpolitik without politics” (1993), Kratochwil 
made the following observation:  
 
“Here the notion of a ‘game’, used as a metaphor for rule-guided action, a la 
Wittgenstein, provided a fruitful new beginning. It stimulated theoretical efforts 
in at least three ways: first, it showed that rules and norms are constitutive of 
social life and that they cannot be understood, therefore, in terms of the 
regulative rules and injunctions familiar from criminal law or the Decalogue. 
Second, it suggested that rules and norms are not simply the distillation of 
individual utility calculations but rather the antecedent conditions for strategies 
and for the specification of criteria of rationality.”98 
 
                                                              
96  Onuf 1989: 163, 185-95. 
97  Onuf 1989: 164-9.  
98  Kratochwil 1993: 75-6. The third is “it fundamentally changed our conception of action and communication”, an 
important point to which I shall return in the next section.  
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Although drawing on Wittgenstein and intending to be an embarrassment of 
Neorealism, Kratochwil’s game was unexpectedly close to Waltz’s. Like Waltz, 
who regarded the structure of the game as determinant of which “kind of player 
is likely to prosper”, Kratochwil’s game designated antecedent conditions for 
being strategic. In a similar manner to Waltz’s system, which was also 
composed of ordering principles and imperatives, Kratochwil’s game was 
replete with “rule-guided” action – a moderation of his stronger assertion, which 
resembled an imperative, that “human action in general is ‘rule-governed.”99 In 
analogy to Waltz’s society-like structure (socialization), Onuf argued for a 
“paradigm” of “political society” in which “social relations, including international 
relations, could and did display evidence of being ruled arrangements”. Like 
Waltz’s units that may choose to abide or defy, Onuf’s agents also have freedom 
to follow the lead or decline; yet, whatever their choice is, these rules “always 
offer a choice, either to follow them or not”.100  
  In both Kratochwil and Onuf’s theory, international politics was portrayed as 
a rule-guided game or a rule-arranged social relation that molded choices. 
Similarly to Waltz’s endeavor to conceive of an order without an orderer (and 
international politics as governed by the “anarchical order”), Kratochwil and 
Onuf regarded these external rules as indispensable for understanding and 
playing these games. A rule was constitutive for the game or social relations 
and, to this extent, could be conceived as the source of meaning. The rules’ 
“pervasive presence…in guiding, but not determining, human conduct, gives it 
social meaning”; actions and deed could be comprehended only “against the 
background of norms embodied in conventions and rules which give meaning 
to an action”.101 For Onuf these rules are exhaustive but can still be subdivided 
into instructive, assertive and commitment forms. Kratochwil, on the other hand, 
comprehensively distinguished the explicit rules, tacit rules, custom 
                                                              
99  Kratochwil 1989a: 11.  
100  Onuf 1989: 164, 110. 
101  Onuf 1989: 21-2, Kratochwil 1989a: 11. For Onuf, any social situation is a particular manifestation of a certain 
configuration of these rules.   
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(convention), institutional rules and precepts that signpost a direction of 
action.102  
  Having laid down this framework, both Onuf and Kratochwil continued to 
argue that rationality is embedded within this rule-bounded game (situation). 
Rationality, rather than being internally ontological, is externally contextual. 
Even if in a semantic sense, Kratochwil cautioned, “it is not some property that 
is taken to exhaust the meaning of the term, but the meaning of rationality is 
seen to be constituted by the use of the term”.103 “Rules and norms” were 
defined by Kratochwil as the “guidance devices which are designed to simplify 
choices and impart ‘rationality’ to situations by delineating the factors that a 
decision-maker has to take into account”.104 “‘Rational choices’ can only be 
made on the basis of the acceptance of a ‘way of life’,” Kratochwil stressed.105 
They establish “such a framework of rationality” and serve as “the 
presuppositions of rational action”.106 To be rational is not to maximize interests 
or repress one’s desire regardless of context. Rather, rationality is derived from 
its relation to the prevalent rule of which the agent is a part. Onuf argued that:  
 
“Everyone who is competent acts rationally in a world of contingency. Hebert A. 
Simon has called this ‘bounded rationality’. The term is misleading…What is 
bounded, in various ways, is the situation in which choices are made. What 
bounds situations are rules….I hold that rules do not ‘govern’ all that is social. 
People always have a choice, which is to follow rules or not. Instead rules 
govern the construction of the situation within which choices are made 
intelligible. The simplest situation is one in which a single rule constitutes the 
boundaries of choice. Either one follows that rule or not. Most situations are 
bounded by a number of rules”.107  
                                                              
102 Kratochwil 1989a: Ch.3.  
103  Kratochwil 1987: 310, emphasis in original.  
104  Kratochwil 1989a: 10.   
105  Kratochwil 1987: 318.  
106  Kratochwil 1989a: 50, 1988b: 219.  
107  Onuf 1989: 261. 
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Rationality is not bounded by itself, but by rules: for Onuf, utilitarian rationality 
is a particularly representative construction within which only one rule is allowed; 
in contriving this situation “exclusively bounded” by interest maximization,108 
the utilitarian theorist presents a picture of political society in which only interest 
and its calculation becomes the rule of conduct. Bringing more rules into 
consideration, rationality extends into rationalities. Like Waltz’s account of how 
different distributions of capability govern dissimilarly political interest and 
rational strategies, Onuf conceived of social action as occurring within “many 
intersecting boundaries deriving from competing rule sets”. Rules designate a 
special way of calculation which will in turn determinate the preponderance of 
a kind of interest. Rational choice (Onuf “intrapersonal calculation”) embodies 
a permissive rule and the maximization of interest; two person (inter-personal 
calculation) game shows directive rule and entails security, and finally a “global 
comparison” that involves instructive rules and the pursuit of standing. 109 
“Resources are nothing until mobilized through rules, rules are nothing until 
matched to resources to effectuate rule”.110 
  This conception of rationality as rule-following is also illustrated by Kratochwil 
in an example which recalls Waltz’s account of changing strategy in different 
games. Consider, Kratochwil proposes, the “generalized attitude” and 
“generalized propensities” as the overarching preconditions for playing a 
utilitarian game. Consider then the prisoners’ dilemma and a coordination game 
(used by Arthur Stein in previous chapter, Fig. 2.10, 2.11). If Row and Column 
take a distinct attitude towards the game, the outcomes will become 
fundamentally different. If one actor displays an envious attitude towards a 
coordination game, then her preference ordering will become quite different and 
change into (3, 1) rather than (5, 5), i.e. a non-coordinate move. Conversely, if 
                                                              
108  Onuf 1989: 263.  
109  Onuf 1989: 266-78.  
110  Onuf 1989: 64.   
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both are playing a Prisoners’ Dilemma but actors have sympathies towards 
each other, then their game will be transformed into a coordination game, and 
choices will be once again changed ( (1, 1) > (3, 1) ). The significance of attitude 
demonstrates that “only after an attitude towards a situation has been taken, 
does the utilitarian calculation become possible”: until the players understand 
their companion’s attitudes in addition to the pay-off structure can the “‘rational’ 
choice be made”.111 
 
Axiological Rationality as Intersubjective Rule-Following 
 
So far I have exposed the similarity between Waltz, Onuf and Kratochwil’s 
conceptions of rationality. All considered that rationality is conditioned by rule, 
order or principle within a certain realm. All confined rationality within a certain 
game without envisaging, as Fierke would do, that one rationality can be an 
intersection shared by many different but possible games.  
  In what follows I want to consider one aspect that differentiates Onuf and 
Kratochwil from Waltz, ultimately with a view to associating the former two more 
closely with Fierke: the intersubjectivity of rationality. Indeed, whereas Waltz 
acknowledged the “shape and shove” effect of structural rules but accounted 
for the mechanism only in terms of parsimonious rewards and punishments, 
Onuf and Kratochwil envisaged multiple mechanisms that would ensure the 
agent’s axiological rationality. For this reason, rule-following must be more 
elaborated than a sheer, positivistic, mechanism. In “The Force of Prescriptions” 
(1984), 112  Kratochwil enumerated four mechanisms: the reward and 
punishment envisaged by Hobbes, the convention for reciprocal benefits 
explained by Hume (which for Kratochwil effectively explains the British 
participation in and acceptance of the European Economic Community and the 
Soviet entrance into the IAEA), the collective conscience discovered by 
                                                              
111  Kratochwil 1987: 317-8.  
112  Kratochwil 1984b, reprinted with least changes as chapter four in Kratochwil 1989a.  
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Durkheim, and finally the emotional or passionate attachment to ideals held by 
Freud. Likewise, Onuf listed “denigration, mockery, ostracism”, “rights and 
duties, or reciprocities”, as mechanisms for enforcing rules of an instructive and 
commitment kind. 113  If the colonist states defied the UN directions on 
decolonization (1960), for example, their conducts will be documented, 
debunked, and denounced in those instances where the rule is implemented by 
“embarrassing non-conforming members and even subjecting them to a hint of 
ostracism”.114  
  It is noticeable that within Kratochwil and Onuf’s pursuit of a more enriched 
account of rule-following, their employment of Durkheim’s social theory115 is 
pervasive: strikingly enough, Waltz also drew on Durkheim; but unlike Waltz, 
who used Durkheim’s theory of mechanical society to demonstrate that states 
are not differentiated, Kratochwil and Onuf deployed the counterpart of organic 
society to explain why moral conduct derives from collective consciousness. It 
is here that Onuf and Kratochwil’s concern with rule-following is distinguished 
as an “intersubjective” conduct: the agents follow rule neither because of 
individual calculation of interest, even in reciprocal forms, nor because of “the 
self-imposed criteria of the agent”.116  
  But how could agents follow rules intersubjectively? Whereas in Fierke’s 
theory, as we shall see, this is explained as two agents engaging in a common 
dialogue and acting “as if” there is a unity that follows, undermines or 
                                                              
113  See respectively, Onuf 1989: 120-1, 144-54. Reconsider Waltz’s (1979: 75-6) account of socialization: “In 
spontaneous and informal ways, societies establish norms of behavior. […] Socialization brings members of a 
group into conformity with its norms. Some members of the group will finds this repressive and incline toward 
deviant behavior. Ridicule may bring deviants into line or cause them to leave the group. Either way…societies 
establish norms and encourage conformity.” 
114  Onuf 1989: 147;  
115  In The Division of Social Labor (1893) Durkheim posed a categorical distinction between mechanical and 
solidary societies. On the one hand, there is a simplistic and mechanical society where the members are held 
together by repressive forces. The maintenance of such a rule-governed society is relied on coercion: punishment 
will follow dare the members challenge the social rules. In such a society, members are not allowed to 
differentiate themselves from others since it will paralyze the disciplining function of rule, render it incapable of 
keeping members in line and thus undermine the mechanically unified structure. On the other hand is the 
“solidary” society. Fulfilled as an ideal of modern society, Durkheim argued that a solidary society is maintained 
not by coercive rules but by rules that have been internalized within each member’s consciousness. As a great 
admirer of Rousseau, Durkheim associates the moral with solidary society, and physical force with mechanical 
society: coercive rules are materialistically external, and solidary rules are idealistically internal. 
116  Kratochwil 1989a: 132, 137, emphasis added.  
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dismantles rules, 117  Kratochwil had conversely mainly used two sorts of 
explication throughout his works in the 1980s (both of which provided a perhaps 
too unorthodox conception of rationality to be heeded by his contemporaries). 
One is his constant reference to R.M. Hare’s Language of Morals and Freedom 
of Reason (1963), in which the universalization of moral claims is invoked. The 
other, which deserves more attention here, is his proposition that if the actors 
want to “reason about our other-regarding choices”, then “the term ‘reason’ has 
then to be taken in a non-cognitivist sense”.118 In this case:  
 
“Reason is, then, concerned with the preconditions (or ‘transcendental’ 
conditions, we might say), of a ‘moral’ discourse, in which the effects of our 
actions on others can be assessed. Although not necessarily providing 
compelling solutions, it imparts at least a certain order and persuasiveness to 
the process of arguing and to its outcomes”.119 
 
Or, as Kratochwil proclaimed in paraphrasing Samuel Stoljar’s Moral and Legal 
Reasoning (1980):  
 
“reason is no longer taken in a cognitive sense, as a self-sufficient source of 
morality, but is given an analytical and self-reflective role; reason simply 
becomes our logical way of finding or of constructing a framework within which 
an orderly (and concludable) argument can be carried out. In this way […] in 
the moral field rationality now provides, in a comparable procedure [to 
prudential rationality], those external or independent standards, without which 
we cannot reason about, let alone settle, our interpersonal grievances or 
complaints”.120 
 
                                                              
117  Fierke 1998: 135-7.  
118  Kratochwil 1989a: 138-9.  
119  Kratochwil 1989a: 139.  
120  Kratochwil 1989a: 131.   
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Under this condition, reason provides an intersubjectively transcendent 
condition for rule following. Rather than merely conforming to what the rules 
have stipulated, the actors can now engage in a process of arguing about which 
rule should be followed and what counts as rational. Contestation, as opposed 
to coercion, defines rationality. “Attempts at a purely cognitivist account of what 
rationality is fail”, Kratochwil argued, “exactly because they leave out issues of 
endorsement evoked by the arousal or moral sentiments”; “to call something 
rational”, he continued, “means then to endorse it in terms of some norm or 
moral feeling that permits it”. 121  Like the concept of ‘morality, the rational 
requires that “assessments need not be related to ultimate cognitive 
foundations, but can be understood as issuing from feelings…which humans 
acquire through socialization and participation in certain practices.”122 Hence 
rules, explained Kratochwil, can not only “mold decisions via the reasoning 
process”, “enable [actors] to act, to pursue goals”, but can also enable them “to 
communicate, to share meanings, to criticize claims and justify actions”.123 
They “establish inter-subjective meanings that allow the actors to direct their 
actions towards each other, communicate with each other, appraise the quality 
of their actions, criticize claims and justify choices”. 124  Furthermore, this 
intersubjective rule-following is related to the concept of reasoning and 
judgment. Kratochwil went on: “The debate concerning the rationality of an 
action or belief is, in short, a search for the basis of the endorsement or 
acceptance within a given domain of appraisal”.125 
 
Waltz, Onuf, and Kratochwil: Beyond the Realism/Constructivism 
Divide 
                                                              
121  Kratochwil 1987: 311.  
122 Kratochwil 1988: 208-9.  
123  Kratochwil 1983: 346.  
124  Kratochwil 1993: 75-6.   
125  Kratochwil 1987: 311. This can be interpreted either in a Habermasian sense as a demand for searching a mutual 
consensus, which necessarily entails cognitive rationality such as Habermas’ communicative one, or just an 
emphasis on the significance of pregiven rules within a domain.   
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In Waltz’s own vocabulary, “rationality” is inexorably an attribute residing at the 
man level. He subsequently builds a theory upon an alternative foundation that 
is very different from the one that is commonly attributed to him. Distinguished 
by its “semantic” meaning, this alternative conception defines structure as 
following external rules (through reward and punishment) that cannot be 
crudely inferred from the individual actors’ motivations. Kratochwil, in a similar 
vein, searches for the “reason” that has to be more than a cognitive part of the 
individual actors; it is ultimately this element which will serve as the external 
framework for deciding which is rational. For Waltz, the actor’s position within a 
distribution of capability conditions strategic choices (in the making diplomatic 
of commitments) and the play of the balance-of-power game. For Kratochwil 
and Onuf altogether, rules are not only an antecedent condition for deciding 
what kind of strategy is likely to prosper and what kind of interest will prevail, 
but the generalized “emotional position” of the actors that determines their 
strategic preferences.  
  Although the intersubjectivity of rule-following profoundly distinguishes Waltz 
from the latter, this distinction can also be viewed from another angle, which 
suggests that Onuf and Kratochwil are providing complementary rather than 
competitive answers in response to Waltz. Rules have to be followed. Actions 
must (or should) be axiologically rational. Outcomes will be produced in 
following the rules. Although the individual actors may not be rational and defy 
the rule, their conducts will be shaped towards axiological conformity through a 
process of competition, socialization, denigration, emotional attachment, 
argumentative contestation and mutual endorsement. What Waltz paints is a 
softened picture of directive rule. Onuf and Kratochwil add rules of the assertive, 
commissive, and communicative (and other) kinds. The axiological rationality 
maintained by reward and punishment in a closed system is supplemented 
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rather than superseded by the more developed and complicated mechanisms 
of enforcement.126  
  Rather than a mechanistic account of international politics, Waltz’s Theory 
appears as a latent form of constructivism: to this extent, many of his guiding 
premises appear to be quite compatible with a Constructivist perspective. In the 
next section I shall turn to a female thinker who has not only animatedly 
rediscovers the implicit sociological potential in Waltz’s Theory but who also 
provides a much more intersubjective and dynamic account of rationality than 
Onuf and Kratochwil. 
 
 (iii) Changing Games, Changing Rationalities and Changing 
Strategies: K.M. Fierke on the Concept of Reason 
 
 
The “Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”127 
 
For over a quarter of century since the debut of Onuf and Kratochwil in 1989, 
the Constructivist movement had swept Anglophone IR. Despite the geometric 
growth of works bearing the name of “Constructivist”, however, there have been 
few to continue laboring on the idea of axiological rationality expounded by Onuf 
and Kratochwil. Why were the Constructivists seemingly uninterested in the 
concept?  
  In fact, the concept remained crucial in many Constructivist scholars’ view, 
but discrepancy arose as to how it was so. To invoke Michael Barnett’s 
aphorism – when “baulking at homo economicus, many international relations 
theorists have turned to homo sociologicus and images of society that are 
                                                              
126  C. Wight (2006) once suggested that Onuf and Kratochwil’s theories of rules were essentially the ones of 
structure. Either to see Waltz’s structure as rule or to see Onuf and Kratochwil’s rules as structure, their thoughts 
do converge on the shared emphasis on external  
127  The title is Checkel’s (1998).  
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culturally and thickly constituted”128 – they soon differed from each other in how 
the culturally constituted can be thickened. On the one side, there were those 
who proclaimed that utilitarian rationality is still a powerful device for making 
sense of international politics, provided the domestic cultural preferences can 
be integrated into the framework. These “cultural rationalists” (as I have 
illustrated in the last chapter), shocked and shadowed by the sudden collapse 
of Soviet Union, equated a cultural study with the projection of an agent’s 
internal value to external world politics in Katzenstein’s The Cultures of National 
Security (1996), Cultural Norms and National Security and Johnson’s Cultural 
Realism (1998). Emanuel Adler, in his famous manifesto for “Seizing the Middle 
Ground” (1997), voiced the formulation that “constructivism means studying 
how what the agents themselves consider rational is brought to bear on 
collective human enterprise and situations”.129 This seemingly complementary 
or even compromising position towards the “mainstream” utilitarian rationalists 
was worsened by the release of Wendt’s Social Theory. Although Wendt’s 
Social Theory is a rare attempt to argue that it is the international “cultures” that 
condition political actions – here “culture” functions like Waltz’s ordering 
principle, Onuf and Kratochwil’s rule – the thick Constructivists still turned away 
from Wendt, becoming more vigilant towards and increasingly concerned with 
the tendency to interweave with the mainstream positivism under the disguise 
of a social theory, and suspecting whether it is tenable to build even a structural 
theory on the epistemological foundations of utilitarian Rationalism.  
  On the other side are the scholars who consider that external rules have 
much significance than the mere externalization of internal qualities. More to 
Matha Finnemore’s National Interest in International Society (1996) showing 
how the UNESCO can shape the states’ actions, Audie Klotz in her Norms in 
International Relations (1995) studied how “systemic norms affect state 
interests” and “furthers attempts among choice-theorists to contextualize 
                                                              
128  Barnett 2002: 100.  
129  Adler 1997: 329.  
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rationality”.130 Fierke, for another instance, criticized the petit constructivistes 
for their constricted concentration on how the agents bring to the collectivities 
of what they believe as rational: it projects their internal or subjective culture (or 
calculation) to the whole world. Furthermore, the compromise between Wendt 
and the Rationalists was alerting. Some responded by deploring this “New 
Orthodoxy”;131 others, including Fierke, initiated a movement to “go back to 
Waltz” and criticized Wendt for failing to go beyond Waltz’s Theory and 
demonstrated how Waltz, despite speak of a positivistic language, had in fact 
constructed an essentially Constructivist or sociological theory of international 
politics. 
It is within this general background that Fierke’s works, despite having a 
disproportionate fame, outstand many others in her explicit cultivation of an 
externally axiological rationality. At once inspired by Wittgenstein that 
influences Onuf and Kratochwil and looking at Waltz as an important precursor, 
Fierke has constructed a thickly interpretative theory of axiological rationality.  
 
Axiological Rationality in Language Games 
 
Like Waltz, Onuf and Kratochwil, Fierke’s rationality is also defined as rule-
following. Yet, unlike Waltz, whose veiled language of axiological rationality is 
sometimes difficult to uncover (primarily because of his positivistic expression) 
– a structure is occasionally described even as a physical force rather than as 
the rules of a game – Fierke accordingly avows that her idea of rationality is 
built on linguistic philosophy (Wittgenstein’s language game), and thereby 
reiterates her hostility to a positivistic vocabulary.132 But although she like 
Kratochwil locates rationality in relation to Wittgenstein’s idea of language game, 
                                                              
130  Klotz 1995: 18, 169.  
131  Kratochwil 2000.  
132  The best statement remains Fierke 2002.  
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Fierke’s conception of rationality is at once different from and similar to 
Kratochwil’s account of how rationality is located within a given language game.  
 To begin with the differences. The first difference is that for Fierke international 
politics should not be conceptualized merely through “the notion of a ‘game’” 
(as in Kratochwil’s manifesto). Rather, international politics is the (possible) 
interplay or coexistence of plural games (I shall expand upon this point in more 
depth in the next section). At this point it suffices to say that to consider 
international politics as a game always implies a one-corresponding-to-one 
relation between game and rationality, whereas to view international politics as 
the possible existence of plural games indicates that one rationality may be 
simultaneously dispersed across several games.  
Second, language games are integral to international political conduct, rather 
than merely “used as a metaphor for rule-guided action” as Kratochwil states. 
Language games, for Fierke, “weave together acts with language”, and “with 
other types of action involving material objects, such as deploying nuclear 
weapons”. There is no act without language, and no language without act. In 
Fierke’s language game, “material capability is linguistically constituted”, and 
political moves “are language use in action”.133 The action of threatening to 
deploy nuclear missiles – for instance, the arrangement of Pershing II missiles 
in NATO countries – is recurrently invoked by Fierke to show that language 
games are “specific moves with language” as well as the act of “making a 
commitment” or “promise”. 134  Even the deployment of nuclear weapons 
becomes a language use in action, a move in the language game. Unlike the 
explanation “trivializing life and death experiences at the international level by 
drawing on game metaphors”, language games are “not ‘mere games’ but 
rather acts by which we are connected and reconnected with a particular kind 
                                                              
133  Fierke 1998: 211.  
134  Fierke 1998: 74, 46-7. 
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of experience”.135 Fierke’s language game is characterized by a practical view 
where the material objects and language games are mutually constituted.  
Third, Fierke’s emphasis on the constitutively practical features of language 
game displaces and marginalizes the role played by speech. Unlike Onuf and 
Kratochwil, whose agents can use criticism and contestation to enforce 
rationality, Fierke’s actors are less communicative and muter than Onuf and 
Kratochwil have supposed. Indeed, Fierke once articulated, borrowing 
Kratochwil’s tone, that “without these shared rules [of language games] we 
could not begin to communicate with one another, attribute meaning to objects 
or acts in the world, think rational thoughts or express personal feelings”.136 But 
whereas for Kratochwil the language game is played by verbal exchange, with 
the rules being enforced by communication and justification of claims, Fierke’s 
game is played more by deeds (such as the deployment of missiles) rather than 
by speeches. This is also exemplified in her critique of Habermas’ 
communicative rationality. Habermas’ division between communicative and 
strategic action is unconvincing, because communicative action through 
speech cannot have autonomy and both are therefore just two instances of the 
use of language. “All communication, both communicative and strategic, is 
intersubjectively and dependent on the shared rules for its meanings”. 137 
Habermas’ two modes of rationality are nothing but two specific instantiations 
of how language games are played in accordance with different rules. For 
Fierke, to conceive of actors as capable of making communicative-rational 
arguments presupposes an “abstract and universal criteria of rationality”.138 
Yet in other respects, Fierke’s idea of rationality and language games also 
bears remarkable resemblance to Kratochwil’s. First, notice that Fierke’s 
emphasis on the practical trait of language games, although silencing the actors, 
reinforces her resemblance with Onuf and Kratochwil’s emphasis upon the 
                                                              
135  Fierke 1998: 110. Notice, however, that his was a criticism on Game Theory, not Kratochwil.  
136  Fierke & Nicholson 2001: 11.  
137  Fierke 1998: 13.  
138  Fierke 1998: 12.  
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contextual characteristics of rationality. In her critique of Game Theory – 
especially those of Deterrence Theorists such as Schelling rather than Axelrod 
targeted by Onuf and Kratochwil – Fierke argues that rationality resides only in 
the application of linguistic moves within a game rather than in the assumptions 
about them. It is important to grasp “the meaning in an unfolding context”.139 
For conduct in international politics closely resembles chess; as Fierke remarks, 
“strategic action can no more be detached from language than the meaning of 
the objects with which chess is played, or the rationality of moves within this 
game, can be detached from a language of chess”.140 The strategic rationality 
conceived by both game theorists and Habermas has mistakenly “separate[d] 
out strategic rationality as prior to context”.141 “To assume the rationality of 
actors”, as Fierke later recapitulated, was the characteristically a-contextual 
error committed by the “models of negotiation” and “models of dialogue”.142 For 
Fierke, as for Waltz, Onuf and Kratochwil, rationality is not to be assumed but 
contextually understood within the context of a broad game.  
Second, rationality is contextually dependent upon the rules of the game. 
Although she outlines an ambiguous definition of rule,143 Fierke’s purpose in 
defining rationality in terms of rule-following is clear. “Game theorists”, Fierke 
argued, “have emphasized the rationality of individual moves, but say very little 
about the ‘rules of the game’. The question is whether strategic rationality can 
ever be detached from the content of a specific game”.144 Without these rules 
as antecedent conditions, “it makes no sense to ask whether a move is rational 
until we have identified the game itself or the structure of rules within which a 
move has this meaning, is undertaken with this object, and is rational or 
irrational given a position within a game in process.” As Wittgenstein’s dictum 
                                                              
139  Fierke 1998: 164.  
140  Fierke 1998: 11-2.  
141 Fierke 2002: 348. This erroneous tendency even includes, she continued to say, “Wendt’s constructivism”.  
142  Fierke 2005: 136.  
143  Fierke 1998: 17-20, where Fierke contrasts rule with law without making much clarifications on rule per se.  
144  Fierke 1998: 20.  
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to “look and see” stipulates, rationality is only discernible in relation to the 
specific rules.145  
Third, rationality must be understood as an external rather than internal 
property. In Game Theory, to take a negative instance, the actors are assumed 
to be rational interest maximizers, who act independently of each other in the 
midst of the different games that are played. Their common rationality is 
aggregated by and reducible to individual attributes. Their plays are rational in 
individual choice but might result in collective irrational (Pareto sub-optimal) 
outcomes. What needed to be envisaged, on the very contrary, is an 
intersubjective rule upholding “relations between rationality and structures of 
meaning”.146 “The focus is on meaning as a fundamentally social, rather than 
purely individual property”; accordingly “not only the meaning of an act but its 
rationality” has to be defined as a collective property among the actors and their 
function within antecedent context. 147  “The space of rational calculation”, 
Fierke cautioned in a Waltzian tone, is “determined by the type of context. Any 
one actor may through a choice of actions influences the range of possible and 
plausible reactions by another, but these meanings are prior to any 
individual”.148 Like Kratochwil – perhaps more like Waltz – Fierke frequently 
pronounces that rule-following cannot be explained as an agent’s following of 
its own psychological design or motivation. This will once again  
 
“shift attention to the context – and explicitly a social context – as the 
necessary condition of rationality. […] For Wittgenstein the central issue 
was not to identify motives, intentions, or rationality of individuals. The 
central thrust of the argument is one about the dependence of our thoughts, 
intentions, or rationality – not to mention our experience of the external 
                                                              
145  Fierke 2001: 123-4, emphasis in original. Unlike Kratochwil’s demonstration of how generalized attitude can 
change a game, Fierke did not provide much specification.  
146  Fierke 2001: 123.  
147  Fierke & Nicholson 2001: 18-9, emphasis in original.  
148  Fierke 2002: 348-50.   
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world – on an intersubjective language and context which is prior. […] It 
rather means that our room for maneuver, the boundaries of what we can 
reasonably think or what will be considered rational, are not defined by 
individual minds but by a context of intersubjective rules, historically, 
socially and/or culturally defined”.149 
 
Fierke’s notion of rationality, which is reflected in her critique of Game Theory 
and Communicative Theory, presents a construal that is embedded in practical 
language games which are composed of intersubjective rules. Material object, 
language games, and the rationality of move within the games, have been 
interweaved together. Although characterized by her emphasis on the 
multipolarity of games and the intersubjective play, Fierke’s idea of rationality 
recalls elements within the work of Waltz, Onuf and Kratochwil: it is dependent 
on the designation of the intersubjective rules of the language games.  
 
The “Rationality of Moving towards a New Game”: Grammatical 
Investigation in Language Games 
 
The originality of Fierke’s pioneering interpretation of rationality can be said to 
derive from its proposition that axiological rationality should not be understood 
to be merely reproductive. Language games are many. Rule-following 
rationality should not merely account for the maintenance of one or several 
games, but the very dynamic should change in the transition from one game to 
another. Hence, whereas for Kratochwil rationality is used for imparting 
intelligibility to how a game is played by actors, Fierke stresses that rationality 
should be used for examining the transition of games. Whereas Waltz uses 
axiological rationality to show how the two games (bipolarity and multipolarity) 
are differently played and self-contained, Fierke wants, as I show below, to 
                                                              
149  Fierke & Nicholson 2001: 19.  
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demonstrate how the bipolar Cold-War game is transformed even when the 
axiological rationality of bipolar conduct remains constant.  
  But how can rationality be rule-following while at the same time dynamic? 
The solution offered by Fierke travels in a diametrically opposed direction to the 
one offered by Onuf and Kratochwil. Whereas they include several kinds of 
rules within a game to enrich the mechanism of enforcement, Fierke proposes 
that one single rule may be simultaneously shared by several games. For Onuf 
and Kratochwil, the crux is to envisage “one game multiple rules” (my term): 
different kinds of rule, ranging from positivistic (reward or punishment) to 
intersubjective (discursive communication or contestation), can ensure that the 
agent acts in a way that is axiologically rational. For Fierke, however, the crux 
is not to envisage “one game multiple rules”, but “one rule multiple games” (my 
term). Fierke conceived of “two players following different but interfacing rules”, 
or “the rationality of possible moves”. 150  One rule may be shared by the 
interplay or (possible) coexistence of several games. The same rationality 
following rule can thus overlap across several games, while the same rationality 
can give rise to different moves, each of which nonetheless aligns with the pre-
requirement of rationality.  
  For Fierke, the rules that can be shared across several games are special. 
Drawing upon Wittgenstein’s “grammatical investigation”, Fierke defines these 
rules as “grammatical”. These grammatical rules are directed to the 
“‘possibilities’ of phenomena” rather than the phenomenon per se, because 
these rules gave rise to different applications upon the basis of the same 
grammar. Or, to use Fierke’s own analogy of originality, a rule serving as the 
grammatical link between several games could generate a move comparable 
to that which takes place in a utilitarian game and which corresponds in turn to 
different payoffs and outcomes (consider a centipede or extended form of 
game).151 “Like the notion of a game tree”, Fierke explained, “a grammar can 
                                                              
150  Fierke 1998: 22, 131, emphasis added.  
151  See Fierke 1998: Ch.3, passim. Two caveats here. In Wittgenstein’s own works a grammatical investigation is a 
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be used to identify how the boundaries of movement are transformed at 
different points in a game”. 152  A grammatical move informed by rule can 
maintain, transform, restore or dismantle a game characterized by distinct 
consequences. In another form, a grammatical rule was expounded in a critical 
relation to the Postmodernist skepticism:  
 
“Some critical constructivists and postmodernists have discounted logic and 
rationality because the discipline of international relations – and modernity in 
general – have turned them into an end in themselves, and an end that 
reinforces the status quo. Another take…is that humans do reason, but this 
is less a reflection of an objective world – objective as independent of human 
meaning – than a part of our grammar for operating in different types of social 
or political context”.153 
 
The same grammatical rule could thus operate in several contextually distinct 
regions. A rule, requiring the actors to follow it, might give rise to moves that 
signposted several directions. This was what Fierke named the “rationality of 
moving towards a new game”: a single move informed by a rule could be shared 
by, and constitute the transition from, the old and new games.154 
                                                              
rule-guided conduct, but in Fierke’s account the emphasis is shifted to a rule-guided conduct. Thus, when 
expounding what a grammar was, Fierke not only failed to explain grammar in terms of rule, but constantly 
compared to the concept of move in Game Theory, referring to it as “a grammar of moves”. This confused rule 
with move and once again redirected to the ambiguous definition of rule in Fierke’s thought. Second, Fierke 
herself did not provide any extended form of game to make her statement clear. I use Schelling’s game of 
deterrence as an illustration (see below, the extended form of Fig. 2.3). Fierke seemingly wanted to argue that 
threat and promise, as grammatical rules, could lead the play of game into various kinds of games (it was 
deterrence when column gains 4).  
                                                      
                                              
152  Fierke 1998: 51-2,  
153  Fierke 2002: 251-2, see also 1998: 47.   
154  Fierke 1998: 130-1.  
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Consider Fierke’s own illustrations. Unlike Waltz, who was primarily 
interested in the distinct ways of playing bipolar and multipolar games, Fierke 
instead focused on how the bipolar game played into collapse. The end of the 
Cold War was “the collapse [that] was generated in the tension and conflict 
between these two games”, rather than “a contest between the zero-sun game 
of the Cold War and an alternative positive-sum game”.155 The first stage 
started with the inauguration of the Reagan administration (from 1981) and 
ended with Gorbachev’s rise to the position of General Secretary of the 
Politburo (1985). During this period, both camps wanted to maintain the Cold-
War structure and a new Cold War was seemingly initiated. The USSR wanted 
to restore the tightened rule over the Eastern communist states within the 
Warsaw Pact (with the unintentional effect that protest movements most notably 
Poland’s Solidarity, became more prominent). The Strategic Defense Initiative 
(1983), intended by the US to maintain the old Deterrence game, conversely 
stirred internal dissent within the Western alliance, and roused civil movements 
that called for nuclear disarmament. To “maintain” was a grammatical rule 
implying a rationality that interfaced two games: it at once pointed to the 
consolidation of alliance, intensification of confrontation, and renewal of the old 
game. It simultaneously suggested the potentiality of discord, 
counterproductive responses, which arose from a social refusal to become 
hostages in the broader superpower struggle, and a new game in which allies 
were pushed further apart.  
  In the second stage, Gorbachev, after taking power in 1985, made the 
gesture of détente towards the Europeans, and thus signaled a Soviet 
willingness to explore the political possibilities of moderation, mediation and 
compromise. By 1986, both Reagan and Gorbachev were following the same 
grammatical rule of “restructuring”. The rationality of Gorbachev’s action 
resided in his restructuring of the Soviet foreign policy into a more moderate 
                                                              
155  Fierke 1998: 155.  
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defense strategy towards the West. Reagan, at the same time, also endeavored 
to restructure the Western camp. The rule of restructuring was crucial, since it 
informed the dualistic move to manage the internal alliance and to initiate 
adjustment towards the external camp. It pointed to a rationality that was 
reinforcing the status quo, an old Cold-War game, and the opening up of the 
possibility of concession; in short, an entirely distinct post-Cold-War game.  
In the third stage, both the US and USSR jointly collapsed the bipolar game. 
And its collapse was not due to the bad play of the Soviets, Fierke contended. 
It was not their inconformity to the rule or their “irrational” strategy (in a utilitarian 
sense) that laid them open to geopolitical dangers and failures. Rather, the end 
of the Cold War derived from an interplay between the US and Soviet Union 
and “the dialectical tension between competing games”. Rather a unilateral 
triumph of the West through a “unilinear” process, the rule of the bipolar game 
was as maintained as changed in an ongoing process.156 
It is also worthwhile to consider her analysis of the Bosnia War (1999). NATO 
intended to play a game of compellence, and accordingly deployed 
bombardment to “compel the Serbs to stop their aggressive acts towards the 
safe havens”: 
 
“However, given the context and the identities involved, the Serbs had an 
alternative move available to them which transformed the game. Just as 
Saddam Hussein, in the context of the Gulf War, took Westerners hostage in 
order to deter NATO from realizing its threat, the Serbs took peacekeepers 
hostage and used this as leverage in bargaining for a promise that the 
bombing [on the Serbs] would stop. From the perspective of the original 
Western game of compellence, this move may not have initially been 
imagined or it may have been categorized as ‘irrational’. However…the move 
on the part of the Serbs may be considered rational in so far as it involved 
                                                              
156  Fierke 1998: 159, 163.  
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following the rule of a different but interfacing game. This move transformed 
the context of choice for the West. They were then confronted with a ‘terrorist’ 
game…”157  
 
By taking hostages, the Serbs were simultaneously playing both an old and 
new game. The “rationality” of their conduct, if understood rigidly within the old 
game, might become unintelligible. Yet, it would become more intelligible if its 
rationality was comprehended as moving towards a new game, or within the 
context of the “rule of a different but interfacing” terrorist game.   
 
(iv) Conclusion 
 
Two Traits of the Axiological Language: Externality and Enforcement  
 
The language of axiological rationality has two characteristics: its definition of 
rationality as an external relationship and its emphasis on how to create, 
maintain and transform such a relationship.  
It is equally apparent that terms such as “rule”, “game”, “principle”, “order”, 
and “imperative” reoccur frequently within the utterances of the axiological-
rational language. And it is in relation to these terms that rationality is identified 
as a relational property between the actors’ conducts and these external rules. 
For Waltz, the international “power-political game” is conditioned by the 
anarchical ordering “principle”, a principle which should be understood to be 
“imperative”. Even the balance of power, he argued, would be changed in the 
ways of strategic calculation, a feature which would be simultaneously 
evidenced in an equivalent shift in the rules of diplomatic conduct (with both 
corresponding to the broader shift from a multipolar  to a bipolar game). This 
system-orientated understanding of rationality would later become a more 
                                                              
157  Fierke 1998: 22-3. Here it would be intriguing to question how would Waltz, Onuf and Kratochwil analyze this 
case?   
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explicit, and prominent, feature of the works of Onuf, Kratochwil and Fierke. For 
them, rationality is the property imparted by rules to situations, presupposed in 
the rules guiding conduct and anteceded by the attitude towards a game. Each 
aspect could be said to depend upon the language game in question and reside 
within intersubjective contextuality.  
  It is noticeable that all the thinkers of axiological rationality have argued 
strongly against the tendency to reduce rationality to the level of the individual 
agent. Their endeavors to distance from utilitarian rationality are exemplary. 
Waltz has consciously repudiated the possibility of viewing consequence as 
following individualistic intentions (the logic of consequence) or assuming “a 
necessary correspondence of motive and result”. For him, an explanation in 
terms of the internally rational property falls into the reductionist trap, and 
thereby overlooks the fact that political leaders’ conduct are shaped by the 
external condition. Onuf and Kratochwil explicitly argue that the individual 
calculation of interest, operated under the various condition of games – rule 
“bounded” situations, “ways of life”, and “attitudes” towards the circumstance – 
is far from being the final arbiter of rational conduct. Rationality cannot be an 
“idiosyncratic” attribute but instead must be a consensus or endorsement of a 
“universalizing” nature. In Fierke’s neat terms, rationality is “a fundamentally 
social property” that cannot be located in the “motives, intentions or rationality 
of individuals”. Rational Choice and Game Theory have failed to realize that 
rather than being a property residing in the individual minds, rationality is 
inherently “intersubjective”. Furthermore, to compare Waltz’s criticism of the 
“man” level and Fierke’s critique of Habermas may also be illuminating.  
  Second, further to this external conception of rationality is the issue of 
enforcement. As I forewarned in the beginning, axiological rationality rarely 
supposes that the rule-following act is determined, automatic and spontaneous. 
On the contrary, axiological rationality is intimately connected to the problem of 
ensuring that the rule can be followed within a game. In this aspect, axiological 
rationality can be said to develop in opposition to its Kantian and utilitarian 
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counterparts: it does not keep a single relation constant (between intellect and 
interest/morality, or between calculation and utility/certainty) and then 
assimilate more objects as well as subjects into it; rather, it complicates the 
relation between the agent and external rules into multiple possibilities. This 
characteristic is a particularly prominent feature within the work of Waltz, Onuf 
and Kratochwil. In Waltz’s Theory, axiological rationality is enforced by 
competition, socialization, reward and punishment. Theses mechanisms 
conform them to the anarchical ordering principle (i.e. taking care of yourself, 
the balance of power), and orientate the agents (who are distinguished by 
differing distributions of capability) to behave in different ways to achieve this 
ultimate end (in bipolarity, the agents gather strength internally as a means 
through which to balance each other). Anarchy is itself an imperative: he who 
defies the rule shall perish, and he who follows them will prosper! In Onuf and 
Kratochwil’s account of enforcement more activity and complexity were 
endowed on rules. The agent enters into a process of being coerced, exhorted, 
mocked, rebutted, etc.  
 
How Rules are Recognized: Waltz’s Idea of Rationality Reconsidered  
 
Axiological reason, as I have demonstrated, begins from the discernment of 
what the external rules are and how to conform to them, not from what the agent 
wants and the associated striving for their concrete realization. If to be rational 
is to discern what a rule is and then follow it, then one question naturally arises: 
how can actors recognize such rules?  
  This question is crucial if we are to grasp why many theorists have ascribed 
“rationality” to Waltz’s Theory (however the term may be constructed). Indeed, 
the problem of recognition poses a particular difficulty to Waltz, and not to Onuf, 
Kratochwil and Fierke. For them, rationality presupposes intersubjective 
recognition. Kratochwil accordingly insists that the pursuit of reason can be 
equated with the contrivance of a “precondition” of “moral discourse”, this 
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course of action is in turn understood to establish the basis for a contestation 
of the precise meaning of the “rational”. To “call something rational”, as he 
clearly states, necessitates the endorsement of “norm or moral feeling that 
permits it”, which means that “humans acquire through socialization and 
participation in certain practices”. Meanwhile, Fierke similarly insists that 
reason can be defined as “grammar for operating in different types of social or 
political contexts”. Rationality is dependent upon the languages games in which 
the actors have been involved, and by the rules which bind them. Rationality is 
thus intersubjectively defined, justified, contested, followed and transformed.  
Waltz’s Theory, however, lacks this intersubjective dimension, which 
conceives of rationality as being contested by, but at the same time irreducible 
to, social actors. As is well-known, Waltz conversely posits the controversial 
claim that there are some principles of conduct that actors have acted on for 
two millennia without realizing their existence. The imperative to “take care of 
yourself” has been obeyed (accordingly states have balanced rather than 
maximized power as a means to ensure their “survival”) 158 – yet actors, in 
following rules that have been legislated by the system, may be unconscious of 
their origin or even their very existence. The actors can be axiologically rational 
without being cognitively or intentionally so. Their rule-following acts, as Waltz 
constantly reiterated, require no assumption of maximizing interest, of a 
“relentless striving to increase their power”, of a “constancy of will”, and even 
no perception of rules that ultimately determine “the structure of the game”! 
These points in turn raise the question of whether IR theorists’ insistence on 
a presupposed rationality of Theory are indeed justified. I argue that that they 
are, as long as the idea of rationality imputed to Waltz is a “systematic” rather 
than utilitarian conception. Keohane, for instance, has indeed realized that 
Waltz presents the structure as so external to its agents that it appears almost 
as if the former stands completely independently of the units: as a consequence, 
                                                              
158  If they do not, the system will shape and shove their action by reward and punishment.  
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the observer loses a sense of the link between the systemic order and the 
response of the relevant agents. His error, however, is to point to the 
indispensability of the agents’ rationality, as if once this internal attribute is kept 
constant the systematic incentive can be transmitted to, and responded to, by 
the individual. Kaplan and Knutsen, on the other hand, come closer to a correct 
analysis when they emphasize the necessity of an axiological rationality, an 
“intra-system” or “systematic” form that has a dimension intertwined with, but 
not reducible to, the actors. What is needed is an understanding that derives 
from a very different semantic meaning (as Waltz himself recognized): this 
meaning would in turn correspond to successful and acceptable practices that 
are designated by a system that is external to the actors.  
 
The Problems of Historical Change  
 
The concept of Axiological rationality may raise a number of problems.159 
Among these problems, the most serious is that of history. When perceived in 
this context, rules, norms and games, once created, will not only have a logic 
but a life of their own. Rather than appearing to be immutable to the erosion of 
time, they come into existence at a certain point in the historical process and 
vanish at another. Instead of persisting in ruling actors’ conduct, they are 
amenable, collapsible, and transformable into distinct forms and contents. In 
fact, it is precisely because of his proclamation of the perennially anarchical-
ordering principle of international politics that Waltz had been subject to forceful 
and sustained attack. Similarly, Fierke’s insight of the rationality of changing 
games should have been developed: the “unfolding” of international events, 
Fierke urged, should be conducted “in much the same way that the observer of 
                                                              
159  Those problems include: what is exactly a rule? Will the interplay of rules be a difficulty for axiological-rational 
thinking? Has the issue of agency and ways of enforcement been clarified enough? See for instance the special 
issue edited by Lang (et al.) 2006.  
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a chess match explain to an audience the relationship between different moves 
and the eventual outcome of the game”.160  
Indeed, in the next chapter I shall turn to a conception of rationality as 
immanent rather than transcendent within a historical process, specific rather 
than universal, tensional rather than unapprehensive. And its name is historical 
reason.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
160  Fierke 1998: 19-20 
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Chapter IV. Historical Reason 
 
 
 
 
When compared to utilitarian and axiological reason, historical reason is a 
conception that is difficult to pin down and even more difficult to delineate.1 Like 
Kantian reason it depicts actors as intellectually rational beings, but it imprints 
an extra temporal element on intellectuality at the same time. Analogously to 
utilitarian reason it is preoccupied with the maximization of interest, but it 
simultaneously emphasizes the role of morality and insists that the problem of 
ethics is constituted in the margin of every political decisions. In a similar 
manner to axiological reason it views actors as bounded by sociological games 
and rules, but it contextualizes these sociological games within a specifically 
chronological background.  
  What is this historical reason, after all? It is generally speaking a trinity. First, 
historical reason conceives of rationality as immanent rather than transcendent, 
specific rather than universal. It rejects the transcendental meaning given to 
human development and conceptualizes being as a series of temporal 
sequences rather than isolated abstract existence. Human beings and states 
are, neither because of their intellectual capacity, nor because of their interest 
maximization identity, but because of what they were yesterday and what they 
will be tomorrow. Historical reason is rationality in history, not rationality of 
history. Historical reason considers history as a process, not as a purpose. As 
Martin Wight scrupulously distinguishes between the two, the rationality in 
history, represented by Meinecke’s “historicism”, believes “that all values are 
historically conditioned, that reality itself is a historical process, and that history 
can teach nothing except philosophical acceptance of change”. The rationality 
of history, exemplified in Popper’s charge of Marx, Spengler and Toynbee, 
                                                              
1  I have benefited from the following sources when trying to do so: Aron 1957: 57, Ortega y Gasset 1986.  
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believes that “history has a purpose and direction” and “its movement is largely 
predictable, and that it can (under proper interpretation) teach everything we 
need to know about life and prescribe our duties”.2 Whereas the rationality of 
history points to rhythms, iron laws and recurrent patterns of history, the 
rationality in history conversely directs towards a constantly changing process 
from one specific space-time to another. Indeed, it is precisely because of this 
understanding of rationality as in history, as I shall show below, that the 
historical-rational thinkers tend aesthetically to define the “real”, “precise” and 
“accurate” as looking closer at the historically specific (past, the present, and 
the future) rather than as projecting sweeping generalization to it.  
  Second, the language of historical reason is one of (practical) morality. It 
regards morality as integral to and inseparable from political interest, and 
accordingly argues that ethics resides both in the heart and margin of every 
political action. For historical-rational thinkers, there is no morality as such, but 
rather praxeology, political morality, unity between utility and justice and the 
intersection of power and ethics. Political acts are not performed in a moral 
vacuum; rather, the calculation of power and interest, the end and means of 
political behavior, have all been constituted as well as regulated by moral 
concerns.    
Third, historical reason contemplates moral problems in a special way: moral 
problems, which are rooted in specifically historical sociological circumstance, 
can neither be repudiated in their significance, nor resolved by universalizing a 
particular moral code. Instead, they must be tackled by returning to and finding 
solutions within specific historical-sociological conditions. Hence the orators of 
historical reason have constantly spoken of overcoming extremes such as 
“Machiavellianism” and “Kantianism”, “Empirical Realism” and “Universal Moral 
Order”, “instrumental” and “normative”. The via media can be found only within 
the historical process itself.  
                                                              
2 M. Wight 1960: 224. Also contrast M. Wight 1958a with 1958b, two reviews of two separate conceptions of 
Historismus viewed by Friedrich Meinecke and Karl Popper.   
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In light of this definition, many would question whether this abstruse 
conception of rationality, which sounds so alien to Anglophone thought, had 
ever been present? My answer is affirmative, although the language first 
requires excavation from the deeply layered historical ground. In the following 
section, I reconstitute four individual speakers who exemplify historical reason: 
Raymond Aron’s reasonable diplomatic-strategic action, Martin Wight’s 
Rationalism, David Boucher’s tradition of historical reason, and finally Christian 
Reus-Smit’s thought of “rationality as a culturally and historically contingent 
form of consciousness”.  
In section (i), I shall concentrate on Raymond Aron’s account of “reasonable” 
diplomatic-strategic action which has been set out in his Peace and War: A 
Theory of International Relations (1966), an English translation of the original 
Paix et Gurre Entre les Nations, 1962.3 As one of the leading sociologists, 
philosophers of history and political commentators, Raymond Aron’s 
international thought has had an enormous impacts on the Anglo-American 
intellectual world.4 Yet as time passed, Aron’s theory of international relations 
was gradually left aside, marginalized and forgotten. For later IR scholars, Aron 
is only renowned for his introduction of historical sociology into the field. (Fred 
Halliday, one of the leading historical sociologists, has commented on Aron’s 
works with enormous admiration, lauding the latter for pioneering the whole 
enterprise in IR.5) Few discuss, however, Aron’s work nowadays and fewer still 
look back over what he once said about the “reasonable” criterion of political 
conduct. Indeed, one might ask, why do I labor on excavating his forgotten 
language of the “reasonable” and what deserves to be known?  
For two reasons. First, it is only when IR scholars have contemplated how to 
have a “conception of reason beyond positivistic episteme” that they have 
                                                              
3  More of Aron’s works will be entailed as auxiliary devise for clarification, such as his extremely influential article 
“What is a Theory of International Relations?” (1967), which is summative of Peace and War, and The Great 
Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy (1962). 
4 Aron had already been famous as a leading French intellectual in the English speaking countries for The Century 
of Total War (1954), The Opium of the Intellectuals (1955), and other works, well before his Peace and War (1966). 
The reception of Peace and War, see, esp. Tucker 1965.  
5  Halliday1990: 137-41, 2002: 244-6.  
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returned to the classical Realists for inspiration.6 And Raymond Aron, they find 
out, not only frequently brings “reason to bear on political judgment” but with 
sophistication and with profound differences from other Realists such as Hans 
Morgenthau.7 These differences, as I shall show in section (i), are typical 
characteristics of historical rationality that distinguish Aron’s and Morgenthau’s 
conceptions of reason: a reasonable action is conducted under concrete 
historical-sociological conditions with normative orientation. For Aron, a 
reasonable action is not a repudiation of the calculation of power or interest at 
all. Rather, it is a measurement that grounds actions within specific historical-
sociological circumstances, thereby enabling the calculation of power and 
interest to be synthesized with morality into a whole that in turn capacitates the 
actor to overcome the dualistic dilemmas of “Machiavellism” and “Kantianism”. 
Second, this historically-rational “reasonableness” does not merely have 
theoretical value. In its historical origin, the criterion of reasonable action was 
orchestrated by Aron himself to combat  the “rational” deterrence theorists and 
Morgenthau’s “rational” Realism, both of which he saw as preposterous in 
theory and pernicious in guiding practice in the thermonuclear age. Both 
assumed the calculation of interest (utility) and power as deterministic for 
political conduct, both of which are too abstract, simplistic and hazardous in a 
bipolar, heterogeneous and nuclear system. For Aron, reasonableness 
provides a better praxeological solution to the early Cold War dilemma. 
Contrary to our usual practice, I shall occasionally bring Stanley Hoffmann’s 
several expository essays into the main texts, both because of Hoffmann’s fame 
as the exponent of Aron’s international thought and because of his “Aronian” 
impacts on the discipline.8  
Martin Wight, one of the most prominent English School thinkers, once 
extolled hat Aron’s achievement in Peace and War was comparable to that of 
                                                              
6  Neufeld 1995: 46, emphasis in original.  
7  Davis 2008: 648.  
8  Many theorists read Hoffmann’s The State of War (1965a) and Janus and Minerva (1987) where Aron’s thoughts 
are expounded and advocated.  
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Hobbes’s and Locke’s contribution to political theory, and Adam Smith’s 
contribution to economics.9 What moved the scholarly-aristocratic Wight to 
praise Aron in these terms? At first appearance, it seems that their shared 
conception of the rational, provides an initial answer.  
In section (ii), I turn to Wight’s conception of “Rationalism”, one of the three 
most significant Rationalisms within IR (besides Morgenthau and Keohane) but 
which remains relatively underexposed. I want to question what/where is the 
rational delivered by Rationalism. Is Wight’s Rationalism a philosophical theory 
that attributes the source of knowledge to the human intellect, as Dunne claims? 
Or is it a tradition appointing international society as “the flagship idea of English 
School” that carves out a “clearly bounded subject” focused on the society of 
states, as Buzan instead insists? Is it a sort of political theory of 
constitutionalism that puts “rational” constraint on extremities in its central place 
and privileges the via media, as Hall argues? Or is it a garbage category replete 
with too many muddled contents to be delineates?10  
In reply, I scrutinize Wight’s main works published between 1957 and 1960, 
represented by the “mature” Wight’s lectures and articles centered on 
international theory which were later published  as International Theory: The 
Three Traditions (1957-1960, released 1991), “Why Is There No International 
Theory” (1959), and Four Seminal Thinkers (1959-1960, published in 2004).11 
I confine myself within works of this period because they provide abundant 
instances of Wight’s own conception. And the answer I tease out is that the 
Rationalism viewed by Wight is an exemplar of historical reason, an ensemble 
that entails all these elements mentioned by his interpreters in a complex and 
inextricable way. The tradition of Rationalism is defined by a particular 
conception of reason as engendering a paradoxical view of human nature that 
                                                              
9 M. Wight 1967b.  
10  See respectively Dunne 1998: 59-60, Buzan 2004: 1 emphasis added, I. Hall 2014: 13-4, Yost 1994. 
11  Wight scholars noticed that that some significant changes in Wight’s thought occurred between the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, see e.g. Bull 1977: 10, Dunne 1998: 49-54, I. Hall 2006: 24 ff. My focus here is on these de-religious 
writings on international thought.  
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presupposes the possibility of a society, a belief in history as agnostic, and 
finally an acknowledgement of the necessity of a “political morality” that is 
historically and sociologically conditioned. Like Aron’s reasonableness, Wight’s 
Rationalism (in which the concept of reason lies at its heart) functions as an 
epitome of historical rationality. Both Aron and Wight construe political problem 
as originating in the historical-sociological process. Both regard moral problems 
as being inherent in every political action. Both speak of the terminology of 
Machiavellian and Kantian. Both argue that the human moral predicament is 
rooted in a historical context and cannot be resolved either by a Machiavellian 
or a Kantian method (either as meaningless or universal) but only within the 
historical process itself through concrete political action.  
To clarify, my aim is not to pin down Wight’s own position within the three 
traditions, a problem which remains contentious, but to stop at a clear 
delineation of the historical-rational trait of his Rationalism and to thereby be 
satisfied with highlighting this underappreciated dimension.12 This historical-
rational dimension has been seriously overlooked, even by David Boucher who 
criticized Wight heavily in his enormously influential Political Theories of 
International Relations (1998). In the third section, I shall endeavor to show that 
the tradition of “historical reason” pioneered by Boucher, far from being a 
distinctly novel category, is in fact an instantiation of historical reason that 
closely resembles Aron’s reasonable praxeology and Wight’s Rationalism. Like 
Aron and Wight before him, Boucher argues that the Machiavellian and Kantian 
(Boucher renames them respectively “empirical realism” and “universal moral 
order”) answers provided by political thinkers to the problem of international 
history, sociology and morality are as violently procrustean in formal 
categorization as they are inadequate in content. The tradition of historical 
reason, which he places in between the two extremes, is one that will try to 
synthesize utility and justice into the same historical-sociological process.  
                                                              
12  Bull (1972: 107-8) thought that Wight’s position transcends and goes around the three categories; I. Hall (2014) 
considered it as grounded solidly in via media.   
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Having examined Boucher I shall finally turn to Christian Reus-Smit. I 
reexamine his proposition that rationality is “a historically and culturally 
contingent form of consciousness”,13 a central theme which emerges from his 
works that were published in the late 1990s. These included works such as The 
Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality 
in International Relations (1999), “The Strange Death of Liberal International 
Theory” (2001) and “The Idea of History and History with Ideas” (2002).14 
Reus-Smit is counted in here on two accounts. First, I propose to bring explicitly 
out that in resembling Aron, Wight and Boucher, Reus-Smit’s argument of 
rationality as “historically and culturally contingent” and “embedded” within a 
historical, sociological and moral condition,15 is another exemplar of historical 
reason. Second, I want to show how Reus-Smit employed his historically-
contingent rationality to expand the conceptual space of historical reason. 
Distinguishing himself from the Neo-Neo theorists and Constructivists 
(Katzenstein, Wendt and to a lesser degree Ruggie), Reus-Smit contends that 
rationality, if envisaged as a historically, sociologically and morally changing 
consciousness, will provide a penetrating standpoint that discloses how certain 
beliefs can serve as foundations not only for entitling actors to rightfulness and 
rightness of conduct, but for enabling the actors (and the system they form) to 
be in the very first place. Hence in Reus-Smit’s conception, rationality as 
historically contingent is more than revealing the historical-sociological 
condition under which acts are performed with a normative orientation. It rather 
penetrates into historical-sociological preconditions of how actors exist and are 
organized in a system. Indeed, this constitutive-colored conception of historical 
reason evidently goes further than the mere unity between justice and utility.   
Three caveats should be established before proceeding. First, with the 
exception of Aron, who speaks of historical rationality in an exhortative tone, all 
                                                              
13  Reus-Smit 1999: 161 
14  Reus-Smit 1999, 2001, 2002. More materials will be involved and reconsidered below.  
15  Reus-Smit 2002: 121, 1999: 161.   
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the other thinkers consider that their historical rationality is a descriptive 
characteristic of the “thought” possessed by statesman/intellectuals themselves. 
It is a feature that coincides with the “ruling idea” that de facto guides the actors’ 
actions. Yet for Wight, Boucher and Reus-Smit, historical rationality should also 
form the basis for political conduct. Hence when they speak of the language of 
historical rationality, one can discern that they are speaking the language both 
in a descriptive and (subsequently) exhortative tone.16 Second, the thinkers of 
historical reason often speak of eschewing a “Kantian” and a “Machiavellian” 
solution to political problems. The “Kantian” they refer to is both larger and 
smaller than my Kantian conception of reason. It is smaller because their 
“Kantian” usually stands for the chase of moral code at the expense of interest, 
whereas my “Kantian” considers that both the pursuits of interest and of morality 
can be unified if conduct is based on the intellect. It is larger because their 
“Kantian” can include nationalistic or racist doctrines, which are irrational 
negations of the Kantian conception of reason. Third, the term “historical-
sociological” (small h and r) needs to be distinguished from the “Historical-
Sociological” (large H and R) advocated by J.M. Hobson and others as the 
theories inspired by Charles Tilly and Michael Mann.  
 
(i) Reasonable Action in Thermonuclear Age: Raymond Aron (and 
Stanley Hoffmann) 
 
Rationality in Deterrence Theory and Morgenthau’s “Realism” 
 
In his development of Peace and War (1966) Aron provides a constant contrast 
with the two celebrated notions of rationality in his time: Morgenthau’s rational 
Realism and the deterrence theories. For Aron, both approaches are deficient 
                                                              
16  For Wight, Boucher and Reus-Smit, historical rationality is a property manifested in the actors’ (statesmen or 
thinker) conduct and thought, and later highlighted or revealed by IR scholars. In the case of Aron, the 
praxeological is quite normative but it is not normative to such an extent that it requires the transcendence of 
historical-sociological conditions (but only transformation within them).  
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to the extent that they obliterate the concretely historical and the socio-moral. 
First, both endeavor to impose a distantly abstract model on the real world. To 
begin Peace and War with (a critique of) Morgenthau’s metaphor of theory as 
an essentialist portrait, Aron questioned:  
  
“What are the ‘rational elements’ of international politics? Is it enough to 
consider merely the rational elements, in order to produce a sketch or paint 
a portrait in accord with the model’s essence? If the theoretician replies 
negatively to these two questions, he must take another path, that of 
sociology. Granted the goal – to sketch the map of the international scene 
– the theoretician will attempt to retain all the elements instead of fixing his 
attention on the rational ones alone”.17  
 
The attempt to capture the rational element – the pursuit of interest as power – 
is bound to fail. States, living in different social condition that varies 
internationally as well as domestically, must have a “plurality of concrete 
objectives and of ultimate objectives” other than the constricted one of power 
in their pursuit.18 The rational deterrence theorists also succumb to this error. 
Aron accordingly questioned the “portrait” of deterrence in his The Great 
Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy (1963):  
 
“The entire American theory is based on rationality; it attempts to 
reconstruct the manner in which a strategist would behave if, like his 
hypothetical counterpart in economic theory, he were both intelligent and 
well-informed. But how many real-life chiefs or state resemble this 
idealized portrait? How many of them are always able to abide by the 
dictates of reason, at least reason defined by the theoreticians?”19 
                                                              
17  Aron 1966: 3, emphasis in original.  
18  Aron 1967: 91.  
19  Aron 1963: 61-2.  
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For Aron, the idea of rationality presented in Morgenthau and the deterrence 
theorists’  “idealized portrait” are too crude to reveal the essence of politics. 
They are exceedingly schematic, unrealistic, and amoral. In Morgenthau’s case, 
the conceptualization of political action as adjusting available power to certain 
end is far from adequate for comprehending political conduct. Political 
collectivities pursue a range of objectives and not all of them can be 
comprehended as schemed by reason (the intellect). A sociological analysis, in 
Aron’s view, could provide a comprehensive dissection of how objectives, not 
only including the one designated by reason but “the nature of the passions, 
the follies, the ideas and the violence of the century”, might come into play.20 
For Aron, Hoffmann interpreted, to understand political conduct one could not 
proceed by trying to grasp the rationality of action, but to question “what kind of 
rationality” that might be entailed. Would it be “the quest for power, the 
achievement of the national interest, or the maintenance of the present 
international system”?21  
In the case of deterrence theorists, this schematic nature becomes more 
evident. They are comfortable to discuss rational strategies within “a mere 
schematic game that can be usefully described in abstract terms as if the 
players were x, y z” rather than “a game in which the players are located in time 
and in space and are neither geographically nor sociologically 
interchangeable”.22 Aron enunciated the distinction between the schematic 
games and the “diplomatic-strategic games in the historical world”. Whereas 
the former is one shot, the latter is played by statesmen indeterminately and 
incessantly. Whereas the former has clear payoff and certainty in view, it always 
seems to the latter that the cost or benefit of a move is unclear, that the “stakes 
and the limits” are uncertain, and that the win and loss cannot be judged 
                                                              
20  Aron 1966: 600.  
21  Hoffmann 1961: 12-3.  
22  Hoffmann 1965a: ix.  
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instantaneously. Anticipating K.M. Fierke’s theory of “changing games”, Aron 
emphasizes that the games in the historical world have been lively and concrete, 
played one round after another, transformed from one to another.23 “Game 
theory cannot be the theory of international relations any more than 
Morgenthau’s theory of power”, as Hoffmann recapitulated neatly, since 
“international political action…looks more like a series of gambles than a chain 
of rigorous calculations”.24  
As a corollary of being schematic, the error of being unrealistic is committed 
by both Morgenthau and the deterrence theorists. For Aron, Morgenthau is a 
utilitarian-rational theorist of power. His notion that rationality in a calculative 
sense can determine political conduct is too economistic to operate. The games 
designed by the deterrence theorists are viewed by Aron as more evidently 
guiling of this mistake. Using Gellen Snyder’s example explained in chapter two, 
Aron argued that  
 
“the cost and gain of a war are not susceptible of rigorous evaluation. One 
can calculate the losses and the advantages, in lives and material 
resources, of the belligerents. […] But what value can either of the super 
powers attribute to the fact of being rid of the threat embodied by the other? 
[…] The irrationality of war in relation to expenditure and gain results from 
a true but vague sentiment or else from the substitution of an economic 
calculation for a political one”.25 
 
Even if it is granted that a calculated deterrence is valid on its own merits, it 
is still conceivable that “calculation” and “deterrence” could be overthrown by 
political confrontation. The calculation of the cost, benefits and probabilities of 
attack, even if in a nuclear age, cannot substitute for the political contestation 
                                                              
23  Aron 1966: 771-4.  
24  Hoffmann 1965: 30.  
25  Aron 1966: 439.   
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of wills that frequently override the cold-headed consideration of quantitative 
consequences, which can lead to the outbreak of a nuclear war. It is simply an 
economistic fallacy to consider politics as solely about using efficient means to 
achieve a prefixed political end as if the calculation of utility can determine 
states’ actions.26 If “statesmen and peoples had acted according to economic 
rationality” the Great War in 1914 would never have taken place.27  
What also causes Aron’s grave apprehension is that Morgenthau as well as 
the deterrence theorists appear less aware of their offering of a moral choice 
(at least in Aron’s own view). Morgenthau, in Aron’s view, fails to recognize the 
potential hazard that his intangible model of Realism may be used as an 
instrument to discipline reality. Incautiously or unconsciously, the intellectual 
conceptualization of national interest as power will be transformed into a 
“crusading realism”, a normatively zealous ideal, a sheer polemic “against 
ideologies of perpetual peace, international law, Christian or Kantian 
morality”.28 Nor do the deterrence theorists realize this underlying issue. They 
do not realize the normative implication of their theories on the statesmen, 
which actually demands the latter to be intelligent, well-informed and subject to 
the dictates of reason (rather than to emotional reaction). For both of them, the 
concern with morality is neither realized nor made explicit. Yet the issue of moral 
judgment should occupy an avowedly central position within a conception of 
reason. “Aron thinks”, Hoffmann explained, “that foreign-policy actions can be 
more or less reasonable, but reasonable and rational are not synonymous. The 
definition of what is reasonable entails value judgments in addition to the 
calculation of forces”. Rationality is about the calculation of power/utility, but 
reasonableness involves a richer consideration in normative consequences. It 
is due to this enhanced criterion of political conduct that neither the theory of 
                                                              
26  Aron 1966: 438-9.  
27 Aron 1966: 275.  
28  Aron 1966: 599.  
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power politics (Aron termed Machievillism) nor the one of universal ideals 
(Kantianism) is satisfactory. 
Aron’s criticism of Morgenthau and Rational Deterrence Theories is acute 
and penetrating. True, his criticism of Morgenthau is sometimes unjustified. 
Morgenthau is no less a fervent critic of the deterrence theories than Aron 
himself, who has pointed out the bankruptcy of calculation of interest in nuclear 
deterrence and the endangerment of the ultimate end of using nuclear weapons 
(as I have shown in chapter one).29 Morgenthau, understanding the moral 
consequence of theory very well, also protested against Aron’s 
misrepresentation of his theory as a rational Realist ideology because of the 
latter’s failure to understand the working of standortgebunden (Mannheim’s 
notion).30 Yet despite these unjustified criticisms, Aron’s approach  is driven 
by his apprehension that the statesmen’s actions cannot be appraised, let alone 
guided, simply by the inducement of power or incentive of utility. For Aron, the 
rationality envisaged by Morgenthau and Rational Deterrence Theories is too 
distant, constricted and demoralized. What is demanded is not to undertake a 
transcendent investigation in which, as Hoffmann puts it, “what is rational to the 
theorists may not be rational to the actor, for their frames of references are not 
identical”. Rather, one must immerse into the historically specific, entering into 
the actor’s own world, undertaking a detailed historical reconstruction of the 
necessity, contingency and complexity surrounded the actor’s action.31 Indeed, 
it is this historical, sociological and moral value added by Aron onto reason that 
distinguishes his work so profoundly from other classic Realists (as I had 
forewarned in chapter one).  
                                                              
29  Morgenthau (1962: 101) echoed Aron’s open letter to Kennedy during the Cuba Missile Crisis.   
30  See Morgenthau’s (1967b: 1111-2) review of Peace and War. Morgenthau, who should have known very well 
Aron’s mastery of Mannheim’s theory of ideology (as early as in Aron 1936: 57 ff.), explained to the latter that 
his theory had been used for justifying a particular policy: “For all political philosophy is “standortgebunden” 
that is, it arises out of a concrete political situation with which it tries to come intellectually to terms in a new and 
meaningful fashion. Because it does this, it is bound to be used by certain groups within the political situation as 
a rationalization and justification of a particular political position, that is, as ideology”. Here Morgenthau is 
clarifying that he is cautious of Realism as a moral choice for conducting American foreign policy in a particular 
way (e.g. economizing the use of power), but it is later abused instead as a justification for abusing power.  
31  Richard Rosecrance (1963 8), who was also impacted by Aron in this aspect, stated neatly in his Action and 
Reaction in World Politics that “homogeneous international behavior is a chimera”.  
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Raymond Aron’s “Reasonable” Diplomatic-Strategic Action 
 
In a sharp contrast to both Morgenthau’s Realism and the Rational Deterrence 
Theories, Aron articulates another criterion than the one of calculation (either 
of Morgenthau’s power or of Deterrence’s utility) to appraise political action. 
This criterion as “reasonable”, explicated in Aron’s momentous Peace and War, 
is signposted in his famously fourfold, categorical, scheme.32  
The theoretical conceptualizes a domain distinct from the numerous 
manifolds of reality. International politics, instead of being defined in analogy to 
economics as the calculation of power and utility, is marked out as a Weberian 
“absence of an entity that holds a monopoly of legitimate violence”. Within such 
an anarchical terrain, states can legitimately employ force and diplomacy, 
namely undertaking “strategic-diplomatic action”, to advance their own 
wellbeing.33 A sociological investigation then searches for the formally causal 
relations within the realm. The collectivities’ diplomatic-strategic action is 
always in a process of being conditioned by such internal variables as 
ideological (emotional) convictions, regime types, demographical 
characteristics, and external (systematic) ones as bipolarity or multipolarity, 
homogeneity or heterogeneity.34 These sociological inquiries will in turn be 
subjected to historical scrutiny. International political action cannot be explained 
either exclusively or transcendentally as the movement of power (or utility), 
because “the course of international relations” is “eminently historical, in all 
senses of the term: its changes are incessant; its systems are diverse and 
fragile; it is affected by all economic, technical, and moral transformations”.35 
Finally the praxeological designates the possible diplomatic-strategic action in 
                                                              
32  Other scholar, who inherits and still uses this fourfold structural logic of inquiry, is Linklater (see Linklater 1992, 
1998). As we shall see below, Reus-Smit will also locate his own work within this schematic map.  
33  Aron 1967: 192, 1966:5.  
34  Aron 1966: 178.  
35  Aron 1967: 205.   
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light of such enquiry for the future.36 Contra the Deterrence theorists (as if their 
utilitarian calculation is morally neutral), a reasonable conduct presupposes in 
itself a normative theory of how strategic-diplomatic actions should be 
undertaken. It requires political conduct to overcome the dualistic dilemma 
between “moral platitudinizing” and “conservative cynicism”, between 
“Kantianism” and “Machievillism”, by eschewing the two extremes, exactly like 
Wight’s Rationalism that is extolled to walk through a middle ground between 
“Revolutionism” and “Realism”.37  
Located within such a scheme, reasonable political action turns out to be 
nothing but an act under a specifically historical-sociological condition with a 
normative orientation. It is a conduct of diplomatic-strategic action with both 
historical, sociological, and moral problems in view. For Aron, reasonable action 
as a criterion is superior to any “rational” counterpart in dualistic senses.  
First, it triumphs over the constricted idea of calculation not by abandoning it 
but by complicating political judgment. As Aron explicitly articulated: 
“Diplomatic-strategic action, like technological action, can be reasonable only 
on condition that it is calculating”; “it is reasonable insofar as it calculates risk”.38 
A strategic-diplomatic action is never reasonable and never could be, was it not 
oriented at all towards calculating power, interests and risks. And calculation, 
far from being based on abstract terms such as utility, is grounded in the 
historically specific. To use Mahoney’s terms, it is grounded “in a recognition of 
the structure of human history” and “statesmanlike prudence”.39 It replaces the 
abstractness of rational models by bridging the gap between the rational 
“scheme and the historical world”.40 “To be prudent”, in Aron’s own terms, is “to 
act in accordance with the particular situation and the concrete data”.41 In its 
                                                              
36  Aron himself (1967: 189, fn.3) professed later that the term “praxeology” might have been too abstruse to be 
accepted in the Anglo-American world. Yet, the term has become too well-known nowadays to demand further 
explanation (see above, Chapter one, section (iii) on Linklater, and below on Reus-Smit).  
37  Aron 1966: 577 ff.   
38  Aron 1966: 635, 10.   
39 Mahoney 1992: 89.  
40  Aron 1966: 776.  
41  Aron 1966: 585.  
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cause, and from a concretely historical-sociological point of view, the Cold War 
is characterized by the nuclear dilemma and the establishment of a heavily 
heterogeneous system. It is the first time that nuclear weapons become an 
employable means for conducting diplomatic-strategic action. With the 
breakdown of the old European and colonialist states system, there forms an 
international society dominated by two non-European superpowers, and “the 
rest of the world reinforces the paradoxical character of the relation between 
the blocs which in all reason must not fight each other to the death and which 
cannot come to agreement”.42 In the case of deterrence, historical-sociological 
investigation shows a more complex conception of deterrence is needed than 
one envisaged by the rational deterrence theorists. It not only requires the 
satisfaction of quantitative demand (how many missiles are needed to wipe out 
fifty percent of American bomber bases?), not only the consideration of whether 
the opponent is a reasonable being (is the other as intelligent as the self, or 
emotionally committed, or an automaton pictured by the Deterrence theorists?), 
but also the consideration of the possibly risky reactions influenced by the 
domestic institutions (what would the Soviets do in the Berlin Crisis?).  
Second, within such a predicament, how could the superpowers, or the 
handful of men who are responsible for making decisions, act towards each 
other in a way that neither sacrifices interest at the expense of morality, nor the 
opposite? What is, then, a reasonable diplomatic-strategic action in the 
praxeological sense? 
From a praxeological point of view, it is reasonable to act on the “ethics of 
responsibility” rather than on the “ethics of conviction”, 43  and to gradually 
resolve the dilemma that is generated by, and can only solved within, the 
specific historical-sociological structure. The foremost problem is not to prevent 
the use of violence, as the theorists of Kantianism believe, nor as the 
Machiavellians proclaimed, to act belligerently. To make peace by disarmament, 
                                                              
42  Aron 1966: 372.  
43  Aron 1966: 634-5.  
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like Russell and Noel-Baker propose, is impracticable and can only induce more 
violence. To use a “Catonian” strategy such as massive retaliation devised by 
McNamara will make the use of violence pointless since the ultimate objective 
is to dismantle the Soviet communist regime.44 Rather, a reasonable choice is 
to constrain violence. Within the superpower struggles and the possibility of a 
nuclear war, the calculation of power and interest must be subordinated to the 
consideration of the destruction of human beings between rival states. “The 
primacy of policy”, cautioned Aron, “permits the control of escalation, the 
avoidance of an explosion of animosity into passionate and unrestricted 
brutality”; and “the reasonable conduct of politics is the only rational one if the 
goal of the intercourse among states is the survival of all, common prosperity, 
and the sparing of the people’s blood”.45 True, there is no guarantee that the 
opponent will necessarily share this conviction, taking the survival of both into 
account and not being carried away by fury or by the escalation of conflict itself. 
Nevertheless, the statesman must endeavor to restrain their own employment 
of violence, hoping that the opponent’s “reaction will be reasonable” so as also 
to limit violence within a certain boundary.46 Aron’s stipulation that such a 
reasonable action to limit violence through historical-sociological specific 
means must be viewed as itself rooted in, or unfolded through, the historical 
process is of particular importance:  
 
“Reasonable and not rational, a diplomatic-strategy, in the thermonuclear 
age and in the age of ideologies, confronts leaders and mere citizens with 
moral antinomies still more agonizing than those of the past. […] The 
contradiction between morality and politics, says the philosopher who 
observes past history with the detachment of a sage, is not as Friedrich 
Meinecke, the analyst of the raison d’état, describes it. Morality, too, is born 
                                                              
44  Aron 1966: 643-76.  
45  Aron 1966: 45.  
46  Aron 1966: 615-6, 635.  
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in history, has been developed through time. It is the very progress of our 
moral conceptions which leads us to judge severely the practices of states 
and gradually to transform them. It is in the concrete morality of the 
collectivities that universal morality is realized – however imperfectly. And 
it is in and by politics that concrete moralities are achieved.”47 
 
As Martin Wight’s subsequent emphasis on a “political morality”, Aron 
highlights the implication of the reasonable strategic-diplomatic conduct that “it 
is in and by politics that concrete moralities are achieved”. Whereas the 
Machiavellians pursue the raison d’état at the expanse of morality, and whereas 
the Kantians sacrifice political, “national”, interest to universal morality, a 
reasonable conduct will synthesize politics and morality in the concrete 
historical process and through political practice accomplish the task. The 
reasonable, in its nature, is neither a personal morality universalized nor a 
morality of the state: it is a criterion – as Wight once called “political morality” – 
that resolves the confrontation of “leaders and mere citizens with moral 
antinomies”. And it is historically ingrained: morality is rooted in a historical 
process in which the moral predicaments are solved and transformed by the 
successive generations of human beings.  
The historical-sociological soil, in which Aron rooted his thought, is a margin 
between superpower belligerent confrontation and mutual nuclear destruction. 
Hoffmann once remarked that in Aron’s own view, “the search for a thoroughly 
rational policy is both a mistake and a delusion”. And he went on: “in the game 
of international politics, whose objectives are multiple and whole rules are 
uncertain, there may be reasonable politics and unreasonable ones”, but “the 
game itself, because of nuclear weapons, has become unreasonable”.48 What 
is needed, for Aron, is a reasonable conduct in an unreasonable game. The 
                                                              
47  Aron 1966: 780-1.  
48  Hoffmann 1962: 178. By “unreasonable” Hoffmann refers to the fact that the bipolar confrontation and nuclear 
dilemma is pushing the international political game towards a point of the very negation of humanity and sociality.  
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calculation of power and interest is indispensable for political action, but the 
abstractly economistic calculation fails to grasp both the specific historical-
sociological circumstances (when the international game itself becomes 
unreasonable), and the demand for a solution which overcomes both the moral 
predicament and the political risk (a move that is reasonable).  
 
Reasonableness and Human Being as Historical Existence  
 
From an intellectually biographical point of view, Raymond Aron’s prescription 
of a reasonable diplomatic-strategic action in Peace and War is but a 
manifestation of his long-standing philosophical foundation and political 
experience.49 It is a projection of his entrenched belief, laid down as early as 
in his Introduction to the Philosophy of History (1938) to the terrain of 
international relations. As Reed Davis exposes, it is Aron’s view of reason as 
antinomic and dialectic that makes the ultimate distinction from Morgenthau’s 
way of bearing “rationality” on political judgment.50  
What Davis fails to clarify, however, is how Aron’s antinomic conception of 
reason can be distinguished from Morgenthau’s similarly antinomic conception, 
which I established in chapter one. Let me try to bring out two important 
distinctions here. Had these distinctions been exposed, the historical nature of 
Aron’s reasonableness can be more clearly delineated, in a manner which also 
paves the way for an illuminating comparison with Wight’s Rationalism.  
  The first distinction is Aron’s view of men as ultimately historical beings. 
Whereas for Morgenthau the antinomy of reason is generated by the 
multidimensional ways of existence, it is for Aron a quality caused by the 
temporal disjunction between the man in the past and the man in the future. 
                                                              
49  In his Memoir, Aron recalled that when he wanted to warn against the upcoming, apocalyptic, repercussions of a 
Nazi regime in Germany, he was informed by an undersecretary of foreign affairs in the Quai d’Orsay that “The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs is a very exceptional person and he enjoys much authority. The moment is propitious 
of any initiative. But what would you, who have spoken to me so well about Germany and the dangers which are 
looming, do if you were in his place?”, cited in Schils 1985: 162.  
50  Davis 2008.  
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That man is a historical being renders his action historical, where 
reasonableness as an attribute of action also becomes so. Yet what is “historical” 
for Aron? It means, first, that the past has been encapsulated in space and time 
and cannot be changed. Second, “action begins by accepting the conditions 
fundamental to all politics” where the conditions are “peculiar to a given time”. 
To perform an act in the present is to confront the structural (sociological) 
precondition and to “find one’s place in a movement which transcend the 
individual”. Third, action “consents to the uncertainty of the future”, which 
renders the act previously made in the present responsible for its 
repercussions.51 
  Second, the criterion of reasonableness is rooted in this threefold, historical, 
characteristic. Reasonableness is antinomic, not because of the interplay 
between the passionate, the moral, and the religious (along the dimension of 
the spheres), but because it is at once embedded in the interplay of the past, 
present and future dimensions (along the dimension of temporality). For Aron, 
to be “truly rational” and the representative of “true reason” – recall 
Morgenthau’s proclamation – is to undertake actions with historical, sociological, 
and praxeological, issues in view. “Historical man”, stated Aron, “belongs to a 
collectivity and participates in reason”: human beings are historical existences; 
they have lived in and through the concretely historical world in which they 
undertake diplomatic-strategic action in a far more sociologically complex 
manner than the simple calculation of power or utility; their activities are 
amenable to the improvement of humanity. Indeed, that human beings are 
reasonable does not necessarily guarantee that the outcomes will be 
reasonable and that the nuclear catastrophe can be eschewed under the bipolar, 
thermonuclear age.52  Yet, there must be a hope that man, especially the 
statesman, will behave reasonably in their designation of the diplomatic-
strategic conduct. They can participate in reason, transform the collectivities 
                                                              
51 Aron 1938: 329.  
52  Aron 1966: 339; see also Davis 2008: 652.  
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and the international systems, solve their problems in history, and realize their 
moral commitment towards humanity in their political practices. The dilemma of 
“war impossible, peace impracticable” can be overcome by such a reasonable 
conduct. Both Morgenthau’s statement for a “rational” theory of American 
foreign policy and the “rational” deterrence theories, indeed, shock him as 
misleading and morally precarious.  
Unfortunately, Aron’s advocate for a reasonable conduct of diplomatic-
strategic action has long been neglected by other later IR theorists. The most 
evident case here is David Boucher’s discernment of a tradition of “historical 
reason”: in his splendid study of the three traditions within Political Theories of 
International Relations (1998), Boucher urged for the recognition of one 
tradition that synthesizes both Realistic and Idealistic characteristics, and 
provides “a standard of conduct in terms of which the rationality of the action of 
states could be judged…to be found in the historical process”.53 Does not this 
conception of rationality as residing in the historical process – which views that 
“human nature is not a fixed entity” and “human beings have developed their 
characters and natures over time, and within the context of historical societies”; 
that “rational state action escapes the mere immediacy of self-interest and 
expediency, while at the same time avoid conforming to abstract principles 
which appear to stand above”; that both raison d’état and the universal moral 
principles are inadequate 54  – bear remarkable resemblance to Aron’s 
reasonableness?  
In the next section, I shall turn to a similar conception of reason by Wight that, 
in spite of its emphasis on the historically-sociologically changeable, is still 
misunderstood as a “tradition” that wants to transcend history.  
 
(ii)Martin Wight and “Rationalism” 
 
                                                              
53  Boucher 1998: 37.   
54  Boucher 1991: 137-8.  
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International Theory: The Tradition of Rationalism 1957-1960  
 
It was around the same time as Raymond Aron was laboring on his 
comprehensive treatise on international relations that Martin Wight was invited 
by Hans Morgenthau to assume the latter’s teaching position and to lecture for 
a year (1956-7) on “international theory”55 in the University of Chicago. Having 
returned to Britain in 1958, Wight continued his lectures at the LSE, spending 
next three years improving the lecture based on previous materials. On the 
basis of the same lectures, Wight also composed more than ten individual 
articles, some of which were devoted to the meeting of British Committee of 
International Relations Theory – including the famous “Why Is There No 
International Theory” (1959) that is claimed to deny the very meaningfulness of 
any moral questions in international politics. The lectures were finally published 
under Bull and Porter’s successive editorships after three decades in 1991, 
under the title of International Theory: The Three Traditions. The special 
lectures on the international thought of Machiavelli and Grotius were recently 
released as Four Seminal Thinkers (2004). Two of Wight’s most important 
essays had already been exhibited in Diplomatic Investigation (1966), a volume 
that not only published in the same times as the English translation of Aron’s 
Peace and War but also lifted the curtain of the first act of the “English School” 
and brought Wight to the forestage.56  
Within these lectures and papers – principally in International Theory – Wight 
introduced three “traditions” or “patterns” of international thought: Realism 
(Machiavellian), Rationalism (Grotian), and Revolutionism (Kantian). Like Aron 
who invokes the names of Machiavellian and Kantian, Wight also labels the two 
extremes under the names of Machiavellian and Kantian with similar content. 
Like Aron who considers both extremes to be inadequate and contrives a 
                                                              
55  By “international theory” M. Wight (1957-60: 1, 1959: 17) meant the “enquiry” or “speculation”, “about relations 
between states”.  
56  Butterfield & M. Wight 1966; an indispensable historiography see Dunne 1998.   
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middle ground called reasonable action, Wight also highlights a third category 
which stands in via media and calls it Rationalism.  
Yet unlike Aron before him, Wight regards Rationalism as having a 
differentiated morphological form of existence. First, unlike Aron’s 
reasonableness as a criterion of conduct grounded in historical-sociology with 
normative orientation, a tradition of Rationalism is a recurrent rhythm of thought 
that is behind/underlying a particular pattern of conduct.   
Second, whereas Aron elaborates reasonableness within the fourfold 
scheme as if the four dimensions can exhaustively delineate the traits of action 
based on a historical-sociological-moral nexus, Wight considers that the 
tradition of Rationalism definitely contains, but is more than, these three traits. 
Instead, a tradition of Rationalism pervades many dimensions of thought, such 
as the conception of diplomacy, human nature, and international law (as I shall 
soon show).  
Third, as often incurred disputes, is Wight’s definition of tradition. 
Conventionally, IR scholars argue that Wight uses tradition in the same way as 
A.O. Lovejoy do (and Ernst Barker, I would add), as if a tradition is unchanged.57 
Or, as Hedley Bull declaimed, that under the heavy influences of Toynbee, “the 
whole emphasis of Martin Wight’s works is on the elements of continuity in 
international relations rather than on the elements of change, and that 
references to contemporary events are only illustrations, not essential to the 
central theme”.58 Recent revisionist accounts show,59 however, that Wight 
himself was very aware of the Procrustean effects of speaking of “traditions”. 
“The purpose of building pigeon-holes”, Wight cautioned, “is to reassure oneself 
that raw materials do not fit into them”.60 Furthermore, the three traditions are 
                                                              
57  See e.g. Bull 1972, Dunne 1993. 
58 At least in Bull’s (1972: 111, 1977: 9-10, Bull & Holbraad 1979: 9, 11) view, Wight’s history is an incessant 
pursuit of transhistorical ideas and patterns. Stephen Hobden (2002: 52) once remarked that Wight “was perhaps 
the most historically minded of the English School writers” and Bull, “paradoxically, given his commitment to a 
‘classical approach’… perhaps one of the least historically informed”. Jackson (1996: 208-9) also touched on this 
point: “classical approach”, which is used for “historicizing”, was and ought to be “inclusive” (Wight) rather than 
“exclusive” (Bull) with modern social sciences.  
59  Clark 1996, Porter 2004: xxiii-vi, I. Hall 2006: 134-42.  
60  Wight 1957-1960: 259, emphasis in original. 
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not equally traditional, or not equally stable as units of a compound. 
Revolutionism, for instance, is deemed as “parricidal”, whereas the first two was 
claimed in an article as “indeed self-conscious intellectual traditions”. Hence the 
tradition of Rationalism, unlike Aron’s criterion, seems to be more dynamic and 
have more forms of existence: they may be at the same time intersecting with 
and even transmuting into other traditions.61 
What then, is this tradition of Rationalism: a “broad middle road” sometimes 
“uncertainty wide” sometimes “disconcertingly narrow”, but nevertheless 
possible to discern with the sense of belonging and “with the most conscious 
acknowledgement of continuity”?62 What makes it unique in its “appeals to 
reason”?63 To answer these questions, Wight does not provide an analytical, 
statist, reply, as Buzan asserts that Rationalism is “about the institutionalization 
of shared interest and identify among states, and puts the creation and 
maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the center of IR 
theory”. 64  Rather, Wight’s answer is complex. 65  For Wight, Rationalism 
considers human (association’s) action to be based on an inextricably historical, 
sociological and moral nexus. Rationalism is distinct from the other two 
traditions by a particular conception of human nature as equipped with the 
rational capacity that leads to its threefold “flagship” notions: the human nature 
amenable to reason engenders the view of society as possible, of history as in 
a constant flux, and of moral concern as indispensable.  
The first defining notion of Rationalism is its paradoxical or tensional view of 
human nature that evidences the possibility of sociality. Wight begins from the 
presupposition that “the doctrine of human nature provides the foundations for 
all political theory” which in turn gives rise to international theory as “the political 
philosophy of international relations”.66 For the Rationalists, human beings are 
                                                              
61  My focus here is the tradition of Rationalism not the tradition of Rationalism. M. Wight 1960: 222, 225.  
62  M. Wight 1957-1960: 14-5. By citing this statement I intend to clarify the importance of Rationalism for Wight 
rather than endorsing the interpretation of Wight as a solid Rationalist.  
63  M. Wight 1957-60: 29.  
64  Buzan 2004: 7.  
65 I have to confine my focus within Wight’s comments on the three dimensions.  
66  M. Wight 1957-60: 1, 99. 
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neither permanently dominated by uncontrollable sinful passions 
(Machiavellian), nor progressing towards a higher humanity under a self-
consciousness of their nature (Kantians). Rather, Rationalism stands in 
between, and will “describe human nature in terms of a tension, and have to 
define it by a paradox”.67 “Besides being a sinful, pugnacious and irrational 
animal”, Wight depicted the Rationalist view, “man is also rational”: 68 
possessed with this rational faculty, human beings are as capable of doing the 
virtuous as committing the vicious. Like most of his contemporaries (see 
chapter one, section ii), Wight considered the rational faculty of man is 
indispensable for harnessing their emotions and impulses; but unlike the 
prevalently transcendent conception, Wight endowed it with a sociological color: 
 
“the Machiavellian and Kantian agree that politics have their origin in sin; 
they believe in the Augustinian doctrine of the state as ‘poena et remedium 
pecati’…The Machiavellian and Kantian agree in seeing politics as 
dominated by human rapacity and stupidity…In other words 
Machiavellians believe that the sinful nature of politics is unchangeable, 
Kantian believe it can be changed. Against both is the Grotian, who 
believes that political life is natural to man, and needed for his proper 
development.”69  
 
This rational man, as Aron’s “historical man”, presupposes a sociological 
potential in living a political life naturally with others and participating on reason 
for development. Rather than supposing government is the remedy for their 
sinful nature, the Rationalists regard “the art of government and the business 
of politics” as serving for “the security and comparative freedom of the rational 
man”.70 Their rational capacity to do good enables them to anticipate that 
                                                              
67  M. Wight 1957-60: 28.  
68  M. Wight 1957-60: 29, see also 13.  
69  M. Wight 1957-60: 161-2, emphasis in original.  
70  M. Wight 1957-60: 103.  
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“goodwill can evoke friendship and reciprocal goodwill; and that common 
interests can be found and from these co-operation will follow”.71 It gives rise 
to a belief in the “resoluble tension of interest”, an interest mediating between 
individuals and society.72 It is “the capacity to know this natural law and the 
obligations it imposes” that is both important for individuals to obey some 
common rules, assisting each other and punishing together the aggressor for 
maintaining “a true society”, and crucial for recognizing a society because of 
their existence and regulative functions.73 This law in turn demands and relies 
on the balance of power, which rests itself on an idea of “collective interest” and 
“broadened meaning of security” that can be “enjoyed or pursued in common”, 
linking back to the governmental purpose (for the Rationalists, balance of power 
is the “unwritten constitution of international society”). 74  Indeed, the 
assumption of rational human nature is simple, but its impacts are tremendous: 
it implies an affirmative answer to the question of whether (international) society 
exists for the participation and proper development of the individuals (states), 
and constitutes an indispensable precondition for all these institutions (for 
instance, law, balance of power). For Wight, international society, far from being 
an analytical concept independent of moral considerations, is one that has 
already been presupposed in political theory. “The question of international 
society” is but “the modern expression of what used to be called the question 
of the state of nature”.75  
  Second, the Rationalist belief in the rationality of man to participate in 
politics presupposes that human conduct can have development and cultivation 
in a historical sense. Thus “a theory of human nature”, Wight pointed out, 
“carries as its shadow, more or less clarified and acknowledged, a theory of 
history”. 76  The Machiavellians, regarding human nature as persistently 
                                                              
71  M. Wight 1957-60: 153-4 
72  M. Wight 1957-60: 128-31.  
73  M. Wight 1957-60: 14, 38-9. Notice, for Wight, that Rationalism accepts both sources of law (cf. Hall 2014) – 
positivistic and natural – it is this that makes it Grotian.  
74  M. Wight 1961: 103.  
75  M. Wight 1957-60: 111, 165. 
76  I. Hall 2006: 43. 
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pugnacious, would view history as “static”, or “cyclical, the repetition of 
conquests, revolutions and defeats”. The Kantians, believing in a progressive 
telos, would conceive of it as “linear, moving upwards towards an apocalyptic 
denouement” or “the totality of mankind surging forward and individuals getting 
trampled underfoot”. 77  Rationalism, by contrast, neither condemns human 
nature and politics as permanently nasty, nor endeavors to transform them into 
an immediate moral kingdom, but expects that man can participate in reason 
and gradually transform his conduct in history. On the one hand, human nature 
is not a fixed entity, and indeed, “It is essential not to have faith in human 
nature”. 78  Nor does it, on the other, necessarily evolve towards a higher 
humanity as Kantians believe. Rather, because of man’s capability as a rational 
animal, he can behave as virtuously as viciously in history. The rational capacity 
does not enable man to transcend history, but it does ensure that he can 
transform history: it is through this rational dimension inherent in human nature 
as a “tension” or a “paradox” that history becomes changeable, developable, 
where human beings could both gradually cultivate reason to bring about social 
and moral transformation, and commit ferocious crimes.79 Far from being a 
process parallel to a train passing through unreturnable stations – “Hitler was 
two stops back, and we didn’t get out thank goodness” 80  – history is 
remembered by vicissitude, the recurrence of tragedy, and the contingency in 
making political decisions. Hence Aron points to the “incessant change” of 
“economic, technical and moral transformations” in history, Wight’s Rationalism 
displays a dynamic conception of history that eludes abstract, timeless, laws. 
The Rationalists, Wight observed, “may be expected to be cautious and 
                                                              
77  M. Wight 1957-1960: 29.  
78  The sentence “It is essential not to have faith in human nature” comes from Wight’s (1949) review of Butterfield’s 
Christianity and History (1949: 65), where it was cautioned, in one chapter entitled “Human Nature in History”, 
that the appeal to a permanent human nature as explanation of historical events must be abandoned, and “it must 
be emphasized that we create tragedy after tragedy for ourselves by a lazy unexamined doctrine of man which is 
current amongst us and which the study of history does not supports”. Wight quoted the foregoing caveat but 
mistakenly added the sentence into the quotations which did not appear in Butterfield’s original work but which 
was, presumably, what Wight himself wanted to say. 
79  M. Wight 1957-60: 28-9.  
80  Cited from I. Hall 2006: 53.  
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agnostic”, and will “see history as a field in which individuals find their several 
purposes or meanings and are skeptical about the meaning of the whole; but 
at least they agree on a sense of history as dynamic, and the individual as 
having responsibility in it”.81 As Wight explained further by citing H.A.L. Fisher’s 
preface to A History of Europe (1935) 
  
“The fact of progress is written large and plain on the page of history; but 
progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained by one generation may 
be lost by the next. The thoughts of men may flow into the channels which 
lead to disaster and barbarism”.82 
     
This dynamically historical dimension of human conduct simultaneously directs 
attention to the problem of human or moral dimension of history. Or, as Porter 
insightfully suggests, Wight stresses the obligation to understand “the moral 
dimension of the past”.83 Indeed, if history is viewed as shaped by individuals’ 
practices, then the individuals will have to assume the responsibility of making 
history what it is. The acknowledgement of the historical agency – human 
nature as amenable to “proper development” rather than to the iron law of 
repetition or just waiting for transcendence – shows that moral conduct has to 
be understood under the ground of history, dependent on the degree of its 
development and cultivation. Indeed, as Linklater once highlighted, 
“Rationalism is as sceptic as much recent social theory about the supposition 
that immutable and universal moral truths reside in some transcendental 
conception of the self or particular civilization”.84 
                                                              
81  M. Wight 1957-60: 29, 161.  
82  M. Wight 1957-60: 29. What Fisher (1935: v) declared before the quoted statement deserves re-contextualization: 
“Men wiser and more learned I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a prederterminated pattern. These 
harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following on another as wave follows on wave, 
only on great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalization, only one safe rule for 
the historian: that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the 
unforeseen”.  
83  Porter 2007: 784.  
84  Linklater 1998: 209-10.  
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Third, it is because of this agnostic history that political actions, far from being 
governed by the timeless and ruthless rule of the calculation of power and 
interest, are conducted with both complexity in historical encompassment and 
comprehensiveness in goals. In a similar manner to Aron, Wight criticized the 
rational statesmen advocated by Morgenthau, on the basis that any of their 
actions together with the criterion of success are historically-sociologically 
conditioned: 
 
“Morgenthau is unhistorical and unphilosophical in talking as if success 
[the defense of “national interest”] is something obvious and agreed. He is 
unhistorical, because […historians] unceasingly remasticate the cud of 
historical reputation, reassessing achievement and reversing judgments in 
the light of new perspectives […] Statesmen act under various pressures, 
and appeal with varying degrees of sincerity to various principles. It is for 
those who study international relations to judge their actions […] It involves 
developing a sensitive awareness of the intractability of all political 
situations, and the moral quandary in which all statecraft operates.”85 
 
The statesman acts under pressure; the criterion of political success is not 
constant but historically-sociologically contingent. For Wight, this pragmatic 
outlook requires an awareness of incessant changes occurring in the course of 
international political environments, a sensitiveness to the intractability of 
political situation that “arises from the conception of politics as the field of the 
approximate and the provisional, and this is too is grounded in the Rationalist 
view of human nature”. 86  This adaption of political conduct to changing 
circumstances, as Jackson highlights, makes the “political theory of 
                                                              
85  M. Wight 1957-60: 121, 258.  
86  M. Wight 1957-60: 242.  
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international society” a theory of “situational ethics”.87 As Wight cited Edmund 
Burke as exemplification:  
 
“We must soften into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy, to think all 
men virtuous. We must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to 
believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public 
life as in private, some good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the 
depression of the other, are the first objects of all true policy”.88 
 
Moral acts cannot be performed as the pursuit of absolute justice. Rather, they 
are adapted to relativity, embedded within a complex ground of human nature. 
Parallel to Aron’s reasonableness as in-between Kantianism and 
Machiavellianism, Wight argues that there is a “political morality” that 
distinguishes Rationalism from the other extremes. For Wight, this is the 
problem of “the justification of power”, deemed as “fundamental problem of 
politics”.89 Whereas Machiavellians may pursue the national interest at the 
expense of the individual’s, and whereas Kantians place the responsibility of 
conviction over that of ethics, Rationalism will uphold a “political morality” that 
corresponds to the sociological potential implied by reason. “To be a Rationalist 
politician is to exist in a state of moral tension between the actual and the 
desirable”, which will “constantly dissolve with the passage of time”.90 It is, 
explained Wight, “different from personal morality, as the moral duty of a trustee 
is different from personal morality” while at the same time it is “equally different 
from raison d’état, since it uphold the validity of the ethical in the realm of 
politics”. It is a synthesis between politics and morality, between the public and 
individualistic, something “broadened and capable of being suffused with moral 
values” that “political expedience itself has to consult the moral sense of those 
                                                              
87  Jackson 1995: 124-6.  
88  M. Wight 1957‐60: 242‐3.   
89  M. Wight 1957-60: 99.  
90  M. Wight 1957-60: 243.  
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whom it will affect, and even combines with the moral sense of the politician 
himself. Thus it is softened into prudence, which is a moral virtue.”91 As Wight 
explained in a summative passage:  
 
“technique and virtu which appeals implicitly to the principle of justification 
by success […] and which implies a repetitive or cyclical theory of history, 
may be called Realist. A theory which stresses the moral tensions 
inherently in political action and the necessity and difficulty of justifying 
political power […] and which appeals to the principle of the choice of the 
lesser evil, is in the Rationalist tradition. The Revolutionist view […] divides 
the world into the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness […] It is 
one […] in which the end justifies the means; or which alternatively asserts 
that the kingdom of light will triumph only through identification of political 
with private ethics”.92 
 
The criterion of political success, far from residing in a transcendentally 
universal principle, is rooted in moral predicaments which are in turn 
susceptible of solution in history.  
For Wight, the assumption of rationality pervades and engenders at the same 
time a political theory, an outlook of history and a social theory, each of which 
can be said to be inseparable. Rationalism emphasizes the amenability of 
human nature to historical development, the agnostic and cautious historical 
outlook, and finally the acknowledgement of the significant role played by 
morality in the political arena. A rare attempt that grasps the inextricable and 
complex essence of Wight’s Rationalism comes from Brian Porter: “Rationalists 
appeal to reason and moral obligation and advocate prudent attempts to pursue 
constructive international cooperation; but they are usually ‘cautious and 
agnostic’ about any pattern or ultimate meaning in history, aware of the 
                                                              
91  M. Wight 1961: 128.  
92  M. Wight 1957-60: 259. 
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unpredictable and contingent and manifesting no confidence in the 
permanence of any apparent progress in political institutions”.93 
In his later years Wight spoke less frequently of the term and turned more to 
the history of events rather than the one of thoughts. However,  his later works 
such as “De Systematibus Civitatun” (1967), “The Origins of Our State-System” 
(1971) and “International Legitimacy” (1971),  displayed a clear tendency to  
closely engage the historically changing sociological and moral foundations of 
international society that are consistent with the line of enquiry stipulated by 
Rationalism.94 And these underlying Rationalistic presuppositions, although 
they cannot be brought out explicitly here, would exert enormous influences on 
later IR theorists including Reus-Smit (to whom I shall turn in the final section). 
 
Rationalism Reconsidered 
 
What makes Wight’s Rationalism so distinct from the Morgenthau and 
Keohane’s? What does the idea of rationality deliver? Two points deserve 
reflection here.  
First, like the “Rationalism” criticized by Morgenthau and advocated by 
Keohane, Wight placed the concept of reason and the rational conception of 
human nature in the center of Rationalism. But in a drastic dissimilarity to both, 
Wight’s conception of reason presents a socially probable, historically 
changeable and morally sophisticated, image that is at odds with both the 
transcendent conception and with the prevalent interpretation of Rationalism as 
a clear-cut, analytical, concept. Indeed, too many IR theorists had been 
attracted to the statement posed by Wight – “The most fundamental question 
you can ask in international theory is: What is international society?” – and the 
idea of Rationalism is construed as exclusively related to the analytical concept 
of international society.95 Bull, for instance, is such an interpreter who has 
                                                              
93  Porter 2004: xxi.  
94  M. Wight 1967a, 1971a, 1971b.   
95  M. Wight 1960: 222. It is necessary to stress again that by posing this question as the “fundamental” one, he did 
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breathed too much analytical, sociological, air into the latter when resuscitating 
the thoughts. Aron is distant from Wight, but the conception of Rationalism 
shares, despite some minor dissimilarities,96 many commonalities with Aron’s 
reasonable action. Like the exponent of reasonable conduct, reason is 
conceived by Wight as engendering a tripartite scheme of the sociological, 
historical and moral that is explicitly expressed:  
 
“International society, then, on this view, can be properly described only in 
historical and sociological depth. It is the habitual intercourse of 
independent communities, beginning in the Christendom of Western 
Europe and gradually extending through the world. It is manifested in the 
diplomatic system; in the conscious maintenance of the balance of power 
to preserve the independence of the member-communities; in the regular 
operations of international law, whose binding force is accepted over a 
wide though politically unimportant range of subjects; in economic, social 
and technical interdependence and the functional international institutions 
established latterly to regulate it. All these presuppose an international 
social consciousness, a world-wide community sentiment.”97 
 
Second, is Wight’s Rationalism as a tradition of thought detached from 
contemporary events which only serve as illustrations?98 Recent revisionist 
reading by Iain Hall shows that the category of Rationalism, like Aron’s 
reasonableness,  demonstrates that Wight’s contemplation on the urgent 
problems of international politics are rooted in his own specific historical, 
sociological and moral condition.99 In fact, the Rationalist tradition is clearly 
linked to contemporary politics that are even more comprehensive than Hall 
                                                              
not intend to articulate that all end solely and ultimately with speculating on “what is international society”.  
96  In one crucial aspect Aron and Wight departs their accompany: Aron’s “historical sociology” contains a huge 
sector of military doctrine and technology, but Wight’s is more softened and thought-oriented.  
97  Wight 1961: 96-7, emphasis added.  
98  The image of Wight as scholarly aristocratic is widely accepted, see e.g. Brown 1992: 9.  
99  I. Hall 2014.  
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suggested: Dulles’ call for assistance for South Korea against the North’s 
invasion (1951), Antony Eden’s response to the Iran Oil Crisis and Suez Crisis 
(1952, 1956), and Eisenhower’s appeal to Khrushchev for control of armaments 
(1953), all evidenced what Wight called Rationalism.100 Even the “attempted 
distinction between the tactical and strategic use of atomic weapons” was used 
by Wight in a lecture to illustrate what makes the Grotian tradition distinct: 
 
“Does the numerical increase in the number of combatants or fighting men 
who are killed with one nuclear bomb alter the quality of the attack? Is the 
marginal destruction of non-combatants morally decisive […]? Is the effect 
of the use of certain weapons upon the future morally decisive – the 
effect…on the long-term physical geography of the locality attacked, 
making it a desert? Has the moral quality of the act been altered if it is done 
as reprisal or retaliation – the declaration of ‘no first use’ being seen as a 
moral justification? Does the moral quality of tactical use depend entirely 
on the pragmatic validity of the distinction from strategic use […]? This is 
the maze in which we are lost. […And to simplify:] if you are apt to think 
the moral problems of international politics are simple, you are a natural, 
instinctive Kantian; if you think they are non-existent, bogus, or delusory, 
you are a natural Machiavellian; and if you are apt to think them infinitely 
complex, bewildering, and perplexing, you are probably a natural 
Grotian”.101 
 
For Wight, these crises entreat resolutions. And his own search for an order, as 
Hall aptly argued, was precisely what Wight constantly referred to as 
“Rationalism”, “Constitutionalism”, “Whiggism”, “Grotianism”, or, more 
peculiarly, “Western Values”. “History-writing”, Hall continued, “was, for Wight, 
                                                              
100  M. Wight 1959-60: 184-5. Hall confined his focus within Wight’s concern with the rapidly increased number of 
decolonized states in Asia and Africa and their demand for a new international order 
101  M. Wight 1959-60: 33-4.   
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a political project”.102 Rationalism, which views human beings as rational and 
gives rise to complex considerations in the tripartite light of historicity, sociality 
and morality, is used for or provides  solutions to contemporary, political, 
problems.103 (Notice, however, that while Wight provides Rationalistic answers 
to contemporary questions, he also identifies answers of Realistic and 
Revolutionary kinds. This raises the question of whether Wight identifies his 
own position with Rationalism, a topic I eschew here.) 
During this period Wight was so occupied with these Rationalistic questions 
that even the most (in)famously paradoxical article he composed – “Why Is 
There No International Theory?” (1959) – is profoundly misunderstood in this 
regard. Several English School members have decoded why Wight contrived 
such an anomaly that amounts to a self-abnegation: by proclaiming the 
nonexistence of international theory, Wight precisely intended to stimulate, 
provoke, and invite refutations to his propositions, and in the end he 
succeeded.104 The article, based on an extended, polemical, and “Realistized” 
version of the opening lecture of International Theory and which is the inaugural 
paper for the first meeting of British Committee on the Theory of International 
Politics, is orchestrated to tease out a Rationalistic kind of answer. 105 
International theory should not be reduced into historical studies of what luridly 
was, as the formula “Politics: International Politics = Political Theory: Historical 
Interpretation” equates (but investigate the moral dimension of the past); it 
should not be characterized not only by “paucity but also by intellectual and 
moral poverty” (but as a tradition “all of us…really belong”, and “the road with 
the most conscious acknowledgement of continuity”); it should not be 
                                                              
102  I. Hall 2014: 13, 15.  
103  Wight was predisposed of using thoughts in the past as illuminating the currently concrete issues rather than 
considering them as ready-made answers that had already been there, merely awaiting rediscovery because the 
moral predicaments had been experienced before.  
104  Is it an anomaly that “Martin Wight”, questioned Ian Clark (1996: 1) as a representative, “the foremost presenter 
of international relations in the form of various traditions of thought, should also have been the writer to express 
greatest skepticism about the existence of a body of international theory at all”? Wight’s self-negation in the essay 
has been noticed by many, see Bull 1972: 114, Porter 1978: 69, Dunne 1993: 316 [fn. 71], 1998: 94-5. Replies to 
Wight can be found in, for instance, Brown 1992: Intro. 
105 Butterfield & M. Wight 1966: preface; compare M. Wight 1959a with M. Wight 1957-1959: Intro.   
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synonymous with “the theory of survival”, as if “international politics is the realm 
of recurrence and repetition” (but become “political philosophy of international 
relations”).106 For Wight, the international realm is not historically repetitive, 
socially futile, and morally barren, and his self-negation is rather an invitation to 
others to recognize and expand inquires on these historical, sociological and 
moral dimensions.  
Irrespective of whether Wight himself is a Rationalist or not, the tradition of 
Rationalism has at least been depicted by him as a tradition of thought or line 
of enquiry that is historically agnostic and morally sensitive to the tension 
inherent in political action, as a sharp contrast to both Realism and 
Revolutionism. His emphasis on the moral dimension of actions within a 
specifically historical sociological condition is perhaps the most significantly 
indigenous exemplification of historical rationality within IR: it is more lucid than 
Aron’s reasonableness, and shares the same conceptual clarity but it has a 
definitely more historical-sociological dimension than Boucher’s one of 
“historical reason” (as we shall soon see). Nevertheless, Wight’s legacy had 
been largely overlooked when it was passed down. Nowadays even the English 
School members seem to be bifurcating their orientations into a historical 
sociology without normative and moral inquiry and without too much 
considerations to the historical background.107 At any rate, for those who want 
to go on with Wight’s Rationalism, it would be a persistent conundrum to reunify 
the historical, sociological, and moral trinity into a more balanced and single 
whole.  
 
(iii) Historical Reason in the Historical Turn: David Boucher and 
Christian Reus-Smit on Rationality 
 
                                                              
106  M. Wight 1959a: 33, 26.  
107   Compare Buzan and Little’s International Systems in World History (2001) with Jackson’s (2000) Global 
Covenant.  
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Raymond Aron and Martin Wight’s works were soon submerged within the rise 
of economic issues in the 1970s. The issues of nuclear deterrence, bipolar 
confrontation and disarmament – it was these issues that Aron’s 
reasonableness addressed and Wight’s Rationalism touched on – were 
outdated by the outgrowth of economic interexchange and the associated rise 
of the MNCs.108  Accordingly, when compared with the IR scholars who drew 
consciously on utilitarian rationality to study international institutions and 
economic interdependence, Aron and Wight’s notions of historical rationality 
also seemed to be overly abstruse and imprecise. Rather than thinking in a 
complex manner that simultaneously took historical, sociological and moral 
perspectives into account, Waltz’s Theory, published in the final year of the 
1970s, became the exemplar for its rigorously analytical conceptualization of 
an unhistorical system within which the balance of power, the rise of MNCs and 
the issue of interdependence receive an ultimately objective explanation. The 
sweeping style of the utilitarian-rational theory throughout the 1980s gave a 
decisive impetus to building theories on the conception of states as 
metahistorical, interest-maximizing, subjects, as exemplified in Gilpin’s 
“sociological plus economic” approach, Krasner’s “system” intellectual 
orientation and Keohane’s “systematic analysis”. 
Yet the search for the historically rational – to view international systems as 
possessing an historically-sociologically changing existence, to appraise the 
moral foundations of international political action as historically conditioned but 
persistent, and to seek the transformation of the international itself – never 
ceased. In what follows I discuss Boucher and Reus-Smit’s conceptions of 
rationality. Before engaging with this theme, I preface the discussion with a brief 
contextualization of the “historical turn” that has occurred within IR.109 Without 
understanding the generally intellectual milieu – how in Boucher’s view that it 
                                                              
108  Raymond Aron’s celebrated The Imperial Republic (1973), although touching on such newly developed issues 
as international trade, still seem to be incompetent. The late Martin Wight’s essays –“International legitimacy” 
(1971), “Triangles and Duels” (1972), and above all the revision of Power Politics – demonstrated the influence 
of decolonization in Africa, the Sino-Soviet split and the nuclear armament on his thoughts.   
109  A comprehensive discussion, see Vaughan-Williams 2005.    
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is through the “historical materialism” of Justin Rosenberg that “the elements of 
the tradition of Historical Reason that have come to dominate”, and Reus-Smit’s 
inspiration that “critical international theory” treats every political association 
and action as historically contingent110 – it would be difficult to understand how 
they built their theories on the preceding endeavors and grounded their 
thoughts more deeply in the disciplinary discourse than Aron and Wight. Indeed, 
there is a need to grasp the significance of their works as themselves immanent 
within a historically intellectual process, a process in which many theorists, 
although not explicitly using the word “rationality” and inspired by various 
springs (Postmodernism, Marxism, Historical Sociology), had at least implied, 
and drawn on, similar notions.   
 
Background: The Revenge of History and its “Grand Return” from 1979 
to 1999 
 
The historical conceptions of rationality, exemplified in Boucher and Reus-
Smit’s works, are not insulated from the general intellectual milieu. From the 
1970s to the 2000s, Anglophone IR has passed two stages along the way to 
history.  
The first stage (1979-1989) which revolved around Waltz’s Theory and the 
historical criticism that it incurred, subsequently paved the way for later theorists 
such as Reus-Smit. Stimulated by Waltz’s claim that the anarchical system had 
not changed over the last two millennia, IR theorists then responded with 
forceful historical criticism. The first, but least famous, refutation came from 
Richard Rosecrance, a disciple of Raymond Aron, who argued, under a 
deliberate Wightian title “International Theory Revisited” (1981), that both Bull 
and Waltz sacrificed historical complexity to the altar of analytical clarity. The 
piece resulted in a debate between Waltz and Rosecrance; but the attention 
                                                              
110  Boucher 1998: 375-7, Reus-Smit 1999: xi, 2009: 218-9, Price & Reus-Smit 1998.   
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was soon attracted to J.G. Ruggie’s review essay “Transformation and 
Continuity” (1983), an article that was considered as “so fundamental in 
bringing international systems change on to the IR research agenda in the first 
place”.111 For Ruggie, Waltz failed to 
  
“account for, or even to describe, the most important contextual change in 
international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the 
modern international system. The medieval system was, by Waltz’s own 
account, an anarchy. Yet the difference between it and the modern 
international system cannot simply be attributed to differences in the 
distribution of capabilities among their constituent units. To do so would be 
historically inaccurate, and nonsensical besides. The problem is that a 
dimension of change is missing from Waltz’s model.”112 
 
Further to the lack of a dimension of change, Ashley denunciated the 
unhistorical nature of Theory. For Ashley, Theory not only denied “history as 
process” but also repudiated “the historical significance of practice, the moment 
at which men and women enter with greater or lesser degrees of consciousness 
into the making of their world”.113 
Among the many impacts made by the historical critics of Waltz, there are 
two that deserve particular emphasis. First is their reinvigoration of the 
significance of historicity (or historical-sociology). Although these critics rely on 
sociology (Durkheim) and poststructuralism (Derrida) to resurge the historicity 
of international relations and rarely draw on historical sociology (Aron), they 
have achieved the same result that Aron, Hoffmann and Rosecrance had once 
proposed two decades ago but which Waltz repudiated: to direct focus to 
historical change and the transformation of international systems (as I show in 
                                                              
111 Hobson 1998: 306, cf. Hobden 1998: 56-7, Reus-Smit 1999: 88-9. Andrew Linklater (1995: 254, 1998: 19) once 
called this essay the “first major critical essay on neo-realism” against what he named “the immutability thesis”.  
112  Ruggie 1983: 273.  
113  Ashley 1984: 258-9.  
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the section on Aron and the system theories preceding Waltz). For many later 
IR scholars including Reus-Smit, critics such as Ashley and the “critical” 
movement they initiated have provided a lasting inspiration in the search for a 
rationality that is contingent on history.114  
Second, however, is the expense paid for reviving history through such a 
particularly sociological or poststructuralist way. Since during this stage the 
theory of poststructuralism (for instance) is used more for arguing against Waltz 
than for claiming for an alternative, many IR theorists are dismayed by an 
overarching rhetorical tone and a seemingly relativist tendency. Scholars such 
as Boucher and Halliday are representative here: both of them, although 
agreeing with their critics on the significance of history, caution that any attempt 
to ask “us to suspend our epistemic and moral judgment” or to deny at least a 
“rationality, or historical narrative” is inherently dangerous.115 Thus for Boucher, 
it is crucial to search for “a historically emerging criterion of conduct” that is 
“relational, rather than relative”.116  
With the end of the Cold War, IR undergoes another wave of historicizing 
movement that climaxes in 2002. As a succession of the first wave, the second 
follows on and pushes the problem of history more to the forefront. Yet unlike 
the previous one, the second wave is both innovative in source and cognizant 
of research agendas. Many enterprises have been embarked on,117 although 
two are particularly crucial for a comprehension of Boucher and Reus-Smit’s 
endeavors.  
First is the influence of Martin Wight. Wight’s examination of historical 
sociology and of the moral foundations of the international provides an 
operational exemplar for such scholars as Reus-Smit in their search for the 
“historically and culturally contingent form/s of consciousness”. Wight’s 
                                                              
114  Reus-Smit 1999: xi.  
115  Boucher 1998: 40, Halliday 1993: 37-8.  
116  Boucher 1998: 39, see also 376-7.  
117  See the excellent overview by Vaughan-Williams 2005.  
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discussion on the three traditions, on the other hand, engenders Boucher’s 
vehement reaction to the form of the former’s definition of tradition.  
The second is the rise of the theories of historical sociology. These theorists, 
despite being profoundly shaped by Marx (and Tilly and Mann) in thought, trace 
back to the works of Aron and Hoffmann and seek to resurrect forgotten insights. 
It is through the efforts of these historical sociologists’ that Boucher sees the 
tradition of historical reason as having “come to dominate”. Fred Halliday, one 
of the most productive points of initial engagement for many articles around the 
turn of 1990 (mostly collected into Rethinking International Relations, 1994), 
reclaimed the significance of Aron’s argument that international political 
conduct is socially shaped by the homogenous/heterogeneous system.118 “The 
international”, Halliday stressed, “is a domain replete with moral claims and 
counter-claims” and “the ‘ought’ will not go away”. 119  Justin Rosenberg’s 
influential The Empire of Civil Society (1994) acquired much success in 
diagnosing the “optical illusion” of Realism to view all states’ action as arising 
out of the consideration of raison d’état.120 Past the mid-1990s and up towards 
its end, the growth of such works became explosive. J.M. Hobson proclaimed, 
in his first manifesto of a “Weberian historical sociology” (1998), that the 
“process of change”, “complex change”, and “immanent orders of change” of 
international relations had to be examined. 121  “The problem here is”, 
reemphasized Hobson in an Aronian tone, that “there has not been one 
international system but many, all of which are quite different, and all of which 
are marked by different rhythms or tempos.” 122  Stephen Hobden, in his 
boundary-breaking International Relations and Historical Sociology (1998), 
cited Hoffmann’s statement (cited in the previous chapter) as endorsement, and 
raised the issue of “inclusion of history as a variable” and “the requirement to 
                                                              
118  Halliday 1990: 137, 1992.  
119  Halliday 1994a: 236.  
120  Rosenberg 1994a: 90, 1994b.  
121  Hobson 1998a: 286, 290-1.  
122  Hobson 2002a: 10. 
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treat all social formations historically”.123 Halliday, once again, in his Revolution 
and World Politics (1999) showed that revolutions in history can be “rationally” 
understood. 124  Under the editorship of Hobson and Hobden, Historical 
Sociology of International Relations (2002) promoted the movement to its 
climax.125 
Within such a broad scenario what is it that makes Boucher and Reus-Smit 
stand out? Certainly, most of these thinkers in the historicizing movement have 
theorized as well as practiced the idea of history rationality, although they may 
not articulate the concept in explicit terms. Nevertheless, they are surpassed 
by Boucher and Reus-Smit in two key respects. First, both have consciously 
and conspicuously endeavored to pioneer a conception of rationality. For 
Boucher and Reus-Smit, an alternative conception of rationality in a historical-
sociological-moral light constitutes a major progression in international theory. 
Far from being a dispute over the semantic meaning, it represents an advance 
in the history of ideas and of events through the exposition of the historical-
sociological basis behind the political conducts. Second, and perhaps more 
crucially, is that unlike some historical thinkers who keep a less balanced view 
– Rosenberg, for instance, is too historically materialistic without being 
moralistic enough – both Boucher and Reus-Smit have strongly emphasized 
the centrality of the moral issue. A historical conception of rationality shows that 
the actors’ actions are inherently embedded within such a moral texture. The 
historical, sociological, and moral form an inextricable nexus. In what follows let 
me explicate their concerns in turn. 
 
David Boucher and “Historical Reason” 
 
                                                              
123  Hobden 1998: 186-7, also 196. Compare, further, Hobden (1999a) with the rejoinder by Nexon (2001).  
124  Halliday 1999: 295.  
125 Hobson 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2004; Hobden, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Teschke 2003. Secondary comments on 
this movement, see Rengger 1996, M. Hall 2002.  
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Boucher’s search for “historical reason” as a third tradition is both related to, 
and distinguishable from, the approach adopted by Martin Wight. In this form, 
Wight’s articulation of a tradition of Rationalism between Realists and 
Revolutionists represents an advance for its transcendence over the 
dichotomization of political thought into antitheses that are too simplistic and 
violently procrustean.126 Yet, on the other hand, Wight’s conception of tradition 
is vertically unchangeable and horizontally exclusive. A Wightian tradition, 
Boucher criticized, is “like coins that change hands…whose value is little 
affected by inflation”, and the traditions are “mutually exclusive and 
autonomous categories”.127 These criticisms of Wight’s tradition, despite falling 
into the commonplace interpretation (as I showed in previous section), are still 
illuminating for demonstrating how Boucher longed to cut across diametric 
opposites and find the via media. Indeed, for Boucher as well as for Wight, 
historical reason represents a synthesis rather than a repudiation of the other 
two categories: it is “the antithetical criteria of Realism and Idealism find their 
synthesis in historical reason”.128 
Although he consciously kept a distance between his “tradition” and Wight’s, 
Boucher was less conscious about the substantial similarity between his 
“Historical Reason” and Wight’s tradition of Rationalism. Speaking in a Wightian 
tone, Boucher argues that both the Machiavellians and Kantians are inadequate 
in grounding morality on “abstract natural law divorced from the experience of 
beings” and on “self-interest and capable of justifying any capricious act”.129 
The Machiavellians (or what Boucher named as “Empirical Realists”), and the 
Kantians (or what he called “Universal Moral Order”), fail to view human beings 
as equipped with “the capacity for self-redemption” through which human 
beings gradually transform their morality in the historical process which is 
                                                              
126 Boucher 1998: 10.  
127  Boucher 1998: 16-7.  
128  Boucher 1991: 127. 
129  Boucher 1998: 299.  
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“gradual unfolding” for human action.130 There has to be an alternative, a 
middle ground, which “posits a thick conception of morality deeply embedded 
in the practices of a living developing society”.131 
What is this tradition of historical reason, that is similar to Aron’s reasonable 
praxeology and Wight’s Rationalism but which has somehow distinguished 
itself as a “tradition”? In both his article which pioneered the concept of historical 
reason, and its fuller exposition in Political Theories of International Relations 
(1998),132 Boucher delineated it as a category with four attributes.  
First is its distinct emphasis on the moral, a trait became more frequently 
pronounced in Boucher’s historical reason than Aron’s. Historical reason “posits 
a thick conception of morality deeply embedded in the practices of a living 
developing society”.133 Notice how this “thick” conception of morality is posited. 
On the one hand, unlike the empirical realist who conceptualizes man and state 
as in nature an utilitarian, individualistic, seeker of interest and power, historical 
rationality will by contrast commit to the solidary view that morality is integral to 
political conduct as a social activity. On the other hand, historical reason has a 
“thin” idea of humanity, 134  in comparison with the universal Kantians who 
consider morality to be unresolvedly obliged to follow transcendent principles. 
Historical reason considers the problem of moral judgment to be integral to 
political conduct.  
Second, the language of historical reason needs to be uttered for explanatory 
as well as judgmental purpose. Historical reason searches for “a criterion of 
state action which explained more adequately what characterized international 
relations, and which also provided a standard of conduct in terms of which the 
rationality of the action of states could be judged”.135  
                                                              
130  Boucher 1998: 356.  
131  Boucher 1998: 39.  
132  Boucher 1991, 1998.  
133  Boucher 1998: 39.  
134  Boucher 1998: 39.  
135  Boucher 1998: 35.  
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Third, this criterion is not abstractly transcendent, but on the very contrary “to 
be found in the historical process itself”.136 It is immanent within the historical-
sociological process, and rooted in the changing forms and content of human 
beings, their associations, and their interactions: 
 
“The answer was to formulate a criterion that was not immersed in 
immediate state interests, nor at the same time entirely divorced from them. 
It was to be found in the historical process itself and in the traditions of 
states’ associations with others: a criterion, to paraphrase Rousseau, 
which would unite utility and justice. The criterion would have to be general 
in that it was not rooted in the immediacy of the preset and, indeed, was 
still in the process of formation as history unfolded, but it would not be so 
general and abstract as to postulate a preexisting set of principles to which 
international law must conform”.137 
 
For Boucher, as for Aron, historical reason cannot dispense with the calculation 
of utility but it pursues utility in a way that unites “utility and justice”.  
Fourth, this historical reason, standing in between utility and justice, the 
immediate and distant, and the general and concrete, exemplifies and 
embodies particular in many classical thinkers’ thoughts. Like Wight who tends 
to find exemplars in thought behind action, Boucher also discovers that 
historical reason has been expressed by classical thinkers. Edmund Burke (a 
thinker Wight prefers to cite), for instance, regarded the moral right of man as 
rooted “in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to be 
discerned”. This aphorism, Boucher continued to decipher, indicated that “the 
principles and rules which guide conduct are to be discerned in the historical 
process itself, that is, the process from which they emanated and in which our 
                                                              
136  Boucher 1998: 37.  
137  Boucher 1998: 37.  
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individual and national characters are formed”. 138  “For Marx”, Boucher 
interpreted in Aron’s tone (on historical man), “it was only by means of the 
historical process that man became a human being”.139 In Marx, moral freedom, 
material production and social progress, which are inextricably linked, 
possesses “not one universal nature but changing natures constituted by the 
historical condition”. 140  And Marx’s emphasis on the historical process 
exemplified in Justin Rosenberg’s revelation of the “optic illusion” suffered from 
the Realists who viewed international politics as the transcendent movement of 
power.  
Indeed for Boucher, Historical reason stands for the very same criterion of 
conduct that Raymond Aron and Martin Wight have advocated: human nature, 
the states and international systems are in a constant changing process; and 
this criterion, which solves the Machiavellian and Kantian predicaments, can 
only be found by merging the gap between the scheme and concrete historical 
world in and through which actions can be realized gradually.  
 
Christian Reus-Smit: “Rationality as a Culturally and Historically 
Contingent Form of Consciousness” 
 
Similarly to Boucher, Reus-Smit also embarks on a search for a conception of 
rationality as the nexus between morality and historical sociology. Unlike 
Boucher who rediscovered the third historical tradition in classic thinkers’ 
international thoughts, Reus-Smit contrived a notion of rationality to combat 
what he saw the dualistic mistakes committed by all the mainstream IR theories.  
In one facet, the historical-sociological background for political action is 
completely purged of from Neorealism, Neoliberalism and Constructivism. The 
Neorealists (Gilpin) presented a picture in which international system and 
                                                              
138  Boucher 1998: 317, emphasis removed.  
139  Boucher 1998: 360.  
140  Boucher 1998: 356,  
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institutions are perennially shaped by the rise and fall of cost-benefits 
calculating hegemons. The Neoliberals (Keohane), using “system-constraint 
analysis”, depicted states as “timeless, context-free rational actors”, 
established “abstract models of institutional rationality”, and thus failed to 
expound why drastically different international institutions had been pioneered 
before and after 1945.141 The Constructivists (Katzenstein and the “cultural 
rationalists”) brought cultures and norms at the second image in, but fell short 
of explicating “social textures of different international societies” at the macro 
level or the “institutional rationality…in particular social and historical 
contexts”.142  
In the other aspect, all these theories have suffered from the deficiencies of 
morality. The Neorealists (Waltz) had forgotten how their classical predecessor 
(Carr) had regarded political conduct as “a perpetual contest between reason 
and unreason”. The Neoliberals, betraying their normative origin, reduced 
political action to interest calculation which could have, as Norman Angell once 
believed, been superseded by the human “capacity to reconcile the real and 
right”, winning a “battle between rationality and irrationality”.143 Constructivists, 
being the outgrowth of the critical-theory enterprise, have “have lost sight of the 
normative ethos inherent in such a theory” and have instead forged a 
“dangerous liaison” with the mainstreams.144 
  It is as a remedy to both errors that Reus-Smit developed his rationality in 
The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional 
Rationality in International Relations (1999). His distinctive conception of 
rationality is also outlined in “The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory” 
(2001) and “The Idea of History and History with Ideas” (2002).145  
                                                              
141  Reus-Smit 1999: 160.  
142  Reus-Smit 1999: 5. 
143  Reus-Smit 2001: 580.  
144  Reus-Smit 1999: 169, see further Price & Reus-Smit 1998: 270 ff.  
145  Reus-Smit 1999, 2001, 2002.  
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Reus-Smit’s conception of rationality has two footings. Its first footing is in 
historical sociology. Heavily influenced by Ruggie’s works and Wight’s System 
of States, Reus-Smit criticized the Neo-Neo theorists’ “deontological conception 
of institutional rationality” and proposed “a historically informed constructivist 
theory”.146 Rather than assuming the rationality of actors as transcendentally 
“unfettered and unconstituted by cultural values and historical experiences”, 
Reus-Smit argued for an alternatively “ontological conception” or “embedded 
rationality” which is specifically grounded in the historical sociology of 
international politics.147  
Notice, first, that Reus-Smit’s historical sociological basis on which rationality 
is embedded is nuanced in character. To this extent, it distinguishes itself from 
Aron’s notion that historical sociology is about the mutably all-encompassing, 
social, economic, and technological condition, leaning towards a “cultural value” 
or an “institutional rationality”. For Reus-Smit, it is this value-laden context, as 
opposed to the specific features of a materialistic environment, that marks out 
how actors come into existence in the first place. Indeed, Reus-Smit was 
disposed to cite A.H.L. Heeren’s dictum as an exemplar: “To have a correct 
apprehension, therefore, of the ruling age of each, and to exhibit the particular 
maxims arising from them, will be the first prerequisite of the historian”.148  
On the other hand, this conception of the historical-sociological as culturally 
idealistic, although resembling Wight’s view of Rationalism as a trait of ideas in 
history, still differs from Wight’s in its location of rationality. Whereas for Wight 
rationality manifests itself in three paralleled, horizontal, spheres, it is for Reus-
Smit an existence that resides in a vertically deeper layer. Historical rationality 
is not merely the Boucherian synthesis between utility and justice, nor 
Wightian’s sensitiveness to the intractability of situation, but something that 
makes them constitutively possible. In Reus-Smit’ account, this is defined as 
                                                              
146  Reus-Smit 1999: 160, 5.   
147  Reus-Smit 1999: 159-61, emphasis in original.  
148  Reus-Smit 1999: 26.  
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the “deep constitutive values”, “constitutive structure”, and “ethical foundations” 
that generate social institutions such as diplomacy and international law 
genetically. (For Wight these institutions are the very manifestations of 
Rationalism, which the latter carried with itself.) As Reus-Smit himself clarified, 
the “issue-specific regimes” as WTO and the NPT are far from the 
exemplification of historical reason, nor is it even sufficient to move towards a 
deeper level and terminate at such organizing principle identified by Ruggie as 
“Multilateralism”! 149  This historically contingent form of consciousness, 
therefore, is based on the recognition of the underlying structure of human 
history.   
Notice, second, that Reus-Smit regards this historical-sociological 
substratum of an idealistic kind as equally underpinning domestic and 
international realms. Reus-Smit once called it “normative symmetry”. 150 
Historical rationality is “the inextricable connection between moral values, the 
identity of the state, and rightful state action”; it defines “what constitutes a 
legitimate actor, entitled to all rights and privileges of statehood”, and points to 
“the basic parameters of rightful state action”.151 The legitimacy, to which states 
resort in undertaking action in both domestic and international realms, is the 
very same. In this respect Reus-Smit stands close to Wight and much closer to 
Aron whose proposition has nevertheless been largely forgotten by later 
theorists – diplomatic action can be shaped by both domestic regime and an 
international homogenous system, both of which are rested on the same 
ideologically legitimating foundation. It penetrates into the underlying identities 
and purposes that designate what can be counted as rightful interest, morality, 
and statehood. 
The second footing of this embedded rationality is in the moral terrain. Similar 
to Aron’s “praxeology”, the Wightian Rationalist “political morality” and 
                                                              
149  Ruggie (ed.) 1993.  
150  Reus-Smit 1999: 49.  
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Boucher’s “historical reason” that all aim at overcoming the Machiavellian and 
Kantian dichotomy, Reus-Smit defined politics as lying “at the intersection of 
instrumental and ethical deliberation and action”, a “juncture of the normative 
and the instrumental” or something “neither strictly instrumental nor strictly 
moral”.152 What international politics should study is “more than the strategic 
interaction of rational egoists”. Instead, speaking in a Wightian language, Reus-
Smit argued that it had to address “practical reason” that “mediates between 
individual and group self-interest and utility, on the one hand, and “ethical 
conceptions of what is right and good, on the other”.153 Just as Aron who 
reiterates the indispensability of the fourfold scheme, Reus-Smit argues that 
any theory must be reflected on a threefold categorical scheme which 
simultaneously combines the conceptual, historical-sociological, and moral.154  
How should, then, this embedded rationality in historical-sociological grounds 
with praxeological dimension be envisaged? Reus-Smit replied thus:  
 
“Only by treating institutional rationality as a culturally and historically 
contingent form of consciousness – a way of thinking that is as normative 
as it is calculating, as value-laden as it is logical – can we explain the 
contrasting institutional practices of different societies of states. […] An 
ontological or embedded conception of institutional rationality seeks to 
capture the intersubjective forces that shape cognition and choice; it refers 
to the social foundations of collective action, to the metavalues that 
condition the institutional texture of international society”.155 
 
Formulated in this way, the rationality as a culturally and historically contingent 
form of consciousness – let us call it historical rationality for short – bears little 
differences from the previous conceptions. It is contingent on historical-
                                                              
152  Reus-Smit 2001: 573-81, passim.  
153  Reus-Smit 2001: 591.  
154  Reus-Smit 1999: 168-70.  
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sociological backgrounds, just as Aron’s reasonableness and Wight’s 
Rationalism’s can be said to be dependent on specific historical-sociological 
conditions. It is furthermore “as normative as calculating”, a defining trait of 
historical reason displayed in Aron’s reasonable diplomatic-strategic action and 
Wight’s Rationalist political morality.  
For Reus-Smit, historical rationality is concretely changed, giving rise to 
variously “institutional solutions that states deem appropriate, with institutional 
choices varying from one society of states to another”.156 Four historical cases 
had been employed for illustration. In the Ancient Greek system, the dominant, 
historically-contingent, form of consciousness was public discourse and the 
cultivation of “bios politikos” and that the rightful states’ action was 
circumscribed by arbitration from Delphi. The Italian city states were formed for 
the pursuit of civic glory and, “oratorical diplomacy” was the main institution for 
their intercourse. As for Absolutist Europe, states were organized along the line 
of “divinely ordained social order” and international relations was in fact 
conducted via inter-dynastic marriage and the natural law. Finally, there was 
the modern state system in which, according to Reus-Smit, the promotion of 
individual welfare and democratization, and the collaboration among states on 
the basis of multilateralism, become the dominant theme. For all these different 
societies of states, Reus-Smit sum up, “constitutive structures are not all the 
same: culture and history matter”.157  
Viewed in this light, Reus-Smit’s rationality, which contextualizes political 
conduct within an encompassing historical, sociological, and moral framework, 
is archetypically historical. The rationality construed by Reus-Smit reaches into 
the very belief that is not only contingent on, but integral to, a specifically 
historical, sociological and moral condition.  
 
(iv) Conclusion  
                                                              
156  Reus-Smit 1999: 64.  
157  Reus-Smit 1999: 39.  
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Although in his recent work Reus-Smit turned to international law, 158  the 
historicizing movement in which he once participated is becoming increasingly 
powerful in IR. Hobson’s The Eastern Origin of Western Civilization (2004) and 
especially his The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western 
International Theory, 1760-2010 (2012) are defining works.159 George Lawson, 
in “The Promise of the Historical Sociology” (2006), announced in a Reus-
Smitian tone that “institutions are not conceived as timeless entities performing 
a universal task”, “but as variables that are particular to a time and space”. 
“Social relations”, Lawson continued, “are constituted in time and space”.160 
Indeed, such examples are endless; and what needs to be done is to pinpoint 
the distinctiveness and promising feature of historical reason that can advance 
this movement in the near future. What are, however, the defining features of 
historical reason?  
 
Historical Reason and Its Changing Conceptions 
 
From Aron to Reus-Smit, I have reconstituted the hidden history of the four 
particular conceptions of rationality, all of which have been categorized under 
the rubric of “historical rationality”. The similarities among these conceptions 
are evident and extensive. Rationality is conditioned by a historical, sociological, 
and moral ensemble. The conduct of strategic-diplomatic action, the existence 
of man, political association and international institutions are always in a 
specifically historical-sociological process. The transcendent calculation of 
power, interest and risk, cannot substitute the impacts of the concrete, the 
agnostic, the contingent. Human beings, the states, and the international realm 
has a sociological dimension that allows their mutual interaction and proper 
development. Morality is historically-sociologically conditioned, developed, and 
                                                              
158  Reus-Smit 2008.  
159  J.M. Hobson 2004, 2012.  
160 Lawson 2006: 404, 410.   
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transformed; the moral is always located in between the extremes of 
“Machiaevillism” and “Kantianism”, between “empirical realism” and “universal 
moral order”. Historical reason, in short, is dependent on a nexus of historical, 
sociological and moral ensemble. It is a conception of rationality inextricably 
related to morality that is both historically-sociologically conditioned and 
changeable.  
These conceptions do have subtle differences, since historical reason as a 
language has a history of itself. One is the different idea of the historical-
sociological: at one extreme Aron considered it as more related to events and, 
technology occupies a huge share; at the other Boucher and Reus-Smit 
preferred to discover the instantiation in thoughts, values, and beliefs; for Wight 
it is more oriented to thought (compared with Aron) but less idealistic than 
Boucher and Reus-Smit’s. Another is the concept of the sociological: for Aron 
there is an “international system” that can be dichotomized into two polarities; 
for Wight and Reus-Smit it is a society, which implies much coherency and has 
thus developed the “sociological” dimension of historical reason. 
 
The Aesthetics of Historical Reason: Its Pursuit of Realness and 
Precision 
 
The thinkers of historical reason have always been dismayed by the assertion 
of transcendent criterion. One of such a claim is “Realism”. Morgenthau’s 
announcement that the “concept” of the “interest defined in terms of power” 
reveals the political essence, for instance, is considered by both Aron and Wight 
as inherently unrealistic. It does not take into account of the historically 
contingent and sociologically pluralistic; nor does it, as I quote Wight’s remark 
on Morgenthau as explanation, bring the situational ethics into its concern. In 
Boucher’s view, the tradition of Realism, running through Thucydides, 
Machiavelli and Morgenthau, displays a conspicuous tendency of justifying the 
subordination of (international) morality and community to individual political 
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calculation (raison d’état) by a transhistorical view of human nature as 
rapacious.161 Similarly, to claim that the states’ actions are determined by a 
“timeless” calculation of interest, both in a Neorealist (Gilpin) and Neoliberal 
(Keohane) form, is for Reus-Smit too abstract to be real. Another, interrelated, 
claim is about precision. For Aron, the pursuit of the deterrence theorists to 
introduce the concept of utilitarian rationality for their construction of a 
demonstrable, operational and quantitative measurement is profoundly 
misleading (see more in chapter two).  
What is the historical-rational view of realness and precision? It seems that 
the realness and accurateness demanded by historical conception of reason is 
derived from looking closer at the historically specific (past, the present, and 
the future). Instead of mistaking abstractness for realness, a “realistic” theory is 
based on the scrutiny of the complex – the multiple objective pursued by the 
states, the historically concrete date, and the pressure and contingency of 
consequence caused by social coexistence. Instead of measuring accuracy 
quantitatively, a “precise” theory will locate political conduct within a process in 
which thoughts, agents, actions, and political associations is in a constant flux. 
Since mobility and change is constitutive to political conduct, “precision” 
demands more attentiveness to the process of change rather than the “proven” 
system of thought (recall Morgenstern’s plea). 
 
Going Critical? Critique Transcendent vs. Critique Immanent  
  
One of the merits of the historical conception of reason is that it can enable IR 
scholars to undertake an immanent critique. Indeed, from a rationality-centered 
point of view, there are mainly two ways to critique international politics. One is 
Morgenthau’s Realism that statesman’s actions are appraised transcendentally 
in relation to the observer’s “rational” standard. By conceptualizing interest as 
                                                              
161  See e.g. Boucher 1998: 141, 145ff.  
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power, by directing and disciplining political action under the intellect (instead 
of the moral, sentimental, and passionate feelings), the rational theory offers a 
map that points to the “timeless feature of its geography distinct from their ever-
changing historic setting”. Indeed, the definition of interest may vary in 
accordance with the historical-sociological contexts; nor will statesman act 
solely on interest, immune from his own ideological preferences.162  But – 
Morgenthau warned gravely – it is by construing political action as power 
seeking, by imposing such a concept on the subject matter, by “testing of this 
rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences” that one 
acquires a standpoint to scrutinize the political landscape.  
The critique, if exercised by Aron, Wight, Boucher and Reus-Smit, will be 
fundamentally different in its immanent nature. Whereas for Morgenthau 
political action is tested “against” a transcendentally rational criterion – the 
“rational” (states)man is the one who grasps “the perennial truths of politics”, as 
Wight understands him too well163 – the historical rationalists will evaluate 
political actions in relation to specifically historical-sociological circumstances, 
“the intractability of all political situations”, the “historical process itself”, and “the 
particular social and historical contexts”. Human beings are rational in a 
historical sense: they understand their mode of existence as historical beings 
(“historical man”) that belong to a chain of process in which they have not only 
a duty to heed the moral dimension of the past – the development of history will 
necessarily leads us to “judge the severely the practices of states” – but leave 
our own practices to be judged in the future. Historical rationality requires 
“retrospective insight” into the past as well as symmetrical foresight on the 
future.164 Their rationality implies that they have “a sense of history as dynamic, 
and the individual as having responsibility in it”, and they are capable of 
gradually transforming morality in history. It should be recalled that Morgenthau 
                                                              
162 Morgenthau 1954a: 7-8.  
163 M. Wight 1959b.  
164  Aron 1958: 18.  
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also conceptualized political conduct as antinomic, in an everlasting conflict of 
the rational and irrational, ideal and real. But the antinomy and tensional in a 
historical-rational sense has a much complex meaning: it requires the conducts 
to be judged temporally. To think in the manner of historical reason is to 
conceptualize the problem as in a lasting paradox along the line of history. The 
political action undertook today is at the same time standing in-between the 
tensions amid ruthless interest and virtuous morality, amid individual wants and 
societal solidarity, and amid the past casting a shadow on the present which is 
in turn overshadowed by the future. This emphasis on the tensional, 
paradoxical, and antinomic endows particular strength on historical reason.   
From a historical-rational perspective, international relations (small i.r.) is 
what it is because what it was and what it will turn out to be. International 
Relations (capital I.R.) is what it is because what it was and what it will be – and 
that is the time for retrospection of how the concept of reason had been 
conceived within the whole history of Anglophone IR. Instead of listening stories 
one by one, let us hear a combined one in the end.  
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Conclusion: The Historical Development of Reason 
in International Relations 
 
 
At the start of this thesis I proposed three aims. First, I wanted to use an 
immanent-historicist method to uncover the centrality of the hidden language of 
reason which was constitutively crucial to IR discourse (both at the level of 
individuals and of community). Second, I wanted to show that the four 
languages of reason – Kantian, utilitarian, axiological and historical – and they 
have developed, intersected with and transmuted into each other. Third, an auto 
history of the development of these four languages of reason reflected a 
dimension of IR history, namely a history of modern international thought in 
rationality-centered terms.  
  In the above four chapters I have accomplished the three tasks by telling 
individually diachronic stories. In conclusion I propose to provide a synchronic, 
retrospective, overview, unraveling the dual puzzles of what the thinkers mean 
by “reason” and “Rationalism”, and how (or why) they had used it as a key 
concept to perform their acts, responding to political events or to each other 
within a given period. The taxonomy of the four languages is crucial to unravel 
these riddles.  
 
(i) The Crisis of Kantian Reason: Rational Man versus Power Politics 
(1919-1939) 
 
The discipline in infancy was marked by the dominance of the Kantian 
conception of reason. At that time, the subject of Kantian reason was man – 
plain man, statesmen, the intellectuals and academicians – not the states. 
Rather than assuming the use of reason as subordinate to the immediate 
satisfaction of emotion or preferences – which utilitarian reason did – the object 
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of Kantian reason was to use the intellect to control events (in relation to the 
environment), harness passions and impulses (towards man himself), and 
forge mutual understanding and reaching consensus (towards each other).  
In general, the term played a dual role. In relation to the past, it served as a 
reflection: the Great War in 1914 attested to the fact that human nature had far 
from reached the Kantian notion of man. The prewar “Idealists” believed in 
reason “with the fervor of religious zeal” as if it was “the supreme arbiter in 
human conduct” and “complete harmony of human relations was discoverable 
and attainable by getting reason to prevail, as Hobson claimed in Problems of 
a New World (1920). Zimmern, in his Europe in Convalescence (192), reminded 
“the idealists” that politics was still dominated by “the outward and 
oversimplified expression of deep lying passions and traditions”, which had not 
been “touched and transfigured by the harmonizing power of human reason”. 
In order to prevent another Great War, it was imperative to understand that man 
had not become rational enough to suppress his competitive impulses. Far from 
holding the naïve belief in human reason, the Liberal Institutionalists shared a 
grim view of human nature with the Cold War Realists’.   
  In relation to the future, the Liberal Institutionalists initiated a threefold 
exhortation for political engagement (commitment) building on the Kantian 
conception during the interwar period. The ultimate end of the project was to 
cultivate and exploit human reason in three ways. First, as in 
domestic/democratic community, people should have recourse to “reason and 
discussion” rather than employ “forcible means”, as Davies explained in Force 
(1933). The “resort to force” should also be “for the appeal to reason”. Russell, 
in his “The Revolt against Reason” (1934) and Which Way to Peace? (1936), 
argued that people should have let reason prevailed in political conduct, relying 
on “persuasion rather than force”, seeking to “persuade by means of argument”, 
“to use every efforts to persuade others” to abstain from war. For Zimmern, who 
viewed the League as an “organization of hue and cry, and nothing more”, 
human reason can manifest as the “voices of reason” (public opinion) which 
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could demonstrate to the states their legal commitment to the maintenance of 
international peace. Robert Cecil, in his contribution to The Intelligent Man’s 
Way to Prevent War (1933), defined public opinion as a legal arbiter.  
  The second deployment of reason was through arguments about education. 
In Zimmern’s terms stated in Learning and Leadership (1926), “the root of evil 
is not political but intellectual. It is because the peoples do not understand the 
problems of the post-war world that their statesmen are unable to control them”. 
Education could provide the common man knowledge to control the political 
environment. Education could also facilitate the common man to articulate a 
true voice from reason that linked to the first solution of rational persuasion, 
since by acquiring knowledge man could bring “his healthy common sense to 
bear upon” foreign policy.  
  The third was Zimmern’s “international intellectual cooperation”. For Zimmern, 
the intellectuals should perform three services. One was to use his “observant” 
and “disinterested” mind to uncover to the people the “non-contentious 
elements” of political matters and “de-emotionalize the material of their study”. 
This was done to provide “natural food” for men to cultivate reason, by which 
they could exercise control over the environment. Another was to “open the 
windows of their minds”, facilitating them to knit their “intellectual relations” and 
mutual understanding. Once reaching consensus on the significance of the 
problem they could “recover control over ‘events’.” The last was to contrive “a 
point of convergence between Knowledge and Power”, and a juxtaposition of 
“scholarship and statesmanship”. 
Indeed, using the intellectual’s own reason to perform an international service 
for cultivating the reason of the plain man was the very purpose of pioneering 
the discipline as an academic study. With the outbreak of the Second World 
War in 1939 and the Cold War soon following which seemed to have 
demonstrated the immaturity of the project, however, this Kantian conception 
of reason experienced a significant demise.  
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 (ii) From the Second World War to Cold War (Part I, 1940-1959I): 
Morgenthau and the Realist Reorientation of Kantian Reason and 
Wight’s “Rationalism” 
 
From 1940 to 1969, the conceptions of reason in IR underwent great 
differentiation and development. Like the Kantian reason upheld by the Liberal 
Institutionalist as a political concept, the varied conceptions during this period 
were profoundly interconnected with the political events, especially the Cold 
War and nuclear weapons. Yet, unlike the discipline in infancy where only one 
conception was dominant, there occurred several conceptions that were more 
or less related to the previous Kantian one.   
  The first was the “Realist” reconstruction of Kantian reason. The failure of 
interwar Liberal Internationalism gave the Kantian idea of reason notoriety and 
generated the large-scale “Realist” critique in the formative years of IR as a 
discipline. This skepticism towards reason was reinforced by the 
commencement of the Cold War after 1946 and the Soviet acquisition of nuclear 
weapons in 1949. It was simply impossible to behold the old hope that by 
rational discussion and intellectually mutual understanding the Americans and 
Soviets could reach peace. Nevertheless, the Realists did not as much 
completely repudiate the Kantian idea of reason as undertake a reconstruction. 
Except for Carr’s denounciation of the “doctrine of reason” and “intellectualism 
of international politics” – an age Carr bemoaned in The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
1919-1939 (1939) that had “so unreservedly proclaimed the supremacy of the 
intellect” – most Realists displayed a transitive, antinomic, position towards 
reason.    
On the one hand, they stressed that the Idealists’ project, based on the 
Kantian conception, entailed the threefold misunderstandings of “the nature of 
man”, “the nature of the [social] world”, and “the nature of reason itself” that 
Morgenthau stated in  Scientific Man versus Power Politics (1946). For 
287 
 
Morgenthau, “to be successful and truly ‘rational’ in social action” and to 
establish oneself “as the representative of true reason”, demanded the 
recognition of the importance of multidimensionality of man, where power plays 
no less an important role than his intellectual faculty.  
On the other hand, the Realists also inherited the Idealists’ emphasis on 
reason as an intellectual faculty whose use was indispensable for designating 
political conduct. Morgenthau, for instance, stated that “politics must be 
understood though reason”, although “it is not in reason that it finds its model”. 
In order to disclose to the Americans that their foreign policy might be too 
sentimental in their tackling of foreign affairs, Morgenthau started to construct 
his Realism, at the bottom of which was the Kantian conception of reason. 
Morgenthau waged his war of reason on two fronts. One was political, the other 
intellectual. The “crusading spirit”, “sentimentalism” and “neo-isolationism” 
committed by the Truman administration towards the Soviet Union rather 
demonstrated the requirement for a “rational guidance for political action”, 
“sound political thinking”, “a clear and concrete understanding of what is it we 
are fighting”, and a “rational approach to the problem of American assistance”. 
Rather than repudiating the significance of reason, Morgenthau urged in his In 
Defense of the National Interest (1951) for “framing a rational foreign policy” to 
intellectually discipline political conduct. Such a rational foreign policy was able 
to adjust the relation between means and ends – “to limit their objectives in view 
of the relative scarcity of available power” – and the crux was to “think about 
foreign policy in terms of power” rather than in terms of intellectually mutual 
dialogue, understanding, and moral interdependence. During the Eisenhower 
government, however, Morgenthau saw more deviations from such an ideal. 
The enlargement of Asian commitments and the inaction in Europe incurred 
Morgenthau’s denunciation that the foreign policy was suffering from “an all-
pervading deficiency of understanding”, the “clumsiness and confusions” of 
intellectual guidance, and the “unsophisticated and mechanical way of thought”. 
For Morgenthau, the nub of the problem was not political but intellectual, not 
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“the quality of specific policies” but “the quality of the thought which goes into 
them”. What was in urgent demand was to think of a “rational foreign policy”, a 
“political doctrine” that “would give political meaning to those technical activities 
and co-ordinate them with the over-all objectives of our political policy”. The 
military aid had “no rational political objective”, for that policy was “lacking in the 
practical discipline which is the reflection, in the field of action, of the discipline 
of the intellect.” When a statesman was not sure “in the knowledge of what I 
seek to achieve and how to go about achieving it”, no common direction, no 
standard for evaluation and no detailed arrangement would be prescribed. In 
crafting policy, reason was indispensable for exercising control and offering a 
center of purpose, a source of meaning around which all the detailed 
proceedings should be arrayed. 
What deserves special mention was Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State and War 
(1959) and Martin Wight’s lectures on International Theory: The Three 
Traditions in the late 1950s. Both participated in and were shaped by the 
movement of Realist critique. Waltz criticized the Kantian conception of man 
depicted by Kant, Cobden and Hobson for their inadequate explanation of war 
that is too internalist to be valid. This critique, however, would lead to his search 
for an external account that culminate two decades later in Theory of 
International Politics (1979) which would culminated in an axiological account 
of rationality. 
 Martin Wight’s tradition of Rationalism depicted in his International Theory 
was the second main development (compared with Morgenthau) that was both 
conditioned by and differentiated from the Realists.1 The international thoughts 
of such “respected names” as Zimmern, Angell, and Woolf – their advocate of 
cultivating reason, furthering intellectual cooperation and moral 
interdependence to prevent the war – were too familiar to Wight. Wight was no 
less familiar with Morgenthau’s rational “Realism”. But Wight, despite viewing 
                                                              
1  Before the “English School” was coined many regarded Wight as a leading Realist thinker.  
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reason as an intellectual faculty of man, a view shared by both his 
Idealist/Realist contemporaries, had endowed it with a much stronger historical, 
sociological and moral sense. Unlike Morgenthau’s rational statesman who 
pursues “national interest” through the discipline of action by the intellect, 
Wight’s rational man presupposes the overcoming of his “sinful, pugnacious 
and irrational” nature, and thus a societal prospect marked by “reciprocal 
goodwill”, by the political life that is natural to him and the possibility of 
participation in a wider international society. Unlike the Idealists whose idea of 
reason seems to be overly progressive, Wight’s notion of reason carries with it 
a shade of historical agnosticism, a color of cautious attitude towards human 
nature. For Wight, finally, what also distinguished Rationalism was its emphasis 
on the problem of “political morality”. “To be a Rationalist politician”, Wight 
declared, “is to exist in a state of moral tension between the actual and the 
desirable”. Moral conduct could neither be pursued as the individuals’ duty, nor 
in the name of the raison d’état, but as part of the “moral tensions inherent[ly] 
in political action” which appeals to the principle of “lesser evil”.  
 
(iii) From the Second World War to Cold War (Part II, 1960-1969): The 
Rise of Utilitarian Reason and Raymond Aron’s Reasonableness  
 
During the transition from the Second World War to the commencement of the 
Cold War, a third significant development was the import of utilitarian reason 
into the discipline. The early Cold War period, characterized by the high level 
of tension between the superpowers and especially the shadow of a nuclear 
war, proved to be one of the most stimulating event (just as stimulating as its 
own end in 1991) for the development of reason in Anglophone IR theories.  
The recruitment of the “Soldiers of Reason” brought their own conception of 
reason into the field, giving rise to a significant transformation of terminology 
from “reason” to “rationality”. The concept of rationality and two person games 
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were so geared to the “reality” of Cold War politics. Utilitarian rationality was 
depicted as possessing two attributes, both of which needed highlighting 
against the Kantian conception. One was Schelling’s definition that rationality 
was a property “not just of intelligent behavior”, but “of behavior motivated by a 
conscious calculation of advantages” on the basis of “an explicit and internal[ly] 
consistent value system”. For utilitarian rationality, ordinal calculation was far 
from complete. Ordinal calculation of interest and risk was requisite. The other 
was the role played by emotion in their account. Whereas the thinkers of the 
Kantian conception were dismayed by emotion (the Idealists and Morgenthau), 
the utilitarian rationalists construed emotional behavior as a way of maximizing 
interest. Schelling’s “rationality of irrationality”, Snyder’s inclusion of “emotional 
value” into calculation, were exemplifications.  
On the basis of the utilitarian conception, the IR theorists presented a variety 
of theories in which the rational ego was capable of deploying many strategies 
to outwin the opponent as well as halt the crisis at the very brink of actual 
conflict. Thomas Schelling demonstrated how in sequential and one-shot 
games, one rational player can deter the adversary by coupling a promise with 
threat. Gellen Snyder envisaged a strategy of inflicting costly retaliation under 
rational and uncertain condition: the opponent’s calculation of the probable 
costs and benefits of attack can determine its conduct and thus the more costly 
the attack the less likely aggression. Thomas Schelling envisaged that in 
uncertain and irrational (the rational player pretending to be) conditions, 
brinkmanship can be executed in such a way that, the player’s irrational 
commitment to unbearable cost and unknown procedures such as some 
“chance, accident”, or “just process that we do not entirely understand” can 
deter the adversary. Herman Khan’s Chicken Game pointed to an uncertain but 
rational game.  
The impacts of the rational deterrence theories were many, but the principal 
two were the introduction of the concept of utilitarian rationality into the field, 
which influenced such later scholars as the Neo-Neo theorists, and stimulated 
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enormous controversy over the concept in the 1960s. Two noticeable 
responses deserved mention. Morgenthau responded to the deterrence 
theorists, warning that nuclear weapons had already obliterated the ultimate 
end (or any intelligibility) of using nuclear war as an instrument. It was “the 
reduction ad adsurdum of policy”, “an instrument of universal destruction”. 
Indeed, “force rationally employed is the supreme guarantee of peace”, but the 
possibility of using nuclear weapons have to be ruled out. Once again, 
Morgenthau saw the specter of the Idealists hanging around. These Deterrence 
Theorists had presumed that if statesman could cultivate reason in a cold, 
calculative, manner, their deterrence could necessarily work to deter the 
opponent. Thus, “nations confront each other not as living historic entities with 
all their complexities but as rational abstractions, after the model of ‘economic 
man’, playing games of military and diplomatic chess according to a rational 
calculus that exists nowhere but in the theoretician’s mind”.  
Like Morgenthau (but wrongly pinning him down with the Deterrence 
Theorists), Raymond Aron also proposed a dualistic critique and an alternative 
criterion of reasonable conduct. Aron’s “reasonableness” marked the fourth 
main development of the conception of reason. Aron’s first critique, resembling 
that of Morgenthau, is centered on the intelligibility and instrumentality of 
nuclear weapons. Were statesmen “always able to abide by the dictates of 
reason…defined by the theoreticians”, both “intelligent and well-informed”? No, 
“the passions, the follies, the ideas and the violence of the century” may come 
into play”. Furthermore, not every element is calculable in a quantitative sense 
– the death of human beings, and the superpowers’ contestation of wills as a 
political struggle which may lead to a nuclear war to resolve their antagonism – 
nor can calculation be conducted as the way Snyder envisages. Unlike 
Morgenthau, however, Aron proposed a criterion of reasonable conduct. “Is it 
enough to consider merely the rational elements, in order to produce a sketch 
or paint a portrait in accord with the model’s essence?” The historical-
sociological condition, under which states and statesman conduct their 
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diplomatic-strategic action, gives rise to “the plurality of concrete objectives and 
of ultimate objectives”. It delimits the ends as well as means of political action. 
Reasonableness, as Hoffmann clarified, “entails value judgments in addition to 
the calculation of forces”.  
The ultimate factor is the Détente between superpowers and the rise of 
interdependence and economic issues. These two, which caused the change 
of focus, had paradoxically enough given rise to the second wave of the 
utilitarian movement in the 1980s. 
 
(iv) The Innovation of Axiological Reason (1970-1979) 
 
In Waltz’s view, the explanation of political conduct in terms of the rational 
faculty of man – either in the form of Morgenthau’s rational Realism or 
deterrence theory – is utterly inadequate. Instead, the cause of political action 
lies in something external and circumstantial that can constrain, intermediate, 
and subdue, human action. This is what he identifies as “system”.  
  Far from repudiating the significance of the term, Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics (1979) introduced a novel conception of rationality. It 
presents a theory of axiological rationality in three aspects. First, structure 
molds conduct “through socialization of the actors and through competition 
among them”. Socialization brings “member[s] of a group into conformity with 
its norms” and establishes “norms and encourage conformity”. Selection 
ensures that the norms will be followed by “rewarding some behaviors and 
punishing others”. As Waltz himself cautioned, the function of structure requires 
no actors to consciously rationally maximize their interest: a structure, acting 
like a directive or even inductive rule, “spurs the actors to accommodate their 
ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices”.  
  Second, the international, anarchical, structure is in itself an “order without 
an orderer”. The rule of nobody is not tantamount to no rule. Instead, anarchy 
is itself a rule of the game that “determines the kind of player who is likely to 
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prosper”. It is an “imperative” that has lasted ever since the formation of the 
realm; it is the command to ‘take care of yourself’!”. Under such anarchical 
organizing principles, states as units will be required “to maintain or improve 
their positions by maneuvering, by bargaining, or by fighting”. Unless they follow 
the order, they “will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will 
suffer”. Once again, Waltz clarifies that his theory supposes no correspondence 
between motive and results, and “requires no assumptions of rationality or of 
constancy of will on the part of all of the actors”.  
  Third, the anarchical order or “power political game” is maintained by the 
balance of power, which is played in accordance with distinct rules under a 
different “distribution of capability”. In multipolarity, the “game of power politics” 
is played with flexibility in making alliances, as it “if really played hard, presses 
the players into two rival camps”. The flexibility in alignment at the same time 
enhances “uncertainty and miscalculation” that may unfold in a series of events 
leading unexpectedly to war. In bipolarity, by contrast, the “rigidity of alignment” 
makes “for flexibility of strategy and the enlargement of freedom of decision”. It 
is characterized by the “clarity of dangers” and “certainty about who has to face 
them”, and thus the result that “the incentives to a calculated response stand 
out most clearly”. Reaction has “to be wary, alert, cautious, flexible, and 
forbearing”. Within such a game, Waltz declared, “rules of reciprocity and 
caution prevail”. Notice once again that Waltz clarifies that the balance of power 
is maintained by the systematic urge of keeping one’s survival rather than by 
the states’ motive to maximize power, and conditioned by the distribution of 
capability at the systematic level.  
  The time when Waltz’s Theory was released was inopportune. It coincided at 
once with the rise of the second wave of utilitarian theorization within IR, and 
with the flow of anti-positivism into the social sciences in the early 1980s. The 
upshot was its suffering from the same misreading from two opposite 
intellectual springs.  
  For the utilitarianists, such as Keohane and Krasner, Waltz had constructed 
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such a system theory that it presented “a world of rational self-seeking actors”, 
“a world of sovereign states seeking to maximize their interest and power”. It 
was a theory that by “taking rationality as a constant”, the states’ response to 
“the incentives and constrains imposed by their environments” became 
conspicuous. Anarchy was not received as an order without orderer. Rather, as 
Oye and Grieco understood it, anarchy was the very absence of order that 
perpetuated the “rational egoists” in international politics to ruthlessly pursue 
their interest: “no overarching authority to prevent others from using 
violence…to destroy or enslave them”, and that “no central authority imposes 
limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests”. The axiologically rational theory 
built by Waltz on the concepts of system and anarchy was debased into a 
utilitarian form.  
  For the Reflectivists, Waltz also presented a theory underpinned by utilitarian 
rationality. Ashley, exploiting Habermas’ division between practical and 
technical reason, condemned the instrumental use of reason to maximize 
national advantage at the expense of human interest which should have 
become the ultimate end. For Ashley, Waltz’s Theory, “modeled on the 
individualist rationalism of Adam Smith’s Political Economy”, was the exemplar 
of “economicism” and “utilitarianism” that collapsed “into technical reason”. Far 
from trying to forge an intersubjective understanding between the scholar and 
statesmen – as Morgenthau’s classical rational Realism did – Waltz expected 
that by contriving an objectified system theory, political actions could be 
explained in a positivistic way. For Kratochwil, similarly, Waltz’s Theory, ruled 
out the significance of international institutions, leaving only the balance of 
power based on the assumption of “the maximization of power” to explain every 
conduct. It was by taking this misreading of Waltz as foil that Kratochwil would 
in the late 1980s develop a conception of rationality as embedded in games, 
bearing remarkable resemblance to that of Waltz’s. Wendt, although capturing 
Waltz’s conceptualization of the distribution of capability as an antecedent 
condition for strategic calculation, still contended that the distribution of 
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capability is but another form of “situation determinism”, shared with Mesquita’s 
account of war in terms of relational calculation in The War Trap (1981).  
  Kaplan and Knutsen were right to highlight the ideas of “collective rationality” 
and “systematic rationality” underlying Waltz’s Theory. Unfortunately, the most 
(misleading) profound effect made by Theory was the very opposite. It was 
understood as a theory showing that states were rational egoists and 
maximized their interest and power under a perennial condition of the absence 
of order, which provided seeming endorsement to the development of the 
second wave of utilitarianism led by Keohane in the 1980s.  
 
(v) The Reign of Utilitarian Reason (1980-1990) 
 
Throughout the 1980s, utilitarian rationality, which had been used by Gilpin, 
Bueno de Mesquita, Keohane, Stein, Axelrod to explain both conflict and 
cooperation among states, became then the most significant and supreme 
theoretical concept.  
  The alleged dominance of the utilitarian conception of reason was a very 
complex historical phenomena. The rationalistic dominance had two pillars. In 
the first place, the supremacy of utilitarian rationality claimed by Keohane as 
unifying Morgenthau, Waltz, and the Neoliberals into a single “research 
program” was based on Keohane’s conflation of three languages of reason into 
a single utilitarian one. From his article “Theory of World Politics: Realism and 
Beyond” (1983) to “International Institutions: the Two Approaches” (1988), 
Keohane had constantly interpreted Morgenthau as a thinker of utilitarian 
reason. For Morgenthau, Keohane interpreted, states had been instrumentally 
“seeking to maximize their power” rather than intellectually disciplining its use. 
World politics for Morgenthau “can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational 
actors, carefully calculating costs of alternative courses of action and seeking 
to maximize their expected utility”. Morgenthau’s idea of rationality was 
“standard in neoclassical economics”, which viewed states as if having 
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“consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits” 
to “maximize their utility”. Similarly to his interpretation of Morgenthau’s reason 
into an instrumental one that was barely concerned with the end of political 
conduct, Keohane also read a utilitarian-rational theory into Waltz’s Theory. For 
Waltz, Keohane argued, “system-constraint analysis” could not function unless 
the actors possessed constant identity as interest maximizers. The assumption 
of utilitarian rationality was also indispensable for Waltz’s “theory of the balance 
of power to hold” – although Waltz himself clarified the non-necessity of such a 
requirement, Keohane still insisted the significance of assuming them as power 
maximizing, which was self-contradictory to the theory of balance of power.  
  In the second place, the Neo-Neo theorists deployed the concept to show 
how pure conflict and cooperation could occur, which was in contrast to the 
previous use of utilitarian rationality to show how a rational actor can contrive a 
deterrence of the opponent without incurring a pure conflict that puts physical 
strength in actual test and make conflict resolution without pure cooperation 
that might concede interest to the opponent. 
  To start from the Neoliberal wing. Keohane’s own deployment of utilitarian 
rationality in the article “The Demand for International Regimes” (1982) and 
After Hegemony (1984), as well as Stein’s “Coordination and Collaboration” 
(1982) and Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), contributed 
enormously to the Rationalistic supremacy. Underlying all three’s theoretical 
accounts of the enduring usefulness of international institutions was their 
concern with demonstrating that the political turbulence occurred in the 1970s 
might not lead inevitably to the return to greater conflict and the collapse of 
international institutions. Instead, states as interest maximizers would create 
and maintain institutions to enhance their advantages. For Keohane, states 
would maintain institutions not merely because of the benefits supplied by 
joining institutions would exceed the cost. Rather, to inverse the Coase theorem, 
one discovered that states also had the demand for institutions to exist: 
institutions can advance states’ interests by reducing the transaction costs and 
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alleviating the difficulty of the flow of information. In Stein’s account, 
international institutions would be extensively maintained because they 
facilitated states to eschew sub-optimal outcome when states pursue their 
individualistic interest in a simultaneous and one shot Prisoners’ Dilemma game. 
Likewise, for Axelrod, institutional cooperation could be fostered as long as the 
players wanted to use Tit-for-Tat for maximize their interests across a certain 
time.  
  For the Neorealists, scholars such as Gilpin and Mesquita used utilitarian 
rationality to explore when a hegemonic war would occur. For Gilpin, a state 
would maximize its interest if a challenge to the existing hegemon could gain 
net benefits, and a state would keep expanding until the equilibrium point when 
no further marginal utility could be obtained. In Mesquita’s theory, the 
maximization of interest was highly relational. An actor would wage a war 
against another if one actor, by taking into account of both actors’ calculation, 
expected that net benefit could be gained.  
 
 (vi) The Development of Reason in the Post-Cold War Era (1991-2009) 
 
The most controversial, post-utilitarian, movement was generated by the 
“Postmodernists” because of their association of reason not only with the 
problem of epistemology but with the one of “discipline”. From the beginning of 
1990s, there appeared increasingly more voices denouncing “the enlightened 
road [of utilitarian reason]”. For Der Derian, it was through the concept of 
rationality that the legitimacy of theorization was monopolized and the discipline 
of the discipline was exercised. David Campbell, although professing later 
(1998) that Postmodernists performed a better service in saving the critical 
function of reason, had in fact undertaken a critique of the concept in Writing 
Security (1992). The “intellectual exclusion” of the Postmodernists within the IR 
community, as Andrew Linkater later called it, generated the first powerful 
movement of criticizing utilitarian rationality.  
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Against the Postmodernist movement but equally against the Neo-Neo 
theorists was another movement initiated by Fred Halliday and Justin 
Rosenberg. Halliday’s Rethinking International Relations (1994) and Revolution 
in World Politics (1998), at the same time criticized the “irrationality” of Ashley 
and others and established a new line of enquiry that would be later called by 
David Boucher “historical reason”.  
The third, and one of the most influential precursors of Constructivism, was 
Kratochwil’s reorientation of “game” to the Wittgensteinian direction in such 
articles as “The Embarrassment of Chang” (1993). Like Fierke who would later 
follow the same path, Kratochwil construed another conception of rationality in 
which “rules and norms are not simply the distillation of individual utility 
calculations but rather the antecedent conditions for strategies and for the 
specification of criteria of rationality”. For Kratochwil, “Reason is, then, 
concerned with the preconditions (or ‘transcedental’ conditions, we might say), 
of a ‘moral’ discourse, in which the effects of our actions on others can be 
assessed. 
Towards the end of 1990s, IR witnessed an explosion of various conceptions 
of rationality, all of which targeted the Neo-Neo theories as the principal 
opposite. Andrew Moravcsik, in his “Taking Preference Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics” (1997), retained utilitarian rationality as a crucial 
assumption but restructured the liberal theory atrophied by Neoliberalism into 
“a non-ideological and non-utopian form” that is “coequal with and more 
analytically more fundamental” than either Neorealism or Neoliberalism. 
Andrew Linklater, in his The Transformation of Political Community (1998), 
argued for “a rational morality with universal significance” to recover the Liberal 
Institutionalists’ program, and for a “higher rationality” against the reduction of 
“rational political action in international relations to technical consideration”. In 
his study on Political Theories of International Relations (1998), Boucher 
explored a tradition of what he named “historical reason”: it is a criterion of 
political conduct that is at once resistant to the ruthless pursuit of interest and 
299 
 
to the general postulate of moral principles, which needs to “be found in the 
historical process itself”. K.M. Fierke, in her Changing Games and Changing 
Strategies (1999), drew on Wittgenstein’s language game to show that IR 
theorists should envisage a rationality that is “a part of our grammar for 
operating in different types of social or political context”. It was the “rationality 
of moving towards a new game”. Finally, Christian Reus-Smit, in his The Moral 
Purpose of the States (1999), rejected the “deontological conception of 
institutional rationality”, and proposed instead “a historically informed 
constructivist theory”, an “embedded rationality” that conceptualizes states 
action as conditioned by a “rationality as a culturally and historically contingent 
form of consciousness”.  
  Now coming to the turn of 2000, the German Idealists such as Muller and 
Risse finally took the baton. The extreme resemblance between the “German 
Idealists” and “English Idealists” of which the former were unaware: both 
assume that reasoned dialogue and argumentation can make a huge difference 
in world politics. Rationality was defined as to “seek a reasoned consensus” 
where the agents “are themselves prepared to be persuaded”. “International 
politics consists predominantly of actions that take the form of language”, 
proclaimed Muller, “action [that] oriented to reaching understanding, or 
communicative action”. “Politics”, went on Muller, “must for the most part be 
produced through understanding via the medium of language”. “The goal of the 
discursive interaction is to achieve argumentative consensus with the other”, 
clarified Risse, “not to push through one’s own view of the world or moral 
values”. 
  These are the developments of the concept in Anglophone IR from 1919 to 
2009. 
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